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ABSTRACT

Symbols Purely Mechanical: Language, Modernity, and the Rise of the Algorithm, 1605-1862
by
Jeffrey M. Binder

Advisor: Alexander Schlutz

In recent decades, scholars in both Digital Humanities and Critical Media Studies have
encountered a disconnect between algorithms and what are typically thought of as “cultural”
concerns. In Digital Humanities, researchers employing algorithmic methods in the study of
literature have faced what Alan Liu has called a “meaning problem”—a difficulty in reconciling
computational results with traditional forms of interpretation. Conversely, in Critical Media
Studies, some thinkers have questioned the adequacy of interpretive methods as means of
understanding computational systems. This dissertation offers a historical account of how this
disconnect came into being by examining the attitudes toward algorithms that existed in the
three centuries prior to the development of the modern computer. Bringing together the
histories of semiotics, poetics, and mathematics, I show that the present divide between
algorithmic and interpretive methods results from a cluster of assumptions about historical
change that developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that implicates attempts
to give meaning to algorithms in the modern narrative of technological progress.
My account organizes the early-modern discourse on algorithms into three distinct
intellectual traditions that arose in subsequent periods. The first tradition, which reached its
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peak in the mid-seventeenth century, held that the correspondence between algorithm and
meaning was guaranteed by divine providence, making algorithms a potential basis for a nonarbitrary mode of representation that can apply to any field of knowledge, including poetics as
well as mathematics. A second tradition, most influential from the last decades of the
seventeenth century to around 1800, denied that the correspondence between algorithm and
meaning was pre-ordained and sought, instead, to create this correspondence by altering the
ways people think. Finally, starting in the Romantic period, algorithms and culture came to be
viewed as operating autonomously from one another, an intellectual turn that, I argue,
continues to inform the way people view algorithms in the present day.
By uncovering this history, this dissertation reveals some of the tacit assumptions that
underlie present debates about the interface between computation and culture. The reason
algorithms present humanists with a meaning problem, I argue, is that cultural and technical
considerations now stand in different relations to history: culture is seen as arising from
collective practices that lie beyond the control of any individual, whereas the technical details
of algorithms are treated as changeable at will. It is because of this compartmentalization, I
maintain, that the idea of progress plays such a persistent role in discussions of digital
technologies; similarly to the Modernist avant garde, computing machines have license to break
with established semantic conventions and thus to lead culture in new directions. As an
alternative to this technocratic arrangement, I call for two complementary practices: a
philology of algorithms that resituates them in history, and a poetic approach to computation
that embraces misalignments between algorithm and meaning.
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Introduction

/*
* If the new process paused because it was
* swapped out, set the stack level to the last call
* to savu(u_ssav). This means that the return
* which is executed immediately after the call to aretu
* actually returns from the last routine which did
* the savu.
*
* You are not expected to understand this.
*/
if(rp->p_flag&SSWAP) {
rp->p_flag =& ~SSWAP;
aretu(u.u_ssav);
}

—Lions’ Commentary on UNIX 6th Edition, with Source Code

Beyond Reading and Writing

In 1677, a British mathematician named John Peter published a short pamphlet titled Artificial
Versifying or, the School-Boy’s Recreation: A New Way to Make Latin Verses.1 In this pamphlet,
which went through four editions in the late 1670s and was reprinted in the eighteenth
century, Peter promises to show the reader how “to make almost Six hundred thousand
different Latine Verses” through what we would now recognize as an algorithm—a rule-based
procedure for selecting and copying letters from a set of nine “Versifying Tables” (2). Peter’s
“operation” involves picking single-digit numbers as starting points and then counting by nines
through each of the tables, which contain jumbled Latin words (Figure 1). The result, he
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promises, will be “true Latine and good Sense” (16). What is more,
the procedure can even be carried out “by he that cannot Write or
Read” (6). The system does indeed work. If one generates a
pentameter line with the starting digits 54321, the result is a
warning: “sordida prædicunt vina pudenda nova” (“wines foretell
sordid new shames”).
To a contemporary reader, Peter’s versifying system might
call to mind the algorithmic poetry of the Oulipo group, a French
collective that formed in the late twentieth century to explore the
relation of literature and mathematics. A particularly strong
parallel is Raymond Queneau’s 1961 book Cent mille milliards de
poèmes (A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems), which enables

Figure 1. Two of John Peter’s versifying
tables, 1679 ed. © British Library
Board, shelfmark 1568/3171, sig. A11v.
Image published with permission of
ProQuest. Further reproduction is
prohibited without permission.

readers to mix and match lines so as to produce more sonnets than one could read in millions
of lifetimes. As the American novelist John Barth put it, the algorithmic methods of the Oulipo
produce “a spooky simulacrum of sense”—texts that are close enough to ordinary language to
be interpretable, but eerily different from something a human being would write (93). But
Peter was living in a different world from the twentieth-century avant garde. He presents his
work not as an artistic provocation, but rather as an attempt to turn poetry into a simple
procedure that may be readily taught to others. In the preface, he offers his “artificial
versifying” system as a challenge to mathematicians, artisans, and musicians who “triumph over
the Latinist and the Poet” because their work can be reduced to a set of mechanical rules that
do not require intelligent thought (4). His goal in creating his versifying system, he tells us, is to
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show that the composition of poetry, too, can be made into a fully “artificial” process that even
“illiterate Artificers” may easily learn (4).
These arguments draw upon and perhaps, to some extent, parody an excitement about
algorithms that was widespread in seventeenth-century Europe due in part to recent
developments in mathematics. At the beginning of the pamphlet, Peter compares his system to
a special type of writing that would have seemed like an exciting new idea to many of his
readers: Hindu–Arabic numerals. Although we now learn the procedures of decimal arithmetic
in elementary school, they were far less familiar to Europeans at the time, and the fact that
people could perform these operations correctly without having to understand the principles
on which they were based—that even the illiterate could learn to work a sum—seemed a
marvel. Peter extols the benefits of such methods in his preface:
Commodious Advantages have arrived to Persons of divers Faculties, who though
they have been altogether ignorant of Arithmetick, and of all Literature, yet by
the benefit of Instrumental Operation, they have been capacitated to perform
such Conclusions, as their respective Faculties required, though thereof they
have not been able to give a better Reason, than that it is so, because it is so. (4)
Peter was only one of a number of seventeenth-century writers, including Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz and, in a more equivocal way, René Descartes, who considered the possibility of
extending the power of numerals to other domains beside the quantitative. If the mechanical
procedures of arithmetic could produce genuine knowledge about the world without requiring
thought—so the reasoning went—then why could one not come up with similar procedures for
use in morality, botany, or poetry? The result would be what Leibniz called a calculus
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ratiocinatur: a universal ratiocinative algorithm that would extend the perfectly mechanical
nature of arithmetic to all domains of knowledge.
By some accounts, this early-modern dream was finally fulfilled, three centuries later,
with the advent of the general-purpose computer. Starting in the 1980s, the word algorithm
went from an obscure technical term to a media buzzword as newspapers reported the
development of automated methods for solving a wide range of problems—finding the roots of
mathematical equations, “reading” people’s handwriting, recognizing objects in photographs—
that had previously been the exclusive province of human intelligence. By 2017, it was
commonplace both in the academy and the popular press to proclaim the present time “the
age of the algorithm.” For technologists of an optimistic stripe, the rise of the algorithm
supports a utopian vision of automation as a way of relieving human beings of labor and
opening new, seemingly limitless possibilities for science and technology. As Ed Finn puts it,
one of the dominant ideologies of the present day imagines computation as a “universal
solvent that can untangle any complex system, from human consciousness to the universe
itself” (8). The mechanical methods that were once, in Peter’s view, the exclusive boast of
mathematicians and musicians are coming to pervade more and more areas of human life.
But one aspect of the seventeenth-century dream is missing from the present discourse
about algorithms: extending absolute certainty to all fields of knowledge. Algorithms have fit
smoothly into engineering and scientific disciplines, where they provide a way to automate the
analysis of large amounts of quantitative data, but in disciplines that deal with interpretation,
and most notably, in literary studies, they have faced a significant degree of resistance. In a
2013 article, Alan Liu argues that literary scholars employing digital methods encounter a
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“meaning problem” due to the absence of a solid epistemological framework in which one can
“take a signal discovered by machine and develop an interpretation leading to a humanly
understandable concept” (414). Liu points out that even advocates of algorithmic methods of
literary study, such as the digital humanists Ryan Heuser and Long Le-Khac, display a selfconsciousness about the ability of such methods to analyze data “in meaningfully interpretable
ways” (quoted in Liu 411; emphasis Liu’s). Liu discerns a common perception that algorithmic
methods exist in a different sphere from disciplines that involve meaning, such as literary
hermeneutics. While digital humanists certainly do not all see the meaning problem as
intractable, the anxiety Liu diagnoses is widespread. A programmer can easily create
algorithms to transform and process textual data in all manner of ways, either for scholarly or
artistic purposes, but making those results mean something is another question.
Just as algorithms have faced heightened scrutiny in the humanities, interpretive
methods have run into problems when applied to the study of computer systems. In computer
science, it is standard to draw a distinction between the user interface of a system, which
conveys information in terms of culturally determined conventions, and the implementation,
meaning the logic beneath. The interface does not necessarily give the user a clear picture of
what is going on inside the machine and can indeed, as the human–computer interaction
theorist P. B. Andersen points out, be designed intentionally to mislead (26). A number of
media scholars, including Friedrich Kittler and Lori Emerson, have responded to the potentially
deceptive nature of computer interfaces with what might be called computational brutalism, an
imperative to lay bare the inner workings of computer systems rather than covering them up
with aesthetically pleasing surfaces. Kittler is especially vehement in his argument against the
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adequacy of interpretive methods for the study of technology. The graphical interfaces of
modern computers, he argues, “hide a whole machine from its users” (“There is No Software,”
n.p.); in his view, the only way to authentically understand a computer is to set aside questions
of meaning and delve instead into the microscopic details of the hardware, an endeavor that
typically involves the bracketing of aesthetics, affect, and interpretive play—in short, just those
aspects of language that are most valued in literary studies.
Underlying both Liu’s meaning problem and Kittler’s anti-hermeneutic stance is an
apparent disconnect between algorithms and what are typically thought of as “cultural”
concerns. This division falls out roughly along the lines of the “two cultures” of the sciences
and the humanities that C. P. Snow described in a well-known 1959 essay, and which is
manifest in a broad range of modern discourses (The Two Cultures). Critical discussions of
algorithms in the media often presume that the “cold” logic of computation is indifferent to
cultural differences and social nuances. While engineers certainly do recognize the importance
of cultural factors in the design of computer systems, their lingo carefully distinguishes such
“soft” considerations from “hard” technical ones, and some programmers have reported the
experience of disappearing into a realm of abstraction, the world of human life dropping from
view in favor of absolute focus on technical problems. The division is also manifest in artistic
uses of algorithms like those of the Oulipo, which often employ algorithms’ autonomy from
semiotic conventions as a way of disrupting the semantic order of language. While various
attempts have been made to blur the lines between scientific and humanistic fields, the division
between technical and cultural concerns is obdurate. Yet this division has not always been in
place. As the example of Artificial Versifying shows, algorithms themselves existed long before
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the modern division between culture and science, and, in some ways, people in earlier times
were more comfortable with their mechanical nature than we are at present.
This dissertation seeks to explain what happened in the centuries that intervene
between Peter’s time and the present that created this gap between technical and cultural
perspectives. To do so, I examine the attitudes toward algorithms that existed in the three
centuries prior to the development of the modern computer. While the topic of algorithms
now falls under the disciplinary purview of mathematics and computer science, understanding
how they came to exist in opposition to culture requires an approach that does not impose
modern disciplinary categories on the past. I thus bring together three histories that are not
often discussed in combination, although they overlap more than one might expect: the
histories of semiotics, poetics, and mathematics.2 Many of the most important developments
in the history of algorithms took place in Great Britain, but my account crosses national
boundaries, as it must to make sense of a network of discourses in which international
exchange was common. In studying these discourses, I have sought to consider epistemology,
as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison put it, “in shirtsleeves”—describing not just the theories
people developed, but also the ways in which those theories translated into practice
(Objectivity 52). Far from being matters of merely scholastic interest, the different ways people
have theorized algorithms supported distinct modes of social organization, education, and
political praxis, to understand which it is necessary to read epistemological texts within their
broader social context.
This study of the intellectual history of the algorithm sheds light on some of the tacit
assumptions underlying the present disconnect between computation and culture. My work
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rests on a variant of Max Weber’s thesis that modernity divided society into distinct value
spheres, such as those of science, ethics, and art, that operate autonomously from one
another.3 While C. P. Snow’s analysis of the divide between the sciences and the humanities
has been rightly criticized for its emphasis on superficial differences, I argue that a dualism
between science and culture does exist at a deeper level that cuts across disciplines.4 A wide
range of disciplinary practices, from engineering to poetics, distinguish the “technical” aspects
of their work from “cultural factors,” which are seen as developing in an organic fashion that
cannot be subject to intentional control. Although I see the disconnect between these two
perspectives as a problem, not least because it occludes the social consequences of the
computational processes that increasingly pervade modern life, my purpose in historicizing the
distinction between technical and cultural considerations is not to undermine it or to question
its legitimacy. Quite to the contrary, I contend that this distinction is deeply embedded in the
way modern technology works, and I am skeptical of the possibility of doing away with it. This
skepticism differentiates my position from Bruno Latour’s argument in We Have Never Been
Modern that the modern division of science from culture never took place (1-12), as well as
from Jürgen Habermas’s program of attempting to complete the “unfinished project” of the
Enlightenment by reuniting the value spheres with the praxis of everyday life.5 My goal in this
study is not to demolish the boundary between technical and cultural perspectives, but rather
to articulate this boundary’s function more clearly and to discern, perhaps, some ways in which
people might be able to bring these two perspectives together more productively.
My account organizes the early-modern discourse on algorithms into three distinct
intellectual traditions that arose in subsequent periods and that took very different attitudes
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toward the relation of mechanical processes to meaning. This tripartite scheme takes some
inspiration from Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things, although my account differs from his in
a number of important ways.6 The earliest tradition I discuss—the one that enabled John Peter
to imagine extending the methodology of arithmetic to the composition of Latin verse—
attributed the power of mathematical symbols primarily to the fact that they did not involve
the spoken vernacular. For adherents of this tradition, which I call the real character tradition,
algorithms provided a way to circumvent the uncertainty of ordinary language, establishing
meaning in a way that was not dependent on the collective practices of people and hence
absolutely certain. For this group of thinkers, which includes Leibniz, John Wilkins, and William
Oughtred, there is no meaning problem at all; algorithmic processes bear meaning simply by
virtue of the fact that they are purely mechanical processes, their intimate relation to the
structure of the universe being guaranteed by divine providence.
If this view of algorithms now seems implausible, it is largely on account of the success
of the second intellectual movement I discuss, a loosely affiliated cluster of projects I capture
under the rubric of Enlightenment theories of the sign. This tradition has some roots in the
work of René Descartes, but it began in earnest with the work of John Locke starting around
1690. Locke’s empiricist philosophy led to a greater recognition that meaning is constructed by
people and that even mathematical symbols can only refer to reality by virtue of the arbitrary
definitions existing in people’s heads.7 Yet the relation between algorithm and meaning was
not, for the Lockean tradition, one of autonomy. For Enlightenment mathematicians such as
Isaac Newton, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, and Nicolas de Condorcet, algorithms were founded on
meaning—they were supposed to follow from the application of universal principles of reason
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to clear and distinct ideas that had to be established ahead of time. Whereas the real character
tradition had presumed that a correspondence between algorithm and meaning was
guaranteed by the divine order, the Enlightenment tradition sought to create this
correspondence by altering the ways people think. The development of algorithms could not,
for this tradition, be separated from the Enlightenment project of remaking culture anew on
rational grounds.
The faith in such programs faltered in the nineteenth century, giving rise to a third set of
attitudes that are, for my purposes, modern. After the Romantic turn, meaning was widely
seen as emanating from, as Wilhelm von Humboldt put it in the 1830s, the “mental life of a
people”; the idea of replacing existing cultures with something more rational lost its appeal as it
became apparent that such a reform would constitute a violent shock to people’s ways of life.
As Raymond Williams has shown, it was in this period that the domain of culture came to be
seen as existing autonomously from other spheres of value (Culture and Society xvi). At almost
exactly the same time, mathematicians such as Martin Ohm, George Peacock, and George
Boole began to adopt algebraic methods that worked entirely through the algorithmic
manipulation of symbols without pre-determined meanings. My contention is that these
simultaneous developments were part of a single readjustment of the relation between
scientific standards of validity to the actualities of human thought. After Romanticism, the
longstanding goal of establishing a perfect correspondence between algorithm and meaning
gave way to a separation of the spheres, in which algorithmic systems can be altered at will to
suit the needs of the creator, whereas the construction of meaning must work with the
organically developing semiotic practices of people.
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This nineteenth-century intellectual turn, I maintain, set the terms in which people
continue to engage with algorithms in the present day. The dualism between process and
culture that emerged from Romanticism resonates not just in the practice of mathematics, but
also in social organization more broadly. Its effects are manifest, for instance, in the language
managerial workers use to discuss institutional change—the “culture” of the institution has an
“inertia,” leaving behind a “residue” of habits from former times that must be broken up to
enable the realization of new organizational structures. The assumption is that the algorithmic
aspects of institutional structures (databases, assessment criteria, methods of processing
paperwork) may be constructed arbitrarily to fit the institution’s aims, but that the human
aspects are less easily controlled and, in some cases at least, must be handled with delicacy.
The designers of computer interfaces operate within the same division between the
autonomous realms of the technical and the cultural when, for instance, they have to select a
name for a menu item that adequately describes the operation in terms that the users will be
able to understand. From a technical perspective, the names of software elements are
“arbitrary,” meaning that the developer can change them at will without affecting the logic of
the software, but from a usability perspective, they must be chosen with care. A user-interface
designer must consider these two perspectives together, balancing the affordances and
constraints of the software with the need to connect with the expectations and conceptual
resources of the people who will use it.
Such handwringing about “human factors” could not be further removed from the
concerns of John Peter in the 1670s. At the beginning of the pamphlet, Peter suggests that the
meaningfulness of the poems produced by his versifying system can be justified on the same
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grounds as the use of arithmetic. He explains the power of the numeral system in grandiose
terms:
As the Reason of Numbers (if we dare credit Solomon, Wisd. 11.20) was One of
the chiefest Rules, according to which God fram’d the World; so is it also none of
the meanest Instruments, by which he still upholds Its Fabrick: So that to set light
by the power of Numbers, is to undervalue the Wisdom of the Almighty, who
thereby first modulated the whole Creation; and still makes use of an Harmonical
Concent, and Physical Proportion to keep All in Tune. By which means also is the
Reciprocal Harmony maintained betwixt the Macrocosm, and the Microcosm (1)
This passage makes a variation of Galileo’s famous statement that God wrote the book of the
world in the language of mathematics; but Peter goes on to extend “the power of Numbers”
into what is now the realm of cultural production—to suggest that poetic composition can be
reduced to a rule-based procedure. This extension was plausible because Peter inhabited a
world that made no distinction between what we now think of as art and craft; both types of
practice were seen as subject to rules of correctness that were not arbitrary in the sense of
being subject to the mercurial will of the individual. If versification is based on eternal truths
just as much as mathematics is, then even the work of the poet can potentially be mechanized.
These different attitudes toward arbitrariness point to an important but often
overlooked thread in the intellectual history of algorithms. The major theoretical contribution
of this work is to show that the notion of arbitrariness in present-day discourse about
computation is based on a complex and often unacknowledged set of assumptions about the
nature of language that developed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The
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reason algorithms present humanists with a meaning problem, I argue, is that algorithmic and
semantic considerations now stand in different relations to history: meaning must be
developed in negotiation with the established practices of a community, whereas algorithms
can function—in a way that places them in a strange alliance with experimental poetry—as an
avant garde, capable of being constructed in novel ways that disrupt continuity. By making the
underpinnings of this arrangement explicit, I hope to reveal the political stakes of the present
divide between humanistic and technical practices. Specifically, I argue that, because the
production of meaning is required to answer to past practices in a way that algorithmic logic is
not, any claim to give meaning to an algorithm must rest on a judgment about the relation of
the past to the future. This need for a historiographic judgment is, I would like to suggest, one
reason why the narrative of progress recurs so persistently in discussions of technology. This
narrative is potentially reaching a crisis in the present moment, and a part of my purpose is to
suggest the possibility of a different way of relating meaning and algorithm that could bring
technical and humanistic perspectives together more fruitfully. But before I can elaborate on
this claim, it is necessary to consider in more detail how the present way of thinking about
algorithms and culture came to be.

The Power of “Instrumental Operation”

Beginning with definitions is not always the best approach for intellectual history, but in this
case a clear definition of algorithm is called for. Given the pervasive and often imprecise use of
the term in media discussions of technology, the danger of anachronism is significant. One
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potential definition of algorithm involves the use of recursion, which is a key element of
computer programming. The historian of mathematics Ivor Grattan-Guinness, for instance,
defines algorithmic thinking as the contemplation of “successive repetitions of a process or
maneuver, its reversal, its compounding with other processes, and/or its substitution into
itself” (“Charles Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 34). My concern here is less with the
details of how algorithms work than with how they relate to culture, for which purpose the
existence of recursion is only of secondary importance. I therefore use the word algorithm in
the much simpler sense in which the OED defines it: “A procedure or set of rules used in
calculation and problem-solving” (“algorithm, n. 2”). The computer scientist Donald E. Knuth,
whose multi-volume work The Art of Computer Programming is a standard reference source on
algorithms, defines the term in a similar, albeit somewhat broader, way.8 In addition to this
intellectual pedigree, the OED definition has the advantage of extending readily to practices
that are not usually thought of as mathematical. It covers John Peter’s poetry-generating
system; it covers some of the operations one might perform using a subject index or another
sort of lookup or filing system; and it covers much of what a modern computer can be
programmed to do without human intervention.9
It should be noted, however, that the definition I am using is not exactly the same as the
one that existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The word algorithm originated
as algorism, a word derived from the name of the Persian mathematician Muḥammad ibn Mūsā
al-Khwārizmī; the change from algorism to algorithm appears to have resulted from people
confusing the word with the etymologically unrelated logarithm. Al-Khwārizmī’s c. 820 book Alkitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī ḥisāb al-ğabr wa’l-muqābala (The Compendious Book on Calculation by
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Completion and Balancing) introduced algebra to Europe upon being translated into Latin in the
twelfth century; the word algebra is derived from al-ğabr in the book’s title.10 Until around
1800, the words algorism and algorithm referred specifically to the procedures of arithmetical
computation, such as long division. When Renaissance writers refer to “the art of algorism,”
they mean arithmetic. Nonetheless, I do contend that an idea much like the broader sense that
we now attach to the word algorithm was available in seventeenth-century Europe. In earlymodern texts, precisely defined logical procedures were sometimes referred to as “operations”
or “instrumental operations.” This is the phrase John Peter applies to his versifying method;
one of the nineteenth century’s most sophisticated thinkers about algorithms, Ada Lovelace,
used a similar vocabulary, referring to the study of algorithms as a “science of operations” (H. P.
Babbage 22). I have chosen to use the word algorithm instead of operation in spite of this slight
anachronism because the latter is used in too many other senses.
Many, although not all, of
the most important algorithms in
the lineage of the modern
computer share an additional
characteristic: they involve the
manipulation of written, printed,
or electronically or mechanically
represented characters.11 By
characters I mean any physical
marks that are organized into

Figure 2. Multiplication by pen. From the anonymous 1539 book An
introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen or with the counters
accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […]. Image courtesy of Bodleian
Library, shelfmark Tanner 55, sig. c7r. Image published with permission of
ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.
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recognizable types that may be manifested in multiple locations, such as 1, 0, and α. By
manipulation I mean a process that involves only recognizing and producing patterns in the
arrangements of these marks, not assigning meanings to them. A prominent example is the
procedure for multiplying two integers on paper (Figure 2). As John Peter points out, it is
possible to perform such a procedure without being literate—that is, without being able to
“read” the characters in the sense of understanding what they mean. The procedure only
involves examining the present arrangement of the digits and writing new ones down according
to rules that are strict enough as to leave only one possible way in which the procedure may
correctly play out, at least factoring out variations in penmanship. This lack of any room for
judgment makes algorithmic processes amenable to mechanization, as people have recognized
for many centuries. Yet it also raises epistemological questions that do not arise in literacy as it
is ordinarily conceived. Under what conditions (if any) can such a procedure produce
meaningful knowledge? What is the proper way to interpret the results of an algorithm? Can a
meaningless algorithm ever have a legitimate use? Advocates and critics of algorithmic
methods addressed these questions in very different ways over the past few centuries,
coinciding with broader changes in attitudes toward language, knowledge, and the nature of
intelligence.
Although it is not to my purpose to give a full account of the early history of algorithms,
it is worth beginning with a brief overview of how the original (that is, arithmetical) “art of
algorism” came to be known in Europe. Although it was introduced to Europe in the twelfth
century, Al-Khwārizmī’s art spread very slowly in the medieval and Renaissance periods. The
Italian mathematican Leonardo Bonacci, later known as Fibonacci, played an important role in
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promoting the new numeral system with his 1202 Liber Abaci (Book of Calculation). The
development of arithmetic and algebra accelerated in the sixteenth century with the
publication of such books as the anonymous An introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen
or with the counters accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […] (1539) and Gerolamo
Cardano’s The Great Art, or the Rules of Algebra (1545). At this point, it was largely merchants
and artisans who promoted these techniques; tainted by their association with commerce and
lacking a precedent in classical Greek thought, decimal arithmetic and algebra were not taught
in universities until the seventeenth century. In spite of
this low academic prestige, there was also considerable
excitement over “the art of algorism,” which provided a
seemingly miraculous way of answering questions about
the real world using nothing but a pen and paper or
slate and chalk. Using trigonometry, for instance, one
could determine the height of a steeple without
climbing it—an example of wizardry in the eyes of some
Renaissance observers. The power of mathematical
algorithms expanded in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries with the introduction of algebraic signs such
as +, −, ×, and =, which made it possible to turn not just
computation, but also the solving of equations into a
mechanical process of moving symbols around on paper
or slate.

Figure 3. A page from a 1618 edition of Napier’s
book of logarithm tables. Image courtesy of
Bodleian Library, shelfmark 8° S 71 Med., sig. F1v.
Image published with permission of ProQuest.
Further reproduction is prohibited without
permission.
tables (n.p.).
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The excitement over algorithms mounted further with John Napier’s introduction of the
logarithm table in his 1614 book Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio. While the
logarithm—the inverse of exponentiation—now stands as one mathematical operation among
many, it had a special purpose in the years before the invention of the calculator. Once they
are compiled into a table, as Napier did in his book, logarithms provide an easy shortcut for the
multiplication of large numbers (Figure 3). One simply had to look up the logarithms
corresponding to the two numbers, add them, and then reverse the lookup process. A strange
thing about this procedure, exciting or troubling depending on one’s epistemological
perspective, is that one did not need to understand why it worked in order to use it. Napier’s
system functioned by means of a purely mechanical process that was, apparently, able to
produce correct results regardless of the intelligence of the person undertaking it. Napier’s
invention was a possible inspiration for John Peter’s Artificial Versifying, which similarly
involved looking characters up in tables. Although the connection is not certain, it is worth
mentioning that Napier initially called logarithms “artificial numbers” (M. R. Williams, “Early
Calculation” 24). In both cases, artificial means something like “According to the principles of
an art or science; scientific, systematic” (OED, “artificial, n. 6”)—that is, governed by rules that
fully determine the proper way of proceeding. With the accelerating development of new
methods of computation and algebraic problem-solving, the domain of such artificiality seemed
to be expanding.
The mechanical nature of logarithms and other new methods of computation raised the
question of how these “artificial” methods gained their power—how, exactly, one could
produce genuine knowledge about the world by moving characters around without
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understanding what those characters mean. One such explanation that was popular in the
seventeenth century, which I detail in Chapter 1, rested on the idea of a real character. In his
book The Advancement of Learning (1605-23), Francis Bacon defined a real character as a
writing system that signifies things directly, rather than (as alphabetical writing systems were
believed to do) signifying the pronunciations of words. This notion, which Bacon derived from
Scholastic philosophy, covered mathematical and musical notation systems, alchemical
symbols, and the Chinese writing system: all forms of written representation that functioned
non-phonetically and thus were not, in Bacon’s term, “parasitic” upon spoken languages. Real
characters, as Bacon points out, were comprehensible to people who spoke radically different
vernaculars; he thus suggests, albeit ambiguously, that these characters possessed the ability to
circumvent the uncertainty of verbal communication. To Bacon’s early readers, the success of
calculating methods like Napier’s logarithms seemed to prove that the superiority of real
characters to spoken language was no chimera. Followers of this line of thought attributed the
power of mathematical notations primarily to their apparent independence from the languages
people spoke from day to day and granted them a special relation to the natures of things.
Since this rationale for the use of algorithms had nothing specifically to do with
mathematics, it raised the possibility of extending the power of numerals to other domains. In
a 1629 letter to Marin Mersenne, René Descartes asserts the possibility of a numeral-like
character that could represent anything whatsoever: “In a single day, one can learn to name
every one of the infinite series of numbers, and thus to write infinitely many words in an
unknown language. The same could be done for all other words necessary to express all the
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other things which fall within
the purview of the human
mind” (quoted by Slaughter
127). While Descartes was
skeptical that this goal could
actually be achieved, others

Figure 4. The Apostles’ Creed written in John Wilkins's real character—a mode of
communication that was supposed to avoid the uncertainty of language because it
worked entirely through non-phonetic symbols (Essay 404).

were more optimistic, and a number of prominent thinkers actually attempted to create real
characters that could represent everything as unambiguously as numerals represented
quantities. The most fully developed attempt to create such a character was undertaken by
John Wilkins, an English clergyman whose 1668 book An Essay towards a Real Character and a
Philosophical Language presents a provisional attempt at a written notation that could
unambiguously represent anything one might conceivably have occasion to write about, a
project that was supposed to mend sectarian rifts and alleviate the political discord of
seventeenth-century England (Figure 4).
While Wilkins and his collaborators deserve credit for creating the most fully realized
real character scheme of the seventeenth century, the project with the most enduring influence
was that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In a wide array of texts written between 1666 and his
death in 1716, Leibniz considered the possibility of a universal notation system that would
enable any dispute to be resolved by means of an algorithmic process as certain as solving an
equation. One description of this calculus ratiocinatur is particularly famous: “The only way to
rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we
can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say:
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Let us calculate, without further ado, in order to see who is right” (Selections 51). While
Leibniz’s attempts to create such a system are often held up as a precursor to computer
science, I show in Chapter 1 that his work placed algorithm and meaning in a very different
relation from the one that now obtains.12 Rather than separating the algorithmic aspects of his
system from those that involved meaning, Leibniz’s work was founded on a faith that the
harmony between the two realms, algorithm and meaning, would ultimately enable the
creation of a symbolic system that represented all things in a non-arbitrary way. This notion of
universal harmony could provide a rationale for the use of mechanical processes of symbol
manipulation in any area of knowledge, even, as the example of Peter’s pamphlet shows,
writing poetry. For this tradition, reducing processes to algorithms—making them, in Peter’s
term, “artificial”—was an end in itself.

The Enlightenment Reasoning Machine

In its most extreme forms, the real character tradition inspired a degree of trust in algorithms
that was amenable to parody. If there is some undercurrent of satire in John Peter’s Artificial
Versifying, it comes to the surface in The Spectator for November 12, 1711, which includes a
description of the pamphlet written by the English poet John Hughes. Like “a kind of Poetical
Logarithms,” Hughes reports, Peter’s system reduces the composition of poems to a rule-based
procedure, enabling people to generate grammatically correct verses even if they do not
understand Latin (2.56). Hughes goes on to suggest that this process can channel meaning
from an unknown source:
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A Friend of mine, who is a Student in Astrology, meeting with this Book,
performed the Operation, by the Rules there set down; he shewed his Verses to
the next of his Acquaintance, who happened to understand Latin; and being
informed they described a Tempest of Wind, very luckily prefixed them, together
with a Translation, to an Almanack he was just then printing, and was supposed
to have foretold the last great Storm. (2.56)
Whether or not it was intentional, the reference to almanacs is apropos: in 1678, John Peter
himself had published an almanac titled The Astral Gazette. Just as in Artificial Versifying, Peter
presents his almanac as a means of making knowledge accessible to those who do not
understand the principles behind it; in the same way that “every one that is capable of being
relieved by Physick [i.e. medicine], is not therefore fit to be a Practitioner in that Art,” he writes,
the beneficiaries of astrology cannot all be expected to understand how it works (n.p.). At the
end of the introduction, he presents procedures for finding the North Star and the Meridian
that even “the most unskilful” can undertake (n.p.). While these procedures are presumably
more likely to work correctly than his verifying system is to predict the weather, there is little to
distinguish the two from a user’s perspective—in both cases, one must trust that a rule-based
process founded on unknown principles will produce the desired result. For Hughes, the fact
that one could use these methods without needing to understand them renders the whole
endeavor questionable. Taking the idea to its logical conclusion, he ends by suggesting the
construction of “a Mill to make Verses,” which would enable all people to become “Wits”
(2.56). Since a person using such a machine would not genuinely know what he or she is doing,
Hughes suggests, the idea that the results could have any meaning is laughable.
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By 1711, when Hughes wrote his letter to The Spectator, such skepticism was winning
out. In his letter to The Spectator, Hughes frames Peter’s versifying system as an example of
what Joseph Addison had, in an earlier issue of The Spectator, called “false Wit” (Spectator
2.55; 1.232-38). Addison’s essay attacks a cluster of practices that masquerade, in his view, as
wit without requiring genuine thought. A common trait among most of these examples is that
they deal with characteristics of signifiers rather than with the meanings of signs. True wit,
Addison writes, deals with the “Resemblance and Congruity of Ideas” (1.233); false wit deals
with “Resemblance and Congruity sometimes of single Letters, as in Anagrams, Chronograms,
Lipograms, and Acrosticks: Sometimes of Syllables, as in Ecchoes and Doggerel Rhymes:
Sometimes of Words, as in Punns and Quibbles; and sometimes of whole Sentences or Poems,
cast into the figures of Eggs, Axes, or Altars” (1.233). With the arguable exception of puns and
quibbles, this condemnation of wordplay and shape poetry (which had been popularized a
century before by George Herbert) targets precisely those linguistic practices that are easiest to
reduce to algorithms—practices that only involve the ability to recognize patterns in the
characters on a page, not the ability to interpret them. From Addison’s perspective, these
patterns fall short of the poetic; true poetry must stem from human thought, and, since it does
not involve thought, an “artificial” system like Peter’s can only ever hope to produce doggerel.
Addison’s attack on wordplay signals a shift in epistemological standards that redirected
the emphasis from signifiers, be they real characters or words, to ideas existing in the human
mind. Addison sums up his argument with the epigram, which he attributes to the French
essayist Dominique Bonhours, that “no Thought can be valuable, of which good Sense is not the
Ground-work” (1.236). But more than Bonhours, the pivotal figure for Addison’s essay is John
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Locke (see Spectator 1.232). In his 1689 book Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke
had famously asserted that all knowledge derives from sensory observations rather than from
innate principles. A major part of Locke’s empiricist philosophy is an emphasis on the
importance of language for thought. Words, Locke argued, do not refer directly to things, but
rather to what he called nominal essences—arbitrarily constructed bundles of qualities like
smooth red sphere. As Hans Aarsleff has shown, Locke’s argument about nominal essences was
directed against seventeenth-century theories of language that sought to establish a natural
correspondence between signifier and signified (From Locke to Saussure 26). This argument
inaugurated the cluster of intellectual traditions that I call Enlightenment theories of the sign.
In these new epistemologies, the claim that real characters could represent the world nonarbitrarily, as Wilkins and Leibniz had maintained, is inadmissible; the only way to combat the
uncertainty of words is simply to define them more clearly.
Enlightenment thought’s emphasis on conceptual clarity placed algorithmic methods
under a greater degree of skepticism than they had faced in the seventeenth century. This
decreased trust in algorithms was not specific to the followers of Locke, but rather spread
widely in the early eighteenth century. Jonathan Swift satirized real character schemes in
Gulliver’s Travels (1726), which depicts the scientifically-minded Laputans attempting to glean
meaning from a screen that generates random strings of characters (154-56). The Cartesian
tradition, which predominated in France, cast suspicion on Leibniz’s use of symbolic methods in
mathematics by emphasizing the importance of “clear and distinct” perceptions to rationality.
Some forms of idealist philosophy also precluded the instrumental use of algorithms. The
eighteenth century’s most notorious attack on algorithmic methods appears in George
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Berkeley’s 1734 screed against the Newtonian calculus, The Analyst. The fact that Newton’s
procedure for integration produced verifiably correct results was not, for Berkeley, enough to
make it scientific. Berkeley asks, in the series of questions with which he ends the pamphlet,
“Whether there be not a way of arriving at Truth, although the Principles are not scientific, nor
the Reasoning just? And whether such a way ought to be called a Knack or a Science?” (85). In
Berkeley’s judgment, the calculus was a “knack” rather than a science because it only provided
procedures for solving problems, without (in Berkeley’s view) founding those procedures on
clear principles. While Berkeley’s arguments about the calculus were controversial, they rested
on an assumption that was widespread in the eighteenth century: that only knowledge derived
from some combination of sensory data and self-evident principles could count as scientific.
Algorithms were widely seen as falling short of this standard.
In spite of these attacks from both empiricist and idealist quarters, algorithms
themselves certainly did not die out in the eighteenth century. The period’s most enthusiastic
advocate of algorithmic methods was also one of its greatest mathematicians, the Swiss-born
Leonhard Euler, whose most productive period stretched from the 1730s to the 1780s. Euler
was more comfortable with algorithms than many others in his time, and he used them to
produce important results that could not be attained otherwise. No admirer of Leibniz’s
rationalist metaphysics, Euler attempted (similarly to Isaac Newton) to derive his algorithmic
methods from the natures of physical things (see Calinger 67-68; 249-52). However, he was not
always able to ground his methods in principles upon which all could agree. One of his
innovations was to develop a method for determining the sums of infinite series that never
converge on any value, such as 1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + 1 − 1 + ⋯ This method enabled him to

26

propose solutions to some longstanding problems, but only at the cost of abandoning the usual
definition of the word sum (see Varadarajan 526-28). Since he was working in a context that
required mathematics to be founded on clear concepts, he had to convince others that his new
definition was worth adopting—a problem that was political as much as it was mathematical.
Similar issues faced attempts to resolve questions surrounding the natures of negative and
imaginary numbers, which spawned endless debates in the eighteenth century about how such
problematic mathematical entities ought to be defined. A major point of disagreement in these
debates was to what extent mathematical thought had to remain continuous with the concepts
embedded in everyday language—whether mathematicians could define sum however they
wanted, or whether they had to work in some way with the word’s existing usage. The status
of algorithms hinged, in other words, on how much respect one thought it was necessary to
have for the linguistic practices that were already established in one’s community.
By the later decades of Euler’s career, the Lockean tradition had splintered into multiple
factions that took very different views on this matter. This splintering set the stage for the
emergence of the modern divide between algorithm and culture, but it also, as I show in
Chapters 2 and 3, produced a number of projects that point in very different directions from
the one actually taken by modern computation. Two of the most important factions may be
exemplified by the French philosopher and educator Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and the
German philosopher and poet Johann Gottfried Herder. Condillac’s faction, which was the
most strongly established in France and England, evinced a view of language that Tristram
Wolff has usefully called voluntarism—the belief that, since the meanings of words are
arbitrary, one may alter the language existing in one’s own mind at will (259). Linguistic
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voluntarism usually coincided with the goal of replacing the putatively unclear languages that
people presently spoke with something better. Between 1746 and his death in 1780, Condillac
argued for the dependence of scientific progress on what he called a “well-formed language”—
a language in which each word refers to a clearly defined concept that can be traced back to
simple sensory impressions. The exemplary well-formed language, at least in Condillac’s later
work, was algebra, since, in his view, it could represent the world in a way that left no room for
disagreement or confusion. Condillac and his sympathizers advocated remaking language from
the ground up, eliminating old “prejudices” and “errors” by throwing out the received
meanings of words in favor of new ones developed in a clear, methodical fashion.
While Condillac himself was no political radical, the ultimate conclusion of this thinking
was that society ought to be reshaped into a more rational form. Condillac’s empiricist theory
of language led, as the philosopher Joseph Marie de Gérando put it in 1799, to the “seductive
hope” (l’espérance séduisante) that reforming language would eliminate political discord (1.xxi).
It is no coincidence that this intellectual strain reached its crescendo in the years following the
1789 French Revolution. At their most radical, Enlightenment theories of the sign inspired
dreams of replacing natural languages altogether with something more like algebraic notation,
a dream that Nicolas de Condorcet articulated in his book Sketch for a Historical Picture of the
Progress of the Human Mind (written 1794, published 1795) and actually attempted in a
manuscript that was published in the twentieth century. While Condorcet’s universal language
scheme has some resemblance to Leibniz’s idea of a calculus ratiocinatur, I demonstrate in
Chapter 2 that Condorcet was working within a radically different epistemology from that of
Leibniz. The difference might be summed up in terms of divergent attitudes toward progress.
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Leibniz evinced the sort of optimism that Voltaire had satirized in Candide—the belief that the
world was already and would always be the best that it could be. Enlightenment theories of the
sign, by contrast, suggested that one had to work to make the world better, in particular by
training people to think in terms of more clearly defined concepts.
I find a particularly strong illustration of the implications of this thinking for computation
in Condorcet’s more obscure ally, the English inventor Lord Stanhope, whom I discuss in
Chapter 3. Some time around 1801, Stanhope began working on a series of devices that he
called the Demonstrators, and that were characterized by a contemporary commentator as
steps toward a “reasoning-machine” (Phillips 106). The Demonstrators are devices that can
perform syllogistic inferences mechanically through the interaction of overlapping plates. In yet
another iteration of the dream of doing away with words, the Demonstrator enables people to
perform logical inferences using a “symbol purely mechanical,” which will supposedly prevent
interpretive confusion (quoted by Wess 385). Unlike a modern computer, these devices are not
just meant to produce the answers to questions, but also to display the whole chains of
reasoning that lead to those answers and thus, in true Enlightenment fashion, to “strengthen
the human mind” (quoted by Wess 381). The projects of Condorcet and Lord Stanhope
demonstrate that Enlightenment theories of the sign did not position algorithms as a way
around the uncertainty of language, but rather treated them as dependent on the clarity of
definitions. Reducing all forms of reasoning to a mechanical process required, for Condorcet
and Stanhope alike, a revolutionary educational program of implanting the same perfectly
unambiguous ideas into every individual’s mind.
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These revolutionary projects exemplify the best and worst aspects of what Jonathan
Israel has called the “Radical Enlightenment” (xi). Both Condorcet and Stanhope were
committed to producing a democratic and equitable public sphere, but their approaches to
creating this equity depended on universalist notions of rationality, without which their
projects were simply imposing arbitrary ways of thought onto people—in effect, turning people
into machines. Starting in the 1760s, Herder put forth a sophisticated critique of such linguistic
reform projects. For Herder, as I show in Chapter 3, recreating language from scratch was both
an impossible goal (“You cannot determine them all, philological philosopher!”) and a foolish
one (Philosophical Writings 36); for Herder, languages are not just repositories of old errors, but
also treasuries of knowledge that define the lifeworlds of communities. Languages, Herder
suggests, have the ability to resist intentional efforts to alter them; a community may accept a
proposed reform, but it may also reject it for reasons that are difficult to fathom. Herder’s
involuntarist philosophy gave an important role to poetry as a means of improving a language,
since a poet could speak to the involuntary urges of a people and sway them to the use of new
words and expressions. In the Herderian view, one had no choice but to work with the
language and culture that are already established in one’s community; to suppose that one
could entirely expunge the influence of existing words from one’s way of thinking, as some of
Condillac’s followers had attempted to do, was to overlook the critical role that membership in
a group plays in the development of human consciousness.
Herder’s critique reveals a major weakness in the way Enlightenment theories of the
sign dealt with algorithms: since clear mental representations were the gold standard to which
all epistemic claims were held, all forms of ratiocination, including the algorithmic, were
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dependent on the reliability of the concepts on which they were based. If the ways people
think are (as Herder argued) inevitably conditioned by culture, then mechanical methods of
computation would have no universal validity; without a grounding in an intersubjective field of
experience upon which everyone could agree, a “reasoning machine” like Stanhope’s could do
nothing but report back the logical consequences of the ideas already embedded in the user’s
language. Because of this dependence on intersubjectivity, algorithmic methods were largely
limited, in the later eighteenth century, to working upon notions such as quantity, space, and
time that could plausibly be posited as self-evident. Projects that aimed to extend the use of
algorithms beyond this narrow scope, such as Stanhope’s logic machine, could only do so on
the basis of strong—and, as Herder would point out, questionable—assumptions about the
universality of reason. Where agreement could not be established, algorithms could not
venture.

From a “Knack” to a Science

What changed to free algorithms from their dependence on ideas? The critical turning point
was, I contend, a shift, starting around 1800, away from the universalizing reform projects of
the Enlightenment toward the establishment of culture and science as autonomous value
spheres. For Enlightenment thinkers such as d’Alembert and Condorcet, the goal of philosophy
was, in essence, to replace culture, to remake the way people understand the world from the
ground up and altogether expunge the old, “vulgar” ways of thinking that people had inherited
from the past. In the nineteenth century, this revolutionary vision gave way to the image of
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culture and science as two separate realms, each of which was valuable in its own way and both
of which were needed to form a healthy society. The unravelling of Enlightenment
epistemologies led, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to the development of new
standards of scientific rigor that attempted to make culture and science work together
productively, the former providing intuitions and meaning, the latter providing rigor. This
epistemological shift—which was, I argue, a product of the Romantic turn in European
culture—created a new space in which algorithms could operate autonomously from the
meanings of the symbols upon which they worked. Now, for the first time, mathematicians
could put algorithm before meaning, experimenting with new ways of manipulating characters
and working out what they meant afterwards.
In Chapter 4, I offer an account of how the modern dualism between science and
culture came to be. While I contend that this dualism did not congeal until the nineteenth
century, it did have some precedents in the eighteenth. An important reference point for
modern notions of disciplinarity is Adam Smith’s exposition of the division of labor in The
Wealth of Nations (1776), which encouraged learned disciplines such as logic and philology to
delineate their boundaries more rigorously. Another eighteenth-century tributary is the critical
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant attempts to describe the
limits of what thought alone may accomplish by means of a series of binary oppositions:
subjective and objective, understanding and reason, concept and idea. While Kant himself was
very much an Enlightenment thinker, his influence was greatest among Romantics, who
transformed (and arguably distorted) Kantian idealism into a rationale for dualistic visions of
both scientific knowledge and artistic production that emphasized the interplay between
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subjective and objective perspectives.13 These dualisms were especially appealing in the wake
of the Terror and the rise of Napoleon, since they seemed to provide a middle ground between
the potential for the advancement of knowledge to change the world and the desire to
maintain some degree of continuity in people’s ways of life.
In regard to the use of algorithms, a key advantage of this new culture–science dualism
was that it provided a way of separating those aspects of knowledge-making activities that
could be subject to intentional design from those that could not. In Culture and Society,
Raymond Williams points out that, even though some nineteenth-century writers defined
culture as “a whole way of life,” the notion did not cover all aspects of British life, excluding
areas such as industry, finance, and sometimes science (234; 256). One point of distinction
between culture and these other domains is a rejection of standardization. Modernity treats
culture, as Williams puts it, as “unplannable” (335); as James Abbott McNeill Whistler
complains in an 1878 pamphlet, “Art is joyously received as a matter of opinion; and that it
should be based upon laws as rigid and defined as those of the known sciences, is a supposition
no longer to be tolerated by modern cultivation” (Whistler vs. Ruskin 14). While Williams’s
history of the idea of culture focuses narrowly on a tradition of social criticism that presented
itself as an opposition party to industrialism, I argue that the emergence of culture as an
“unplannable” domain had an effect on scientific practices as well. Specifically, the distinction
between technical and cultural perspectives enabled scientists to subject specialized sign
systems such as chemical nomenclature and symbolic algebra to strict, intentionally designed
rules while allowing other aspects of their practice—those that involve the messy actualities of
human thought and life—to develop freely of such regulation.
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An important early articulation of this dualism appears in the work of William
Wordsworth. In the 1802 version of his preface to the collection Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth
positions poetry as a mediating agent in the process by which scientific knowledge becomes a
part of the familiar lifeworld of people. “If,” Wordsworth writes, “the time should ever come
when what is now called science […] shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and
blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the Being
thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man” (168n). Poetry,
Wordsworth argued, could do something the technical terminologies of science could not
readily do—appeal to feelings—and accordingly was a potentially much more effective
instrument than a well-formed technical language for introducing scientific knowledge into the
everyday lifeworld of a people. While some scholars have taken Wordsworth’s preface as an
attempt to establish poetry as an intellectual discipline on the level of physics and philosophy
(Siskin 170; Valenza 146), this framing underrates the extent to which Wordsworth viewed the
poetic as a general aspect of language, rather than a specific genre of writing. I show in
Chapter 4 that Wordsworth was advancing the view that all forms of knowledge, including the
mathematical, must necessarily have a poetic element, a view that would later find an echo in
Ada Lovelace’s famous call for a “poetical science” (Ada 10).
Although it was not exactly Wordsworth’s intention, this fixation on balance eventually
resulted in the establishment of culture and science as autonomous realms. In England, this
autonomy was codified in the second quarter of the nineteenth century by epistemologists
such as Richard Whately, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill, who all treated the specialized
notations of mathematics and logic in drastically different ways from natural languages. British
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social critics, from Edmund Burke to Thomas Carlyle to Matthew Arnold, further reinforced the
belief that mechanical models of rationality were anathema to the development of what would,
by Arnold’s time, be referred to as culture. Later in the century, the dualism between science
and culture was manifest in the way language standardization set its limits: the meanings of
technical terms could be rigorously standardized by organizations like the International Bureau
of Weights and Measures (founded 1875), but standardization only extended to those aspects
of artistic and poetic practice that could be considered technical, such as meter.14 In
universities, the new dualism between science and culture also informed the model of
academic disciplinarity that Wilhelm von Humboldt put into practice with the founding of the
University of Berlin in 1810, and which was adopted internationally in the last decades of the
nineteenth century. All of these disciplinary shifts carried a single message: cultural concerns—
what later would be referred to as “human factors”—required a connection to the existing
practices of a community, whereas technical ones were subject only to the judgments of
experts.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I explore some of the ways in which this historical frame can
illuminate two of the early nineteenth century’s most important figures in the history of
computation: George Boole and Charles Babbage. I begin with Boole, who, in the late 1840s,
developed the binary logic system that would eventually be used, in slightly modified form, in
all digital electronics, including computers. Like Leibniz and Condorcet before him, Boole was
attempting to compensate for the uncertainties of ordinary language by extending the scope of
algebra beyond the quantitative. But Boole differed from these predecessors in rigidly
separating the logical aspects of his system from questions of meaning. Leibniz and Condorcet
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had both intended for their universal algebras to include encyclopedic catalogues of things,
making them complete, self-sufficient replacements for natural languages. Boole’s system, by
contrast, dealt only with formal relations of symbols, excluding questions of meaning from the
scope of logic. Unlike Condorcet’s revolutionary project, Boole’s system was not meant to
replace culture altogether with a new way of thinking about and discussing the world; instead,
Boole envisioned a system that could work together with existing bodies of knowledge, formal
logic providing algorithms for reasoning rigorously, culture providing the meaning.
In addition to demonstrating the importance of the culture–science divide for the
emergence of modern computation, Boole’s work offers a strong illustration of the connection
between algorithms and poetry. Around the same time that he was developing his logic
system, Boole wrote hundreds of poems in a style influenced by Dante, Milton, and
Wordsworth, and he reportedly claimed that a poetic sensibility was essential to a
mathematician’s success. In his most important work on logic, An Investigation of the Laws of
Thought (1854), he draws on examples from Milton to show how a text can maintain a logical
structure even as it violates the grammatical rules of a language. Boole’s system places logical
notations in an analogous position to experimental poetry in that both practices operate
autonomously from the rules that govern ordinary language. This “lawful freedom” provided
Boole with a means of developing strict standards of rigor without having to ground logic, as
Condillac attempted to do, in a notion of universal grammar (30).
Although the disciplinary divide between logic and ordinary language enabled Boole to
avoid some of the problems that had hindered the schemes of Leibniz and Condorcet, it also
opened its own set of difficulties. One of the distinctive characteristics of Boole’s logical system
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is that its algorithms can produce “uninterpretable” expressions—strings of characters that
have no conceptual meaning within the domain of knowledge to which the logical system is
being applied. Since the rules for interpreting logical symbols work differently from the rules
for manipulating them—the one based on propositional logic, the other based on the
algorithmic symbol manipulations of algebra—the possibility arises of a disconnect between
the way the logic system works and what the user thinks the symbols mean. This “failure of
correspondency between process and interpretation,” as Boole calls it (Laws of Thought 67),
might be viewed as an early instance of Liu’s meaning problem. Boole was among the first to
discover the possibility that algorithms, once given their autonomy from human thought, could
produce results that people could not understand.
Boole himself was too optimistic a thinker to find the existence of “uninterpretable”
expressions particularly troubling, but a more anxious reaction to the gap between algorithm
and meaning appears in the writings of Charles Babbage. Babbage became internationally
famous in the 1820s and 30s for designing sophisticated computing machines known as
difference engines and was celebrated, after his rediscovery in the twentieth century, for
exploring the possibilities of general-purpose computation in his correspondence with Ada
Lovelace. In some ways, Babbage and Lovelace granted less power to algorithms than Boole
did; Lovelace denied that logic could be mechanized, whereas Boole showed decisively that it
could. But unlike Boole, Babbage built computing machines, which gave him a direct sense of
the possibility that an algorithmic process could escape its creator’s control. While undertaking
some of his earliest experiments with difference engines, I show in Chapter 6, Babbage
discovered the possibility that an algorithm could produce results that are, as he puts it,
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“beyond the utmost reach of mathematical analysis” (Bridgewater 42). Babbage’s evident
discomfort with this possibility, I argue, stems from a tension between the realities of
mechanization and the Enlightenment epistemology to which he adhered. The employment of
algorithms that were not backed up by clear ideas threatened to introduce an inscrutable
element into the production of knowledge, a possibility that would, if realized, deal a fatal blow
to the Enlightenment dream of grounding scientific knowledge in the human understanding.
The early nineteenth century’s most unflinching treatment of these implications
appears, I argue, in the works of one of Babbage’s most complex interlocutors: Edgar Allan Poe.
In a series of newspaper texts in which he both debunked and perpetrated hoaxes, Poe
grappled with the fact that, given the broadening gap between science and the common-sense
view of the world, empirical methods—that is, ones that work solely through the analysis of
sensory data—were inadequate to tell real from fake. In his detective fiction, Poe presents an
alternative model of rationality that combines mathematical knowledge with a poetic
sensibility. The idea of the poetic that Poe was advocating, I argue, involved an embrace of the
algorithmic aspects of language—a devaluation of meaning in favor of patterns in the
arrangement of characters on the page and sound waves in the air, which Poe used to convey
the existence of “ethereal” realms detached from the mundane reality of life. One place where
Poe articulates this view is the 1845 dialogue “The Power of Words.” As I demonstrate in
Chapter 6, this text is likely based on ideas drawn from Babbage’s writings, but it takes these
ideas in precisely the direction that Babbage seemed unwilling to go. The power of words, Poe
suggests, has nothing to do with what people think they mean—instead, it is based solely on
the physicality of vibrating air molecules. For Poe, placing too much emphasis on meaning
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made one a dupe, since semantic conventions could never fully account for the effects that
signs can have on the world. To avoid being deceived, one must take signifiers for what they
are, material things moving around according to physical laws.
Poe’s poetic emphasis on signifier over signified indicates that attitudes toward signs
had, to some extent, come full circle between the time of John Peter and the nineteenth
century.15 Whereas Addison had attacked wordplay as “false Wit” in his 1711 essay, requiring
genuine poetry to be founded on clear ideas and “good Sense,” Poe suggests that the essence
of poetry is its very lack of sense—poetry is language that draws attention to itself rather than
referring to the world. This signifier-oriented poetics, which has roots in Wordsworth and Percy
Shelley, and which would be further developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries by Stéphane Mallarmé, Guillaume Apollinaire, and others, marked something of a
return to the seventeenth-century attitudes that Locke had criticized—a return to the elevation
of form over clear mental representations, a return to the belief that signs could do things in
the world independently of the semantic conventions of people. An analogous shift from ideas
to signifiers occurred around the same time in mathematics and logic, where the symbolic
methods developed by Boole and others seemed to prove that characters really could have a
power that had nothing to do with meaning. The philosophy of Leibniz, too, experienced
something of a revival in the nineteenth century, cresting with the publication of a two-volume
collection of his writings on logic in 1840. By the 1890s, when symbolic logic took off as a
discipline, the early-modern dream of a calculus ratiocinatur, a mechanical method that could
produce genuine knowledge through the mechanical manipulation of symbols, had gained a
new life.
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But such methods had taken on an uncanny, otherworldly quality that they did not have
in the seventeenth century. While formal rules could provide mathematics with rigor, there
could be no guarantee, from a nineteenth-century perspective, that the structures they
produced would harmonize with the ways people ordinarily understood the world. The
alienation of formal structures from historically transmitted modes of representation is, I argue,
a distinctive characteristic of modernity in both mathematics and poetry. Modernity in the
artistic sense, which is typically considered to begin around the middle of the nineteenth
century, is especially relevant here. It was one of Poe’s most ardent admirers, Charles
Baudelaire, who coined the word modernity (modernité) in his 1863 essay “The Painter of
Modern Life.” Baudelaire’s notion of modernity is drawn in contrast to artists who paint figures
in the costumes of previous periods, taking their inspiration from artistic traditions rather than
from the observation of the world. Modernity, he writes, is “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the
contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable” (13). As Foucault
has pointed out, Baudelaire’s notion of modernity, like Kant’s notion of Enlightenment, involved
a break from the past (Foucault Reader 39). But unlike Kant’s all-encompassing vision of
liberation from the dogmas of old, Baudelaire’s discontinuity is specific to the autonomous
realm of art, where it is set off in subtle chiaroscuro from a continuous background of human
history. Although technical fields differ from art in being more thoroughly subject to
standardization, the two realms are analogous in regard to this negative relation to the past.16
In both engineering and the artistic avant garde, one has license to break with the conventions
established in the culture at large and experiment with new forms; but this license to invent
came at the cost of creating a rift between the vanguard and ordinary language, which has
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been understood, since the mid-nineteenth century, to be characterized by organic and
continuous development. In contrast to the Enlightenment dream of an absolute break from
the superstitious past, modernity as it has existed since the nineteenth century takes the form
of a compromise between continuity, which is respectfully maintained in the language and
culture of everyday life, and discontinuity, which is permitted if not altogether encouraged in
science, technology, and the avant garde.
One of my purposes in this dissertation is to show that the algorithm could not have
taken the central position it now holds in the production of knowledge without this
compromise. The separation of the technical and cultural perspectives, the following chapters
argue, arose partly in reaction to the failure of Enlightenment epistemologies to devise a
philosophically and politically plausible means of uniting scientific rationality with the
actualities of human thought. The autonomy of the spheres enabled two of the great factions
that had clashed in the eighteenth-century debates over language—the followers of Condillac,
who advocated remaking language and knowledge from the ground up, and those of Herder,
who emphasized the impossibility of making a total break with the linguistic past—to cease
squabbling and coexist peacefully in separate compartments. In the domain of ordinary
language, Herder’s side definitively won out. The founders of modern linguistics, from
Humboldt to Saussure, near-unanimously deny that one can alter a language at will and insist
that producing meaning requires reckoning in some way with the established practices of a
community. But in modern mathematics, logic, and computer science, algorithms are not
restrained by past practices in the way signification is; they may be made and remade at will,
limited only by physical laws, professional standards, and the creator’s ingenuity. It is this
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compromise between two fundamentally incompatible attitudes toward history, I argue, that
makes it difficult to reconcile algorithmic and hermeneutic methods at present. The technical
and cultural perspectives are alienated from one another by the fact that the first is
fundamentally about control, while the second is built on a denial of the possibility of total
control.
The coexistence of the discontinuity of science with the continuity of everyday culture, I
maintain, is one reason why the idea of technology has become so inextricable from narratives
of progress. The idea of progress originated in the work of Enlightenment thinkers like Turgot
and Condorcet, but the modern narrative of technological progress functions in a way that runs
directly counter to Condorcet’s egalitarian politics. A watershed moment for this modern
narrative, which forms the end of my historical account, was the commencement of the great
International Exhibitions—later known as World’s Fairs—in 1851. The exhibitions were
founded to promote international trade and intellectual exchange; early on, they focused
largely on exhibits of unfamiliar goods and new technologies, which were increasingly, as the
nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, presented as previewing in some way the world
of the future. The exhibitions presented a vision of historical change led not by universal
reason, as Condorcet had hoped, but rather by science and industry, with capital providing the
motive force. An unusually blunt statement of this scheme’s oligarchical implications appears
in the unofficial motto of the 1933 Century of Progress International Exposition in Chicago:
“SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES—MAN CONFORMS” (Tozer 81).17 This scheme provides
an explanation of how the discontinuities that punctuate time in the technological sphere can
fit together with the continuity that characterizes everyday culture. The technological
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vanguard leads the way, introducing new practices, words, and ideas into a culture that will
respond to them at its own pace, without having to make a total break with tradition.
I contend that this narrative of progress remains a key element of the way algorithm
and culture relate in the twenty-first century. It is manifest, for instance, in the endless push to
upgrade one’s software and adapt to the latest HTML standards and Web-design practices. But
the narrative of technological progress is not the only available way of mediating between
technology and culture. As I discuss in the Coda at the end of this dissertation, recent
developments, including widespread disillusionment with the technology industry and the
development of powerful new forms of artificial intelligence, might present a new opening for
alternatives to the Whiggish historiography that continues to undergird attitudes toward
technology. Experimental poetics that employ algorithms for their disturbing or uncanny
effects could provide one such alternative. New media artists such as the interactive-fiction
writer Porpentine employ algorithms not to lead the way forward, but rather to unsettle the
assumptions that undergird the lifeworld of the present. Such artistic practices involve an
embrace of the alienness of algorithms, of the fact that they do not always fit smoothly with
the meaning-making practices of human beings. Another possibility, I wish to suggest, is a
philological engagement with algorithms—a form of scholarship that places them in dialogue
with the past. Algorithms meant something entirely different 400 years ago, when Napier’s
logarithm tables were new, and a simple recognition of this fact can provide a valuable
perspective on the present debates about the meaning problem and the cultural effects of
technology, showing how these debates are conditioned by contingent assumptions about
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language, history, politics, and knowledge that have become so familiar as to be virtually
invisible.
My approach in this dissertation is historical. While the compartmentalization I am
describing did not fully congeal until around the end of the nineteenth century, I am primarily
focused on what happened before this period. In The Laws of Cool (2004), Alan Liu calls for a
“dark historicism,” a mode of scholarship that seeks to describe what was lost amidst the
disruptive changes of modernity (9). Extending this thinking to the study of intellectual history,
my work attempts to recover past modes of thinking that have been erased and written over by
epistemological categories that we now take for granted. Inspired by philology’s etymological
reference to a loving attitude toward the word, I have sought to keep myself open to the
strangeness of the past, willing to take seriously ways of thinking that may now seem absurd. I
begin in the seventeenth century, when attitudes toward algorithms were sometimes very
strange indeed. While my concern is primarily with the turn that took place between the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, considering the seventeenth century is necessary in part
because Leibniz has played a major role in discussions of computation from his own time all the
way up to the present day. In the following chapter, I place Leibniz’s work in the context of
early-modern discussions about language, in the light of which his attitudes appear far more
different from our own than they have often been assumed to be.
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Chapter 1: The Dream of a Real Character

Wherefore, as men owe all their True Ratiocination to the right understanding of Speech; So
also they owe their Errors to the misunderstanding of the same; and as all the Ornaments of
Philosophy proceed onely from Man, so from Man also is derived the ugly absurdity of False
opinions.
—Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy

Idols and Hieroglyphs

In the scientific circles of seventeenth-century Europe, words were in disrepute. In the 1623
Latin expansion of The Advancement of Learning (1605), Francis Bacon warned of what he
termed the “idols of the market:” the “vulgar” notions that, in everyday speech, tend to
“insinuate themselves into the understanding” by means of ill-defined words (242). As a way of
guarding against “the seducing incantation of names,” Bacon tentatively suggests the use of
clear definitions and “terms of art,” but he concludes this is still not enough to protect thought
from the temptations of words (242). Definitions “themselves are in many respects
irremediable, as consisting of words: for words generate words, however men may imagine
they have a command over words, and can easily say they will speak with the vulgar, and think
with the wise” (242). The idea that words can confuse and mislead was widespread in the
seventeenth century, influencing groups as diverse as the scientists of the Royal Society of
London and the Puritans, who advocated a plain style as an alternative to the ornate ornaments
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of Renaissance rhetoric. For the seventeenth-century Moderns, spending too much time
studying words was seen as a vice of Scholasticism, a sign of slavish devotion to the ancients
rather than a commitment to the production of new knowledge. Even more damningly, words
were seen as insufficiently stable in their meanings for the purposes of science. People from
across the Western world responded to Bacon’s call, spending countless years in lamp-lit
studies attempting either to improve the clarity of existing languages or, in surprisingly many
cases, to create new modes of communication that would enable us to rid ourselves of words
altogether.
Early in the century, one of the most promising alternatives to words was the use of
visual symbols. In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon gives a description of the Chinese
writing system based on the often fabricated reports of travelers. According to Bacon, the
Chinese system of ideographs can operate independently of spoken language, enabling people
from “numerous nations, though of quite different languages,” to read the same written texts
(249). This makes them, in a term that Bacon borrowed from the Scholastics, real characters—
written symbols that directly express things or ideas, rather than representing the
pronunciations of spoken words (Bacon 249). Later writers identified Arabic numerals, musical
notation, and the occult symbols of astrology and alchemy as symbolic systems that are
comprehensible across spoken languages, which suggested, as the Encyclopédie of Diderot and
d’Alembert would later state, that “it is not necessary to imagine that the real character is a
chimera” (2:646). Such characters seemed, for some, to provide a way around the problems
caused by words. A number of people, most prominently the English polymath John Wilkins
and the German mathematician-philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, attempted to build
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comprehensive systems of real characters that would, they thought, solve Bacon’s complaint
about words for good. While such a system could obviously facilitate international
communication, some thinkers believed that it could do far more than that. In the seventeenth
century, symbols were often represented as having a transparency that spoken language
lacked, representing ideas in a unambiguous way without being subject to the uncertainties of
verbal communication.
To back up their claims, advocates of real
characters could point to the astonishing
success of one of the seventeenth century’s
newest symbolic systems: mathematical
notation. Not long before Bacon wrote The
Advancement of Learning, Michael Stifel, Robert
Recorde, François Viète, and others were
making major strides in the symbolization of
algebra, for which no widely accepted standard

Figure 5. Frontispiece from Leibniz’s Ars Combinatoria, 1690
edition. Public-domain image by Deutsche Fotothek via
Wikimedia Commons, contrast adjusted.

notation existed in the West prior to the seventeenth century. The introduction of algebraic
symbols—the now-familiar +, −, =, and ÷—seemed to many to grant a degree of clarity to
mathematical ideas and inferences that was not possible when they were communicated by
means of words. Some thinkers envisioned a future in which an algebra-like notation could be
extended to all areas of knowledge, mathematical or otherwise. One of the period’s most
sophisticated takes on mathematical symbolism survives in the work of Leibniz. In one of his
first published works, the Ars Combinatoria of 1666, Leibniz explains how the laws of
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combination can be applied not just to numbers, but to alchemical symbols that, he suggests,
can reveal the natural structure of matter (Figure 5). Throughout his life, Leibniz experimented
with the idea of extending this sort of symbolism into what he called a calculus ratiocinatur—a
general logical calculus that could be used to draw conclusions about anything whatsoever—
while also developing mechanical devices that were meant to free the minds of the elites who
were lucky to have access to them from the labor of calculation (Figure 6). As the new algebraic
notations enabled people to reason about quantities by reasoning about symbols without the
need to interpret them, this scheme was meant to turn all forms of reasoning into mechanical
processes that left no room for disagreement, and as such, provide a way around the
uncertainties that Bacon had attributed to words.
The products of this early-modern flight from language occupy a paradoxical position in
the historiography of Western thought.
On the one hand, Leibniz’s calculus
ratiocinatur is almost universally
regarded as one of the earliest major
advances towards the modern computer.
In 1961, the computer-science theorist
Norbert Wiener ensured Leibniz’s place in

Figure 6. A depiction of one of Leibniz’s calculating machines, known as
the stepped reckoner. The design has some similarities to an earlier
adding machine designed by Blaise Pascal, although Leibniz claimed not
to have known about Pascal’s work when he began the project. While
Pascal’s machine could only add and subtract, the stepped reckoner could
also multiply and divide. Image from Meyers grosses KonversationsLexikon, 6th ed. (16.658ff). See Leibniz, “Leibniz on His Calculating
Machine.”

the computer-history canon by
suggesting that he could be “a patron saint for cybernetics,” the field that deals with systems of
control and communication involving both humans and machines (12). Leibniz has since
attained cultural-hero status within computer science (see Golumbia 8), and he has become a
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fixture in histories of computation; David Berlinski (2000), Martin Davis (2001 and 2011),
Edward K. Blum (2011), Agarwal and Sen (2014), and Subrata Dasgupta (2014) all center Leibniz
in their discussions of early developments before skipping ahead more than a century to
George Boole, Charles Babbage, or Giuseppe Peano in the 1800s. At the same time, however,
Leibniz’s project is part of a broader seventeenth-century trend of attempting to overcome the
conventional nature of communication that contemporary scholars have generally
characterized as misguided. Leibniz, along with Wilkins and a sizable number of other
seventeenth-century scholars, was attempting to create not just a new means of international
communication, but a system of symbols that could express anything unambiguously, and that
could thus circumvent the “idols” that Bacon identified in natural languages. The result has
been a schism in scholarship on the period between accounts that emphasize the
computational insights of Leibniz, Wilkins, and other near-contemporaries such as Blaise Pascal,
often with a mind to extracting something of value from their work, and readings that
emphasize the semiotic aspects of real-character schemes, which are generally presented as
expressions of early-modern ideas about taxonomy and representation.
In this chapter, I give an alternative account of the seventeenth century’s position in the
history of computation that takes the semiotic theories of the time seriously. In particular, I
argue that one of the elements of Leibniz’s work that seems most questionable from a modern
perspective—the confidence in the ability of symbols to bear a stable meaning—provided him
and his contemporaries with a radically different way of understanding the mechanical aspects
of symbolic reasoning from the one that was employed from the nineteenth century onward.
Contrary to what many contemporary scholars have assumed, seventeenth-century advocates
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of real characters generally did not view them as languages, but rather drew a sharp distinction
between characters, which were written or printed, and languages, which were spoken.18 For
many scientifically inclined thinkers of the time, printed or written characters had an important
advantage over spoken words because they facilitated algorithmic procedures of computation,
such as the ones used in arithmetic. Yet unlike in later periods, seventeenth-century thinkers
drew no sharp line between algorithmic and semiotic uses of symbols. For their advocates, I
argue, real characters provided a way of fixing the meanings of signifiers more firmly than the
social conventions governing spoken languages could, suppressing the urge to vocalize written
texts as a way to prevent readers from straying into thickets of verbal disputes against which
Bacon warned. In this context, the question of what mediates between algorithmic processes
and the world of human life—a question that would lead to paranoia and skepticism in later
centuries—could only be answered by an appeal to the divine will.
Taking the seventeenth-century discourse on real characters seriously reveals very
different networks of affect and trust from the ones that came to undergird the mechanization
of thought in the industrial period, when Leibniz’s idea of universal computation was
supposedly revived. Separating Leibniz from the computer are two major shifts in Western
attitudes towards symbolic systems. In the eighteenth century, the empiricist tradition
inaugurated by Locke and Newton called into question the ability of real characters to
transparently convey ideas. Rather than taking the correspondence between symbols and
ideas for granted, Enlightenment thinkers from the eighteenth century attempted to establish it
through programs of education, while relegating algorithmic processes to a mnemonic role in
the production of knowledge. In the nineteenth century, mathematicians and industrialists
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alike began to treat the formal aspects of symbolic systems as entirely separate from
signification, resurrecting the potential for mechanization by placing algorithm ahead of
meaning. Before these shifts, however, it was possible for thinkers from a variety of traditions
to treat visual signs as a way of getting around language, of establishing meaning without the
need for social agreement, and thus to represent them as a definitive solution to the pernicious
dependence of human thought on words. This view of symbolic systems enabled Leibniz to
imagine a very different relation between human and machine from the one that emerged in
the nineteenth century—one founded on a confidence in the power of symbolic representation
that the linguistic turn of the eighteenth century destroyed, and that has never returned to the
mainstream of Western thought.
This chapter begins with a general account of how the idea of a real character
functioned in the seventeenth century, especially in the conversation ensuing after Bacon’s
warning about the idols inherent in natural languages. I then triangulate Leibniz’s symbolic
project in terms of two other developments that illustrate the attitudes of seventeenth-century
thinkers towards symbolic systems. The first, the real character of John Wilkins, is
characteristic of Britain’s pre-Newtonian scientific establishment, and provides a useful
example of how the idea of a real character could function in a non-mathematical context.
Wilkins attempted to create a collection of symbols that constituted miniature definitions of
the things they represented, a goal that he achieved using a hierarchical taxonomy based on an
essentialist reading of the Aristotelian system of categories. Second, I examine the
symbolization of algebra, which, for many of its early adopters, provided mathematical
reasoning with a greater degree of clarity than is otherwise possible. Finally, I consider the
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work of Leibniz. While Leibniz generally dismissed Wilkins’s approach to semiotics, he
sympathized with his dream of creating a real character that could transparently represent
things, and shared with him, I argue, a belief in the ability of algorithmic procedures to establish
the transparent signification of visual symbols.19 Emerging just as the trust in real characters
was beginning to break down, Leibniz’s work on the calculus ratiocinatur stands at one of the
last moments when it was possible, in the mainstream of Western thought, to avoid raising the
issue of what grounds one has for trusting a mechanical system of calculation. As such, unlike
many people in later periods, he had little reason to worry about the non-human nature of
mechanical systems like his calculating machine, but rather saw the mechanical as fitting
seamlessly with the meaning-making practices of human beings.

The Wound of Babel

A common reference point for early-modern
attitudes towards language is the story of the
confusion of tongues from Genesis 11. At the
beginning of the chapter, the King James
Version states that “the whole earth was of one
language, and of one speech” (Genesis 11:1).
In the land of Shimar, people constructed a

Figure 7. Der Turmbau zu Babel, Vienna Version (c.
1563) by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Oil on panel. Publicdomain image from Wikimedia Commons.

tower “whose top may reach unto heaven” (11:4), on account of which—presumably as a
punishment—God decides to “confound their language, that they may not understand one
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another's speech” (11:7). In the traditional reading of this passage, this resulted in the
proliferation of mutually unintelligible languages on Earth. This interpretation is, as Umberto
Eco has pointed out, complicated by Genesis 10, which states that the Gentiles were divided
“every one after his tongue” when Noah’s grandsons disperse (Genesis 10:5; see Eco 9-10). In
spite of these ambiguities in the scripture, the idea that the multiplicity of languages was a
divine punishment captured the early-modern imagination. In the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth century, European artists produced dozens of visual depictions of the Tower of Babel,
including the iconic oil painting by Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Like many other depictions from
the period, Bruegel’s painting emphasizes the vanity of the builders by showing the instability
of the tower, which is built at a slight slant and is crumbling in some sections (Figure 7). In
addition to its moral overtones, this interpretation of the story contains the value judgment
that linguistic diversity is to be regretted, a wound that God inflicted upon humankind as a way
of deflating our hubris.
In spite of the story’s warning about vanity, many believed that it was possible to repair
the wound that God inflicted on humanity at Babel, thus restoring a clarity to our
representations of the world that was lost with the fall of the Tower. Such schemes tend to
share a historical assumption that is not apparent from the text of Genesis: that the “one
language” from before the confusion was better than those that arose later. Hans Aarsleff calls
this assumption the Adamic view of language. In Aarsleff’s definition, the Adamic view holds
that, “[e]ven after the Fall, Adam was the greatest philosopher, etymologist, and naturalist who
ever lived on earth” because his language was “divine and natural, not human and
conventional,” giving him an unmatched insight into the true natures of things (From Locke to
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Saussure 25). By implication, the Adamic view holds that all changes that language has
undergone since the time of Adam are to be regretted and—if possible—reversed. Some
people in the seventeenth century thought that one could literally recover some of Adam’s
original language. Jacob Böhme, the German Lutheran mystic, attempted to do so by means of
divine inspiration. In the Mysterium Magnum of 1623, Böhme gives a commentary on Genesis
that emphasizes the naturalness of the Adamic language, which, he writes, is still
understandable to “the Birds in the aire, and the beast [sic] in the fields” (230). Through a
mystical discourse that combines philology with glossolalia, Böhme tries to recapture some of
what we “shall againe obtaine in the New-birth” (230)—that is, the sensual language of nature.
Böhmean attempts to recover the one original language continued sporadically into the
early twentieth century (see Eco 111-13). Most attempts to repair the wound of Babel after
Böhme relied less on divine inspiration, although Böhme’s mystical theories may nonetheless
have been an inspiration for some of them (see Knowlson 86-88). In the early decades of the
seventeenth century, another tradition emerged whose goal was not to recover a perfect
language that once existed, but rather to replace language altogether with a new and better
mode of representation, thus reversing the confusion of tongues by a feat of “art.” As Cram
and Maat note, scholars have found references to a number of constructed language and real
character schemes developed in France, Ireland, and England in the 1620s and 30s that either
do not survive or only survive in fragments (1032). The earliest one that is known to survive in
full is Jean Douet’s Proposition présentée au roy, d'une escriture universelle (Proposition
Presented to the King, of a Universal Writing), a short book published in 1627 that proposes the
creation of a form of writing that is universally comprehensible and resistant to change
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(Asbach-Schnitker, xxxiii). While some of the early schemes were concerned only with universal
communication, more scientifically-oriented schemes began to appear towards the middle of
the century. Jan Amos Comenius (1641), Cyprian Kinner (c. 1640s), Francis Lodwick (1647), Seth
Ward (c. 1654), Isaac Newton (c. 1661), George Dalgarno (1661), and Dalgarno’s erstwhile
collaborator John Wilkins (1668) all attempted to create universal characters reflecting a
systematic organization of ideas based on natural philosophy. These writers wanted to create a
mode of representation that was not just understandable to everyone, but superior to natural
languages because it was truer to the natures of things.
Such a carefully engineered symbolism was thought to have advantages for the new
forms of scientific inquiry that were gaining momentum in the seventeenth century. The idea
that ambiguity was an impediment to science was in the air throughout the century, especially
in England. In a statement that would be echoed for hundreds of years, Bacon’s The
Advancement of Learning warns of a “distemper of learning” that takes place “when men study
words and not matter” (56). Bacon is calling for a turn away from the Scholastic focus on
literary style and interpretation towards observational science. While Bacon himself wrote
some of his work in Latin, his rhetoric was used to justify a shift towards the vernacular, which
would relieve students of the need to spend time studying ancient languages. 20 As Robert
Markley and Denise Tillery have argued, there is a strong gendered component to such
elevations of the study of “things” over the study of “words.” Bacon and his followers in the
British scientific establishment viewed plain language as an imposition of masculine order on a
feminized nature, while representing flowery language as a surrender to temptation (Tillery 623; Markley 93). Avoiding this temptation required a kind of linguistic self-discipline that was
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meant to prevent words from occluding the natures of things, which could only be “unveiled”
through the use of an adequately rigorous means of representation.
Bacon’s statement that people should stop paying so much attention to words could be
taken to warrant a shift towards quantification. Some scientists, such as Christiaan Huygens,
did go in this direction, but others took Bacon’s statement as a call for the rectification of the
errors inherent in natural languages (see Dascal 5). Britain’s Royal Society of sciences, founded
in 1660, represented itself as opposed to linguistic ornateness and ambiguity. Thomas Sprat’s
History of the Royal-Society of London (1667) has often been held up as exemplary of the
Society’s attitude towards language (see Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 226-27). Although
this text cannot be taken as representative of all of the members’ views, it does indicate one of
the prime linguistic ideologies that was in the air in the mid-seventeenth century (see, for
instance, Robert Hooke’s similar remarks, 63). In a section about the Society’s “manner of
Discourse,” Sprat claims that, in order to avoid the errors resulting from “specious Tropes and
Figures,” the Society strives “to return back to the primitive purity, and shortness, when men
deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal number of words” (111-13). Achieving this elusive
correspondence between things and words, he writes, requires that the members use “a close,
naked, natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness; bringing all
things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language of Artizans,
Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, or Scholars” (113). In some cases, this
stylistic disrobing meant clearly defining terms and foregoing rhetorical flourishes, but for
others it meant working towards a better medium of writing that imposes a sturdier order upon
the world than natural languages were thought to.
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In associating “primitive purity” with “Mathematical plainness,” Sprat’s History indicates
one of the central tensions in seventeenth-century attitudes towards language: a desire to
balance the natural with the artificial. The desire to represent the world in a precise, scientific,
mathematical way—perhaps by substituting equations for sentences—coexisted uneasily with a
fixation on modes of communication that were seen as simple or primitive. Starting with the
Renaissance and the beginnings of colonialism, Europeans faced an influx of new information,
some accurate, some not, about both ancient civilizations and cultures from other parts of the
world, which inspired new reflections on the nature of communication (see Slaughter 10). In
colonial expeditions to the Americas, Europeans were encountering languages that were
entirely unfamiliar, leading to a greater recognition of the arbitrariness of European languages.
Accounts of colonial encounters also led some writers to speculate about the existence of
modes of communication that worked in entirely different ways from alphabetical writing and
that, perhaps, could provide a way around the curse of Babel. Yet at the same time that nonWestern languages were thought of as potentially more natural than European vernaculars,
they were also generally denigrated as being uncivilized. The goal of real character schemes
was to create a language that was just as natural as the non-verbal modes of communication
that supposedly existed in the Americas, Asia, and the ancient world, but also reflective of
modern science and civilized manners.
Many of the non-Western or non-modern modes of communication that were seen as
more natural than European languages had something in common—they did not use words.
One such medium of communication was the hieroglyph. In his discussion of language in The
Advancement of Learning, Bacon mentions Egyptian hieroglyphs as a mode of communication
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that is “significative without the help or interposition of words” (249). While the hieroglyphs
were not correctly deciphered until the discovery of the Rosetta stone in 1799, they sparked a
great deal of interest in the seventeenth century, culminating in the extensive analyses of the
German scholar Athanasius Kircher starting in the 1630s. Some writers speculated that the
hieroglyphs could bypass linguistic convention because the symbols bore a representational
relation to things that arose, in Francis Lodwick’s words, “not at Random” (quoted by Singer
57). In addition to hieroglyphs, gesture and facial expression were also widely seen as modes of
communication that were non-arbitrary and therefore understandable to all. In his 1644 book
Chirologia, the English physician John Bulwer argues that the “naturall Language of the Hand
[…] had the happinesse to escape the curse at the confusion of Babel”—an idea that was widely
shared by seventeenth-century writers on language (7). Eco traces this interest in gesture as a
universal language to early accounts of contact between Europeans and Native Americans such
as the one given by Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, who describes how the explorers learned to
communicate with the people they encountered non-verbally (159; 210). Accounts of both
hieroglyphs and the language of gesture encouraged the designers of real characters by
suggesting that the divisions created at Babel were not absolute—rather, it seemed that there
remained a universal common ground, a natural mode of communication that could convey
meaning transparently because it worked independently of spoken words.
While Bacon distinguishes real characters from hieroglyphs, insisting that real characters
are non-representational, he attributes this independence from speech to both of them. In
early-modern Europe, it was generally assumed that letters referred to sounds rather than
things or ideas, making alphabetical writing systems “parasitic” on spoken language (Cram and
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Maat 1032). But a number of travel narratives were circulating in Europe claiming that the
ideographic writing systems of the Chinese and the indigenous peoples of Central and South
America could bear meaning independently of spoken languages (Eco 158; see Gu 192). Bacon
puts it this way in The Advancement of Learning:
And it is now well known, that in China and the more eastern provinces, they use
at this day certain real, not nominal, characters, to express, not their letters or
words, but things and notions; insomuch, that numerous nations, though of
quite different languages, yet, agreeing in the use of these characters, hold
correspondence by writing. And thus a book written in such characters may be
read and interpreted by each nation in its own respective language. (248-49)
If, as was widely known in early-modern Europe, kanji could be read in either Chinese or
Japanese (see Bacon 248; Wilkins, Mercury 107; “Character” in Chambers’s Cyclopædia I.196;
“Caractère” in the Encyclopédie II.646), then perhaps a writing system could be created that
could work for any language. In addition to kanji, Hindu–Arabic numerals, musical notation,
alchemical and astronomical symbols, and algebraic signs were often held up as examples of
symbols that could be “read off” in multiple languages. The philosophical character schemes of
the seventeenth century almost all attempted to produce a comprehensive set of symbols that
were universal in this way, and that would thus be untainted by the idols of any particular
language.
Exactly how these real characters were supposed to work has been a subject of debate
among twentieth- and twenty-first century scholars. Most accounts emphasize some
combination of two aspects of the idea: first, the belief that real characters bypass spoken
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language, and second, the idea that they establish, in some way, a natural correspondence
between symbols and the natures of things. Jaap Maat emphasizes the first of these aspects in
his book on philosophical character schemes. Bacon’s innovation, Maat writes, was to
generalize the Aristotelian theory of signification by “pointing out that the third place in the
sequence ‘things – notions – words – letters’ may also be occupied by other types of symbols
than words” (17). What distinguishes real from nominal characters, then, is that they “refer to
things and notions directly, without spoken words being intermediate between written symbols
and extra-linguistic reality” (18). While Maat contends that the term real character meant no
more than this, many scholars have noted that the most successful real character schemes of
the seventeenth century attempted to establish a relation between signifier and signified that
was not entirely arbitrary. In The Search for the Perfect Language, Eco argues that the
designers of philosophical real characters attempted to create a “conformal” relationship
between the form and content of the expression (23). In his later essay “The Language of the
Austral Land,” Eco explains this correspondence in terms of modern chemical notation: while
the individual characters in the formula for sulfuric acid, H2SO4, are arbitrary, they are
composed together in a way that is “motivated by the nature of the designated object” (426).
In Eco’s view, it was primarily this conformal quality that distinguished philosophical character
schemes from natural languages.
But the idea of a conformity between expression and content does not, in itself, explain
why written or printed characters were given such a privileged role over spoken language in the
seventeenth century. It was possible to imagine the sort of conformity that Eco describes
existing in speech, as well as in writing or print; Thomas Urquhart, in his satirical
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Logopandecteision (1653), imagines just this, a universal spoken language in which there is “a
proportion betwixt the sign and thing signified” (1). But, with some exceptions, those who
advocated real characters tended to assume that visual symbols had a special ability to resist
the sort of natural shifts to which spoken language is liable.21 As Maat points out, Bacon
suggests that “in the Far East, the order of spoken and written language has been reversed”
(18). In the West, Bacon thinks, alphabetical symbols refer to words to which people have, to
the detriment of science, attached a proliferation of differing ideas. In Bacon’s mythical version
of Asia, however, people have attached a proliferation of different words to symbols, but the
ideas remain fixed. The presumption that written characters could convey ideas with a greater
stability than spoken language persisted in later accounts of the Chinese language, such as a
John Webb’s 1669 book An Historical Essay Endeavoring the Probability that the Language of
the Empire of China is the Primitive Language, which claims that, despite the proliferation of
corrupt spoken dialects, the written version of Chinese has existed unchanged since the Flood
of Noah (189). Advocates of philosophical characters suggested that they would have a similar
resistance to change on account of their independence from speech.
This trust in the stability of characters is especially apparent in the work of Wilkins, who
produced the most detailed of all the real character schemes in the seventeenth century.
Wilkins made one of the last prominent attempts to create a universal character without using
mathematics as a model, instead basing his work in the qualitative science of natural history.
Nevertheless, his system has striking a resemblance to computation, presenting the reader with
a precise procedure for looking up the meanings of symbols that, as Eco notes, works in a very
similar way to the memory lookup processes of computers (255). For Wilkins, I argue, it was
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the deterministic and, from our perspective, computational nature of this procedure that could
protect the symbols from the sort of corruption to which spoken language was subject. Seen in
this light, Wilkins’s work illustrates one of the aspects of seventeenth-century thought that is
most strongly at odds with modern assumptions: the idea that symbolic notation made it
possible to bypass the hermeneutic circle by replacing reading with a more thoroughly rulebased and more definitively mute process. For Wilkins, it was not the recovery of the Adamic
language that was to heal the wound of Babel; it was the algorithm.

John Wilkins: Characters Answerable to the Nature of Things

Wilkins was born to a prominent Puritan family in 1614, and he maintained close connections
to those in power throughout his life, marrying Oliver Cromwell’s sister in 1656 and gaining the
favor of King Charles II after the Restoration. In the late 1650s, he inaugurated the meetings
that led to the formation of the Royal Society of London, and he served as the Society’s first
Secretary (Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 254-55). His writings about semiotics constitute
only one part of a diverse collection of published works that also includes The Discovery of a
World in the Moone, a 1638 treatise arguing that the moon is an inhabitable world, and a
popular book on simple machines and automata entitled Mathematical Magick (1648). Wilkins
was, above all, an administrator; he was active in both church and university, and he
energetically defended the academic institutions of England from attacks by John Webster and
Thomas Hobbes (Wilding 155). His universal character project betrays an administrative logic
that jibes with his academic activities, presenting a centralized standard to which people can
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refer in determining the meanings of symbols. How Wilkins meant this standard to function,
however, was quite different from more familiar instruments of language-planning like the
dictionary, not least because of how it handled the relationship of symbols to spoken language.
Wilkins first discusses the idea of
a universal character in his 1641 book
Mercury, or the Secret and Swift

Figure 8. The Lord’s Prayer in Wilkins’s real character (395).

Messenger, which covers a variety of
topics in cryptography, steganography,
and unusual modes of communication.

Figure 9. The Lord’s Prayer in the philosophical language (421).

Almost thirty years later, in 1668, he published An Essay towards a Real Character and a
Philosophical Language, which, at over 450 folio pages, is one of the most detailed universal
character schemes ever produced. In this book, Wilkins introduces two distinct, though closely
related, systems of communication that were meant to revolutionize scientific practice. The
first, the real character, consists of peculiar symbols of Wilkins’s devising (Figure 8). Since this
character is supposed to be “real” in the sense Bacon discusses, the symbols should be “legible
by any Nation in their own Tongue” just as all of the inhabitants of China use the same
character, each “reading it in his own Language” (13). The second system, the philosophical
language (Figure 9), is meant to provide a substitute for existing languages, including both the
written and spoken components, and is printed in a phonetic alphabet loosely based on Latin
and Greek characters. Although the philosophical language could work independently, Wilkins
emphasizes the primacy of the real character, which, he suggests, should be easier to learn than
the language because it can work with the pronunciations one already knows (385).
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Figure 10. A page of Wilkins’s categorization scheme (236).
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The heart of Wilkins’s system is a detailed, hierarchical classification scheme (Figure 10).
This hierarchy, Wilkins writes, provides “a just Enumeration and description of such things as
are to have Marks or Names assigned to them,” arranged in a fashion inspired by the
Aristotelian system of categories (20; see Slaughter). This system is complex, but the basic idea
is to organize concepts in a threelevel hierarchy: 40 genuses, each
containing 9 differences, each of
which, in turn, can contain up to 15
species. From this hierarchy, Wilkins
attempts to derive a system of
signifiers that are “answerable to the
nature of the things which they
signif[y],” so that “we should, by
learning the Character and the

Figure 11. Wilkins’s explanation of the real character (387).

Names of things, be instructed likewise in their Natures” (21). That is, the form of each symbol
serves as a miniature description of the thing it represents. In practice, this means that the
symbols each indicate a particular set of coordinates within the hierarchy. In the real character,
a shape at the middle of a line indicates the genus, while marks at the left and right indicate the
difference and the species (Figure 11). Loops and hooks can also be added on to characters to
indicate part of speech, conjugation, and to further modify the meaning. Wilkins also provides
smaller characters for pronouns and grammatical words. The words of the philosophical
language express the same information, mapped onto syllables rather than shapes.
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In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this scheme is often characterized along two
diverging lines: it is either mocked as hopelessly naïve or praised as ahead of its time. The
received account of Wilkins’s Essay treats it as an exemplar of a discredited approach to
classification that was supplanted either, in Foucault’s view, with the emergence of modern
biology in the nineteenth century or, in Slaughter’s view, with the rise of Newtonian science in
the 1680s. Robert Markley has given a detailed analysis of the conservative political values
encoded in Wilkins’s hierarchy, which are, in his account, laughably far from the sort of
disinterested representation of the world that would be needed to make the system truly
universal (80-84). Yet in spite of the apparent impossibility of his goal, Wilkins has also gotten
some positive press recently from scholars who have noted hints of computational thinking in
his work. John Guillory notes, albeit guardedly, that Wilkins’s project was ahead of its time in
treating communication as a technological matter (“Enlightening Mediation” 46-47). Michael
Hancher argues that Wilkins was able to solve a problem in information retrieval that later
troubled Charles Babbage by uniting a hierarchical taxonomy with an alphabetic dictionary
(Hancher 129-30). Eco, too, compares Wilkins’s handling of repetitions within the hierarchy to
the way hypertext establishes non-linear connections between pages (258-9). Wilkins’s work
has also been cast as a precursor of the print thesaurus, and it could even be likened to
computationally oriented thesaurus projects like WordNet or the Historical Thesaurus of the
Oxford English Dictionary. This is not a wholly gratuitous connection. The categorization
scheme in Wilkins’s Essay provided a model for the development of Roget’s Thesaurus, which is
perhaps the greatest practical result of Wilkins’s project (Hüllen 95). This recent turn has cast
Wilkins as a pioneer of information management, developer of a system that, even if it is not as
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certain as it is meant to be, at least provides a usable set of procedures for navigating a very
complex repository of information.
As with Leibniz, however, Wilkins’s treatment of semiotics has proven a stumbling block
for scholars who have set out to redeem his ideas. One of the ongoing debates in Wilkins
scholarship has centered on whether the Essay is dependent on the idea of a natural relation
between the signifier and signified, or whether it treats signifiers as arbitrary. Wilkins himself
claims that the real character signifies “by Institution” rather than “Naturally” (385), suggesting
the latter; but Hans Aarsleff and Michael Isermann have taken Wilkins’s desire to make
signifiers “answerable” to things as evidence that he maintained an attachment to the
mysticism of earlier thinkers like Böhme, who held to the Renaissance doctrine of divinely
instituted resemblance between signifier and signified (Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 262;
Isermann, “Substantial” 108). Maat has argued against this position, distinguishing Wilkins’s
semiotic theory from “mystical” ones on the grounds that Wilkins’s “view of language was
strictly utilitarian” (250). Nonetheless, even Maat has found some aspects of Wilkins’s attitudes
towards symbols difficult to rationalize. Wilkins’s idea of a universal character, Maat writes,
depends on “the clearly unreasonable assumption that linking the word ‘elephant’ to the
symbol

is easy since it is a matter of pronunciation only, while linking the word ‘elephant’

to the word ‘zibi’ [the word for elephant in the philosophical language] is a matter of translation
from one language to another” (160). On account of the practical difficulties of using such a
scheme, Maat finds it “remarkable that composing the Essay did not arouse any doubts about
the myth of a universal character in Wilkins’s mind” (160).
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While Maat is certainly right to conclude that Wilkins’s scheme for a universal character
is untenable, he leaves open the question of what made it possible for him and his supporters
to be so confident in the idea of a universal character in spite of the obvious (from a modern
perspective) problems it faces. As Maat points out, the real character appears to add nothing
to the scheme, since the phonetic alphabet for the philosophical language can encode exactly
the same information (158). Yet Wilkins clearly put a great deal of effort into developing it, as
did Joseph Moxon, Samuel Gellibrand, and the workers in his print shop into carving and
typesetting the special symbols that Wilkins devised. Wilkins’s confidence in the transparency
of characters was not an eccentricity. In seventeenth-century scientific circles, the idea that
visual signs could bear meaning more reliably and transparently than spoken language and thus
provide a fair recompense for the Confusion of Tongues was a widespread, if not universally
accepted, belief.22 For Wilkins, I propose, what was supposed to set the symbols apart from
words was the hierarchy, which enabled their meanings to be fixed through a set procedure
rather than through the process of reading as it was understood at the time. Like the
celebrated Hindu-Arabic numeral system, Wilkins’s real character reduces a wide semantic field
to a small set of components put together through simple rules.23 To determine the meaning of
one of the real character, one has only to decompose it into its parts and look up or recall the
genus, difference, species, and modifications that they indicate. The character

, for

instance, refers to position T. 1. 4. in the hierarchy. If one wishes to read it, one can turn to the
appropriate page of the book and select an English synonym from the list—in this case, name,
style, title, etc. (26)—but the scheme makes this verbalization posterior to the establishment of
meaning, which is reduced to a procedure determined by a simple set of rules.
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It is clear from Wilkins’s remarks in the Essay’s Epistle to the Reader that he sees the
hierarchical classification system as functioning differently from verbal definitions. Previous
authors of real character schemes, he writes, “did generally mistake in their first foundations”
because they attempted “the framing of such a Character from a Dictionary of Words,
according to some particular language, without reference to the nature of things” (n.p.). It is
less the words in the hierarchy that are meant to provide the fixity of meaning than the
structure of the hierarchy itself. Wilkins clearly distinguishes the sort of deterministic process
that his lookup system enables from reading. In the hierarchy, Wilkins classifies “READING” as
one of the “particular kinds of speaking,” defining it as a variety of articulate speech that refers
to “such words as we see before us” (235). This view of reading was not peculiar to Wilkins;
John Wallis’s comments on deaf education betray a similar assumption that the ability to speak
ordinarily plays a role in reading, although Wallis believed that it could be circumvented
(“Letter” 1091). The real character alters the situation, separating the process of establishing
the meaning of a symbol from that of verbalization. So long as one follows the rules correctly,
then, meaning precedes the act of reading, in which all the divisions imposed on us at Babel are
quarantined.
The lookup process could, of course, work just as well with the written version of the
philosophical language as it could with the real character. But in Wilkins’s time, verbal language
was seen as too much of a temptation to make an entirely alphabetical scheme appealing. In
introducing the real character, Wilkins makes a rather cryptic comment that suggests he saw
the phonetic alphabet of the philosophical language as inextricable from orality. Introducing
the real character before the philosophical language, he writes, “will conduce more to the great
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end of Facility” in learning the system, whereas “To proceed from the Language to the
Character, would require the learning of both; which being of greater difficulty, than to learn
one alone, is not therefore so sutable to that intention of ingaging men by the Facility of it”
(385). The thinking here seems to be that, since the written version of the philosophical
language is constructed from letters, it cannot be learned without learning its pronunciation at
the same time, thus making it more difficult to learn than the character. Like other linguistic
thinkers of his time, Wilkins used the term letter to refer to both alphabetical glyphs and
speech sounds, apparently conflating the two (see Isermann, “Letters, Sounds, and Things”); he
thus appears to view alphabetical writing systems as inherently bound up with orality. In light
of the rhetoric of Bacon, Sprat, and Hooke about the idols and temptations that exist in
language, then, it makes sense that Wilkins would take extraordinary pains to extricate his real
character from phonetics. Differentiating the character and the language provided a way of
enforcing the muteness of the signifiers, guarding against the Curse of Babel by ensuring the
authority of the standardized procedures by which those symbols are defined over the
unpredictable temptress that is, in the Baconian imaginary, speech.
All of this is not to suggest that Wilkins’s scheme could have actually worked. The
assumption that there is a universal set of notions shared by everyone was as false in the
seventeenth century as it is now. Setting aside the issue of universality, there are serious
problems with both the real character and the philosophical language as media of
communication that could not be overcome without compromising Wilkins’s goals. Wilkins’s
scheme is rendered more-or-less useless by a failure to recognize that the aspects of
communication he tries so hard to strip away—the supposedly extraneous verbiage that Sprat
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and Hooke deplore—are not noise, but rather a form of protection against noise. All natural
languages have some degree of redundancy, which is essential because it enables them to
function even in a noisy channel; this way, one can skip over or miss a phoneme or two—or a
word or two—and still get the gist. This phenomenon has been studied in detail.24 But in
Wilkins’s philosophical language, every letter is significant, and consequently every loss of
information is potentially catastrophic. As Eco points out, there is at least one misprint in the
printed version of Wilkins’s book; the word Gαpe (tulip) is misprinted as Gαde (barley) (Eco
249). Where, for instance, in an English text, one might easily recognize tulid as a misprint of
tulip, it is only possible to determine that Gαde is an error based on context. Worse, since the
language is designed such that similar spellings represent similar things, misprints are likely to
be off in meaning only by a little—one species of plant substituted for another, for instance.
This increases the chance of an unintended meaning insinuating itself into a text that is
plausible enough to slip by unnoticed.
This excessive information density is certainly not the only strike against Wilkins’s
project from a practical point of view. Bringing the real character into use would also require
both an educational infrastructure and some degree of momentum. Needless to say, it did not
catch on, although the initial reception was generally positive. The Royal Society formed a
committee for the improvement of Wilkins’s scheme, although there is no evidence that this
committee did anything (Asbach-Schnitker xxviii; Lewis 195). In 1669, the Anglican clergyman
Andrew Paschall reported that he was using the real character in correspondence with some of
his friends (Slaughter 177). Another Royal Society member, Sir Robert Moray, claimed that King
Charles II had easily mastered the philosophical language (Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure
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263), and John Collins wrote that the King was so pleased with it that he resolved to make
Wilkins a bishop, which indeed he did (Slaughter 161). In 1676, Robert Hooke, an enthusiastic
supporter of Wilkins’s linguistic work, used the real character in a patent application for a
pocket-watch, partly as an attempt to promote Wilkins’s scheme (Johns 525; Slaughter 174).
But after the initial period of excitement, serious theoretical and practical concerns with
Wilkins’s Essay came to light, and by the mid-1680s, not twenty years after it was first
published, interest had died out (Slaughter 183). Some later writers, including Charles
Babbage, attempted to construct languages on similar plans to Wilkins’s, but none had more
success. Most later attempts at replacing language were either humbler than Wilkins’s project,
merely aiming to create a new mode of expression rather than to capture the true natures of
things definitively, or more strongly rooted in mathematics. The latter is the route taken by
Leibniz, whose scheme would eventually rival Wilkins’s in fame, even though he accomplished
far less than Wilkins did. Before proceeding to Leibniz’s attempt at a universal character, it is
useful to consider, briefly, the origins of the mathematical symbolism on which he drew. While
algebraic symbols like + and – are now so familiar as to escape notice altogether, in the
seventeenth century they were new, and people had a wide range of reactions to them, some
of which are manifestly at odds with the commonplace assumptions of the twenty-first century.

The New Algebra, or, (𝒂 + 𝒙)(𝒂 − 𝒙)(𝟐𝒂 − 𝒙) = 𝒂𝒙𝒚

While Hindu–Arabic numerals had been well-established in Europe since the late middle ages,
algebraic notation was only beginning to take shape in the seventeenth century. It is now a
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cliché that mathematics is a universal language, comprehensible to speakers of all national
tongues, but mathematical knowledge was communicated with words through most of its
history, and European algebraists did not have a fully developed symbolic system of their own
until around 1700. While Egyptian, Greek, and Indian mathematicians had developed some
symbolic notations thousands of years ago, no such system was established in Europe until the
sixteenth century (see Mazur, x). It was in 1557 that Robert Recorde introduced the = sign as a
way, he writes, “to avoid the tediouse repetition of these woordes: is equalle to” (quoted by
Boyer and Merzbach 290), and this symbol, which Heeffer takes as the final step towards the
symbolization of algebra, was not universally adopted until the mid-seventeenth century
(Heeffer 22).
Prior to symbolization, algebra was a
verbal art. In early textbooks, the written
traces of algebra looked more like oddly
fragmented prose interspersed with digits
(Figure 12). In modern notation, the
equation described in Figure 12 might be
𝑥

𝑥

written 2 + 3 + 9 = 𝑥, and could be easily
solved by the application of formal rules.
But early-modern algebraists expressed such
reasonings in prose paragraphs that were
often, as Travis D. Williams has pointed out,
shot through with sensory details such as, in

Figure 12. Algebraic reasoning in prose. From the anonymous
1539 book An introduction for to lerne to recken with the pen or
with the counters accordynge to the trewe cast of algorysme […]
(n.p.). Image courtesy of Bodleian Library, shelfmark Tanner 55,
sig. k3v. Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further
reproduction is prohibited without permission.

73

this example, a “spere” sticking out of the water. These passages resemble the story problems
of modern textbooks, but it is not only the problem that is stated like a story: the solutions are
also worked out in prose. As Williams puts it, “their mathematics is in many ways not our
mathematics” (47). There was no question, at this time, that algebra involved the
“manipulation of symbols.” For sixteenth-century practitioners, it was a way of reasoning
about sensible things.
The symbolization of mathematics was not a sudden breakthrough. In his landmark
study A History of Mathematical Notations, Florian Cajori traces the history of how each major
mathematical idea has been represented from ancient times to the present. The general
picture he gives is of a gradual shift from prose to symbols and from varying personal
preferences to uniformity, with algebra reaching something like its modern state around 1700.
The traditional account of the shift from prose to symbols, deriving from an 1842 study by
G.H.F. Nesselmann, divides it into three stages. First is the rhetorical phase, in which authors
use prose (and often quite vivid prose) to communicate their reasonings to others. The second
is the syncopated phase, in which symbols serve as shorthands or ligatures that stand for
words, in the same way that & stands for and. Finally, in the symbolic phase, algebraic symbols
become tools for thought as well as abbreviations, enabling people to solve equations using
formal rules. Some recent historians have contested this three-stage model, which rests on a
relatively small number of documents whose purposes are often difficult to interpret (Heeffer
1-2). But the fact remains that, in post-Classical Europe, the division between the language of
mathematics and prose was not at all sharp until around the middle of the sixteenth century.
Algebra came to look the way it does through a long process of abstraction, in which certain
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formal elements of how people wrote about equations were isolated from the rest of natural
language and given an embodiment of their own. Algebra came before the symbols, and it can
be done without them, but they change the sort of thinking that the practice involves.
Credit for the development of modern algebraic notation often goes to René Descartes
(see Boyer and Merzbach 319). While many of the elements were already in place prior to
Descartes’s time, he did play an important role in demonstrating the range of utility that
symbolic notation could have. Prior to the work of Descartes and his contemporary Pierre de
Fermat, geometry and algebra had been two distinct fields with different methods; geometry
primarily worked through visual demonstrations in the form of diagrams, while only algebra
worked with symbols (Boyer 74). Descartes’s 1637 treatise Geometry, which was published as
an appendix to Discourse on Method, brings algebra and geometry together, showing how
problems in each field can be translated into the other (Boyer and Merzbach 337). Descartes’s
book introduced something similar to, although not exactly identical to, the modern x-y
coordinate system as a way of converting geometric problems into numerical ones, thus making
algebraic and visual reasoning interchangeable. (Fermat developed a similar system to
Descartes’s independently around the same time, although he did not immediately publish his
work.) For example, Descartes applied his symbolic notation to an old geometric problem
raised by the Alexandrian mathematician Pappus, which involves a curve described with the
equation (𝑎 + 𝑥)(𝑎 − 𝑥)(2𝑎 − 𝑥) = 𝑎𝑥𝑦 (Boyer and Merzbach 340). Contrary to traditional
practice, Descartes does not represent this shape visually at all; instead, he presents the
argument entirely through symbols.
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Compared to earlier texts like Recorde’s book, Descartes’s mathematical work looks
mostly modern in its use of notation. But there is another, subtler gap between the use of
symbols in the early-modern period and the formalist mathematics of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries that is important to emphasize. Descartes’s algebraic geometry is
supposed to be an example of reasoning with the method that he develops in the Discourse, in
which he resolves “to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my
mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt” (15). Algebraic notation, in
Descartes’s view, provides a way to divide a long chain of reasoning into small enough steps
that each deduction proceeds with this absolute clarity of apprehension. The reasoning is still,
however, supposed to have reference to geometrical ideas. The purpose of Descartes’s treatise
on geometry is, as Boyer and Merzbach put it, first, “through algebraic procedure to free
geometry from the use of diagrams,” and second, “to give meaning to the operations of algebra
through geometric interpretation” (339). Until the nineteenth century, it was not accepted that
symbolic notation could be used to produce new concepts; it was still supposed to have
reference to ideas that were founded in spatial and temporal intuitions. What was new about
algebraic notation was that, in the minds of the early-modern mathematicians who adopted it,
it bore a more direct and transparent relationship to ideas than the verbal statements that had
formerly constituted algebraic texts. Shorn of all that was extraneous, it was supposed, the
symbolic notation presented bare thoughts in their simplest possible form, with the result that,
as Descartes claims, there could be no doubt about their truth or falsity.
One reason for this confidence in the self-evidence of symbols was that they made it
easier for people to reason about complex equations. Seventeenth-century commentators
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often linked the power of algebraic symbols specifically to their visual nature, and especially to
the way in which notation allowed people to view a complex equation at a glance. 25 John
Wallis, who is remembered for introducing the infinity sign (∞), explains in the preface to his
1685 Treatise of Algebra that the advantage of symbolic notation is to provide a condensed
representation in which “the whole process of many Operations is at once exposed to the Eye
in a short Synopsis” (n.p.).26 Similarly, in discussing the practice of “Registering” the results of
experiments in natural history, Robert Hooke recommends using “some very good Short-hand
or Abbreviation,” and states that “’twere to be wisht, that we could express the whole History
in a few Letters or Characters” in the manner of “Geometrical Algebra” (63-64). Hooke
emphasizes the cognitive advantages of such a concise notation: contracting the account “into
as little Space as possible,” he writes, “is of huge Use in the Prosecution of Ratiocination and
Inquiry, and is of vast Help to the Understanding and Memory” (64). By breaking its ties to
verbal language, such condensed notations could serve as visual mnemonics as well as means
of communication, facilitating forms of “Ratiocination” that would otherwise be difficult and
unreliable.
But many seventeenth-century scientists viewed algebraic symbols as more than just an
aide memoire; they also saw them as a way around the uncertainties of verbal argument. As
Helena M. Pycior argues, British mathematicians in the Baconian tradition saw mathematical
symbols as a way of keeping their attention on “things” rather than “words” (46). Some
seventeenth-century algebraists described their notation as presenting ideas directly on the
page rather than representing or signifying them. For instance, in the 1630s, William Oughtred,
an English occultist and author of popular schoolbooks about mathematics, explained his use of
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symbols as a way of reaching the naked truth beneath the veil of language: “Wherefore that I
might more cleerly behold the things themselves, I uncasing the Propositions and
Demonstrations out of their covert of words, designed them in notes and species appearing to
the very eye” (The Key, “To the Reader,” n.p.). For many thinkers of the seventeenth century,
mathematical symbols were exempt from the need for interpretation; the initial choice of
symbols may be arbitrary, but once the decision was made, the symbols and the corresponding
ideas would be as one.
As with the numeral system, people had varying views on whether it was the
mathematics or the symbols themselves that produced this transparency. For some, it was the
use of numbers that made the difference, and the solution to Bacon’s challenge was thus to
extend quantification as far as it could go. This was the route taken by, to pick a prominent
example, Christiaan Huygens, whose 1659 book on pendulums replaced the verbal elements of
Descartes’s and Galileo’s theories of motion with an entirely mathematical theory as a way of
increasing their precision (Yoder 42). Others, however, suspected that the symbols were the
key, and that, as a result, it would be possible to extend the transparency of algebra to nonmathematical areas of study. Such a project would enable the “uncasing” not just of equations,
but of all sorts of ideas from the potentially misleading garb of words and, by doing so, enable
conclusions to be drawn with absolute certainty. This idea reached its fullest development in
the work of Huygens’s one-time student Leibniz.

Leibniz: Into the Interior of Things
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Unlike Wilkins and Dalgarno, Leibniz never published a detailed plan for a real character.
Scattered throughout his writings, however, are numerous references to a project called the
universal characteristic (caractéristique universelle or characteristica universalis) or universal
symbolism (spécieuse générale), which he apparently revisited sporadically through much of his
life. As mathematical, astronomical, and musical symbols provide real characters within their
specific domains of knowledge, the characteristic was meant to provide a universal “alphabet of
human thoughts” that could be applied to anything (Philosophical Papers and Letters 222). In a
letter to Walter Von Tschirnhaus dated May, 1678, Leibniz declared that, with the aid of this
characteristic, “a spoken and written language can also be developed […] which can be learned
in a few days and will be adequate to express everything that occurs in everyday practice, and
of astonishing value in criticism and discovery, after the model of the numeral characters”
(Philosophical Papers and Letters 193). Elsewhere, he declared that it “will be an instrument
even more useful to the mind than telescopes and microscopes are to the eyes” (261). The
language and character he proposed was meant to be able to express everything that German,
French, or Latin could, and do it in a way that makes ideas clearer and easier to reason with.
While it is difficult to determine exactly how Leibniz envisioned it, the characteristic
appears to be more akin to algebraic notation than to Wilkins’s taxonomic scheme.27 As Donald
Rutherford points out, Leibniz differentiated his project from those of Dalgarno and Wilkins by
its greater emphasis on the role of signs as instruments of thought (230-1; see also Pombo 81).
Wilkins’s real character is, as Eco has argued, a closed system; it represents an existing body of
knowledge without providing a means of developing new concepts (250-51). Leibniz, however,
intended the characteristic to provide an instrument of discovery. When fully developed, it was
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meant to work together with a calculus ratiocinatur—a rational calculus—that would make
reasoning on philosophical matters as easy and certain as solving an equation. In his 1685
essay “The Art of Discovery,” he states the dream wistfully: “The only way to rectify our
reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our
error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us
calculate, without further ado, in order to see who is right” (Selections 51). As this widely
quoted statement indicates, Leibniz had much broader ambitions than those of later logical
formalists; symbolic reasoning, for him, was not restricted to the abstract disciplines of logic
and mathematics, but capable of making truth claims about any subject matter.
A key idea in Leibniz’s project is blind thought. There has been a great deal of debate
over exactly what Leibniz means by this, but the central idea seems to be that a properly
constructed character makes it possible to produce new knowledge about things entirely by
performing algorithmic operations on symbols, without the need to interpret them. In his early
work Dissertation on the Art of Combinations (1666), Leibniz argues that Hindu–Arabic digits
themselves are an example of this shortcut, since “we often grasp a number, however large, all
at once in a kind of blind thought, namely, when we read figures on paper which not even the
age of Methuselah would suffice to count explicitly” (Philosophical Papers and Letters 76). The
point is that one does not need to have a clear image of a million in one’s head in order to
reason correctly with the word million—one only needs to know the proper rules for the word’s
use. This manner of thinking derives in part from the standardization of algebraic notation and
Descartes’s introduction of the coordinate system (Davis 9). By enabling mathematicians to
prove geometric theorems entirely in algebraic notation, without needing to draw or imagine a
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figure, the Cartesian coordinate system enables mathematicians to reason “blindly” about
shapes that they have not seen. The characteristic was meant to extend this sort of symbolic
thought to fields beyond mathematics, enabling the creation of an encyclopedic character that
opens the totality of human knowledge to the rigors of symbolic reasoning.
In spite of the likelihood that Leibniz took some of the inspiration for blind thought from
Descartes’s geometrical work, the way he imagined such a system working was in direct
opposition to Cartesian philosophy. One of Descartes’s few extended discussions of semiotics
appears in a 1629 letter to Marin Mersenne, which was published in 1657. In response to
Mersenne’s description of an early philosophical language project (which project appears to
have been lost), Descartes argues that a truly philosophical language could not be created
without “la vraie philosophie” (the true philosophy), which would be needed to determine the
correct way of dividing up concepts (915). Against Descartes’s view, Leibniz held that the signs
could be developed alongside the theory, aiding in the process of analysis rather than
depending on it (Pombo 95-100). Leibniz was confident in the utility of blind thought in
developing theories not just about mathematics, but also about the essences of substances. In
the letter quoted above, he assures Tschirnhaus that the characteristic will not lead thinkers
into tangles of abstraction: “No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead
us away from the things themselves; on the contrary, it leads us into the interior of things”
(Philosophical Papers and Letters 193). The rational calculus would be blind, but given the
correct character it would be infallible.
Despite—or perhaps because of—the lack of a detailed description of how it was to
work, Leibniz’s characteristic has had a much more laudatory afterlife than Wilkins’s real
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character. A century before Leibniz became an icon of the computer age, there was a rush to
claim him for the newly successful tradition of formal logic. Bertrand Russell’s 1900 book A
Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz describes the characteristica universalis as a
“Universal Mathematics” and claims that it “was evidently akin to the modern science of
Symbolic Logic, which is definitely a branch of Mathematics, and was developed by Boole under
the impression that he was dealing with the ‘Laws of Thought’” (169-70). Russell’s nemesis,
Kurt Gödel, likened the universal characteristic to his own work in theoretical mathematics in a
1944 essay, even suggesting to a friend that there was a conspiracy to suppress the elusive
details of Leibniz’s scheme (Dawson 137; 166). The most influential attempt to make a logical
formalist of Leibniz, though, is Ernst Cassirer’s chapter on the history of linguistic thought in
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29), which crowns Leibniz’s characteristic as the
culmination of an early-modern form of Platonism that “demanded a return from words to
‘things’” and “accorded primacy to mathematics and the mathematical study of nature” (127).
While Cassirer himself does not connect Leibniz to later developments in logic, his account led a
generation of scholars to presume that the characteristic was meant to be something entirely
different from signification systems as they are usually conceived, and, for the most part, to
treat it as a forerunner of Boolean, Fregean, or Russellean formalism (see Aarsleff, “The
Eighteenth Century” 386; 399).
While there is some merit to this connection, simply equating the characteristic with
formal logic only captures one aspect of Leibniz’s program. For Russell, the problem with the
characteristic was that it attempted to apply to philosophy what was an essentially
mathematical method; since it works entirely through deduction, Russell writes, Leibniz’s
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calculus ratiocinatur cannot help in “the discovery of those simple notions, and those primitive
axioms, upon which any calculus or science must be based” (170). If we construe Leibniz’s
project as Russell does, it would seem to involve composing the symbols for complex ideas out
of components representing simple ideas. Leibniz comes close to this way of thinking in a text
from the early 1690s called “A Study in the Logical Calculus,” in which he introduces the
concatenation of letters as a way of representing the combination of properties—thus, if R is
rational and A is animal, human is equivalent to RA (Philosophical Papers and Letters 371-82).
Such a character would, as Russell suggests, only be able to produce conclusions that follow
from the definitions of terms, which would limit its usefulness. But as a way of defining the
entire “alphabet of human thoughts,” this bottom-up approach would seem to conflict with
Leibniz’s anti-Cartesian stance. If the character is to be developed in parallel with the analysis
of knowledge, rather than founded upon it, how could it express complex ideas entirely
through the composition of simple ones?
One possible answer to this question, suggested by Donald Rutherford, is that Leibniz
had in mind something similar to what Hilary Putnam calls a “division of linguistic labor”
(Rutherford 247-8; Putnam 13). Arguing against the positivist definition of meaning as a
criterion for recognizing a thing, Putnam observes that people concern themselves with
different aspects of a word’s usage based on their social roles. Thus, for example, people can
genuinely care whether a wedding ring is made out of gold without, themselves, knowing how
to tell real gold from fake; the latter “job” is left to chemists and jewelers (13). The notation
that Leibniz invented for the infinitesimal calculus would seem to be tailor-made for just this
sort of division of labor. Take, for instance, the integral, which provides a way of determining
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the area of arbitrary shapes by dividing them into infinitesimal portions. In Leibniz’s notation,
this integral describes the area of a right triangle with two sides of length 1:
1

∫ 𝑥𝑑𝑥
0

0 and 1 indicate the left and right bounds of the area; 𝑥 is the expression that defines its upper
bound; and 𝑑𝑥 indicates the infinitesimal steps by which the area is to be measured. The 𝑑𝑥—
which is typically held up as a reason why Leibniz’s notation is superior to Newton’s—provides
a clue as to how the calculation works. But this formula does not tell us what simple ideas
make up the complex idea of the integral in the way that “rational animal” decomposes the
idea of the human. The symbol  is a stand-in for a longer definition that one does not need to
keep in mind—or even know—in order to perform the calculation. Leibniz’s notation provides
just enough information to make the idea of integration useful, while enabling most people to
leave the details to the experts.
There is, however, major difference between the labor politics of Leibniz’s work and the
division of labor as Rutherford and Putnam represent it. While Rutherford imagines blind
thought supporting the delegation of responsibilities between disciplines of knowledge—one
can defer questions like what gold is to “experts with the latest knowledge and techniques
available” (Rutherford 274)—Leibniz was generally antagonistic toward the division of
disciplines, which was not, in his time, taken as a given.28 In particular, his remarks about his
calculating machine suggest not the sort of disciplinary autonomy that characterizes Weberian
modernity, but rather a hierarchy between the philosophers who create the definitions and
subalterns who work out their consequences.29 In a 1685 manuscript, Leibniz suggests that one
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purpose of the machine is to enable scientists to delegate the task of calculation to inferiors: “it
is unworthy of excellent men [such as astronomers] to lose hours like slaves in the labor of
calculation, which could be safely relegated to anyone else if the machine were used” (“Leibniz
on his Calculating Machine” 181). The point of mechanization is to make calculation into an
easier, less intellectual task, thus enabling philosophers to entrust it to those of lesser mind.
Addition is reduced to turning a crank. While the procedure for dividing numbers requires a
somewhat more complex process that involves estimation, Leibniz emphasizes that it is “but
very easy for anyone of mediocre ability to estimate the correct quotient at first sight” (178). In
characteristically seventeenth-century fashion, Leibniz supposes that science takes place under
the direction of an individual genius, whose range of ability is not limited to any particular
science, and who would gladly delegate the tedious parts of scientific inquiry to others were
there not the troubling possibility of error. The prime concern that arises in dividing up labor,
for Leibniz, is not whether an ordinary person can trust the experts—a concern that would
reach a crisis in the nineteenth century—but whether “excellent men” can trust people at
lower positions on the social hierarchy.
For Leibniz, I argue, what enables a machine to ground this trust is a belief in the ability
of real characters to retain a stable relation to ideas as they go through mechanical processes.
Whereas the industrialists who revived the idea of mechanizing thought in the ninenteenth
century would come to treat symbols instrumentally, separating the question of interpretation
from the mechanical aspects of calculation, Leibniz never gave up on meaning. He states one
version of his rationale for the use of algorithmic process in the 1684 essay “Meditations on
Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas.” This essay is in part an attempt to refute Thomas Hobbes’s
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argument that truth is arbitrary because it depends on the arbitrary signs of language (see Maat
338; 353). Leibniz begins this essay by defining clear and distinct ideas in terms broadly similar
to Descartes’s, but he then notes that some forms of reasoning can proceed without perfectly
clear ideas. In complex chains of reasoning, he writes, “we do not intuit the entire nature of a
subject matter at once but make use of signs instead of things, though we usually omit the
explanation of these signs in any actually present thought for the sake of brevity, knowing or
believing that we have the power to do it” (292). Later in the essay, he gives a partial
explanation of how this sort of blind thought might apply to the material world by drawing a
distinction between “nominal definitions, which contain only marks for discerning one thing
from others, and real definitions, through which the possibility of the thing is ascertained”
(293). Real definitions in this sense would enable blind thought to produce knowledge about
things, rather than just about the meanings of words. The calculus ratiocinatur and, in
principle, the mechanization and delegation of reasoning, could thus be applied to any subject
matter, provided only that we keep in mind “the difference between a true and a false idea,”
backing our symbols up with definitions that are not arbitrary, but that, to the contrary, encode
truths about the possibilities and causes of things (293). Given a symbolic calculus that is
constructed upon such true definitions, it should be possible to offload the operations of
reasoning to a subaltern without having to worry about whether they truly understand the
ideas or not—so long as they are made to follow the procedures correctly, they can do no
wrong.
How exactly Leibniz thought these definitions would work is a difficult question to
answer. Many modern commentators have attributed the difficulty of making sense of
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Leibniz’s universal characteristic to a fundamental ambiguity in his writings about symbols. Two
such accounts are those of Dascal and Pombo. Through a reading of Leibniz’s use of the
traditional metaphor of words as money, Dascal argues that Leibniz wavered in his
characterizations of the calculus ratiocinatur, sometimes suggesting a “formalist” position in
which deduction proceeds from an analysis of complex ideas into simple, but at other times
treating symbols more like promissory notes that must eventually be “cashed in” in exchange
for ideas (21). In her monograph on Leibniz’s linguistic projects, Pombo explains this wavering
as the result of a desire to have it both ways, gaining the advantages of formalism without the
trade-off. The essence of Leibniz’s project, she argues, is “to reconcile the rigour of a formal
language with the meaning that only natural languages possess, and thus to avoid both the
meaninglessness of formal systems and the ambiguities of ordinary language” (25). Pombo
argues that the ambiguity in Leibniz’s remarks on the characteristic ultimately results from the
theological underpinnings of his project, which presents simple ideas (of which the idea of God
is, for Leibniz, the sine qua non) as both forming the foundation of and existing outside the
bounds of human reason (119). Leibniz did make some strides towards what now appears as
symbolic logic, Pombo concludes, but he held back from creating systems that were “totally
formalized, and as such, separated from the world by an impassible barrier” (189).
To treat this attempt to reconcile meaning with formalism as an ambiguity, however, is
to impose modern categories and a modern sensibility on the aspects of Leibniz’s work that
most conflict with them. From Leibniz’s perspective, there was no problem in reconciling
formalism with meaning; if a “real definition” can load a symbol with knowledge about the
natures and causes of things, then one would have no reason to expect a symbolic calculus to
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be separated from more worldly considerations by an “impassible barrier.” Based on his
scattered comments about the characteristic, Leibniz seemed to have anticipated no difficulty
in connecting symbolic systems to practical concerns across all areas of life. As Leroy E.
Loemker notes, one of Leibniz’s longstanding preoccupations was with legal reform, and he saw
his universal character as a necessary element of a rationalized legal system (6). In addition to
law, Leibniz suggested that the characteristic could be applied to matters as diverse as
cryptography, music, morality, and religion (Philosophical Papers and Letters 192; 224; 261).
The idea that a symbolic calculus can extend to all these areas depends, of course, on some
very strong assumptions about how symbols relate to the world.30 Leibniz does not seem to
have denied the arbitrariness of signifiers in all cases; in the New Essays, he suggests that the
“artificial languages” of “George Dalgarno and the late Bishop Wilkins of Chester” are “wholly
chosen and arbitrary” (278). But even if the symbols themselves are arbitrary, the mechanical
processes to which they are applied could, from his perspective, be used to establish their
meanings with certainty, and thus to put them in a non-arbitrary relation to the world. As long
as this metaphysics remains unquestioned, there is no barrier between algebraic symbols and
the world of people and things.
Committed as Leibniz seemed to be to it, this metaphysics of the algorithm had a
powerful adversary in the Cartesians, and it fell out of favor in the eighteenth century. As I
show in the next chapter, many from the 1680s onward were highly skeptical about the efficacy
of character systems like Leibniz’s universal characteristic, and some even questioned the
ability of symbolic algebra itself to connect to the world of sensible things. While Leibniz held
onto the dream of a real character into the eighteenth century, his linguistic project
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encountered intractable problems only a few decades after its author’s death in 1716. In the
mid-eighteenth century, one of the most prominent followers of Leibniz (after the tireless
Christian Wolff) was the Swiss logician Joseph Heinrich Lambert, who attempted to develop
Leibniz’s idea of blind thought further in the direction of a logical calculus. Lambert began his
investigations into logic in the 1750s with an attempt to discover, through a series of essays
that were published after his death, what “was concealed in the Leibnizian characteristic and in
the ars combinatoria” (quoted by Capozzi and Roncaglia 137). To this end, Lambert developed
a logical system based on a representation similar to Venn diagrams, which was meant, as he
presented it, to do for qualities what the algebraic notation had done for quantities. But
Lambert soon had difficulty moving from theoretical descriptions to a practical system that
could maintain a clear relation to the material world.
While Lambert’s work contains several important advances in symbolic logic, his
symbolism is sharply distinguished from the formalism of later periods by its attempt to make
logical symbols into non-arbitrary signifiers. In the New Organon (1764), an important preKantian work of critical philosophy, Lambert coined the word semiotics to describe a cognitive
theory of signification whose scope extended, in Winfried Nöth’s words, “from musical notes,
gestures, and hieroglypics to chemical, astrological, heraldic, social, and natural signs” (Nöth
28). The highest variety of sign, Lambert declares in this book, is the scientific sign, which
represents the world with such a veracity that, he writes, “the theory of things and the theory
of signs become interchangeable” (quoted by Nöth 28). Lambert presents his attempt at such a
scientific symbolism in his book Disquisitio, published in 1767 (Capozzi and Roncaglia 139).
What he developed, however, did not live up to the expectations he had created; early readers
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of the Disquisitio were disappointed to find that his logical calculus used arbitrary letters to
represent qualities rather than, as he had promised, symbols that naturally corresponded to the
essences of things (Capozzi and Roncaglia 141). In spite of Lambert’s efforts, Leibniz’s universal
symbolism remained unrealized.
Lambert’s failure was due in part to a change in the intellectual climate between the
time of Leibniz and the 1760s. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake, which Voltaire depicted in Candide
and in his “Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne,” was only one of a number of factors that placed
Leibniz’s optimistic metaphysics under question. By the latter half of the eighteenth century,
the possibility of a connection between symbols and things could no longer be taken on faith,
as it could for Leibniz himself; instead, connecting symbolic systems to the world had become a
practical problem and, as Lambert recognized, a psychological one. In the next chapter, I
examine how one of the major intellectual traditions of the eighteenth century—the strain of
empiricism running from John Locke through Étienne Bonnot de Condillac to the French
idéologues—grappled with the question of how the symbolic systems of science relate to
people’s mental representations of the world. For the thinkers in this tradition, unclear words
were just as much a problem for scientific thought as they were for Bacon, but it was no longer
seen as possible to bypass the uncertainties of verbal language, even through the use of
mathematical symbols. Instead of seeing algorithmic systems as an alternative to language,
these thinkers viewed them as better languages that one had to learn to “speak” in order to
genuinely connect the symbols to objects of the senses. For this eighteenth-century tradition,
unlike the schools of thought that came before and after, it was not enough just to learn the
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rules of a symbolic system—one had to absorb that system as deeply into one’s being as one
absorbs one’s mother tongue.
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Chapter 2: Science and/as Language in the French Enlightenment

The alphabet is really now superfluous
for in this sign all men can find salvation.
—Faust, Part II (trans. Atkins)

Condorcet: An Exorcism

In the winter of 1794, Nicolas de Condorcet knew that he would not live long. During the early
years of the French Revolution, he was an enthusiastic participant, helping to draft the 1789
Declaration of the rights of Man and of the Citizen and representing Paris in the Legislative
Assembly of 1791-2. Just a year and two weeks after that assembly was dissolved, however, his
support for the moderate Girondin faction made him into an outlaw. On October 3, 1793, the
Jacobins released a warrant for his arrest, and he was forced to flee from his home (D. Williams
42). During his eight months in hiding, he passed the time by writing political texts whose
forward-looking nature belied the direness of his situation. In these manuscripts, which include
some of his best-known work, he sketched out a utopian plan for the future that stood in sharp
contrast to the realities of revolutionary France.
In one of the fragments he wrote while a fugitive, later published as Esquisse d'un
tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress
of the Human Mind), Condorcet suggests two means by which the improvement of the human
race can be assured: first, the adoption of “technical methods,” by which he means “the art of
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uniting a great number of objects in an arranged and systematic order;” and second, a
“universal language” that “expresses by signs, either the direct objects, or those well-defined
collections constituted of simple and general ideas, which are to be found or may be introduced
equally in the understandings of all mankind” (285-6). Such a language, he writes, would not
have “the inconvenience of a scientific idiom, different from the vernacular tongue” (287); it
could be learned by all, as schoolchildren learn the language of algebra, providing universal
access to the best scientific knowledge available and ensuring that there could be no
disagreement about either the meaning of terms of the validity of arguments. Uncertainty
about the meanings of words would be solved once and for all, and reasoning would be
reduced to a purely mechanical process.
Condorcet’s work has long stood as a metonym for the longstanding desire to extend
mathematical reasoning to all domains of knowledge. Foucault, in The Order of Things, cites
Condorcet as one of the Classical thinkers who attempted “to mathematize empirical
knowledge” in domains outside of physics and astronomy (56). Similarly, Umberto Eco, in The
Search for the Perfect Language, takes Condorcet’s approach to creating a universal language as
proof that “the search for perfect languages was definitively turning in the direction of a logicomathematical calculus” (283), and Roger Chartier holds Condorcet’s project up as an example of
a desire for “formalizing cognitive operations and logical reasoning” (137). More boldly, Keith
Michael Baker argues that Condorcet’s remarks about the possibility of mechanizing algebraic
operations are prophetic of twentieth-century developments in computation (124). There has,
however, been surprisingly little in-depth scholarship on the way Condorcet’s views on
computation fit into the broader context of eighteenth-century semiotics. This chapter looks at
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Condorcet’s universal language scheme alongside two other linguistic projects from lateeighteenth-century France: the pedagogical program of Étienne Bonnot de Condillac and the
reform of chemical terminology undertaken by Antoine Lavoisier. My reading of these three
projects shows that algorithms had a very different relation to semiotics in French
Enlightenment thought than it did for Leibniz. While Leibniz could take it on faith that symbols
bore a stable relation to things, by the late eighteenth century it was no longer possible to
avoid the question of how the algorithmic processes of calculation related to the world of
human life; instead, in order to make a logical calculus useful, one had to take pains to establish
a connection between the symbols and the ideas by which people understand the world.
Condorcet’s project thus exemplifies a distinctly eighteenth-century approach to relating
algorithm and meaning, one that keeps the human understanding in the center even as
reasoning becomes bound to a fixed set of rules.
Condorcet did not live to see his remarks about the universal language published. On
March 27, 1794, he was arrested while attempting to flee the house where he was hiding, and
two days later he died in his cell of unknown causes. His papers, however, survived, and the
Sketch was published the following year (Manuel 59). Along with the manuscript for the Sketch,
he left behind an unfinished plan for the
universal language he describes. Over the
course of about 90 handwritten pages,
Condorcet shows how the symbolic
language of algebra can be made to
subsist on its own, without the need for

Figure 13. Condorcet shows how a mathematical proof can be
communicated without the need for words (reproduced by Granger 205).
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sentences linking the pieces together (Figure 13). He thus eliminates the need for the
fragments of natural language that, in a typical mathematical paper, link propositions together
into proofs; in this system, a complete argument can be made without the need for a single
word of French, English, or German. While Condorcet begins with algebra, his goal is to extend
this sort of symbolization beyond mathematics to “all kinds” of knowledge (Granger 204).
What he seems to have in mind is a classification system that enables all ideas to be
represented as numbers. To use his example, one could have the number 145702342
designate a particular plant, with 145 representing the class, 70 the genus, 23 the species, and
42 the individual (217). Just before the manuscript cuts off, Condorcet promises to explain how
such a symbolic system can be extended to the realms of metaphysics, linguistics, morals, and
politics (219).
Even before Condorcet begins to move beyond mathematics, however, he begins to
show some anxiety about the possibility of natural language finding its way back in. Before the
universal algebra can be put to use in a particular case, it is necessary to establish the meanings
of the symbols, and it was not apparent that this could be done without some recourse to
words. Condorcet considers this a flaw in his scheme, although not a fatal one:
We observe first that if, in a rare circumstance, it were impossible to make
understood an absolutely new theory, to designate an object which had not yet
been considered, to develop an operation of which one has not yet formed any
idea, without having recourse to some verbal explications, the language would
not merit less the name of universal, would not be less useful. It would happen
then, but in an opposite sense, what happens in spoken language, when
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sometimes one is obliged to show the object itself or its representation, because
of a lack of having the expressions to describe it. One would need one language
to supplement [suppléer] the other. One might believe that this defect will not
be encountered but very rarely in the language of universal algebra[.] (213; my
translation)
To make theories understood, to designate objects, to form ideas of operations—these are all
matters of mediating between the symbols and a person’s mental conceptions of the world.
When an adjustment has to be made to the alignment between symbols and ideas, “verbal
explications” must intervene. This is an objection that the philosopher Joseph Marie de
Gérando would judge, a few years later, to be fatal to the idea of a philosophical language: one
would have to explain the meanings of the newly minted words in an existing, presumably
imperfect language, thus tainting the new one (Knowlson 200). Yet Condorcet is confident that
it will not be a problem in the majority of cases. One can mostly avoid the taint of language, he
thinks, by taking care always to proceed “from known to unknown” and by expressing new
ideas as “generalizations” or “restrictions” of existing ones (213). In this way, the algebraic
system can be made as self-contained as possible, and words can, for the most part, be held at
bay outside the walls.
The urgency with which Condorcet wanted to get rid of natural language manifests
much the same distrust of words that had motivated Wilkins, albeit in a very different context.
But his apparent anxiety about the possibility that, despite his best efforts, natural language
would seep back in—the fact that he sees the occasional need for French definitions as a
“defect” of his plan—is distinctive of the eighteenth century. For Wilkins and Dalgarno,
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establishing the meanings of symbols had not been a major problem. The two of them could
argue over what sort of taxonomy a real character scheme should use, but there was never
much doubt at the time that a hierarchical thesaurus would suffice to fix the meanings of the
characters with certainty, independently of any verbal language (see Maat 155). By the 1750s,
however, it had become clear that the idols of the market existed not just in words, but in the
minds of people who spoke them. A new attention to the histories of European vernaculars in
the mid-century had led to the widespread belief that languages were deeply bound up with
thought, a proposition that implied, for some Enlightenment thinkers, that it would be much
harder than previously believed to overcome the influence of words. If one’s native tongue is
an essential element of one’s way of thinking, it is not such a simple matter to learn a new
symbolic system without some of the old prejudices polluting it. In order to truly dispense with
the idols that lurk in one’s mind, one would have to rebuild the language and the ideas alike.
In spite of the very evident difficulty that such a project faced, Condorcet was far from
alone in attempting it. The French Enlightenment context produced some of the eighteenth
century’s most radical claims for the ability of new symbolic systems to reshape society, and
Condillac and Lavoisier, two widely respected thinkers, both expressed their own versions of
the desire to create a new scientific language from scratch. Condillac, one of the period’s most
influential philosophers on the subject of language, argued that words play a constitutive role in
human thought and that, as a result, a clear language was essential to the pursuit of science.
Citing Condillac’s maxims, Lavoisier worked to renovate the terminology of chemistry,
promoting new definitions for the elements based on experimental evidence. While
Condorcet, Condillac, and Lavoisier were all sanguine about the potential for symbolic systems
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to create a more rational society, they faced a difficult task in bringing this rationality into
being. As empiricists of an eighteenth-century stripe, they could appeal neither to the
essentialism of Wilkins nor to the pre-established harmony of Leibniz as a way of linking their
scientific languages to the world. As a result, they had to navigate between twin threats to the
coherence of their languages: on the one side, the possibility that the new language will be
tainted by the role that the vernacular plays in its construction, and on the other, the possibility
that the reasonings it enables are merely arbitrary algorithms, not grounded in any analysis of
physical reality.
Placing these three thinkers together illustrates the epistemological rifts that separate
this moment from what came before and what followed. With the benefit of hindsight, one can
perceive Condorcet’s universal algebra, like Leibniz’s characteristic, as a prefiguration of the
later development of formal logic by George Boole, Gottlob Frege, C.S. Peirce, and their
followers. But viewed in its intellectual context, Condorcet’s desire to expunge words from
algebra suggests that he was responding to quite the opposite concern from the one that drove
the formalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like Lavoisier, Condorcet was trying
to create a language for analyzing physical things as they are perceived—a language in which
one can think about the world. From this perspective, mechanization was no solution to the
uncertainty of language, as it would become in the time of Babbage and Boole; instead of
formal rules, what a properly scientific language needed in the context of eighteenth-century
empiricism was a well-constructed system of mental representations that connect it to the
senses. From this perspective, the continued influence of received ways of understanding the
world—of what later came to be known as culture—was a problem to be solved.
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Condillac: Linguistic Purity as an Epistemic Virtue

To see how Condorcet’s linguistic project differs from that of Leibniz, it is necessary to gain a
sense of the difference between the natural science of the seventeenth century and the
empiricist philosophy of the eighteenth. An important figure in the new empiricism is Condillac.
In the last chapter of his second book, A Treatise on Systems (1749), Condillac sums up his
argument with the gnomic, often-quoted statement that “a well-conducted science is merely a
well-formed language” (151). The heart of any scientific endeavor, in Condillac’s view, is the
analysis of sensory data, and language provides a “method of analysis,” its words dividing up
the world into comprehensible chunks and indicating their relations. As a result of the
fundamentally linguistic nature of science, he argues, “any science should be within the reach
of an intelligent mind, since every well-formed language is comprehensible” (151). Condillac
disarmingly turns the rubric of the well-formed language upon himself. “If you do not
understand me,” he writes, “it is because I do not know how to write; and if you happen
sometimes not to understand me, that is because I sometimes write badly” (151). Condillac’s
insistence on the importance of language to science participates in the push for clarity that
goes back to Bacon. But Condillac is not just saying that science requires a clear language; he is
saying that science is a language. This statement heralds a new alternative to the Baconian
mandate to study things rather than words.
Between the time of Wilkins and Leibniz and that of Condillac stand a number of
changes in the relations of science, language, and education. Earlier in the eighteenth century,
natural historians had come widely to recognize the arbitrariness of categorization schemes,
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while the Newtonian revolution had cemented the place of quantitative methods at the center
of the physical sciences. Together, these changes made the idea of a language that naturally
corresponds to the essences of things, after Wilkins’s model, an anachronism. At the same
time, however, the rise of Newtonian science had created new communicational issues.
Newton’s Principia (1687) was almost universally hailed as a work of genius in the eighteenth
century, especially in his native England, but it was of daunting complexity even for skilled
mathematicians. This problem led, in the first half of the eighteenth century, to an outpouring
of textbooks and popular accounts that attempted to explain Newton’s physics more clearly,
including books by John Harris and Charles Hayes in English and Voltaire in French (Guicciardini,
Development of Newtonian Calculus 13-18; Hine 38). Condillac attacked the challenge of
communicating complex systems like Newton’s at a theoretical level, attempting to explain,
through the psychological theories of his time, why people sometimes have trouble absorbing
scientific ideas.
Condillac’s approach to this project is heavily indebted to British empiricism and natural
philosophy, including Newton’s Principia. As Ellen McNiven Hine has noted, Condillac often
wrote of the “Newtonian Method” as the best route to knowledge (43). This method, as
Condillac construes it, is to derive the laws of nature “from an examination of sense
experience,” not “geometrically from indubitable first principles” (Hine 42). In A Treatise on
Systems, Condillac presents this Newtonian method as a superior alternative to the “abstract
systems” of rationalists like Leibniz, Spinoza, and Malebranche. According to Condillac, such
thinkers fall prey to an “excessive blindness” due to their rigid adherence to principles that are
not based on sensory data (13). It is unclear whether Condillac means this reference to
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blindness—which is one of many in the Treatise—as a jab against Leibniz’s idea of blind
thought, but Condillac leaves no doubt about what he thinks of the doctrine of pre-established
harmony. Unlike Leibniz, Condillac is not willing to take it on faith that a system of symbols,
even the one used in algebra, has anything to do with the world.
While Newton was a key model of scientific achievement for Condillac, the most
important reference point for his philosophy is John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1689, dated 1690). As Aarsleff has argued, one of Locke’s overall thrusts in the
Essay is against the idea that words can naturally express the true essences of things (From
Locke to Saussure 27-28). In Locke’s view, there are no innate ideas in the mind; all of our
knowledge ultimately derives from the senses and the faculty of reflection, and as a result, it is
not possible for us to know the “real essences” of substances (401). Instead, all we have access
to are simple ideas that derive directly from the senses, such as the idea of yellow. In Locke’s
view, ideas of substances, such as gold, only refer to what he calls nominal essences—
collections of qualities that we have arbitrarily chosen to bundle together in the definitions of
particular words. To continue with his example, we might define gold as something that is
yellow, malleable, and fusible, but our choice to include these particular qualities in the
definition is ultimately arbitrary (393). As a result, contrary to the views of Bacon, Wilkins, and
Leibniz, we can never test our language against the natural order of the world. There is no
question, for Locke, of characters being answerable to the nature of things (Wilkins) or ideas
being true (Leibniz); the only standard to which words and ideas can be held is whether or not
we are being consistent in how we define them.
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Locke concludes his discussion of language with a long section on “the abuse of words,”
which presents yet another call for clear language as a way of avoiding philosophical confusion.
Compared to the expansive real-character projects of the earlier seventeenth century,
however, Locke’s solution to the problem of linguistic imprecision is relatively modest. Locke
disavows the idea of a philosophical language, stating in the Essay, with apparent reference to
Wilkins, “I am not so vain to think, that anyone can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming
the languages of the world, no not [sic] so much as that of his own country, without rendering
himself ridiculous” (453; on the connection to Wilkins, see Slaughter 206). Instead, Locke
merely suggests that one use clear and consistent definitions for all of one’s terms; echoing
Sprat, he also exhorts his reader to avoid figurative language (437; 455-65).31 More
speculatively, he envisions that people might someday create a dictionary “containing, as it
were, a natural history,” which would rectify the problem for good (463-64). In response to
what he called, in a letter to William Molyneux, “the cheat of words,” Locke primarily
emphasizes definitions rather than the construction of a completely new language (Works,
9.301). As long as one clearly states the simple ideas that make up one’s complex ideas, words
should not get in the way.
While Condillac accepts most of Locke’s epistemology without question, he takes a
much more radical position than Locke in regard to language. For Locke, words are primarily
communicational in function, and at only a few points does Locke suggest that they also play a
role in thought (e.g. 346). Condillac, on the other hand, asserts emphatically that complex
ideas cannot exist without signs of some sort. As a result, coming up with a system of signs—a
language—is equivalent, for Condillac, to coming up with a system of ideas—that is, a science.
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Clearing up language thus takes much more than definitions; instead, Condillac argues, clear
ideas can only be derived from a careful analysis of the world that begins with the senses.
Condillac’s notion of analysis, which had a great deal of influence in the later eighteenth
century, is a two-stage process: first, one divides up sensory data into component parts, and
then one reassembles the ideas of the parts into an idea of the whole. The result is a sign that
refers to a complex idea that, if one has been careful enough, relates in a clear way to sensory
data. The role of language in this process is unavoidable for Condillac. A language, for
Condillac, is an “analytical method,” meaning that it consists of nothing but signifiers referring
to ideas, either clear or confused, by which one can divide up the world of the senses (Logic
392). As a result, if we want to build a scientific theory of the world based, in Newtonian
fashion, on the analysis of observations, we will have to recreate language anew.
Condillac first attempts this refashioning of language in Essay on the Origin of Human
Knowledge (1746). In this book, he attempts to give an account of “the springs of human
understanding” on the model of Locke’s Essay, but in a way that accounts for the role of
language from the start rather than, as Locke did, considering ideas first and words second (7).
This book includes Condillac’s theory of the origin of language, which spawned a great deal of
debate in the second half of the eighteenth century (see Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 14699). Imagine, he suggests, two children alone in the “desert,” lacking any language (113). The
idea of signification might first arise when one of them tries to reach a fruit on a branch that is
too high. The other, recognizing the desire of his companion, would help her get the fruit (11415). Noticing this response, the first child would realize that a reaching motion can be used to
indicate a desire for something, and thus the first sign is created. Further signs would develop,
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vocal language would emerge as a supplement to the “language of gestures,” and, at length,
words would form (116). But in early times, according to Condillac, abstract ideas could only be
developed by imperfect analogies, as the French word esprit (mind) arose “from the idea of
very rarified matter, of vapor” (165). Languages became confused when “people forgot the
origin of these signs,” mistaking the imperfect metaphors for true reflections of the essences of
things (166). Thus, as Knowlson writes, Condillac concludes that “[a]s languages have become
more elaborate and richer in terms, they have also tended to become less effective as methods
of analysis” (168). Condillac assigns the new language, just emerged from simple sensations, a
kind of empirical purity that has since been lost.
Condillac thinks that his “imaginative reconstruction” of the origin of language can
provide us with a method for making a better language. In order to overcome the errors in
existing languages, he suggests, we must imagine ourselves in the situation of a man “created
fully grown by God” without the knowledge of any words or ideas, and thus, through the
analysis of our sensory input, “make an entirely new language for ourselves” (209). In practice,
this reconstruction of language amounts to a didactic method that emphasizes learning
concepts in the proper order. As the newly created man would develop simple ideas first and
gradually build complexity, so the student should begin by learning about simple sensations,
and learn other subjects in the order in which they derive from these primal ideas. The
progression from simple to complex, which Slaughter traces to Comenius’s pedagogical theory
and to Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Slaughter 206), is meant to ensure that all
of the words the student learns have definite, “fixed and secure” ideas attached to them,
traceable back to the simple ideas of the senses (Condillac, Essay 205).
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When Condillac writes that a science is a “well-formed language,” he means a language
with clear ideas attached to every word. His project is thus very different from the
philosophical languages of Wilkins and Leibniz, which included (or were meant to include)
lexicons of symbols for simple ideas. For Condillac, there is no particular reason to create new
symbols or words. In the section on learning science at the end of A Treatise on Systems, he
suggests that a scientific language can be built on the foundation of French. When setting out
to study the sciences, Condillac admonishes his reader, “you have a language to learn,” and in
order to learn it well, it is not enough to glance over its words; instead, you must “speak it and
make it familiar” (152). “Nevertheless,” he continues:
one difficulty remains and it is a big one. It comes from the fact that before
studying the sciences, you already speak their language, and you speak it badly.
For with the exception of a few words, their language is your own. Now you
agree that you often speak your language without really understanding what you
are saying or that at most you understand yourself only approximately. This is
nevertheless sufficient for you and for others, because they pay you in coin. It
seems that to maintain our conversations we tacitly agreed that words can take
the place of ideas, as in games chips take the place of money. And although
there is only one cry of protest against those imprudent enough to play without
having learned the value of chips, everyone can with impunity speak without
having learned the value of words.
Do you wish to learn the sciences easily? Begin by learning your
language. (152-53)
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So concludes the book. Condillac is suggesting that sciences can be difficult to learn because,
however clearly an author might explain them, they involve words which most people already
know, but to which they have not attached clear ideas. Blind thought—treating words as
“game chips”—is a vice for Condillac, even if it is a necessary one. To truly understand a
science, one must attach precise ideas to every signifier that the science uses, be they words,
numbers, or even—as Condillac suggests in his later work—symbols like + (on numbers, see the
Essay 204; on algebraic symbols, see Logic 408-09).
While Condillac paid little attention to algebra in his early work, he later came to see it
as an exemplary instance of a well-formed language (Albury 23). In Logic, published a few
weeks after Condillac’s death in 1780 (Albury 15), he argues that exact proofs are possible in
algebraic notation because it is tainted by neither “vulgar words that have no determinate
sense” nor “foreign or barbarous words that are poorly understood,” and thus capable of a
greater degree of certainty than other languages (410). From the success of algebra he draws
one of his most extreme conclusions about the relationship of science and language: that
“scientific progress depends solely on the progress of languages” (410). Since the language of
algebra has a superior clarity to the “jargon” of “inexact sciences,” it spreads certainty and
enlightenment everywhere it extends (410). This clarity, however, is not on account of the
symbolic notation itself. Condillac demonstrates how an equation can be solved in just the
same way using either sentences like “Two plus three equals two lefts minus a left” or symbolic
notations like “2 + 3 = 2𝑦 − 𝑦” (408-09), which he takes as equivalent in rigor, if not in
convenience. “We should not,” he writes, “suppose that the sciences are exact—or that we
prove rigorously—only when we use x’s, a’s, and b’s” (410). The only advantage of algebraic
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notation is that it is simple and pure, free from the confusions caused in other languages by the
mixing of idioms and the naturalization of metaphors; if this purity could be extended to the
languages of other sciences, they would all be subject to exact proof in the way that
mathematics is.
By asserting this, Condillac is emphatically not suggesting a logical calculus of the sort
proposed earlier by Leibniz and later by Boole. Condillac sees algebra, like other languages, as a
method for analyzing sensory data, and accordingly, for him, one cannot ignore the meanings
of symbols even temporarily; the symbols must, rather, become enmeshed in the way we
understand the world. For this reason, Condillac rejects the idea that reasoning can take place
through the application of formal rules. As he states in one of the last paragraphs of Logic, it is
a mistake to think that “for each line of reasoning, the first thing we ought to do is to think
about the rules for pursuing it” (419). “It is not,” he writes, “up to us to think of rules, it is up to
them to guide us without our thinking about them. We would not speak if, before beginning
each sentence, we had to concern ourselves with grammar. Now, like all languages, the art of
reasoning, can be spoken well only insofar as it is spoken naturally” (419). In other words, the
rules should become habits, worn into the grain of one’s being, just like the grammar of one’s
native language. As a way of ensuring this deep absorption of his ideas, he prefers students
whose habits are not yet deeply ingrained: “I write only for the uninstructed. Since they do not
speak any scientific language they will find it easier to learn mine. It lies closer to hand than
any other because I have learned it from nature, which will speak to them as it does to me”
(419). In Condillac’s logic—as for many logic textbooks of the eighteenth century—the point is
not to learn a set of formalized procedures for manipulating symbols through rote
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memorization, but to become someone who understands and reasons about the world more
clearly. This means, in Condillac’s view, learning a better-formed language than the ones most
people speak.
From a twenty-first-century perspective, of course, Condillac might seem to be trying
and failing at objectivity, imposing his own linguistic preferences on others and calling it the
voice of nature. That Condillac was effectively colonizing the minds of his students is a fair
criticism; that he certainly was doing. However, to hold him to the standard of objectivity
would be to misunderstand the epistemology in which he was working. The procedures of
formal logic, as it developed in the late nineteenth century, are objective in that they prevent
one’s individual judgment from influencing the results of a deduction, but objectivity in this
modern sense is not an important consideration for Condillac. What is at stake is the concern
that what Condillac calls “abstract systems” might, if one is not careful with them, become
unconnected to the material world. Near the end of Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge,
Condillac argues that even the seemingly formal task of comparing ideas can be facilitated by
the contemplation of physical objects, which “offer aid to reflection” (212). Because wellformed ideas are rooted in the material world, “it is not necessary for us to take the precaution,
as some philosophers do, of withdrawing into solitude or entering a cave in order to meditate
there by the light of a lamp. Neither light, nor darkness, nor noise—nothing can stand in the
way of the mind of a man who knows how to think” (212). Even the apparently formal aspects
of reasoning that only involve the relationships of signs are ultimately meant to gain their truth,
in Newtonian fashion, from observations of physical things. For its own part, the well-formed
language is meant to have an effect on how a person understands the world, rather than
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existing only on sheets of paper in lamp-lit rooms. Like most other thinkers of the French
Enlightenment, Condillac wanted to extend rationality as much to the marketplace as to the
laboratory. For this purpose, algorithms for manipulating symbols are not enough; logic must
be enacted through a comprehensive program of character formation.
Condillac sparked, as Hans Aarsleff has discussed in “The Tradition of Condillac,” a great
deal of debate about the origins of language in the late eighteenth century, drawing interest in
France, Germany, and the English-speaking world (From Locke to Saussure 148). Even among
those who rejected his specific claims, Condillac’s version of the Newtonian method was widely
admired (Hine 3). His work was a major reference point for the idéologues, although, as
Knowlson discusses in detail, they had varying appraisals of it; some, such as Maine de Biran,
rejected Condillac’s proposition that language plays a fundamental role in reasoning, while
others, such as Pierre Jean George Cabanis, pushed it even further, claiming (as Condillac did
not) that signs are necessary not just for thought, but for sensation itself (Knowlson 177). As a
result of the work of Condillac and Locke, Knowlson writes, “the degree of influence that
language exercised on the understanding” became a key question for philosophers in the late
eighteenth century, leading to a renewed interest in the idea of a philosophical language in the
1790s (165). The problem in this late-eighteenth-century moment, however, is very different
from the one faced by the seventeenth-century language designers. For Bacon, as well as for
the Royal Society of Sprat and Wilkins, signs were primarily seen as a means of communicating
discoveries, and the goal was to make them as unobtrusive as possible. For Condillac and his
followers, in contrast, language is an instrument for analyzing sensory data, and, as such, the
process of improving it must coincide with a program of education. In the Condillacian view,
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defining new symbols using pre-existing words is not enough; it must be possible to construct
the language in one’s mind, along with the structure of ideas to which it is attached, from the
ground up.
One way of doing this, implied if not explicitly stated in Condillac’s later work, would be
to extend the language of algebra to all areas of science. This is the road that Condorcet took in
his unfinished manuscript. The extent of Condillac’s direct influence on Condorcet’s universal
algebra is uncertain. Granger states that Condorcet’s “philosophy of knowledge is very
evidently of Condillacian inspiration” but notes that there is nothing in Condillac’s corpus that
directly suggests Condorcet’s plan for a universal language (199; my translation). Condorcet
was lukewarm in his comments about Condillac, claiming, in a 1780 letter, that the Abbé’s work
stated only “things that everyone had known for a long time” (quoted in Baker 116). He did,
however, read Condillac’s Logic (Granger 199; Baker 117), which holds up algebra as an
example of a particularly clear language and declares that “every science would have the same
precision if we spoke them all with well-formed languages” (410). While he disagreed with
Condillac on a variety of points, Condorcet shared his belief that mathematics was a language
and that its certainty should serve as a model for all the sciences. More importantly, the two
thinkers shared the belief that this mathematical language ought to be built from the ground
up—that one could and should throw out existing ways of thinking altogether and replace them
with mathematical rationality. Yet doing so proved easier said than done. A well-formed
language as Condillac describes it must connect to the concepts of the understanding and thus
to the senses in order to remain rooted in the world. It was in attempting to maintain this
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connection that Condorcet found it necessary to resort to French, despite the taint of “vulgar”
thinking that it might introduce into his system.

Three Views of Mathematical Notation

In his attempt to extend the language of mathematics to all areas of life, Condorcet was riding a
wave. John Heilbron writes that “the later 18th century saw a rapid increase in the range and
intensity of application of mathematical methods,” which he and his colleagues call “the
quantifying spirit” (2). In the later decades of the century, Heilbron argues, this turn to
quantification responded to the increasing importance of “imponderables” like phlogiston, the
ether, and the electrical fluid that were important to scientific theories, but that do not refer to
anything that can be perceived directly (5). Measuring instruments provided a way of getting at
these (supposed) phenomena, but their results could only be analyzed quantitatively. The
quantifying spirit had a political bent in the time of the American and French revolutions, in that
mathematical methods were thought to reach the naked truth irrespective of the interests of
aristocrats and the wealthy. In post-Revolutionary America, surveyors, under the direction of
Thomas Jefferson, applied quantitative methods to the division of land in an effort to distribute
it more equitably (Heilbron 15-17). In France, Condorcet was at the forefront of a movement to
quantify political decision-making itself through the mathematization of voting (Urken 3). The
assumption underlying both projects is that mathematics is immune to the biases that can
creep into other forms of reasoning. 𝐴 > 𝐵 was thought to have a persuasive power that
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could overcome people’s prejudices, breaking down the structures of monarchical and
aristocratic authority with the force of undeniable truth.
For its most ardent supporters, the quantifying spirit provided a definitive solution to
Bacon’s call for the study of things rather than words. The philosophical language that Wilkins
and Leibniz had sought a century before had been there all along, so the thinking goes, in the
language of calculation; once everything has been measured and counted, algebra would
provide an incontrovertible means of resolving all manner of disputes. Condorcet’s mentor,
Turgot, viewed mathematical language as, in Frank E. Manuel’s words, “the loftiest expression
of human thought, at the summit of intellectuality” (43). In Turgot’s version of Enlightenment,
Manuel writes, “the armor of numbers and equations” was a safeguard against “antiprogressive
forces” like the recurrence of “barbarism” (Manuel 43). Mathematical rigor was not, however,
by itself enough to accomplish this political program. It was also necessary to make the results
understandable to the public. Even if mathematics is a perfectly precise language, that does
not necessarily make it a universal one, and in practice, the mathematizers recognized that
their demonstrations would be comprehensible only to a select few. This need to make one’s
reasoning known to the general populace raised questions about the status of mathematical
language that Condorcet, in his attempt to accelerate the spread of quantitative rationality, had
to contend with. If algebra is the true language of reason, can its results be translated, as it
were, into French or English, without losing their undeniable force? Or, to put it more
theoretically: to what extent does the symbolic notation of algebra differ from other
languages?
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The French philosophes had debated these questions a few decades earlier. In Elements
of Philosophy (1759), Jean le Rond d’Alembert poses the question of why algebra, in spite of the
certainty of its principles and inferences, “is not yet entirely exempt from obscurity in certain
regards” (261; my translation). As a specific example, d’Alembert offers negative numbers, for
which, he writes, he does not know a single work to provide a clear theory (261n). D’Alembert
is referring to one of the most notorious conceptual readjustments caused by the widespread
adoption of symbolic notation in the seventeenth century. Antoine Arnauld, one of the authors
of the well-known Port-Royal Logic, argued in a 1667 geometry text that, intuitively, the
proportion of a larger number to a smaller one should be larger than the reverse (Heeffer 13).
Yet, he points out, this is not the case with negative numbers, at least in modern symbolic
algebra: 1/−1 = −1/1. The continuing debate about this seeming paradox illustrated,
Albrecht Heeffer argues, “the clash between symbolic reasoning and classical proportion
theory” (Heeffer 14). The transition to symbolic mathematics fundamentally altered the
definition of division, leading, for d’Alembert, to an epistemological gap between those who
knew symbolic algebra and those who did algebra with words. As an explanation of this gap,
d’Alembert concludes that algebra is “a kind of language which has, like the others, its
metaphysics” (262). A person who blindly follows the rules of algebra without understanding
this metaphysics, d’Alembert writes, “only celebrates the result” but cannot “see the germ that
produced it” (262). In order to genuinely understand what the results of algebra mean, one
must learn to think within its conceptual scheme; otherwise, it will only lead to confusion.
Condillac took an emphatic stand against this line of thinking. In his Logic, he states: “I
do not agree with mathematicians who claim that algebra is a kind of language. I say it is a
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language and cannot be anything else” (410). As W. R. Albury points out (23), two of the
mathematicians he is referring to are d’Alembert and Alexis-Claude Clairaut, who, in his 1746
book Elements of Algebra, calls algebra a “particular kind of language” that uses “simple signs”
so as to make it easier to see one’s operations at a glance (3; my translation). The distinction
between algebra being “a kind of language” and being “a language” might seem pedantic, but
something serious is at stake. Condillac is attempting to argue that the way of thinking involved
in algebra is fundamentally the same as the way people always think. Against the objection
that his description of “reasoning” only captures “the way we reason in mathematics, where
reasoning is carried out with equations,” he asserts that “equations, propositions, and
judgments are at bottom the same thing, and that consequently we reason the same way in all
the sciences” (413). As Albury argues, Condillac is equating two different types of analysis that
d’Alembert, in the Encyclopédie entry for “Analytic,” distinguishes: the analysis of ideas into
components, and algebraic analysis (17-18). This means that, contrary to d’Alembert’s claim, all
languages are based on the metaphysics of algebra. While Condillac admits that algebra
“develops lines of argument that cannot be translated into any other language” (410), this is
not, for him, because of a fundamental difference between algebraic and natural language;
rather, it is because algebra is better-formed than other languages. If some algebraic results
cannot be expressed in French, this is just because one’s French terms are not clearly defined, a
fault that can be rectified by developing ideas in a careful, methodical way.
Whether or not there was any direct influence, the quantifiers of late eighteenth
century mostly shared Condillac’s optimism about the universal comprehensibility of
mathematical reasoning. A common element of the quantifying spirit was what Tore Frängsmyr
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calls an “equation of reason with
mathematics” (28). The leveling pretensions
of Turgot and Condorcet rested on the
assumption that the results of algebra, if not
the proofs themselves, could be restated in
the vernacular with their persuasive force
intact. Condorcet employs the rhetorical
equation of mathematics with reason in one of
his most influential works of “social
mathematics,” Essay on the Application of
Analysis to the Probability of Majority
Decisions (1785). In this book, he develops a

Figure 14. Mathematical notation comingles with prose
in Condorcet’s 1785 Essay (5). Source gallica.bnf.fr /
Bibliothèque nationale de France.

theory of voting through densely packed formal notation, albeit not yet entirely exorcised of
French words (Figure 14). Recognizing the difficulty that these thickets of mathematical
symbols will present for many of his readers, Condorcet also explains his argument nontechnically in a “Preliminary Discourse” almost as long as the main text of the book. This way,
he writes, “readers who are not Geometers, will only need, in order to judge the work, to admit
as true that which is given to be proven by calculation” (ii; my translation). Even though the
innumerate reader will have to take Condorcet’s word that the proofs are correct, Condorcet
does not expect much surprise as to the results: “almost everywhere one will find results
consistent with what the simplest reason would have dictated” (ii). The assumption is that,
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even if one cannot follow the intricacies of the algebra itself, the conclusions it produces
remain intuitively true, so closely does mathematics limn the grammar of reason.
But for all the confident rhetoric of the 1785 Essay, Condorcet did not accept Condillac’s
argument that all types of analysis were equivalent, and he saw more value than Condillac did
in imposing rules upon thought as a way of preventing error. As Baker points out, Condorcet’s
goal in his universal language project was to extend the certainty of mathematical analysis to
areas of inquiry that were ordinarily the domain of other, less reliable forms of analysis (Baker
117). Doing so led him to the possibility of turning reasoning into a mechanical process, which
Baker takes as evidence of proto-computational thinking (114). Yet there is an important
difference between Condorcet’s universal language project and the instrumental approach to
computation that took hold in the nineteenth century. Mechanical implements for reasoning,
Condorcet writes in a late fragment, “would appear ridiculous” until the “tables” of
classification on which they are based are proven worthy by experience (quoted by Baker 124).
Mechanizing thought, for Condorcet, is only possible after one has established a clearly defined
system of signs. For eighteenth-century empiricists, the establishment of signification was a
problem not just for utopian language schemes, but also for the mechanical methods employed
in mathematics itself. The positions of Condillac and d’Alembert betray a common desire to
avoid a third possibility that was troubling from the point of view of empiricism: that
mathematical notation is not a language at all, that its symbols have no referential relation to
any conceptual scheme, vulgar or not. A third view that was present in the eighteenth
century—to a teleological reading of history, a seed waiting to grow into the computer—was
the algorithmic view of mathematical notation.
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As much as eighteenth-century mathematicians insisted that their work rested on clear
concepts and self-evident principles, their practice consisted to a large extent of rearranging
patterns of symbols on paper or slate. Notation was especially important in the calculus,
where, on the Continent at least, Leibniz’s symbolic methods, based on the celebrated
𝑑𝑦

notations 𝑑𝑥 and ∫ 𝑦𝑑𝑥, reigned supreme. The Leibnizian version of the calculus provided a set
of algorithmic or partially algorithmic procedures for the two basic operations of calculus—
differentiation and integration—that enabled people to produce correct results even in cases so
complex as to be virtually impossible to reason about conceptually.32 Euler’s work of the 1740s
and 50s was an especially strong illustration of the power of symbolic methods. But the
rationale for these methods was missing. Leibniz could explain the power of his symbols in
terms of his idea of blind thought; the symbols, he could argue, constituted a non-arbitrary
mode of representation whose workings existed in intimate relation to the natures of things.
Yet by the 1760s, little faith remained in the power of real characters. The combination of
Leibnizian methods with Lockean and Cartesian epistemologies produced a gap between theory
and practice that was largely unresolved in the late eighteenth century. In effect, people were
still using Leibniz’s algorithms even though the rationalist metaphysics by which Leibniz himself
had justified them had collapsed. The methods worked, apparently, but no one had a fully
convincing explanation of why they worked.
The problems were not simply theoretical. Useful as they are, Leibniz’s symbols can
𝑑𝑦

easily lead to wrong results if one is not careful about using them correctly. The symbol 𝑑𝑥 ,
which Leibniz used to represent a derivative (that is, a quantity’s rate of change at a particular
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point), appears to be a quotient of two numbers, and in some ways it works similarly to one;
yet what it represents is not quite the same as division in the usual sense. In the Leibnizian
calculus, the 𝑑𝑦 and 𝑑𝑥 are supposed to represent infinitely small quantities, which, as Berkeley
had pointed out, cannot be reasoned about in the same way that ordinary numbers can be. 33
Treating these symbols as if they behave like normal quantities can lead to contradictory
𝑑𝑦

results. If one supposes, for instance, that 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑑𝑦—something that would be true for
ordinary, non-zero numbers—then one can easily use the calculus to prove that 1 = 2.34 A fully
rigorous theory of what one can and cannot legitimately do with Leibniz’s symbols was not in
place until the work of nineteenth-century mathematicians such as Bernard Bolzano, AugustinLouis Cauchy, and Karl Weierstrass, who developed the version of the calculus that is now
standard in mathematics textbooks.35
In Condorcet’s time, there were several competing explanations of why the calculus
worked that all had unresolved difficulties. One of the preëminent theories was d’Alembert’s.
In the Encyclopédie, D’Alembert attempted to explain “the metaphysics of the differential
calculus”; since, he argues, the calculus provides simple methods that work with certainty, “the
principles on which it depends must also be simple and certain” (4.985; my translation).
D’Alembert’s theory is based on the notion of the limit, which he explains, in the article for
“Limite,” in terms of the idea of one quantity “approaching” another—so that an infinitesimal is
a quantity that “approaches” zero (9.542). D’Alembert’s theory anticipates the famous epsilon–
delta definition, which Bolzano formalized in 1817 and which forms the basis of modern
calculus.36 Yet there is an important epistemological difference between d’Alembert and
Bolzano: d’Alembert was not trying to create rigorous symbolic methods, but rather to create a
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“metaphysics”—a system of ideas that would ground the algorithms of the calculus in a clear
conceptual basis. Whether the idea of one quantity “approaching” another really met this
standard of clarity was open to dispute. Around the end of the eighteenth century, JosephLouis Lagrange developed an alternate theory that aimed to root calculus in algebra, a view of
which Charles Babbage was a late holdout (Robinson 267; Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage” 36).
Since one’s choice between the two theories rested on which ideas one thought were clearer,
the disputes were endless.37
One reason for the ongoing difficulties in the foundation of the calculus was that, for
both the Condillac and the d’Alembert factions, algorithmic procedures had to derive their
validity in some way from the natures of physical things.38 Enlightenment mathematicians
responded to the empiricist challenge by depicting mathematical ideas as abstractions from
experience, applicable with a great deal of generality but still ultimately rooted in sensory data.
As d’Alembert writes in the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie, geometry arises when
“by a few successive operations and abstractions of our minds we divest matter of almost all its
sensible properties, in order to envisage in a sense only its phantom” (19). Algebra, he
continues, is “the farthest outpost to which the contemplation of the properties of matter can
lead us” (20); yet, as Amir Alexander has pointed out, he ultimately suggests that it retains a
connection to the physical world (see Alexander, “From Voyagers to Martys” 21). A similar
statement appears in Diderot’s dialogue D’Alembert’s Dream: “Every abstraction is merely a
symbol devoid of particularized meaning. Every abstract science is simply juggling with
symbols. The exact picture was dropped when the symbol was separated from the physical
object, and it is only when the symbol and the physical object are brought together again that
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the science once again becomes a matter of real things” (221-22). It was a difficult question,
however, how to ensure the possibility of this return to the world of “real things” in a field that
increasingly involved the shuffling-around of symbols on sheets of paper.
For some, the answer was simply to avoid depending on symbols. In the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there was a reaction against symbolic algebra,
especially in Britain. Leading the anti-symbolic charge was Isaac Newton. While he did use
algebraic notation, Newton was skeptical of methods that depend heavily on it, a skepticism
that was exarcerbated by his priority dispute with Leibniz. In a 1715 Philosophical Transactions
article discussing this dispute, Newton declared in the third person that “Mr. Newton doth not
place his Method in Forms of Symbols, nor confine himself to any particular Sort of Symbols for
Fluents and Fluxions” (quoted by Cajori II.200). Rather than employing symbolic forms as a
method of demonstration, Newton preferred to make his arguments through geometrical
diagrams when possible. This preference for the visual, as Douglas M. Jesseph argues, reflects
an empiricist desire to root mathematics in physical forms and motions rather than in abstract
notions of quantity (279-80). The influential Scottish mathematician Colin MacLaurin promoted
Newton’s geometric approach into the 1740s, presenting the computations of the calculus, as
Guicciardini writes, not “as blind manipulations of symbols, but rather as a meaningful language
that could always be translated into the terminology of the kinematic-geometric model”
(Guicciardini, “Dot-Age” 239-40). In Newton’s immediate followers we already see the idea,
later repeated in Condillac, that mathematical notation is a language like any other, more a
means of representation than of computation. For Newton and MacLaurin, equations are
made out of ideas, not symbols.
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Newton’s skepticism toward symbolic methods had a precedent in an earlier critique
made by his countryman Thomas Hobbes. In a 1656 pamphlet titled Six Lessons to
the Professors of the Mathematiques, Hobbes made perhaps the early-modern period’s most
vicious statement against algebraic notation. Hobbes’s pamphlet is primarily an attack on a
geometrical treatise by John Wallis, who, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, was an enthusiastic user
of symbolic methods. Hobbes deplores the way in which Wallis’s book “is so covered over with
the scab of Symbols” and states that algebraic notations “ought no more to appear in publique,
then the most deformed necessary business which you do in your Chambers” (Six Lessons 49,
23; see Alexander, Infinitesimal 280 and Pycior 146). Hobbes’s view seems to be that algebraic
notation is acceptable as an aid in the performance of mathematical reasoning, but not as a
means of public argumentation. In Elements of Philosophy, he divides symbols into two
categories—“Markes,” which one creates for one’s own use, and “Signes,” through which one
may share information with others (11).39 His criticism of Wallis suggest that he views
mathematical symbols primarily as marks and, accordingly, not as an appropriate means of
communication. Further, Hobbes suggests in his pamphlet that the meaningfulness of
mathematical symbols is ultimately dependent on natural language:
Symboles though they shorten the writing, yet they do not make the Reader
understand it sooner than if it were written in words. For the conception of the
Lines and Figures (without which a man learneth nothing) must proceed from
words, either spoken or thought upon. So that there is a double labour of the
mind, one to reduce your Symboles to words (which are also Symboles) another
to attend to the Ideas which they signifie. (54)
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This statement turns Bacon’s idea of a real character inside out. Rather than circumventing the
need for words, Hobbes argues, mathematical symbols add an extra, unnecessary step into the
signification process. Algebraic notation could have some use in one’s “private” reckonings, but
it is of no epistemic significance—when it comes to demonstrating a mathematical truth, the
important action takes place in the mind, where, according to Hobbes, natural language is the
name of the game.
Hobbes’s attack on Wallis illustrates an aspect of early-modern attitudes toward
algorithms that may seem paradoxical from a modern perspective: that some of the strongest
opposition to algorithmic methods came from philosophers who were deeply committed to
mechanical views of the world. After 1800 or so, algorithmic methods came to be seen as a key
part of “mechanical” philosophies like utilitarianism, an association that was encouraged by
industrialists like Charles Babbage. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this
association did not always hold. In Elements of Philosophy, which was published the same year
as his attack on Wallis, Hobbes begins his discussion of logic with the more-or-less
unprecedented statement that all human thought consists of mathematical operations: “By
RATIOCINATION, I mean Computation. Now to compute, is either to collect the sum of many
things that are added together, or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of
another. Ratiocination therefore is the same with Addition and Substraction” (2-3; see also
Leviathan 22-23). Such views echoed in the French Enlightenment; in La Langue des calculs,
Condillac asserts that “to calculate is to reason, and to reason is to calculate” (150; my
translation). But unlike contemporary computationalism—that is, the philosophical school that
views the human mind as analogous to a computer—these “mechanical” views of cognition did
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not necessarily lend themselves to developing algorithms. If human thought is already a
computational process, then creating additional mechanical systems of computation is
redundant.
This lack of interest in algorithms, which stemmed in part from a generalized opposition
to imposing rules on thought, had a significant degree of influence in the eighteenth century.
As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century logicians
launched a sustained attack on the system of formal rules that constituted Scholastic logic. One
participant in this attack, Locke, advocates teaching by example rather than by rule, since habits
become more deeply ingrained than statements committed to memory: “Children are not to be
taught by Rules which will be always slipping out of their Memories. What you think necessary
for them to do, settle in them by an indispensible Practice, as often as the Occasion returns;
and if it be possible, make Occasions. This will beget Habits in them, which being once
establish’d, operate of themselves easily and naturally, without the Assistance of the Memory”
(Some Thoughts 39). Immanuel Kant states a similar view in his 1784 essay “What is
Enlightenment?”: “Dogmas [Satzungen] and formulas [Formeln], those mechanical aids to
rational use (or rather misuse) of [individual man’s] natural endowments, are the ball and chain
of his permanent immaturity” (54-55). The Enlightenment elevated natural reason above the
logical formalism of the Scholastics, and the idea that the human mind needed artificial aids like
algorithms to discover the truth was anathema.
By the 1780s, however, Leibniz’s algorithms for calculus had attained a secure place in
the mathematical canon. Symbolic notation was simply too useful to abjure, and Euler had
shown that algorithmic techniques could lead to important discoveries that were otherwise

123

inaccessible (Guicciardini, “Dot-Age” 244). A key sign of the change was that, by 1780 or so,
mathematics textbooks had stopped explaining the value of algebraic symbols; by the later
decades of the eighteenth century, the need for notation was a given. This raised again the
problem of establishing trust in the method, which from an empiricist perspective meant linking
it to the senses. An important consequence of this theoretical need to assign meanings to
symbols is that, in eighteenth-century empiricism, mathematical reasoning is fundamentally
dependent on the concepts by which one thinks about the physical world. There is thus more
at stake in the dispute between Condillac and d’Alembert than the question of translatability—
it also bears on the reliability of symbolic mathematics itself. If Condillac is right, then symbolic
methods are admissible so long as one explains them clearly using terms that are rooted in
sensory experience, and it is not particularly important which language one uses to do this so
long as one’s approach is methodical. If d’Alembert is right, however, mathematics constitutes
an entirely separate theory of the world from the ones embedded in natural languages, and so
the excessive reliance on words in explaining mathematical symbols is suspect. If, as we trace
our mathematical ideas back to the senses, we find that it is not mathematics all the way down,
that our notions are based in “vulgar” thinking rather than the true metaphysics of algebra, this
is a sign, in d’Alembert’s view, that our understanding is confused.
Condorcet’s last writings suggest a mounting anxiety about this potential for the errors
embedded in ordinary language to infect mathematical reasoning. In his 1785 Essay, he is
confident that mathematical results can be clearly communicated in plain French; circa 1793,
he takes extreme measures to exorcise French from mathematics altogether. It makes
biographical sense, given how fundamentally irrational he had found the Revolution to be, that
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he came to see rationality as something more rarified than he had earlier in his life, something
that requires a greater amount of discipline to attain.40 As Sophia Rosenfeld argues, after the
French Revolution began to fragment, many began to blame the mounting factionalism on the
fundamental slipperiness of terms like liberté and égalité (2). Bacon’s idols of the market had
become not just a problem for science, but a political issue with life or death consequences. In
this context, it is not surprising that Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of
the Human Mind, written while the Revolution was at its deadliest, repeatedly celebrates
moments in history where linguistic confusions were removed, even congratulating the
Scholastics—so often condemned for their endless verbal disputes—for clarifying “the different
senses that may be affixed to the word liberty” (140). Condorcet’s universal algebra was
supposed to solve the problem of language once and for all by introducing one of the most
extreme forms of equality imaginable—equality of ideas. The universal language would, to
recall the definition quoted above, firmly attach signs either to “direct objects” or “those welldefined collections constituted of simple and general ideas, which are to be found or may be
introduced equally in the understandings of all mankind” (286). Instituting this scheme would
require not only teaching everyone the same words or symbols, but inserting the same
mathematically rigorous concepts into every individual’s mind.
Condorcet’s philosophical language scheme is an extreme response to the anxiety about
the role words play in the formation of mathematical ideas. Most empiricist thinkers of the
time advocated more moderate linguistic reforms. But the view that mathematical reasoning
was fundamentally dependent on language was widespread in the late eighteenth century.
Mediating between an equation and the world, in the thinking of many of the empiricists,
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requires words—and preferably, it requires clearly defined ones. The desire to create words
that are adequate for the purposes of science produced a genre of its own.

Lavoisier: From Real Characters to Well-Formed Words

If Condorcet’s attempt to turn algebra into a full-fledged language proved to be, like Pound’s
Mauberley, wrong from the start, the development of modern chemical terminology shows
eighteenth-century theories of semiotics at their most effective. The chemical formulas that
are now a familiar part of high-school science and popular culture—H2O and C8H10N4O2—were
introduced by Jöns Jacob Berzelius in 1813, but much of the conceptual apparatus underlying
them was constructed around the 1780s. Prior to the late eighteenth century, the concepts of
hydrogen and oxygen simply did not exist; people thought of air as an indivisible element, not
as a mixture of multiple gasses. The fact that oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen gas could not be
directly perceived in the course of ordinary experience meant that these concepts could not be
built up through simple ostension (that is, by pointing and saying “that stuff”); a more complex
conceptual and instrumental armature was needed. But defining the elements in terms of
distinguishing qualities was not a simple matter. Bringing the new system of elements into
being would require reconstructing the conceptual structure with which people think about
substances. For some, this provided an opportunity to put Condillac’s theories of language and
education to the test. The example of Lavoisier shows that Enlightenment theories of the sign
were not always utopian—they could be put into practice, and effective practice at that.
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The so-called chemical revolution
was, by some accounts, the only major
scientific revolution of the eighteenth
century (see Donovan 1). It was in the late
eighteenth century that the classical theory
of the four elements—fire, water, earth, and
air—gave way to modern chemical terms.
One of the most venerable real characters
was a casualty of this revolution. The occult
symbols of alchemy, which can be found in
Isaac Newton’s manuscripts and numerous
early-modern books of “secrets” (Figure 15),
provided an international language of
chemical substances and operations, albeit
one that was known only to a select few.

Figure 15. Table of alchemical symbols from the 1670 book
Basilius Valentinus […] His Last Will and Testament (n.p.).
Public-domain image via Wikimedia Commons.

Although they were fairly standardized in the early-modern period, these symbols were, from
the perspective of the new chemistry, based on unclear concepts and faulty thinking about the
natures of substances. By the 1780s, a number of experiments had rendered the old system of
elements untenable. In the early 1770s, Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier discovered
methods of isolating various gasses from air; in 1783, Lavoisier and his colleague Pierre-Simon
Laplace demonstrated that water, which was previously held to be one of the four fundamental
elements, is a compound of what are now called hydrogen and oxygen (Donovan 154). These
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discoveries, for many young chemists, provided definitive proof that the system of alchemical
symbols was misguided. Lavoisier stood at the forefront of a movement to replace the real
characters of alchemy with—in characteristically eighteenth-century fashion—a well-formed
language.
Lavoisier’s project is as good an illustration as any of the difference between the
attitudes toward signs that prevailed in Bacon’s time and those of Condillac’s followers. Real
characters, which seemed, for many in the seventeenth century, a more reliable alternative to
words, had lost much of their magic in the late eighteenth century. The idea of a character that
referred directly to ideas rather than to words was, to be sure, still around; in 1797, Joseph de
Maimieux introduced a new sort of a priori language called pasigraphy, which offered a set of
ideographic symbols that were supposed to be comprehensible to speakers of any language.
But these latter-day universal languages had much narrower ambitions than the real characters
of Wilkins and Leibniz. Pasigraphies were mainly meant to facilitate international
communication, and they were not, as Wilkins’s Real Character was, intended to limn the true
structure of the world. In the late eighteenth century, symbols were no longer regarded as a
way to bypass language altogether, but rather were seen as another sort of signifier, subject to
the same uncertainties as natural language. For Condorcet, this meant that an effort had to be
made to ensure that algebraic symbols have clear meanings. For Lavoisier, it meant that words
could serve the purposes of science just as well as special symbols like

, , and

, so long as

they are attached to a well-formed system of ideas.
Lavoisier set out for himself, from the very beginning of his scientific career, the
programmatic goal of outfitting chemistry with a methodology based more thoroughly on
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empirical observation than the old alchemical methods. Lavoisier came from a well-off family
of Parisian lawyers and bureaucrats, and from a young age he balanced aspirations to public
office with lofty intellectual goals. As he recalled in the early 1790s, after completing four years
of courses with eminent chemists of the time, the young Antoine concluded that the science
“was founded on only a few facts” and “was composed of absolutely incoherent ideas and
unproven suppositions” (quoted by Donovan 47). Lavoisier represented his work as a new
approach to chemistry founded on the methods of experimental physics, especially the
Newtonian method of drawing generalizations from empirical observations. In a 1773
manuscript that was published in the nineteenth century, Lavoisier claimed that his work would
produce “a revolution in physics and chemistry” (quoted by Donovan 104). An important part
of this “revolution” would be a new system of nomenclature to replace the old symbols.
Lavoisier first announced his linguistic project in 1782, but he did not begin campaigning
seriously until a few years later. He publicized his plan in an April 1787 address before the
French Academy of Sciences entitled “The Need to Reform and Improve Chemical
Nomenclature.” In this address, Lavoisier calls for improvements to both the language and the
method of chemistry. Citing Condillac’s Logic, he declares that languages are “veritable analytic
methods, with the aid of which we proceed from the known to the unknown,” as a result of
which “it is important that these instruments be the best that is possible” (V.356-57; my
translation). Lavoisier’s purpose was to institute a new, clearer set of terms for chemistry, and,
in doing so, render the old, “incoherent” ideas of alchemy obsolete.
In characteristic fashion for one of the bureaucrat-scientists of pre-Revolutionary
France, Lavoisier pursued this reform through official channels. Starting in 1786, Lavoisier had
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been collaborating intensively with three other chemists, Guyton de Morveau, Berthollet, and
Fourcroy, to design a new array of words to describe chemical elements and compounds.
While Guyton, as well as Pierre Macquer and Torbern Bergman, had already made forays into
the revision of chemical terms (Knowlson 173), none were as authoritative as the effort of this
group. Their work was published in 1787 as Method of Chemical Nomenclature, and it bore the
approval of a committee formed by the French Academy of Sciences. As Jonathan Simon
argues, the 1787 Method had a greater degree of authority than these previous reforms due to
the official backing of the Academy (Simon 206). While Lavoisier was careful not to offend
those members of the Academy who rejected the new chemistry, the new terminology that the
Method presented was theoretically loaded. As Arthur Donovan writes, it was also “an
ambitious effort to convince, and to a degree compel, all chemists to adopt Lavoisier’s new
theories and the methods on which they were based” (157). The project’s consonance with the
absolutist logic of the Bourbon monarchy is clear: by promoting the new terminology, they
promoted their new theory, and by securing for it an institutional sanction, they installed their
theory as the official doctrine of the French chemistry community.
Lavoisier gives a more detailed philosophical justification of this project in his later
publications. In the winter of 1789, just a few months before the storming of the Bastille, he
published an expanded version of his 1787 address under the title Traité élémentaire de chimie,
translated into English the next year as Elements of Chemistry. In the preface to this text,
Lavoisier enthusiastically yokes the terminological reform with Condillac’s philosophy, including
the controversial remarks about algebra in Logic. On the first page, Lavoisier cites four “maxims
of the Abbé de Condillac”:
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We think only through the medium of words. — Languages are true analytical
methods. — Algebra, which is adapted to its purpose in every species of
expression, in the most simple, most exact, and best manner possible, is at the
same time a language and an analytical method. — The art of reasoning is
nothing more than a language well arranged. (xiii-xiv)
From these maxims, Lavoisier deduces “[t]he impossibility of separating the nomenclature of a
science from the science itself” (xiv). Since, he writes, “ideas are preserved and communicated
by means of words, it necessarily follows that we cannot improve the language of any science
without at the same time improving the science itself; neither can we, on the other hand,
improve a science, without improving the language or nomenclature which belongs to it” (xivxv). Since science is, in Condillacian terms, a well-formed language, the idea of pursuing
research in the new chemistry without using the new terminology is incoherent, as is the
reverse. The science and its terminology, Lavoisier suggests, are one.
To an extent, Lavoisier’s appropriation of Condillac’s philosophy was a rhetorical ploy.
Donovan suggests that Condillac merely provided a familiar reference point by which Lavoisier
could get his ideas across to the members of the Academy, among whom Condillac was a
generally admired figure (162-63). But Lavoisier’s approach to nomenclature was, if not directly
inspired by Condillac’s thought, very much in step with it. The words would be, as they must in
a Condillacian program, backed up with well-formed ideas, and they would thus encapsulate
both the theories and the methods of the new chemistry. Lavoisier and his group attempted to
create terms whose derivations would give clues as to their meaning, which they did through
the use of Greek roots. The word oxygen, for instance, derives from the Greek for that which
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makes acid. The word itself is a capsule summary of one of Lavoisier’s theories (in this case,
one that was eventually proven false). The new terminology thus constitutes a sort of
epistemic Trojan horse that would introduce the ideas of the new chemistry into any text that
used it. Lavoisier backed up the reform of the language of chemistry with a program of
education that was meant to ensure that the thinking of young chemists would not be tainted
by the old alchemical terms. As Lavoisier declares in the preface to Elements of Chemistry:
“When we begin the study of any science, we are in a situation, respecting that science, similar
to that of children; and the course by which we have to advance is precisely the same which
Nature follows in the formation of their ideas” (xvi). By developing the principles of the science
in the student’s mind from this child-like beginning, the text would remake chemistry from the
ground up on a sturdier foundation.
Regardless of its “revolutionary” implications for chemistry, Lavoisier’s program did not
suit the climate of opinion in France after the political revolution began in 1789. Lavoisier’s
approach to administering linguistic reform, with its dependence on the authority of a royally
sanctioned institution, was a product of the pre-Revolutionary context in which he came of age.
Although Lavoisier tentatively supported the creation of a new constitutional monarchy in the
early days of the Revolution, he also had ties to the old regime through his bourgeois
upbringing and his membership in the Order of Barristers (Donovan 19-24). His conception of
science combined an ideal of knowledge for its own sake with a notion of civic utility, a
combination that perfectly suited the social structures of Bourbon France, with its tensions
between the top-down administrative projects of the monarchy and the decentralized power of
the aristocracy. After the institutional structures of French science came under Revolutionary
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scrutiny, Lavoisier attempted to position himself as the architect of the educational system of
the new order. In 1793, he authored a report to the National Convention titled Reflections on
Public Instruction, in which he extended the Condillacian theories of his chemistry texts into a
general program of national education (Poirier 342). But in spite of his attempts to establish his
standing in the new regime, Lavoisier was never in favor with the Jacobins. In part because of
his connection to the Order of Barristers, and in part because he owned a share of the
Company of General Farmers—a tax-collecting organization of the old regime—the deck was
stacked against him. In November 1793, he was arrested for violating the public trust, and on
May 8, 1794, he faced the guillotine, becoming one of the Revolution’s most notorious
casualties.
In spite of the destruction of their institutional support structure during the Reign of
Terror, Lavoisier’s reforms had a lasting effect on the field of chemistry. They did, however,
face some opposition among those interested in the science. Lavoisier’s program raises a
similar question to the one that Descartes had raised in his letter to Mersenne: does it make
sense to create new terms before the theory is perfected? Thomas Jefferson, during his time in
Paris, made such an argument about the new chemical nomenclature (see Donovan 72). In a
1788 letter to James Madison, Jefferson calls the reform “premature”:
It is probably an age too soon to propose the establishment of system [sic]. The
attempt therefore of Lavoisier to reform the Chemical nomenclature is
premature. One single experiment may destroy the whole filiation of his terms,
and his string of Sulfates, Sulfites, and Sulfures may have served no other end
than to have retarded the progress of the science by a jargon from the confusion
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of which time will be requisite to extricate us. (Jefferson to Madison, 19 July
1788)
A few months later, Jefferson reiterated his argument in a letter to James Currie, calling the
terminology “premature, insufficient, and false,” and noting that the publications written using
Lavoisier’s terms “must be translated into the ordinary chemical language before they will be
useful” (Jefferson to Currie, 20 December 1788). Jefferson’s point is that, loaded with new
theories that had not yet stood the test of time, the new terms could make matters worse; if
Lavoisier’s theory of chemistry did not turn out to be “la vraie philosophie,” as Descartes had
put it, the reform would only lead to more confusion.
Jefferson’s rejection of the new system of chemical terms could easily be dismissed as a
misjudgment. Contrary to Jefferson’s prediction, Lavoisier’s nomenclature has by and large
proven durable, even in some cases where the theories underlying it did not. But there is a
political, as well as a scientific, import to Jefferson’s disagreement with Lavoisier that is
deserving of consideration. While Jefferson admired and was on friendly terms with Lavoisier
(see Adams 43), the two had very different linguistic ideologies. Lavoisier—as well as
Condorcet, with different aims—supported d’Alembert’s view that the learned had the
responsibility to “legislate for the rest of the nation in matters of philosophy and taste” (quoted
in Donovan 161). Jefferson’s well-known writings on language present a very different view of
how language change happens. In an 1820 letter to John Adams, Jefferson declared himself “a
friend to neology”—that is, to the coining of new words—yet Jefferson was also fixated on the
purity of Anglo-Saxon roots, and he granted languages a kind of immunological ability to reject
changes that do not fit their temperaments (Memoirs, 3.339). For him, the community that
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speaks a language, not a central organization like the French Academy, should be the tribunal
that will ultimately judge which new words are acceptable and which are not.
Jefferson’s disagreement with Lavoisier rests on the division between the voluntarist
and involuntarist theories of language that coexisted in the eighteenth century. Condillac,
Condorcet, and Lavoisier all treat language primarily as something that exists inside an
individual’s head and assume that is capable of revision whenever one desires; but a language
can also be viewed as a historical phenomenon, shared by a community and subject to forces
that are, at least in most cases, beyond the control of any individual. Empasizing one or the
other of these aspects of language leads to very different attitudes toward linguistic reform
projects. Referring specifically to the French tradition, Jessica Riskin identifies these two
different tendencies in eighteenth-century linguistic as the “social” and the “cultural.” The
social approach, which was, Riskin argues, the one taken by Lavoisier and his collaborators,
involved “deliberately orchestrated, rather than organically arising, human activity” and treated
signs as “deliberately chosen” (210; 217). By contrast, in the cultural approach, “one did not
deliberately invent customs, manners of thought, or sciences according to first principles, but
only fostered their natural growth” (208). These differing views of language’s artificiality have
epistemological and political consequences in equal measure. Social, voluntarist approaches to
language like Lavoisier’s were conducive to centralized administrations, such as the ones
supported by the Bourbons in France, Frederick II’s supporters in Germany, and the Federalists
like John Adams in the United States; they could also fit in with radical Enlightenment projects
like Condorcet’s universal algebra, which he could justify imposing on people by contending
that it was based on the universal teachings of reason. Cultural approaches, on the other hand,
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fit better with popular sovereignty and the anti-Federalism of Jefferson, treating language as
the collective property of a people.
Since eighteenth-century linguistic thought made no sharp distinction between ordinary
language and special-purpose notations, these competing linguistic ideologies could apply to
what Condillac called “the language of calculation” as much as they could to the languages
people speak; the choice between voluntarism and involuntarism thus had important
implications for the status of algorithms. The next chapter examines these implications by
contrasting two very different thinkers who took opposite sides in the debate—Lord Stanhope
and Johann Gottfried Herder. Although Stanhope is a far more obscure figure than Herder, his
work is, to my knowledge, the only example of an actual attempt to mechanize reasoning on
the basis of Enlightenment epistemology. In line with his radical politics, Stanhope’s “reasoning
machine” is not just meant to produce results, but rather to enlighten—to provide people with
a new, rational set of concepts that will replace the unclear concepts that exist in present
political discourse. Herder’s cultural view of language, which emphasized the inextricability of
individual modes of thought from collectivity and from history, undermines the universalist
basis of Stanhope’s program. In linguistics, it was ultimately Herder’s side that won out. But
prior to the triumph of linguistic involuntarism, possibilities were imaginable that have now
moved to the margins. Right as Herder may have been that language is a collective
phenomenon, incapable of being rebuilt from the ground up, this recognition came at the cost
of foreclosing the possibility that new symbolic systems could serve the end of mending
political rifts, a possibility of which Condorcet dreamed while in hiding from Robespierre.
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Chapter 3: Logic Machines in the Age of Reason

What is their deduction of metaphysical attributes but a shuffling and matching of pedantic
dictionary-adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be
worked out from the mere word ‘God’ by one of those logical machines of wood and brass
which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood. They have the trail
of the serpent over them.
—William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience

The Gold Standard

If Condorcet’s universal algebra shows that Enlightenment thinkers were far more skeptical
about algorithms than Leibniz was, the work of Charles Mahon, Third Earl of Stanhope shows
how credulous they could be about the possibility of discarding the past. Stanhope created
several calculating machines starting around 1770 and experimented, around the turn of the
century, with doing something much more ambitious.41 An anonymous 1818 obituary in Annals
of Philosophy explained it this way: “It has been asserted, upon grave authority, that his
Lordship conceived the possibility of forming a reasoning machine, by which the results of
certain combinations of ideas, or of elementary propositions, might be ascertained with as
much ease and accuracy as those of figures” (“Biographical Account of Lord Stanhope” 85; the
“grave authority” is perhaps Richard Phillips, who discusses Stanhope’s device in the book
Public Characters of 1800-1801; see Phillips 106). Stanhope did not build a reasoning machine,
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as we might understand the term today. He did, however, conceive of what Martin Gardner
calls a logic machine—“a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving
problems in formal logic” (xiii). Between around 1801 and 1811, he constructed a series of
devices that he called Demonstrators based on a logical theory that he had been working on
since the 1770s. These devices were supposed to cut through the pedantry and complexity of
Aristotelian logic, making the truth or falsity of chains of reasoning plain to all; and further,
Stanhope claimed that they would do this “by means of a symbol purely mechanical, and
without using any of those symbols which are called words” (quoted by Wess 385). Like
Condorcet, Stanhope was attempting to make a radical break from the past modes of thought
in the name of social revolution—a goal that tethered his system to a voluntarist view of
language that was rapidly losing its foothold in the early 1800s. Stanhope’s project stands as a
rare attempt to mechanize thought on the basis of Enlightenment universalism, an
epistemology that places algorithmic processes in a radically different relation to culture from
the one that now obtains.
Stanhope’s reasons for building “reasoning machines” can only be understood in the
context of the British political radicalism of the early Romantic period. Stanhope was one of the
few members of the British House of Lords to support the French Revolution, and he kept up
his support for it long after most English radicals had jumped the ship. The “Jacobin Earl,” as his
contemporaries called him, had personal ties to Condorcet, la Rochefoucauld, and other French
figures involved in the Revolution (G. Stanhope and Gooch 110-12), and immediately after the
storming of the Bastille, he became the London Revolution Society’s envoy to the French
National Assembly (Phillips 90; see Erdman). In line with the radical Enlightenment project of
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replacing existing modes of social organization with more rational ones, the Demonstrator is
meant as a way of dispelling the “prejudices” and “superstitions” of the past. Underlying this
political program was a belief that the machine was founded on the universal teachings of
reason, on the basis of which Stanhope envisioned the possibility of establishing a perfect
correspondence between its workings and the ideas that exist in people’s heads—a process
that would, if carried out successfully, be primarily a matter of changing how people think.
While Stanhope’s work occasionally shows up in discussions of early computing
machines, the moment in which he lived has largely been overlooked in accounts of the
philosophical roots of computation. Standard histories of the computer tend to focus primarily
on thinkers with hierarchical, anti-democratic views of society, notably Leibniz and Babbage,
mostly overlooking the radical thought in which Stanhope was immersed. David Golumbia, in
The Cultural Logic of Computation, traces the ideology of computationalism to the philosophies
of Leibniz and Hobbes, thinkers that, in his view, exemplify the political tendency that “we
typically think of as the right, or conservatism, or Tory politics, or in our day […] neoliberalism”
(9); against this conservative strain he constructs an anti-mechanistic liberal tradition including
Locke, Hume, and Kant. Stanhope does not clearly fit into either of the traditions Golumbia
describes. Epistemologically, he was broadly in line with Locke, and politically, he was as far left
as the British parliamentary politics of the time allowed; yet he was committed to the idea that
human thought was equivalent to a process that could literally be mechanized. The example of
Stanhope shows that radical thought was not incompatible with mechanical computation—it
just required a very different approach from the one that modern computers have taken.
Unlike Babbage’s engines, Stanhope’s “reasoning machines” are not based on a division of
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labor, but are rather designed to lay their workings bare; the machine was not supposed to
serve as a “black box” that spits out answers to questions, but rather to rationally persuade
people by means of mechanical processes that were, in Stanhope’s view, embodiments of
universal reason.
In this chapter, I explore the implications of radical Enlightenment thought for the
possibility of creating a “reasoning machine” by considering Stanhope’s work alongside that of
another thinker—Johann Gottfried Herder—who reached the opposite conclusion about
whether mechanical processes could serve the end of Enlightenment. While Stanhope and
Herder were very different thinkers emerging from different national contexts, they were both
strongly influenced by Condillac, and yet they took his ideas in opposite directions. The critical
difference that made the mechanization of thought plausible for Stanhope but not for Herder, I
argue, was Stanhope’s acceptance of linguistic voluntarism. For Stanhope, as for Condillac,
language was an artificial phenomenon, and it was accordingly possible to create a new
language by a feat of mental discipline; one could thus establish agreement about what the
symbols meant by developing their meanings methodically from first principles. Herder, on the
other hand, argued that language and thought were fundamentally historical and that one’s
cultural background exerted an influence on one’s way of thinking that could not be overcome
by such an analytical method. From Stanhope’s perspective, this argument would pose a fatal
threat. If, as Herder suggested, the ways people think cannot easily be reduced to a set of
mechanical laws, then a “reasoning machine” is less a means of social leveling, as Stanhope
certainly intended his Demonstrator to be, than an expression of “arbitrary power”—an
imposition of artificial rules on people’s thought. Since its purpose was not just to produce
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scientific knowledge, but to enlighten, the Demonstrator sank or swum based on whether its
workings reflected the undeniable teachings of universal reason.
From a practical perspective, it sank. Like most of Stanhope’s projects, the
Demonstrator logic met with a mixed reaction (see Wess 375-76). The 1818 obituary was not
very sanguine about the idea that a logic demonstrator could avoid the taint of words:
[I]t is scarcely necessary to observe that, independent of other difficulties, no
mechanical process for reasoning can ever be employed until mankind have
agreed upon certain general principles as decidedly as upon the value of certain
numbers, and until all doubt has been removed respecting the import of words,
or the combinations of them. A machine for resolving political queries would
give very different answers, according as it was constructed under the
superintendance of an advocate for reform, or an admirer of the infallible
wisdom of our ancestors. (85)
The Cartesian “la vraie philosophie” argument strikes again—but by the nineteenth century,
few in the mainstream of Western thought would be convinced by the Leibnizian response that
real characters have a special revelatory power that transcends Babel. The ability of a
“reasoning machine,” in the sense the author describes, to produce true conclusions depends
on people’s agreement about “the import of words”; the human, and particularly the linguistic,
remains squarely at the center. While Stanhope would certainly disagree with the obituarywriter’s dismissive conclusion, he would not dissent from this general construal of the project.
The Logic Demonstrator was not meant to automate thought, in the sense of performing
intellectual labor independently of human reason altogether; instead, its persuasiveness
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depended on the possibility of connecting its elements to a well-formed system of ideas,
without which its results would mean nothing.
The failure of the Demonstrator perhaps proves Herder right about the inevitable
influence of culture upon thought. But this failure resulted less from the faultiness of
Stanhope’s logical principles than from the excessive scope of his ambitions. While Herder’s
side won out definitively in how people view language and culture, voluntarist views of
language somewhat like Stanhope’s did survive in the modern disciplines of logic, mathematics,
and computer science. Placed together, the opposing perspectives of Stanhope and Herder
provide a clear illustration of why the division of such scientific fields from the domain of
culture was needed to free algorithms from their dependence on human thought. The
establishment of culture as an autonomous sphere enabled advocates of mechanical methods
to circumvent critiques like Herder’s, employing those methods in limited disciplinary contexts
in which the messy actualities of language and thought could be prevented from undermining
their validity, as they did undermine that of Stanhope’s Demonstrator. This disciplinary
compartmentalization came at the cost of foreclosing the possibility that computing machines
could serve the sort of leveling function that Stanhope had envisioned for his machines. While
it happened very gradually, the separation of the voluntary and involuntary aspects of language
into separate spheres inflicted a new wound upon language that, unlike the wound of Babel in
the early-modern imagination, could not be healed by any feat of artifice: the severing of
natural languages, which were recognized as subject to the mercurial collective wills of the
communities that spoke them, and the special-purpose symbolic systems used in computation,
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which were freed to be constructed arbitrarily without concern for what happened in the realm
of culture and, thereby, defanged as potential instruments of enlightened reform.
This chapter begins with an analysis of Stanhope’s theory of logic along with some of his
political activities and experiments with calculating machines. I then discuss Herder’s
philosophy in the context of some other cultural views of language that existed in the second
half of the eighteenth century. Advocates of such views, such as Herder and Johann David
Michaëlis, mustered a strong case that meaning was inextricably bound to the experiences that
people share with their communities; as a result, the rigid operations of a “reasoning machine”
can serve as no guarantee that people will reach the same interpretation of a result. While
these arguments anticipate in many ways the direction taken by nineteenth-century philology,
they are also critically engaged with the Enlightenment theories of language that this new
discipline ultimately displaced, making them a particularly useful ground for understanding the
tensions that existed before science and culture were cordoned off into separate spheres.
Considered together with Stanhope’s project, they illustrate one of the key Enlightenment goals
that Western science had to abandon in order to reconcile itself to the algorithm: the goal of
ensuring that all symbolic systems, even the specialized ones of science, meshed well with the
way people thought in daily life.

Stanhope’s Comet

Like Condorcet, the Earl of Stanhope immersed himself in a realm of logical certainty in the face
of worldly disappointment, doubling down on the utopian goals of the Enlightenment just as his
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personal fortunes were waning. But whereas Condorcet fell from a seat in the Legislative
Assembly to a prison cell in less than two years, Stanhope’s disappointment was more
protracted and, in a sense, more personal. Stanhope’s support of the French Revolution, as
might be expected, did not win him many allies in the House of Lords. He withdrew from
Parliament in 1795, upon which, according to his 1914 biography, “a medal was struck in his
honour, with the motto, ‘The Minority of One, 1795’” (G. Stanhope and Gooch 139). Stanhope
would eventually return to politics with some success, but his children bristled against his
democratic views and, one by one, deserted him in favor of more decadent company. In 1801,
the Earl’s eldest son, then twenty, left to travel abroad without informing his father of his
whereabouts, a decision that a family acquaintance described as a fortunate escape from “the
infernal principles of Jacobinism” (quoted in G. Stanhope and Gooch 240). In 1803, his
daughter, Lady Hester Stanhope, drove in another nail by moving into the household of his
political rival, Pitt the Younger (Cleveland 47). Hester detested her father’s politics, declaring
herself “an aristocrat” and denouncing the “dirty Jacobins” with which he associated (G.
Stanhope and Gooch 241). Hester would eventually exceed her father in fame, becoming a
well-known adventurer and archaeologist; her Byronic exploits in the Levant would eventually
form the subject of several popular books, including Charles Meryon’s Memoirs of the Lady
Hester Stanhope (1846), which depicts the Earl as a moralistic, imperious, and distant parent
(Meryon 2).
Throughout this whole series of frustrations—from the ignominious, though temporary,
departure from Parliament in 1795 through the public quarrels with family that continued until
his death—Lord Stanhope devoted his time to practical efforts in both science and engineering.
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Stanhope was a prolific inventor, and his work on logic was not his principal claim to fame.
Among other inventions, he made early advances towards the steam-ship, conceived an
effective means of fireproofing buildings, and developed a new method of printing that was
widely adopted in the early nineteenth century (W. Walker 171-73). According to the 1914
biography, however, “[n]o branch of his many-sided activity interested him more than the
attempt to create a new science of logic” (261). He often discussed philosophical problems in
logic with Hester, who referred to him by the nickname “The Logician” when she was young
(241). The capstone of Stanhope’s logical theory, which he never completed, was to be the
Demonstrator, a device that was meant to lay sophistry bare and that would, if successful,
render the sort of political disagreement that had alienated him from so many people
impossible.
Stanhope’s approach to logic fits in well with both his political views and his personal
predispositions. Like Thomas Paine, whose work he often championed, Stanhope advocated
scientific reason as a way of challenging the authority of the aristocracy (G. Stanhope and
Gooch 21; 113; 238). Stanhope also had a well-documented puritanical streak; as a young man
living in Geneva he offered extra prizes in a shooting competition as a “reward” for those who
had not been to the theater (G. Stanhope and Gooch 17). The Demonstrator suits this
moralistic tendency as well as it does Stanhope’s championing of science: in addition to
ostensibly embodying rationality, it is a fundamentally didactic instrument, a means of
informing people of their logical errors through a “mechanical symbol” that was supposed to
make the truth undeniable. This didactic nature distinguishes Stanhope’s device from the logic
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machines of later periods, which were meant to operate independently of the human mind;
instead of replacing human reason, the Demonstrator is designed as a way of training it.
Philosophically, Stanhope’s logic appears to have been aligned with Condillac’s late
philosophy (Wess 381).42 Stanhope recorded his views on logic in an unfinished treatise
entitled The Science of Reasoning Clearly Explained Upon New Principles, which he had privately
printed and distributed to his friends in 1800. While this book never circulated outside a small
circle of Stanhope’s acquaintances, Robert Harley published excerpts from it in an 1879 article
in the journal Mind, which provides an outline of Stanhope’s distinctive approach to logic. In
his manuscript for the book, Stanhope claims that his work accomplishes something that Locke
suggests in the Essay but was unable to complete: correcting a “manifest mistake in the rules of
syllogism” that restricts syllogistic reasoning to working with general propositions (Locke, Essay
601; see Harley 195). As a result of this and other “mistakes,” Stanhope writes, the whole
syllogistic apparatus as it had existed since Aristotle was to be “totally reformed” (quoted by
Harley 195). His primary purpose in “reforming” the syllogism was, it seems, to develop a form
of logic that better corresponds to the way human reasoning works in the real world, enabling
deductions from observations as well as from universal principles. In addition to renovating the
rules of syllogism, Stanhope introduces a new nomenclature, replacing middle term with
totality, distributed with whole, and quantity with extent (Harley 200). His intention in this
terminological reform, he writes, is “to exclude entirely that long catalogue of pedantic words”
that rendered logic “both unintelligible to youth and unfit for men of any age, so far at least as
relates to convenient and habitual use” (quoted by Harley 194). By stripping logic completely of
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the old Scholastic terminology, Stanhope is out to make logic easier to learn and, presumably,
more useful for practical applications.
In rejecting the “pedantry” of Aristotelian logic, Stanhope was doing nothing that would
have been unexpected for the author of a logical treatise circa 1800. As James Franklin has
pointed out, the Aristotelian system was under sustained attack throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, with Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and their many followers all criticizing
it for being excessively complicated, confining, and impractical (838). Stanhope’s adult life,
stretching from the 1770s to the 1810s, roughly corresponds to the period in which what
Wilbur Samuel Howell has called “the new logic” was at its peak popularity (259). Responding
to a general shift away from the belief in eternal truths towards scientific discovery, eighteenthcentury authors from countries across the Western world attempted to construct new sorts of
logic that were better suited to empirical inquiry than the old system of syllogisms. As Capozzi
and Roncaglia point out, one of the principal goals of logic from humanism to the end of the
eighteenth century was “to make logic inventive”—to develop logical procedures that could not
only determine the validity of inferences but also teach us something new about the world
(146). While Lambert, along with Gottfried Ploucquet and other logicians influenced by Leibniz,
continued to experiment with mathematical approaches to logic, some of the most influential
British logicians of the later eighteenth century, notably Thomas Reid and George Campbell,
turned away from formal methods altogether in favor of practical education. Perhaps the
strongest statement against formalism appears in Campbell’s The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776),
which declares, after an extended discussion of the limitations of syllogisms, that no one “will
ever be made a reasoner, who stands in need of them” (164). In place of the old rule-based
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system, the “new logic” provided a pedagogical program that was meant to train people to
think methodically and without prejudice—something that had more to do with developing
good habits of mind than with memorizing formal criteria for validity.43 For a brief period, logic
was an eminently practical concern.
Stanhope’s project thus stands in
an odd position in intellectual history—a
“reasoning machine” created within an
intellectual climate that was actively
hostile toward “mechanical” forms of
logic. The Demonstrator is, as one might
expect, very different from the logic
machines of later periods that were
more friendly to the mechanical (Figure
16). The device represents a whole
category using a square aperture, which
Stanhope referred to as the holos or

Figure 16. Text pasted to the front of the square version of Stanhope’s
Demonstrator. From Harley’s 1879 essay (203).

holon; two sliders are inserted through slots so as to represent other categories that make up
either all or some of this whole (see Wess). If the sliders are forced to overlap, a conclusion can
be deduced about their relation. To take an example from Harley, suppose we have the
premises “No boaster deserves respect” and “Some heroes are boasters” (202). We use the
holon to represents boasters, since this is the term that is common to the two premises. One
slider represents people who do not deserve respect; since this includes all boasters, the slider
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must cover the whole aperture. The other slider represents heroes; since there may be other
boasters who are not heroes, this slider only covers some of the aperture. Because the sliders
must overlap, we can conclude that “Some heroes do not deserve respect.”
If, as Shilov and Silantiev observe, this process seems to require about as much mental
exertion as it would take to think through the inference oneself (4), it is likely by design. As
Jane Wess points out, Stanhope viewed the mechanization of logic primarily as a way to
“strengthen the human mind” (quoted by Wess 381). Stanhope calls this device the
Demonstrator, he explains, because it is supposed to convey the reasoning that leads to a
conclusion as well as the conclusion itself: “It exhibits the consequences symbolically, and
renders them evident to the mind. By the aid of this instrument the accuracy or inaccuracy of a
conclusion is always shown, and the reason why such consequence must of necessity exist is
rendered apparent” (quoted by Harley 195). Although it is not reliable as a document of
Stanhope’s own thinking, the account in Public Characters is indicative of what the phrase
reasoning machine suggested circa 1800: the Demonstrator was meant “not only to detect false
reasoning, however sophistically combined, but to shew the various links of the chain by which
these false conclusions have been deduced” (Phillips 106). Both of these statements rest on an
assumption that was widespread among adherents of the Enlightenment: that to know the
truth of a proposition is to know the entire chain of reasoning that produced it. To pick
someone from Stanhope’s immediate political circle, William Godwin states this precept
explicitly in the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice: “Wherever truth stands in the mind
unaccompanied by the evidence on which it depends, it cannot properly be said to be
apprehended at all” (596; see also 668). While Godwin is here referring to the situation in
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which “government assumes to deliver us from the trouble of thinking for ourselves” (596), his
argument could just as well apply to the use of machines in reasoning. Enlightenment
epistemology excludes the possibility of trusting a machine to produce knowledge when one
does not understand the deductions oneself. In accordance with this distrust of conclusions
that are not backed with the gold bullion of reasoning, the Demonstrator functions in a radically
different way from the “black-box” logic machines of later periods. Instead of separating the
user interface from the internal logic of the machine, it makes the entire process transparent to
the user. Such a machine, if we accept the thinking that surrounds it, can help to train or to
direct the understanding, but it does not attempt to replace it.
A consequence of this centering of the human understanding is that the Demonstrator
does not, in itself, provide a guarantee against the uncertainties of language. It is still
incumbent on the user to attach well-formed sensory ideas to the aperture and the sliders,
without which the inferences that the Demonstrator produces would be, at best, mere
tautologies; accordingly, uncertain words still have a chance to infect the results. Stanhope’s
views on this issue seem to have been broadly similar to Condillac’s. His principal advance in
the theory of logic (which anticipates later developments by George Bentham and William
Hamilton) is to reduce all logical propositions to what he called identic propositions—
statements of the form A is B (see Gardner 80; Wess 385). In an exchange with the Rev. John
North starting in November 1811, Stanhope responds to the objection that such a logic can only
work with tautologies and is thus as sterile as the Aristotelian syllogism. “L’âme est un être
pensant,” North writes, “is a proposition which may be of use in argumentation, but its
equivalent (according to Condillac and your Lordship) l’âme est l’âme conveys no idea;
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consequently if such an identic proposition were inserted in any argumentation, it would be so
far from forming a step to facilitate our progress that it would present a most insurmountable
barrier to our passage: such identities would inevitably bar up every avenue to knowledge”
(quoted by Harley 197). Harley quotes Stanhope’s response at length:
When I talk of identity, I do not say, as you make me say, que “L’ame [sic] est
l’âme,” car cela ne dit rien, but I say thus: Example. Suppose I had heard that
there was such a thing as a comet. I now perceive in the heavens at night a star
with a luminous tail; that is all I know, and it is by means of that mental
description that I distinguish that star from all other stars. I afterwards find my
star, so distinguished, described and defined, amongst the stars of some new
constellation, and I predicate that that star has moved fast, which is a quality of
my comet, but which quality of my comet was before to me unknown; that is to
say, I aver that “the star with a luminous tail” and a star which “moves fast,” that
is, which belongs to the class of stars that move fast, are IDENTIC. Have I not
made an advance in knowledge by my having so perceived, though in point of
fact, it is the same comet, the identical comet, originally described by me
incompletely, before I perceived, or could predicate, such identity? Voilà tout.
(quoted by Harley 197)
Given the reasoning he describes, one might suspect that the sentence was meant to read,
“Suppose I had not heard that there was such a thing as a comet.” Apart from that one
sentence, this passage describes someone constructing the idea of a comet from the ground
up. The fact that this reasoning is rooted in the senses, just as empiricism requires, is critical to
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Stanhope’s response to North. The “principle of identity” can only avoid falling into tautology if
it is used to posit the identity of something across two different observations, or at least across
two different analyses of one observation. Without this link to the senses, Stanhope’s
“reformed” theory of logic is limited, like the Scholastic syllogism, to producing nothing but
words about words about words.
Stanhope’s argument might as well have been taken straight out of Condillac. Jacques
Derrida’s reading of Condillac is particularly relevant to the question North raises, provided that
we remain aware of its limitations. As Derrida points out in The Archaeology of the Frivolous,
Condillac exhibits an anxiety about the tautological nature of philosophical language
throughout his work, and especially in Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge. In the Essay,
borrowing an example from Locke, Condillac argues that any statement we can make about the
properties of gold must be a tautology, since it can only be verified against the definition of the
word gold (415; see Locke, Essay 516-18). If one could know the real essence of gold, one could
deduce its properties from this essence. “But that is not how I know it,” Condillac writes. “In
truth, every proposition that I make about this metal if it is true is identical. Such a one is the
following, gold is malleable; for it means A body that I have observed to be malleable and that I
call gold, is malleable—a proposition in which an idea is affirmed of itself” (415). In Condillac’s
terms, this sort of self-identical proposition is frivolous—it is true, but it tells us nothing of use.
Since metaphysical statements are all, in Derrida’s view, self-referential in this way, there must
be some defect that these statements are meant to relieve; otherwise we would have no
reason to write. In such cases, Derrida writes, “the sign remains for nothing, an overabundance
exchanged without saying anything, like a token, the excessive relief of a defect: neither
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merchandise nor money” (118). Derrida argues that the supplement that motivates philosophy
is desire, the need for which, he intimates, undermines the “legitimacy” of Condillac’s
metaphysics (135). But this reading of Condillac, while insightful in many ways, is distorted by
Derrida’s well-documented aversion to empiricist philosophy (A. Dick 15-21; see also Garver).
For Condillac, as well as apparently for Stanhope, the supplement that protects us from frivolity
is the use of the senses, which, Condillac writes in Logic, provide “a storehouse of knowledge”
from which we may draw propositions that truly expand our conceptions of the world, rather
than merely restating what we already know (375).
A more sympathetic critique than Derrida’s would be to go after the universalism of
Condillacian thought. What differentiates the empiricism of Locke and Condillac from more
skeptical philosophies like that of Hume is the assumption that, so long as they carefully
suppress all presuppositions and prejudices, all human beings will naturally tend to perceive the
same things to be true. By means of this universalist assumption, the new logic is able to do
without formal criteria for truth. As Locke puts it in The Conduct of the Understanding: “Every
man carries about him a touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold
from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances. And indeed the use and benefit of this
touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed prejudices,
overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds” (10). The existence and reliability of this
“touchstone” is essential to the workings of empiricist logic, since without it, there is no reason
to think that logic is anything but arbitrary, and, worse, no reason to think that one can
effectively communicate one’s reasonings to another person.44 Seen in this light, the comet is a
fitting image for what empiricism requires of the human mind. Stanhope’s choice of this image
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was almost certainly influenced by the excitement over the Great Comet of 1811, which had
been visible throughout much of the world for several months at the time of his writing (Figure
17). This comet stands for something that looks the same to everyone, a sensory object that
cannot (with nineteenth-century instruments) even be viewed from different angles, but that
rather presents the same image to anyone who can look up at the sky.45 It is, if anything is,
eminently public. Without this shared field of sensory data and a shared faculty of reason by
which to analyze it, the Demonstrator would be able to produce no knowledge that can be
communicated to another person, and would thus be, in Condillac’s term, frivolous.
In the context of the British politics of the late eighteenth century, this universalist
position was political as much as it was epistemological. Like the other members of the

Figure 17. H. R. Cook’s engraving of the Great Comet of 1811, after a drawing by A. Pether. This exceptionally large comet
reached its peak brightness in October, just a few weeks before Stanhope’s exchange with the Rev. North. A major topic of
conversation worldwide, this comet was almost certainly the one Stanhope had in mind when he composed the letter.
Image © Wellcome Collection, licensed under CC BY 4.0; https://wellcomecollection.org/works/ftg2286r.
Wel
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Revolution Society, Stanhope founded his politics on the belief that every “citizen,” as he
defiantly referred to commoners and nobles alike, is capable of political participation on an
equal basis; and in accordance with the quantifying spirit of the time, he put his trust in
mathematical reason as a way of appealing to what is common to the minds of nobility and
peasants. Like Paine and Godwin, Stanhope defended this belief in the rationality of
commoners on the grounds that, given proper education, everyone can perceive the truth or
falsity of logical argumentation. In a pamphlet attacking Burke, he explains away the irrational
behavior of the French peasants who participated in the October March as a result of their
debased circumstances (“A Letter” 10). In his work as a Parliamentarian, his style of
argumentation could verge on the geometric. His 1786 pamphlet “Observations on Mr. Pitt’s
Plan for the Reduction of the National Debt” sketches out an alternative to Pitt the Younger’s
plan in a style that mimics the structure of a mathematical proof, beginning with “AXIOM I” and
ending with the pronouncement, “And this is the proposition, which I had proposed to prove”
(14; 27). Stanhope backs up his argument with a series of statistical tables presented as
appendices. The effectiveness of this “axiomatic” approach as a political tactic depends on the
assumption that mathematical reasoning bears persuasive power simply because it is
mathematical. In this case, it did not happen to succeed (G. Stanhope and Gooch 70);
Stanhope’s “proof” convinced some people, but not Pitt.
This pamphlet is, to my knowledge, the only documented case in which Stanhope
actually used a machine to make a political argument—although it was not the Demonstrator.
A contemporary biographical account reports that Stanhope used a mechanical calculator to
produce the tables, “proving the truth of each separate result by means of an arithmetical
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machine invented by himself” (Phillips 83). If this is true, Stanhope did not seem to be
confident that the machine itself would impress his audience; the pamphlet does not mention
it, and states, instead, that two people independently verified the calculations (23). This
rhetorical choice makes sense given the context. Used as a way of appealing to universal
reason, as Stanhope had to do given his political commitments, computing machines can only
fill a modest role: saving time (at least if one trusts them enough not to check the results) and
preventing errors. To go beyond this and use a machine for rhetorical purposes, however,
would also require convincing one’s audience that the machine works properly, and in the
1780s, this would not have been so easy.
The evidence is foggy as to how many different calculating machines Stanhope made
and when. According to a letter by Lady Mary Coke, he had already built his first “mathematical
instrument” by the age of seventeen, which would place it in 1771 at the latest (G. Stanhope
and Gooch 11). Two of the machines, bearing the dates 1775 and 77, eventually wound up in
the collection of Charles Babbage (G. Stanhope and Gooch 33-34). Richard Phillips describes
them in his book Public Characters of 1800-1801:
The first and smallest machine is about the size of an octavo volume, which, by
means of dial-plates and small indices, moveable with a steel pin, is calculated to
perform with undeviating accuracy the operations of simple and compound
addition and subtraction. The second, and by far the most curious machine, is
not more than half the size of a writing desk. By this problems in multiplication
and division, of almost any extent, are solved without the possibility of a mistake
by the simple revolution of a small winch. What appears very singular and
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surprising to every spectator of the machine, is, that in working division, if the
operator be inattentive to his business, and thereby attempts to turn the handle
a single revolution more than he ought, he is instantly admonished of this error
by the sudden springing up of a small ivory ball. (84)
Stanhope’s division machines improved on the Leibniz design primarily in automating the
process to a greater extent. The user no longer has to carry ones manually, and, for division,
the machine can help the user determine whether his or her estimate is correct. By
mechanizing more of the procedure than previous machines, Stanhope’s devices reduce the
number of points at which an oversight or misjudgment could lead a calculation astray,
ensuring that at every step the algorithm for long division is followed to the letter.
This approach to mechanical computation is sound when it comes to arithmetic, but it
would quickly encounter difficulties if extended to politics, as Stanhope appears to have
intended. The spectators’ amusement at the ivory ball indicates one of the points at which
Stanhope’s calculating machine most clearly deviated from the expectations of the time: its
mechanism is meant to enforce a rule upon the user.46 The device is an example of what Ursula
M. Franklin calls prescriptive technology—it not only moves in response to human action, but
also provides feedback that is meant to alter the behavior of the human being turning the crank
(18). While this mode of human–machine interaction is familiar to anyone who has used a
computer, it is a shock to an eighteenth-century sensibility that is suspicious of rigid logical
rules. From this perspective, Stanhope’s machine is just as despotic as his parenting allegedly
was; the ivory ball substitutes for a wagging finger. What one is to make of this depends
strongly on whether one believes that the logic of the machine is universal. In the case of the
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mechanical calculator, it is a benevolent tyranny because more-or-less everyone did agree on
the rules for division (for positive numbers, at least). When a gap opens between the rules
embodied in the machine and those internalized by people, however, it is not a given that the
machine will win the argument, especially when ancient and cherished beliefs are involved. In
response to such an impasse, empiricism can only offer the assurance that the result makes
sense if you think about it. The right of the machine to tell the user what to do is founded on
the assumption that its workings correspond to laws of reason that are accessible to anyone
who is willing to let go of prejudice and keep an open mind.
This enforcement of rules is much harder to justify when it comes to logic, which is
supposed to be binding on all forms of reasoning, not just the numerical. I have found no
examples of the Demonstrator in action, but it would be hard to imagine it faring better than
Stanhope’s axiomatic theory of debt if it were let loose in the political sphere. The complexity
of British political discourse was too great for people to reach anything like an agreement on
what the basic terms meant, especially in the tense atmosphere of the 1790s and early 1800s.
A sonnet that Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote to Stanhope in early 1795 provides as good an
example as any of the slipperiness of the political vocabulary of the period (see Zall). While
Coleridge originally intended to dedicate his volume of poetry to Stanhope, he soon reversed
his opinion of the Earl, and he later insisted that the poem “was written in ridicule of Jacobinical
⟨Bombast⟩” (quoted in Works 16.I.1.191). The published version follows:
Not, STANHOPE! with the Patriot’s doubtful name
I mock thy worth—FRIEND OF THE HUMAN RACE!
Since scorning Faction's low and partial aim
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Aloof thou wendest in thy stately pace,
Thyself redeeming from that leprous stain,
NOBILITY: and aye unterrify’d
Pourest thine Abdiel warnings on the train
That sit complotting with rebellious pride
Gainst her, who from the Almighty’s bosom leapt
With whirlwind arm, fierce Minister of Love!
Wherefore, ere Virtue o’er thy tomb hath wept,
Angels shall lead thee to the Throne above:
And thou from forth it’s [sic] clouds shalt hear the voice,
Champion of FREEDOM and her God! rejoice! (Works 16.I.1.191-92)
The fact that this poem is convincing both as a Jacobin eulogy and as a Tory parody thereof
illustrates the extent to which the two political factions could produce radically different effects
with a common vocabulary. By refiguring conservatives as the rebels of Lucifer’s army, the
speaker sets divine authority against that of the aristocracy. The paradoxical reference to
“NOBILITY” as a “leprous stain” from which one must be “redeemed” requires a moral judgment
to sort out. On the one hand, it could be a sarcastic description of Stanhope’s stubborn
rejection of the trappings of aristocracy, as in his persistent refusal to powder his hair (G.
Stanhope and Gooch 20). But the inversion of values was also common in radical writing from
the period; the paradox closely resembles, for instance, Thomas Paine’s remark in The Rights of
Man that the use of hereditary titles “degrades” the human character (50), and one might also
think of the numerous commoners who self-identified as “swine” in light of Burke’s famous
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remark about the “swinish multitude” (O. Smith 79-82). Either way we read it, the tone is, in
this instance, virtually the only factor by which we might distinguish an anti-Jacobin poem from
a “Jacobinical” one.
Enlightenment empiricism could provide no way to extricate computing machines from
this sort of interpretive difficulty. If machine-made knowledge is inadmissible into arguments
except insofar as people can understand the whole set of operations that produced it, then
mechanical processes are dependent on the clarity of ideas just as much as written texts. How
serious a problem this is depends on the extent to which we believe that language can be
reconstructed from first principles. Stanhope’s position appears to have been that, starting in
Newtonian fashion from sensory data, one can develop clear “mental descriptions” of things
from the ground up, so that, through a careful enough conversation, one could build a common
set of terms with one’s interlocutor without the interference of any old, bad words. But this
approach cannot work in cases where reason does not clearly dictate a single correct analysis
that everyone can agree upon, regardless of political leaning. This appears to have been the
case with regard to the political language of the time. Even if the older Coleridge sets off an
ivory ball to indicate that we are reading his poem wrong, we are under no obligation to believe
him; the meaning of the poem differs radically depending on which side one thinks it is on. To
be sure, the logical inferences the Demonstrator produces, if it is used properly, are hard to
dispute. But convincing someone that they are relevant to the matter at hand requires the use
of words, and the idols of the market thus remain a potential threat. The Demonstrator can
only serve its function of making truth self-evident on the assumption that the analytical
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method can override preexisting disagreements about the meanings of the words in question.
A failure to agree upon terms reduces it to a chunk of wood.
One idea that is noticeably absent from the public corpus of remarks about the
Demonstrator is that the ability of the machine to operate autonomously of the human mind
could itself serve as a guarantee against bias—that the machineness of the machine could itself
be a solution to linguistic uncertainty. This would be the approach taken by advocates of what
Daston and Galison call “mechanical objectivity” in the later nineteenth century. As they
explain it, mechanical objectivity involves “the insistent drive to repress the willful intervention
of the artist-author, and to put in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move
nature to the page through a strict protocol, if not automatically” (121). Within this later
epistemological arrangement, any disagreements people have about the significance of words
could be quarantined in the realm of the subjective, leaving mechanical processes of datarecording and -processing to proceed unhindered. But this use of the terms subjective and
objective would have made no sense to Stanhope. The form of Enlightenment empiricism in
which he was immersed does not permit the result of a mechanical process to have any
meaning unless every step that led to it can be comprehended. This assumption precludes the
possibility of a machine that can extend the human mind beyond its natural capacities; human
reason remains the outer bound of what one can accomplish, however many artificial aids one
might devise. An Enlightenment computing machine can only legitimately perform a regulatory
function, enforcing rules upon our thinking better than we can do ourselves, but still remaining
in the confines of what reason naturally teaches us.
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Stanhope’s adherence to the empiricist project of grounding knowledge in the senses is
why, as the 1818 obituary points out, his goal of creating a “reasoning machine” is ultimately
dependent on a utopian vision. Ensuring that everyone genuinely understands words in the
same way would require the sort of top-down educational program that Condorcet proposed, a
means of placing the same ideas in each individual’s head. By the end of Stanhope’s life, this
empiricist view of language had largely given way to a new school of linguistics that placed the
possibility of such a project under serious doubt. Around the same time that Stanhope was
designing his first computing machines, Johann Gottfried Herder and the philologist Johann
David Michaëlis were arguing against the idea that the artificial notations of logic and
mathematics could function as languages in the true sense, suggesting, instead, that meaning
can only be established through the medium of culture. These critiques, for those who
accepted them, put an end to the idea that the empiricist method of analysis could suffice to
establish the meanings of symbols independently of any existing language. While they were
not universally accepted in the eighteenth century, the triumph of such involuntarist views of
language ultimately, over the course of the nineteenth, supplanted Enlightenment theories of
the well-formed sign, leaving behind, on the one hand, language in all its messiness and beauty,
and on the other, finally detached from any concerns so fuzzy as meaning, the algorithm.

Herder: The Sins of the Father

For the version of Enlightenment upheld by Turgot, Condorcet, and Stanhope, “the people”
primarily figure as the ones who must be enlightened. Progress, in this view, consists of the
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extermination of all forms of prejudice and superstition across the world; in its most extreme
form, it means teaching everyone the same well-formed algebraic language so that political
disagreements can be resolved through computation. Starting in the 1750s, Michaëlis, Herder,
and other thinkers, centered primarily in a German context, undertook one of the eighteenth
century’s most sophisticated attempts to redeem what this tradition wanted to throw out: the
language of common life. Developing a well-formed language from the ground up, in the view
of these thinkers, is a futile endeavor, because people cannot truly expunge the influence of
their native languages from their ways of thinking; instead of chasing the impossible dream of a
philosophical language, one must make productive use of the tension between the rigidity of
philosophical abstractions and the liveliness of everyday speech. The works of Michaëlis and
Herder suggest a conclusion that, while perhaps mere common sense today, was disturbing
from the perspective of Condillacian empiricism: that the sort of linguistic uncertainty that
enabled Coleridge to retroactively change the political message of his poem, and that
threatened, from an empiricist perspective, the validity of Stanhope’s Demonstrators, will be
with us forever. These writings stand as early expressions of a view of language that would
ultimately, in the nineteenth century, displace the Enlightenment theories of the sign on which
the projects of Condorcet and Stanhope alike depended and establish, in their place, a newly
sharp divide between the concerns of philology and those of logic and mathematics.
Modern scholars have had varying views of how Herder’s thought relates to that of the
Enlightenment. Isaiah Berlin classifies Herder as one of the “critics of the Enlightenment,”
attributing to him a form of relativism that undermines the liberal universalism of
Enlightenment thought. As Berlin puts it, “Logic for him is only an abstraction from languages
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living or dead. There is no ‘deep’ logical structure presupposed by all forms of rational thought;
in his Sprachphilosophie, logic is an approximation to what is common in isomorphic languages,
which themselves point to a high degree of similarity in the experiences of their users” (19394). While Berlin insists that Herder viewed cultures as entirely incommensurable and thus
denied the existence of any possibility of progress, this interpretation is hard to uphold (see
Morton 19). Other scholars, such as H. B. Nisbet and Robert Edward Norton, have noted
affinities between Herder’s work and Enlightenment thought, and Jonathan Israel classes
Herder as a radical Enlightenment philosopher (H. B. Nisbet 1; Norton 6; Israel 15). A nuanced
reading would be that Herder’s project insists on maintaining, rather than resolving, the tension
between universalism and relativism—attempting to unite these two poles, as Michael Morton
puts it, “in a synthesis […] that does not go back on the initial formulation of the problem but
rather preserves the element of opposition between them” (20). This perspective troubles one
of the central assumptions of Stanhope’s project: that the workings of a “reasoning machine”
can be made to fit smoothly with the way everyone thinks, rather than (at best) embodying the
practices of a small community of academic logicians. Herder’s work contains an early
expression of a view that would become widespread by the beginning of the nineteenth
century: that the development of such methods could never form a substitute for natural
language, as Condillac and Condorcet asserted, but would rather inevitably exist in tension with
the culture of a people.
Herder’s work was situated within a broader eighteenth-century cultural formation that
existed in opposition to the Enlightenment project of recreating language. In a commonplace
that circulated internationally in the eighteenth century, ideas that cannot make the leap from
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academic discourse to the language of common life were depicted as effeminate and bloodless.
A famous example appears in the English poet Edward Young’s long poem Night Thoughts, first
published in parts between 1742 and 1745, which contains a passage that is often cited as an
example of an eighteenth-century statement of the relationship of language to thought:
Speech, Thought’s Canal! Speech, Thought’s Criterion too!
Thought, in the Mine, may come forth Gold or Dross;
When coin’d in Word, we know its real worth.
If Sterling, store it for thy future Use;
’Twill buy thee Benefit; perhaps, Renown.
.....................................
What Numbers, sheathed in Erudition lie,
Plung’d to the Hilts in venerable Tomes,
And rusted in; who might have borne an Edge,
And play’d a sprightly beam, if born to Speech;
If born bless’d Heirs of half their Mother’s tongue! (63)
This passage exemplifies a widespread tendency in eighteenth-century linguistic thought that,
in contrast to the seventeenth-century valorization of real characters, elevated the liveliness of
the vernacular over the abstractions of bookish discourse. Once again, words are coins, but the
valence of the metaphor here is quite the opposite of Condillac's comparison of words with
“game chips” in A Treatise on Systems. Instead of fiat currency, Young's words—at least the
good ones—are coins minted from gold or silver, and their stamps certify their value based on
high authority.47 Opposed to this verbal exchange of specie are the characters “rusted in” on
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the pages of a book. Without speech, Young suggests, the printed word is lifeless, impotent; its
true value is unknown until it is wielded in conversation. The speaker of these lines shares with
Condillac a concern about the possibility of abstractions becoming detached from the world.
For Young, however, it is not the world of the senses to which thoughts must connect in order
to be meaningful, but the world of society. To avoid rusting away in the dark recesses of
“erudition,” thoughts must inherit some of the vitality of the “mother’s tongue.”
While views like Young’s were common internationally, it was the German context that
produced the most sophisticated attempts to theorize these cultural aspects of language.
Under the reign of the famously Francophilic Frederick II (from 1740 to 1786), the Prussian
government attempted to establish a centralized administrative structure on the model of
Bourbon France. These measures inspired a controversy that produced some of the period’s
best writing on education and language. A center of this activity was the Royal Prussian
Academy of Sciences, which began in 1700 as one of Leibniz’s administrative projects.48
Thinkers involved with the Academy, including Herder, Michaëlis, and Johann Georg Hamann,
produced a powerful critique of the French Enlightenment’s fixation on linguistic purity that
arguably undermined the idea of a well-formed language, and with it one of the eighteenth
century’s most important rationales for the use of algorithmic methods. This critique attacked
the universalism of French Enlightenment views of mathesis at a deeper level than d’Alembert
did with his argument that algebra is “a kind of language,” suggesting that all forms of thought,
however formalized, are inextricably bound to culture.
This discourse was conditioned in part by an influx of French thought into the Academy
starting in the 1740s. The famous French scientist Pierre Louis Maupertuis, whom Frederick
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invited to Germany in the early 1740s and named, in 1746, the president of the Academy,
produced a series of writings on language that are indicative of the general direction the
German debates on language took. In a 1748 pamphlet, he gives an account of the origin of
language that is broadly similar to Condillac’s, but that makes much more of the differences
between languages.49 English and French are, he writes, merely “translations of one another,”
their signs “cut in the same manner” (4; my translation); but there are, he believes, other
languages built on “plans of ideas so different from ours” that they are almost impossible to
translate into European languages (5). Many of the German writers on language in the later
eighteenth century shared this tendency towards linguistic relativism, which resulted in a very
different attitude toward language planning in Germany from the one that prevailed in France.
While Maupertuis and a number of others still clung to the Condillacian program of remaking
language anew in the student’s mind, Germany also produced a number of proposals for
linguistic reforms that attempted to work with the linguistic knowledge that was specific to
German culture, a movement that was spurred on both by mounting linguistic nationalism and
by a desire to keep the sciences grounded in the ordinary lifeworld of the people.
While some thinkers associated with the Academy, such as Johann Georg Sulzer,
attempted to find a middle ground between an appreciation for the resources of natural
languages and a desire for something better, there was also a significant amount of pushback in
Germany against the idea that science should use a different language from the one used in
daily life (see Sulzer, Kurzer Begriff). The philologist Johann David Michaëlis made a detailed,
well-argued case against constructed language schemes in the published version of his
Dissertation on the Influence of Opinions on Language and of Language on Opinions. This essay,
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which is primarily an examination of the ways in which language can introduce errors into
people’s thinking, won the Prussian Academy prize in 1759, and it was well-received
internationally, winning high praise from d’Alembert in France (Lifschitz 38), and circulating in
England and the United States in an unauthorized 1769 English translation.50 The French and
English versions of the essay include an extensive section arguing against the idea of creating a
“learned language,” with apparent reference to Leibniz’s universal characteristic, advocating
instead a science presented “in the language of common life” (English 91/French 175). In an
argument that would go on to have significant influence in the German context and elsewhere,
his section concludes that, in spite of all the problems that language causes, we are to a large
extent stuck with it—the costs of doing away with words, as Condorcet, Stanhope, and so many
others would attempt to do in the name of Enlightenment, outweigh the benefit.
Appropriate to the time of Frederick II, Michaëlis’s essay places the “learned language”
in a very different political light from the utopian vision of Condorcet’s Sketch. One of
Michaëlis’s arguments concerns the possibility that it would create a deeper divide between
those who understand science and those who cannot. “The body of the people,” he writes,
“and all who are not learned by profession, will be daily sinking deeper into ignorance: the
characteristic throws up a partition between them and the sciences” (86/164). In addition to
reinforcing stratification, he suggests, the characteristic could be used to delude the masses by
concealing the way new inventions work and thus casting them as “false miracles” (87/166).
Michaëlis’s concerns can apply to the specialized terminology of philosophical writing as well as
to constructed languages, since, he writes, “an author treats as sovereign master the technical
language he makes use of. He says, this is the meaning I fix to this term, this is the definition I
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give of it: we then are all obliged to understand him, as he has declared he will be understood,
and as little can we contest that right with him, as prescribe to the Algebraist what lines he shall
call a and what b” (88/168). In contrast to the “sacred tyranny” of the technical, Michaëlis
argues, with the living languages of nations “all is Democratic: words cannot be deprived of
their received meaning but by the consent of the people, and by a contrary usage, that is
introduced bit by bit” (88/168). Being foreign, as it were, to all nations, a learned language
could never be absorbed as deeply as we absorb the languages we hear from the cradle.
Michaëlis’s essay points in the direction of a different response to the flaws of language
that would gain a great deal of influence by the end of the century: that imaginative literature,
in appealing to the feelings as well as to reason, was better suited to influence the linguistic
practices of a people than explicitly prescriptive projects like Leibniz’s characteristic or
Condorcet’s universal algebra. Similarly to Jefferson, Michaëlis denies that scholars have a right
to propound changes: “it is not for him [the scholar] to give laws, nor proscribe established
expressions: if he hazards it, he is ridiculed, and deservedly; it is no more than a just
chastisement for his ambition and for the infraction he commits against the rights of the
people” (78/148). Instead, in a section entitled “Improvement of the Vocabulary”
(“Amélioration du langage”), he suggests that poets and authors of belles lettres are best
situated to correct flaws in a language (77/147). This line of thought would gain cultural
dominance in Germany around the end of the century with the emergence of German
Classicism, which was one of a number of cultural formations to emerge at the time that
consider language as a product of culture rather than as a set of mental representations that
may be arbitrarily changed. For Michaëlis, as well as for many of the later adherents of this

169

view, it is poets, not philosophers, who have a legitimate right to attempt to improve upon
existing languages.
Herder was a key figure in defining the linguistic program of German Classicism, and his
body of writings on language constituted a powerful case against the Enlightenment project of
replacing language with a new system of abstractions. Herder’s unfinished early work “How
Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People” (1765) sets
the terms of his philosophical program. Taking a cue from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, this essay
attacks the idea that “the people” would benefit from learning philosophy, suggesting, instead,
that the “natural understanding” is better suited to the needs of common life. Throughout the
essay, Herder maintains an opposition between “healthy reason” and metaphysics, the latter of
which, he suggests, chokes students with “school-dust” rather than enlightening them
(Philosophical Writings 7; 9). In expounding on the dangers of philosophical education, Herder
emphasizes the deadening effects of memorizing abstractions: “O you his machine-like teacher,
well do you need to suppress his healthy understanding with your school Logic; otherwise he
would take your measure, repeat the gobbledygook you took an hour to trot out afterwards
naturally but without school-cleverness in three words. He would despise you!” (9). All the
greatest deeds in war and statecraft, for Herder, are results “of the Logic which our nurses
implanted in us, not of the Logic which our schoolteachers wanted to stamp us with” (10).
Herder’s opposition to rote memorization is broadly similar to Locke’s argument that parents
should teach their children through positive examples rather than forcing them to remember
“Rules” (Some Thoughts 39); it is in step with the eighteenth-century trend away from rote
memorization toward habit-building. Yet Herder was much more concerned with collectivity
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than were Locke’s British and French followers. His later work developed into a program of
improvement directed not towards individual students but towards “the people” as a whole—a
goal that raises very different questions about what it would take to bring an improved
language into being.
Herder’s most direct response to the Condillacian theory of signs appears in his Treatise
on the Origin of Language, which won the Academy’s essay prize in 1772. In the first part of
this essay, Herder gives an explanation of the origin of language that is rather different from
Condillac’s story of the two children picking fruit. For Herder, language does not wait to
emerge until a person needs to communicate with another; instead, he writes, “it is
unintelligible to me how a human soul was able to be what it is without precisely thereby,
already even in the absence of a mouth and society, inevitably inventing language for itself”
(90). In Herder’s view, we create signs instantly as soon as we begin to develop ideas of things.
Herder’s account of how this process might begin is as follows. A sheep passes before the eyes
of a man. Since human beings are not driven entirely by instinct, the significance of the sheep
for the man is not pre-ordained, as it would be for a “blood-licking lion” or a ram (88). Once the
man “develops a need to become acquainted with the sheep,” he searches for a “characteristic
mark” by which he can “recognize” it (88). Just in time, “the sheep bleats!—his soul has found a
characteristic mark. The inner sense takes effect” (88). Later, the sheep returns, “it bleats, and
now the soul recognizes it again! ‘Aha! You are the bleating one!’ the soul feels inwardly” (88).
The sign enables the man to recognize the sheep “in a human way,” rather than in terms of
mere animal instinct (88). The development of language is, Herder argues, an inevitable result
of human capacity to shape oneself by means of reflective thought.
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So far, Herder primarily focuses on language as an individual medium of recognition
rather than as a medium of communication. But while sociality does not yet enter at the point
of origin, Herder shifts his focus to the social aspects of language in the second part of the
Treatise, in which he attempts to argue that human language develops “progressively” over the
course of human history (127). Herder’s case for the progressive nature of language rests on
the procreative chain linking us back to the beginning of the human species: “If I came into the
world in order to need to enter immediately into my family’s instruction, then likewise my
father, likewise, the first son of the first father of the tribe […]. The chain goes on and only stops
with ‘the one, the first’; in this way, we are all his sons, from him begin species, instruction,
language” (156). Since no one can survive infancy without the aid of elders, the language of
each generation is inevitably influenced by “the inheritance of their ancestors’ whole treasure
of experiences” (157); and since no human being can live without language, the chain cannot be
broken. Apart from constituting a position within a rather esoteric eighteenth-century
academic dispute (whether language improves or declines over time), Herder’s argument
suggests a very different pedagogy from the one that Condillac and Lavoisier were enacting a
few hundred miles away. Building a new language from scratch is neither possible nor
desirable for Herder. Instead, one must work with and improve the language that one inherits
from one’s ancestors.
There has been some disagreement among scholars about how these arguments should
fit into the historiography of the eighteenth century.51 Friedrich Kittler associates Herder
primarily with later developments; in Kittler’s view, Herder’s “lamb” (which is actually, Kittler
points out, a ewe) represents the eternal feminine of German Romanticism, and Herder’s
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Treatise stands as an early volley of the Classical–Romantic discourse network that existed in
Germany circa 1800 (39). But one might also read Herder’s text in its entanglement with the
empiricism of earlier thinkers like Locke and Maupertuis (see Forster 132). The importance that
Herder grants to the parental voice makes perfect sense in terms of the Enlightenment
sensationalism of the mid-eighteenth century. A similar statement, for instance, appears in
Maupertuis’s 1748 pamphlet: “Hardly are we born, but we hear repeating an infinity of words
that express rather the prejudices of those who surround us than the first ideas that are born in
the spirit” (6; my translation).52 What differentiates this account from Herder’s is primarily that
Herder places more value in knowledge obtained from other people. For Maupertuis, the
presence of the mother’s (or nurse’s) voice is a bad thing, because the old prejudices (préjugés)
that we imbibe in the cradle keep us from perceiving the genuine origins of ideas. Herder
would respond that those natal experiences are, in fact, essential to the development of the
spirit, and what we gain from our caregivers is not prejudice but culture—an initiation into a
lifeworld in which we will need to learn to dwell in order to work together with the other
members of our community.
This argument suggests a very different pedagogy from the one that Condillac
developed. For Condillac, one can start from scratch with an individual student, in whose mind
ontogeny will recapitulate phylogeny, fixing a few things up as it does so. This educational
method presumes not only that the mind begins as a blank piece of paper, as Locke claimed,
but also that whatever stray markings it may have accumulated before the student started
school can be rubbed or scraped off. Herder denies the genuineness of this new beginning. For
Herder, the origins of ideas cannot be considered independently from the history of the people
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who made them; accordingly, the sort of thought experiment that Condillac and Maupertuis
used to reconstruct language from first principles must give way to philological research.
Herder states this view exultantly in Fragments Concerning Recent German Literature: “Not
how language should have arisen or could have arisen, but how it arose—that is the question!”
(Philosophical Writings 55). While a consensus generally exists that Herder failed to fulfill his
stated purpose of explaining the origin of language without hypothesis or imaginative
reconstruction, his historicist response to Condillac still deserves consideration as a
philosophical argument. For Herder, languages are a part of history, and there is no starting
history anew. From this perspective, attempts to expunge words from algebra, as Condorcet
tried to do, are not only futile but counterproductive, because they sever the connection to a
historically situated human community that would be needed to give meaning and vitality to
the symbols.
One of Herder’s most direct statements against well-formed languages appears in a
passage in one of the manuscripts of the Treatise. Herder begins by stating a version of the
familiar complaint about the errors caused by Bacon’s “idols,” which “are made eternal by
nothing as much as by language,” and which command people “to think in accordance with the
analogy of their fathers and not in accordance with the analogy of nature, to read the images of
the universe in the distorting mirror of tradition and not in nature” (144n). But against the long
tradition of attempting to heal the wound of Babel, Herder asserts that fallen languages are the
best we can hope for:
Whoever can, let him think his way beyond [the idols], or rather right through
them—for if one means to destroy all those images and prejudices (praeiudicata)
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as prejudices (praeiudicia) and empty idols, then indeed one has the easy work
of the Goths in Italy or the Persians in Egypt, but one also leaves oneself with
nothing more than a desert. Precisely thereby one has stripped oneself of the
aid of all the centuries of one’s fathers, and stands there naked […]. So, unless
we want to follow the warning example of all those who make systems out of
their own heads, there is nothing for us to do in such a case but to throw
ourselves into the great ocean of truths and errors, and, with the help of all
those who have lived before us, to see how far we can get, then, in beholding
and observing nature and in naming it through distinct linguistic ideas! (144n)
Whatever the reason this passage did not end up in the published version of the essay, Herder
did not abandon the line of thinking it expresses. Herder was, along with Michaëlis and
Giambattista Vico, one of the early practitioners of a form of philosophical discourse that came
to be known as Sprachkritik, a practice that aims to create a greater attentiveness to the
language we speak in daily life and, through the poetic development of new linguistic
resources, to improve and enrich it without creating a sudden break with the past.53 His work
points not towards yet another attempt to replace language with something better, but
towards a critical appreciation of words as what they are: an inheritance from the past.
In response to the Lockean epistemology, then, Herder offers the warning that, given
the fundamentally collective nature of language, there might be a limit to our ability to alter the
system of signs by which we understand the world. As Tristram Wolff has pointed out, in
eighteenth-century linguistic thought, the idea that language is arbitrary could mean that it is
willed, subject to the “capricious or even despotic” control of individuals (259). Herder (like
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Michaëlis with his remark against the “sacred Tyranny” of technical terms) pushes against this
assumption by emphasizing the “involuntary” aspects of language, as Wolff calls them (259),
the fact that even the most creative individual must root her language in social practices that,
far from being subject to the arbitrary pronouncements of any individual, seem to have a life of
their own. This turn against linguistic voluntarism, if accepted, causes serious problems for the
way eighteenth-century empiricists made sense of artificial symbolic systems like algebra. The
sort of constructed-language project that Condorcet undertook is not just impractical, but
altogether impossible in the Herderian view; algebra could not be made into a living language
by a mere feat of bureaucracy. One possible response to this critique—and the one that would
eventually prevail with the emergence of nineteenth-century formalism—would be to abandon
the connection between symbols and ideas altogether, reducing the scheme to an algorithmic
system rather than a Condillacian method of sensory analysis. But Herder’s work points in a
rather different direction from this one. Instead of turning to formalization as a way of finally
defeating the influence of words on thought, Herder embraces this influence, trying to develop
a form of philosophy that can work together with the linguistic resources of “the people.” As
he concludes in the second section of “How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful
for the Benefit of the People”: “You the philosopher and you the plebian, make a common
alliance in order to become useful” (20).
Herder’s philosophy would seem to have dire consequences for projects like Stanhope’s
Demonstrator. James W. Marchand echoes a common view of Herder when he writes that
“Herder hated systems, algorithms, discrete entities, rules, and the kind of thinking that went
along with them” (20). This conclusion is perhaps a too-easy accommodation of Herder to the
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received image of the Counter-Enlightenment; Herder did, after all, sketch out a set of pseudoalgebraic “laws” for history and ethics based on the mathematical research of Lambert (see H.
B. Nisbet 92-93). But Herder’s work does present a challenge to projects attempting to
establish meaning in a way that does not take account of their position in history. For Herder,
it is not possible to return to the innocent state of the primitive human who, staring naked at
the night sky, saw a comet for the first time in human history; for us living in later times,
whatever judgments we make will inevitably be inflected by those who came before us. In this
view, the storehouse of knowledge is not the senses, but language itself, and we are thus, to an
important extent, stuck with the flaws of our mother tongues. If Herder is right, then a logic
machine like Stanhope’s Demonstrator can do little to establish concord among people who do
not already share a great deal in common culturally, politically, and intellectually —in short, it
can only reflect the way of thinking of a particular community at a particular point in history
rather than letting through the light of universal truth. As such, it could still be useful; but it
would be limited in its utility by the extent to which it corresponds to the way its users already
think. It would have no right tyrannically to enforce its logic upon us, as Stanhope’s machines
did and modern computers (with their error messages and warning beeps) arguably do.
Whether or not Herder had any direct influence on the new cohort of philologists who
rose to prominence in the early nineteenth century, they largely followed his lead in viewing
language as an inherently historical phenomenon. The idea that we can and should “make an
entirely new language for ourselves,” as Condillac had put it, lost its credibility as language
became an object of scientific study. The research of Grimm, Bopp, and Humboldt provided
strong empirical evidence that Herder, Jefferson, and other supporters of cultural views of

177

language were right: languages could not be created and replaced at will, but were rather
subject to historical laws that could be imperfectly discerned with careful study but not easily
overcome.54 A few latecoming universal language projects notwithstanding, this new form of
linguistics gave lie to the notion that symbolic systems modeled on mathematics or logic could
ever attain the status of true languages like English and German. As Humboldt put it in his book
On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development
of the Human Species (first published in 1836), language “possesses an autonomy that visibly
declares itself to us, though inexplicable in its nature”; rather than something intentionally
created, it is “an involuntary emanation of the mind” that people use “without knowing how
they have fashioned it” (24). Involuntarism had become an unquestioned doctrine in linguistics
by the twentieth century, with Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics arguing at length that
“the individual has no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has been established in a
linguistic community” (68; see also 71-74). With the collapse of the Enlightenment optimism
about the universality of reason, it became clear in Humboldt’s time that the linguistic practices
of groups of people could not be changed at will in the same way that algebraic and logical
symbols apparently could. The languages people speak in daily life and the symbols that
circulate through algorithmic systems were doomed to be at odds.
But the result of the abandonment of Enlightenment voluntarism was perhaps not what
Herder would have wished. Although it took nearly a century, the form of algorithmic
reasoning that Leibniz had called blind thought finally returned to the mainstream of Western
science in the nineteenth century. In a turn that culminated with the work of Boole,
nineteenth-century algebraists abandoned the assumption, so tenaciously held by Stanhope,
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that their algorithms must map transparently onto clear and distinct concepts; they thus, at
length, relieved computational processes of the dependence on words that inspired such
skepticism in the writer of Stanhope’s 1818 obituary. This shift away from signification enabled
not just ambitious computational projects like that of Babbage and Lovelace, but also the
development of seemingly counterintuitive mathematical constructs like the non-Euclidean
geometries of János Bolyai and Nikolai Lobachevsky, which were both published in the early
1830s. Unlike Enlightenment mathematicians, for whom mathematics had to constitute a
comprehensible analysis of the world to be valid, the young mathematicians of the nineteenth
century made no effort to back their symbols up with ideas; instead, they used formal rules to
construct imaginary mathematical worlds whose structures, in some cases, seemed to flatly
contradict what human reason dictated (Alexander, “From Voyagers to Martys” 39-40).
Differentiating the formal symbolic systems of mathematics from languages in the strict sense
freed people once again to experiment with blind thought, but it left them in a very different
position from Leibniz, with his faith in the divinely instituted meaningfulness of algorithms. The
fact that algorithms could be constructed arbitrarily was no longer a threat to their credibility,
but rather—for the first time in the modern history of the West—an asset.
One reason why cultural views of language were eventually able to coexist with
algorithms was that, unlike Enlightenment theories of the sign, modern linguistics restricted its
scope to dealing only with what we now think of as ordinary language. For Humboldt, the
involuntarist argument that language existed in an intimate relation to the practices of human
communities applied only to natural languages like Sanskrit and Kawi; mathematical languages
were subject to disciplinary norms that potentially stood in a different relation to the mind and
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to history. The next chapter examines how this new form of disciplinarity came into being. A
key element in this shift, I contend, was the Romantic thought of Germany and England. While
Romanticism is widely regarded as a reaction against the mechanical philosophy of the
Enlightenment, I show that at least some Romantic thinkers were less concerned with opposing
the mechanical than with creating a space in which culture could develop autonomously from
mechanical rationality. This compartmentalization enabled mathematicians to develop new
symbolic methods based not on the gold standard of reason, but rather on arbitrary rules that
were decided, as it were, by fiat; yet it had the side-effect of alienating scientific knowledge
from the sort of common-sense reason on which Stanhope’s Enlightenment project depended.
As science departed further and further from culture, empirical methods of the sort advocated
by the Lockean tradition became increasingly inadequate as means of telling real from fake.
Locke’s touchstone might work to distinguish gold from dross, but a mere touchstone is not
enough to spot a forged bank note.
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Chapter 4: Romanticism and the Objectivity of Culture

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
—Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass

The Schism

If the reputation of language reached a lowpoint in revolutionary France, Romanticism restored
it. In the 1830s and 40s, writers from a variety of disciplines praised the vitality of vernacular
tongues, suggesting that, rather than enemies of science, they were its wellsprings. The most
famous scientist of the early nineteenth century, the naturalist Alexander von Humboldt,
includes a brief discussion of the power of words in his popular-science book Kosmos, first
published in 1845. Humboldt begins by claiming that signs play a fundamental role in thought,
a statement that echoes the Enlightenment philosophy of Condillac. But whereas Condillac had
emphasized the danger words posed to the certainty of reasoning, Humboldt’s tone is
celebratory:
THOUGHT and LANGUAGE […] stand in most intimate and old relationship to one
another. When speech adds grace and clearness to ideas, when its
picturesqueness of derivation and organic structure favour our efforts sharply to
define natural phenomena as a whole, it scarcely fails at the same time, and
almost unconsciously to us, to infuse its animating power into the fullness of
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thought itself. The WORD is, therefore, more than the mere sign and form, and its
mysterious influence still reveals itself most strikingly where it springs among
free-minded communities, and attains its growth upon native soils. (1.42)
Here Humboldt breaks entirely from the venerable suspicion of words, extolling, in somewhat
nationalistic terms, the resources of the German language for communicating scientific
discoveries. What saved language from the Baconian critique was that, for Humboldt, the
“mysterious influence” of words did not stand like a distorting lens between the observer and
reality, as it had for the Enlightenment empiricists, but rather existed in a dialectic with the
material world. Humboldt’s goal, as he states it in the preface, is to develop a writing style that
combines a rigorous scientific “completeness” with a “liveliness” of presentation (1.x; see
Tresch, “Even the Tools Will Be Free” 255). Humboldt’s discussion of language exemplifies a
dualism between science and culture that radically altered the way mechanical processes
related to ordinary language in the early nineteenth century.
This chapter examines how this dualism came to supplant Enlightenment theories of
language. The terms Humboldt uses to explain the relation between language and thought, as
this chapter shows, stem from the Romantic turn of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Although some recent accounts of Romantic thought have emphasized the
continuities between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, I show that the notion of culture on
which Humboldt draws constituted a departure from Enlightenment views.55 A number of
Romantic thinkers, including William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and the Humboldt
brothers, rejected Enlightenment theories of the sign in favor of a division between science and
culture, calling for a balance between the definitional precision that artificial languages enabled
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and the connection to the organically developing mental life of a people that only longestablished words could provide. Although it was not exactly the intention of either
Wordsworth or Coleridge, this division produced an epistemological atmosphere that was far
more conducive to the development of mechanical methods of computation than the
Enlightenment had been. No more was it necessary for the specialized symbolic systems of
mathematics and logic to determine how people think all the way down; now, mathematical
notations could work together with existing languages, the former providing rigor, the latter
providing the “animating power,” as Humboldt puts it, of culture. Before Leibniz’s dream of a
calculus ratiocinatur could return, the vernacular needed to be redeemed.
Outside of its well-known importance for Ada Lovelace, Romanticism has not often
played a prominent role in histories of computation. The received view is that the Romantic
movement was a reaction against the “mechanical” philosophies of the eighteenth century,
making it antagonistic to the development of anything like an algorithm. In Discourse Networks
1800/1900, Friedrich Kittler frames the emergence of the digital as a break with Romantic
attitudes toward communication (177-84). But Romantic thought was not as unilaterally
antagonistic to the mechanical as scholars have assumed. This chapter shows that at least one
strain of Romanticism was more concerned with delineating the limits of mechanical methods
than with condemning them altogether. Two of the central poets of the British Romantic
canon—Wordsworth and Coleridge—made explicit statements to the effect that scientific
reason must work together with an enlivening supplement of feeling (Wordsworth) or moral
purpose (Coleridge). These statements were part of a broader, international trend toward
science–culture dualism that found an influential expression in the work of Alexander von
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Humboldt’s brother, the linguist and educational theorist Wilhelm von Humboldt.56 Insofar as
it pushed toward the separation of the technical aspects of science from the organic
development of human thought, Romanticism was not effaced with the advent of technical
media, but rather contributed to the modern notion of culture that continues to inform the
ways people interact with information technologies in the twenty-first century.
This chapter makes a variant of Max Weber’s argument that modernity took the form of
the division of society into a number of distinct spheres. This notion of modernity has become
somewhat disreputable among scholars in the past few decades, especially in the field of
Science and Technology Studies. In We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour argues that the
division between nature and culture never truly existed and that modernity as a historiographic
rubric gives a distorted view of the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (1-12). I
agree with Latour that disciplinary compartmentalization leads to a difficulty in understanding
the entanglements, as he calls them, of ecology with human culture, yet I do maintain that a
form of the science–culture divide took place in the nineteenth century. The division I am
positing is discernable in a quite concrete set of practices. Since the word literature took on its
modern sense, no one, to my knowledge, has seriously suggested that the meaning-making
aspects of literary language could or should be standardized in the way that chemical
nomenclature has been standardized.57 It is hard to imagine, for instance, an international
consortium publishing a list of standard metaphors for describing a sunset.58 If any literary
work did appear to be following a standard—an allegation that was made, for instance, against
the formulaic sensation tales churned out by Blackwood’s Magazine in the early nineteenth
century—this would be a strike against its status as serious literature. Conversely, literariness is
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suspect when it shows up in technical contexts, since it interferes with the requisite conceptual
clarity.
As common-sensical as it may now seem, this differential treatment of literary and
scientific language did not exist before around 1800.59 In the eighteenth century, the word
literature referred to any sort of learned writing, including many of what we would now
recognize as works of science.60 While specific literary genres, such as poetry and drama, were
clearly delineated, they did not exist in the same contradistinction to informational or
argumentative forms of writing that they now occupy. In the early eighteenth century, writing
poetry would have been seen as an art in the same sense that shoemaking was an art: a rulebased craft involving skills that one may learn from others. Augustan poetics, the dominant
aesthetic school in early-eighteenth-century Britain, emphasized regularity in meter and rhyme,
and rhetoric manuals and florilegia—compilations of quotations from famous authors that
were used to simulate erudition—arguably provided standards for the use of figures of speech
and allusions.61 By the time that national and international standards organizations began to
form in the later nineteenth century, though, there was no question that poetry would fall
under their purview. Post-Romantic notions of culture placed literature and other forms of
serious art in opposition to such intentional planning; what made a text literary in the modern
sense was precisely that it was not using language in a standard way, but rather in some way
exploring novel expressive possibilities. As technical language became more standardized,
literary language became less so.
The emergence of this differential treatment of culture and science, I contend, was a
critical turning point in the rise of the algorithm. After the Romantic turn, obsessive attempts
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to expunge all traces of natural language from logical reasoning, as Condorcet and Stanhope
had done, gave way to a desire to make rigorous scientific languages work together with the
organically developing culture of the people who use them. In the introduction to Kosmos,
Humboldt calls for a balance between experience and intellect, utility and beauty,
“manufacturing industry” and “the liberal arts” (1.38); true science, in his view, occupies a
middle ground between mechanical, fact-gathering “empiricism” and an excess of imaginitive
“fancy” (1.9). Similar calls for balance appear in Wordsworth, who claimed that feeling plays a
role in all knowledge, making it necessary to balance a scientific perspective with a poetic one;
and Coleridge, who argued that the abstractions of science must be “enlivened” with a sense of
purpose. This dualism led thinkers across Europe to see the specialized nomenclatures,
terminologies, and notations of science not as replacements for natural languages, but rather
as artificial constructs that had to work together with the organically developing culture of a
people to produce meaningful knowledge. For a moment, the watchword was, as Ada Lovelace
put it, “poetical science”—an approach to knowledge production that combines the advantages
of mechanical methods with the intuition and imagination of a poet. Science and culture,
algebra and poetry, innovation and tradition arrived at a truce.
Although it had significant advantages over Enlightenment empiricism for developers of
mechanical methods of computation, this dualism also created new anxieties regarding such
methods. In the simultaneous adoption of organic views of culture and mechanical views of
algebra I locate the origin of Alan Liu’s “meaning problem,” a difficulty in reconciling the results
of algorithmic methods with interpretive discourses (“Meaning” 411). The difficulty, I argue,
stems from the fact that the Romantic turn placed algorithm and meaning in different relations
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to history: while the algorithmic aspects of symbolic algebra could be altered at will, attempts
to give them meaning had to answer in some way to the signification practices already
established in a community. This disconnect between algorithm and meaning differentiates
modern attitudes toward computation from those of Leibniz and his early-modern
contemporaries, for whom the mechanical nature of algorithmic methods was itself a
guarantee of their meaningfulness. Now, the case was quite the opposite: the mechanical
nature of such methods was reason to doubt that they meant anything at all.
This chapter begins with a discussion of William Wordsworth’s role in the development
of the modern notion of literature. As an alternative to Enlightenment programs of social
reform, Wordsworth offers a dualistic vision of society, in which science deals specifically with
matters of fact, whereas poets handle the emotional aspects of human life. In his long poem
The Prelude, Wordsworth explicitly links this break with Enlightenment precepts to his
experiences during the French Revolution, which demonstrated, in his view, the danger of
supposing that moral questions could be addressed through the same sort of philosophical
abstraction employed in science. In the next section, I discuss another major ingredient in the
dualism between culture and science: Kantian thought. Kant articulated a number of binary
oppositions, including the distinction between reason and understanding and the modern
definitions of the subjective and objective perspectives, that became part of the common
parlance in the nineteenth century. An especially powerful statement of the division between
subjective and objective appears in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose philosophy, I
argue, remains useful in understanding the relation of computational systems to language.
Finally, I discuss how Wordsworth’s poetic collaborator and philosophical antagonist, Samuel
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Taylor Coleridge, approached the philosophical questions raised by the employment of
mechanical methods in the production of knowledge. Coleridge’s prose writings of the 1810s, I
argue, reveal a problem latent in the dualism between science and culture that is our
inheritance from Romanticism: in order to mediate between the ahistorical realm of science
and the historical realm of culture, one must make some claim about how the past ought to
relate to the future. The need for such a claim opens a gap into which, in the absence of a
legitimate moral basis for believing that the results of algorithmic methods should be
meaningful to people, pure ideology may flow.

William Wordsworth: A Wholesome Separation

In the 1805 version of The Prelude, William Wordsworth describes an early encounter with a
type of writing that we would now recognize as literature:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thirteen years,
Or haply less, I might have seen when first
My ears began to open to the charm
Of words in tuneful order, found them sweet
For their own sakes—a passion and a power—
And phrases pleased me, chosen for delight,
For pomp, or love. (1805 5.575-81; emphasis in original)62
For Wordsworth, the idea of a kind of writing done purely for the sake of pleasure is no frivolity,
because, in a view that he derived from eighteenth-century thinkers such as Jean-Jacques
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Rousseau and William Godwin, abstract knowledge cannot be translated into human action
without the aid of feelings, and in particular, the feeling of enjoyment one gets from learning.
In both poetry and prose, Wordsworth argued against universalizing Enlightenment projects of
linguistic reform, suggesting that poetry, rather than the well-formed languages of the
empiricists, was best suited to produce social change. Wordsworth’s poetic project formed a
key element of the nineteenth-century notion of culture that replaced Enlightenment theories
of the sign, and that ultimately led to a differential treatment of literary language and the
specialized languages and notations of science.
Wordsworth’s writings are valuable in understanding the origin of this modern division
not just because of his influence—although that certainly was large—but also because, at least
in the early phases of his career, he had one foot in modernity and one in the eighteenth
century. As Stephen Gill has remarked, Wordsworth can be difficult to appreciate as a
philosophical poet because many of his ideas have since become common sense (151). But
going back to Geoffrey Durrant’s Wordsworth and the Great System and Alan Bewell’s
Wordsworth and the Enlightenment, scholars have recognized that, as much as Wordsworth
rejected some of the philosophical claims of Enlightenment thinkers, his work owed a
significant debt to Enlightenment writings on history, language, and science. Moreover, some
scholars have noted the continuity of Wordsworth’s writings on the nature of poetry with
Enlightenment models of disciplinarity. In Clifford Siskin’s view, Wordsworth’s poetic project
embraced a “divide and conquer strategy” of disciplinary specialization that he inherited from
the Enlightenment (170); similarly, Robin Valenza argues that Wordsworth was attempting to
carve out a space for poets within the disciplinary system created in the eighteenth century,
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representing poets as “specialists, with their own peculiar technical usage” (144). Reading the
Lyrical Ballads project in this frame, Valenza finds “strong and not incidental parallels between
how Wordsworth and Coleridge aimed to transform poetic language in the Lyrical Ballads and
how, a decade earlier, experimental chemists had reformed their nomenclature” (146).
Yet this continuity is stronger in Wordsworth’s rhetoric than in his actual claims about
poetic language. At a philosophical level, there is a major difference between the positions of
the chemical reformers and Wordsworth. Lavoisier had framed his reform effort in terms of
Condillac’s philosophy, which posited language as something that can be taken apart and
rebuilt at will. Wordsworth, on the other hand, quite plainly denies that a genuinely poetic
language could be built from scratch in this way. Wordsworth addresses this point most
directly in the preface to the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, where he makes a much-debated
argument for a poetry based on “a selection of the real language of men in a state of vivid
sensation” (153). One of his arguments in favor of this rustic language is that it has, he claims, a
deep connection to the “durable” experiences of the natural world (156); it thus provides “a
more permanent and a far more philosophical language” than that of Dryden and Pope, whose
work is hobbled by “false refinement or arbitrary innovation” (157). Wordsworth’s use of the
word arbitrary should be read as a signal that he is positioning himself against the eighteenthcentury tradition of linguistic voluntarism. Wordsworthian poetic diction is supposed to be less
“arbitrary” than that of the Augustans because it stems from human experiences—especially
rural experiences that put one in touch with the natural world—that have been repeated over
long periods of time, not from the momentary whims of fashion or the eccentricities of
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individual writers.63 Whereas Lavoisier’s nomenclature was literally designed by committee,
Wordsworth’s ideal poetic diction emanates organically from the common people.
One reason for the importance of rooting poetic language in human life is that, in
Wordsworth’s view, poetry is specifically concerned with expressing feelings. In the note to
“The Thorn,” which first appeared as an appendix in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads, he
makes one of several statements that might be taken as his definition of poetry: “Poetry is
passion: it is the history or science of feelings: now every man must know that an attempt is
rarely made to communicate impassioned feelings without something of an accompanying
consciousness of the inadequateness of our own powers, or the deficiencies of language”
(140).64 This definition of poetry aligns Wordsworth with a cluster of eighteenth-century
thinkers, including Rousseau and Edmund Burke, who had centered their arguments on
affective and aesthetic aspects of language that the Lockean tradition had largely ignored. As
Burke had pointed out in his 1757 book on the sublime and the beautiful, the emotional effects
of words do not depend solely on their definitions; one can feel the emotional impact of a word
like angel, heaven, or death even if one can attach no clear idea to it (334-42). Poetry,
Wordsworth’s note suggests, must work with these emotional associations, as well as
employing techniques such as repetition and tautology to convey emotions that cannot be
communicated through explicit statements. Wordsworth’s definition of poetry precludes the
possibility of intentionally designing a poetic language, as Lavoisier’s group had designed their
chemical nomenclature; instead, Wordsworth argues, true poetry must be written in, as he puts
it in the preface, “a language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings” (157).
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In its elevation of naturally arising linguistic forms over “arbitrary innovation,”
Wordsworth’s poetic project is less akin to Lavoisier’s reform effort than it is to the
involuntarist arguments of Michaëlis and Herder. But Wordsworth differs from the eighteenthcentury involuntarists in restricting his argument to poetry, while leaving open the possibility
that scientific languages could work differently. Wordsworth is not calling for, in the words of
the English translation of Michaëlis’s essay, “[a] science laid down to us in the language of
common life” (91)—instead, Wordsworth suggests that poetry places fundamentally different
demands upon language than science does. In a footnote, he rejects the “contradistinction of
Poetry and Prose” in favor of “the more philosophical one of Poetry and Science” (164n),
meaning, as he clarifies in the revised version of the preface, a distinction between language
that deals with feeling and language that deals with facts. If this distinction seems to contradict
his statement elsewhere in the book that poetry is a “science of feeling,” this is a mere
symptom of the lack, circa 1800, of a clear vocabulary in which to articulate the distinction that
is now captured by the terms literature and science. Both the preface and the note to “The
Thorn” push toward the establishment of this division, suggesting that the sort of language
needed to communicate facts (in the preface’s terms, science) is very different from the sort
needed to create pleasure (poetry).
The extent of this argument’s implications depends on how broadly one interprets the
term poetry. Wordsworth’s immediate target in the preface is the highly formal poetic
language of the Augustan poets, against which he offers a collection of poems written (he tells
us) in a diction more rooted in the language of the middle and lower classes. Interpreting it
primarily in this narrow frame, Valenza takes Wordsworth’s preface as an attempt to carve out
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a space for poets among the emerging disciplinary system (144). But poetry could also carry a
broader sense in the Romantic period. Poets, Percy Shelley would write in 1821, “are not only
the authors of language and of music, of the dance and architecture, and statuary, and painting:
they are the institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of
life, and the teachers” (7.112); William Hazlitt puts forth a similarly broad definition of poetry in
his 1818 essay “On Poetry in General” (2). While Wordsworth is more guarded in his claims for
the pervasive importance of poetry than Shelley, his footnote about poetry and science leaves
open the possibility that the poetic is not a specific type of writing, but rather an aspect of
language that is potentially relevant to all forms of knowledge. Throughout the preface, he
makes it clear that “Poetry” refers not specifically to metrical compositions, but rather to any
uses of language whose primary purpose is to impart pleasure. If so, then it is possible that, for
Wordsworth, poetry and science are not distinct disciplines, but rather distinct aspects of
language that may come together in a wide range of disciplines, including mathematics and
chemistry as much as the composition of verse.
The long section that Wordsworth added to the preface in the 1802 edition of Lyrical
Ballads upholds this interpretation. Poetry’s object, he writes, “is truth: not individual and
local, but general, and operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into
the heart by passion” (166n). Wordsworth makes it clear that this “passion” is an element of all
forms of knowledge, including scientific ones: “We have no knowledge, that is, no general
principles drawn from the contemplation of particular facts, but what has been built up by
pleasure, and exists in us by pleasure alone. The Man of Science, the Chemist and
Mathematician, whatever difficulties and disgusts they may have had to struggle with, know
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this and feel this” (167n). Given what Wordsworth has already said about the importance of “a
language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings” for producing pleasure, the
implications of this claim are large: no matter how thorougly one scrubs the understanding
clean of any traces of words, natural language is still at work in the feelings that motivate
action. In granting this important but not all-encompassing role to poetic language,
Wordsworth departs from the Enlightenment fixation on eliminating “prejudices” toward
something more like the modern notion of culture. For scientific purposes, it may remain
desirable to create a well-formed language from scratch or even to forgo words in favor of
symbols; but as far as the “human” aspects of science go—as far as one must develop the
affections that make scientific knowledge mean something to people—one will have to work
with an organically developing natural language and take on the role, to however diminished a
degree, of a poet. Far from slotting in poetry alongside other disciplines as one among many,
Wordsworth’s system of poetic language opens the way for Lovelace’s “poetical science.”
Wordsworth gives an explicit rationale for this balancing of fact with feeling in the 1805
version of his long, autobiographical poem The Prelude. Although The Prelude was not
published in time to have any major influence in the early nineteenth century, it serves as a
clear statement of the historical and personal circumstances that led Wordsworth to develop
his mature views of poetry and science. The 1805 version, in particular, balances a sympathy
with the aims of the French Revolution with a recognition of its disastrous consequences, which
he blames in part on a failure of radical Enlightenment thought to account adequately for the
role of feeling in human life. Over the course of his autobiographical account, Wordsworth is
drawn to the revolutionary aims of the radical Enlightenment before eventually repudiating
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them, arriving finally at a commitment “to keep / In wholesome separation the two natures— /
The one that feels, the other that observes” (1805 13.330-31). The imperative to divide culture
from science, to cordon off the cultivation of human activity from the construction of abstract
bodies of knowledge, flows for Wordsworth directly from a perception of the violence that
resulted from an actual attempt to unify scientific knowledge with human life. This awareness
of the potentially catastrophic consequences of Enlightenment criteria of knowledge leads to a
reconfiguration of the relation of language to human action, with implications for literature and
science alike.
Wordsworth’s explication of this division in The Prelude rests, as in the 1802 preface to
Lyrical Ballads, on the idea that pleasure plays an important role in the formation of knowledge.
In the sections of the poem dealing with his education, Wordsworth assigns less importance to
formal schooling than to the playful experiences through which nature works “her tender
scheme / Of teaching comprehension with delight” (Prelude 1805 3.587-88). In the “Books”
section, he describes a young boy corrupted by the utilitarian educational system of England
circa 1800, a child who is “no child, / But a dwarf man,” a “monster birth” whose mind is
distorted by premature erudition (5.294-95; 292). The child’s discourse, Wordsworth writes, is
“Tremendously embossed with terms of art. / Rank growth of propositions overruns / The
stripling’s brain; the path in which he treads / Is choked with grammars” (5.322-25). As an
alternative to this stifling imposition of technical language upon the too-young, Wordsworth
describes (in a section that he published separately as “There Was a Boy”) another child who
would call out to wild owls with “mimic hootings,” joining them in a “concourse wild / Of mirth
and jocund din” (5.398; 403-04). While the contrast between these two boys suggests a
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dichotomy between the artificial and the natural, the point is not exactly that the second boy is
in touch with nature in the modern sense—with the wilderness. The point is more that, instead
of attempting to plan out his vocabulary intentionally, the second boy’s guardians have let him
discover the pleasures of language on his own. The analytical languages of the schools, for all
their precision, cannot provide a child with a sense of joy in the voice itself, and so,
Wordsworth suggests, they stifle rather than enlighten.65
In this section of The Prelude, Wordsworth was responding to a proliferation of
educational theories that did, quite overtly, treat childhood as something to be engineered for
optimal results. As the editors of the Norton Critical Edition of The Prelude point out, a likely
target for Wordsworth’s polemic is Maria Edgeworth’s 1798 book Practical Education, which
includes a few chapters written by her father Richard Lovell Edgeworth (162n); Coleridge read
this book while staying with the Wordsworths in Germany. One of its principle arguments,
inspired by such Enlightenment thinkers as Condillac and Dugald Stewart, is that scientific
knowledge “may be insensibly acquired from the usual incidents of life” (vi). Rather than
separating instruction from play, the Edgeworths advocate using the “technical terms” of
chemistry and other scientific fields in ordinary situations, thus enabling children to absorb
their meanings deeply (vi). Although Maria Edgeworth criticizes some of Condillac’s
pedagogical choices, she endorses his approach of building a well-formed language by defining
words before using them: “There is no occasion to make any sudden or violent alteration in
language, but a man who attempts to teach will find it necessary to select his terms with care,
to define them with accuracy, and to abide by them with steadiness; thus he will make a
philosophical vocabulary for himself” (77). Her father draws on Condillac to support the
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argument that language plays a fundamental role in thought: “Words, as M. Condillac well
observes, […] are in all mental processes the algebraic signs which assist us in solving the most
difficult problems” (61-62). While the Edgeworths reject “sudden or violent” approaches to
linguistic reform, their educational program is ultimately directed toward remaking language on
more rational grounds, starting with the earliest phases of a child’s encounters with the world.
Maria Edgeworth’s project shares one of the major weaknesses of Lockean nominalism
in that it rests on the possibility of tracing each idea back to its absolute origin. The
“philosophical vocabulary” is supposed to arise from carefully defining each new word in terms
of other words one has already defined, thus creating an unbroken chain back to first principles
in which every step is clear. Wordsworth’s Prelude as a whole can be taken as a demonstration
of the inadequacy of this theory to capture the complexities of actual human experience. In a
passage that is sometimes read as his statement of intent in the poem, Wordsworth notes the
impossibility of ever reaching a definitive analysis of one’s own mind:
Hard task to analyse a soul, in which
Not only general habits and desires,
But each most obvious and particular thought—
Not in a mystical and idle sense,
But in the words of reason deeply weighed—
Hath no beginning. (1805 2.232-36)
The lack of beginning has important consequences if considered in the context of
Enlightenment linguistic thought. Lockean psychology allows for no subconscious influences
that one must work hard to uncover; as Locke puts it in the famous discussion of innate ideas in
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the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “to imprint anything on the mind, without the
mind’s perceiving it, seems hardly intelligible” (60). By denying that one can ever determine
the origins of one’s “habits and desires,” Wordsworth also denies the transparency of the mind
to itself that had underwritten the Enlightenment project of remaking language anew. It is
telling that he anticipates being seen as mystical for asserting that thoughts have no beginning
and, through an oddly positioned parenthetical, attributes his position to “reason.”
Wordsworth was breaking with one of the major epistemologies of his time, positing the
existence of a vast domain of subjectivity that it cannot encompass.
In the later sections of The Prelude, Wordsworth quite explicitly links this repudiation of
Enlightenment theories of language to his disillusionment with Enlightenment reform. In Books
Nine through Eleven, Wordsworth narrates his flirtation with and and subsequent turn away
from the radical politics of, first, the French Revolutionaries and, second, the followers of the
English radical William Godwin. During his first residency in France, in royalist company,
Wordsworth shares in the faith of the Jacobins that the revolution is merely the inevitable
result “of nature’s certain course” (9.253). He believes, at this point, that the progress of
nature will inevitably put paid to the reactionary arguments of his companions: “Every word /
They uttered was a dart by counter-winds / Blown back upon themselves; their reason seemed
/ Confusion-stricken by a higher power / Than human understanding, their discourse / Maimed,
spiritless” (9.261-66). His experience during the Terror shakes this early confidence that the
understanding and the spirit will inevitably fall into harmony. While he certainly does not reject
reason in the Kantian sense—he reminds us at various points that he sees writing poetry as a
rational endeavor—he moves, over the course of these three books, toward a recognition that
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feeling has just as much of a role to play in social change as abstract argumentation. In order to
prevent the disaster that results when reason is allowed to substitute for affect, he concludes in
the final book of the poem, the two must carefully be separated. He thus turns away from the
Enlightenment project of remaking society on the basis of scientific reason in favor of a dualistic
arrangement in which science is autonomous within its sphere, but not permitted to encroach
on areas of life that must rightly be governed by feeling.
This “wholesome separation” of empirical knowledge from feeling gives science a much
more tenuous authority over moral questions than it had had for Enlightenment reformers.
Wordsworth makes this distinction most explicitly in reference to the science of mathematics.
In stark contrast to the eighteenth-century empiricist view of mathematics as a means of
representing reality, Wordsworth characterizes geometry as “an independent world / Created
out of pure intelligence” (6.186-87).66 He places mathematics in opposition to politics in Book
Ten, which deals with the core of Wordsworth’s spiritual crisis. Having become disillusioned
with Godwinian thought, he “Yielded up moral questions in despair, / And for my future
studies, as the sole / Employment of the enquiring faculty, / Turned toward mathematics, and
their clear / And solid evidence” (10.900-04). There is arguably a parallel for Wordsworth’s
frustrated retreat into mathematical abstraction in Condorcet, who devoted himself to his
universal algebra scheme while in hiding from the Jacobins. But Condorcet certainly had not
“Yielded up moral questions”—mathematics for him was a way to pin morality down. As
d’Alembert had viewed mathematics as a potential instrument for spreading enlightenment, a
fundamentally political and ultimately revolutionary project, Condorcet believed that his
mathematical system would produce real political change. Wordsworth, by contrast, finds
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mathematics comforting precisely because, in his view, it has nothing to do with the political
turmoil surrounding him. The social conflicts of the 1790s, the poet has come to recognize,
were governed by affections and sentiments more than by reason; mathematics, even
considered as a generalized “method of analysis,” could have no direct bearing on these
motives.
Wordsworth’s contention is that poetry is better suited than mathematics to fill this
moral function. He contrasts the powers of mathematics and poetry explicitly in one of the
best-known passages in The Prelude, the allegorical dream at the beginning of Book Five. In the
1805 version of The Prelude, Wordsworth attributes the dream to “a friend” (5.49); as Jane
Worthington Smyser has shown, the story is likely inspired by a passage from Descartes (27072). Alone in an Arabian desert, the dreamer encounters a stranger carrying a stone under one
arm and a shell under the other. The stone, the stranger says, is Euclid’s Elements, while the
shell “[i]s something of more worth” (5.90). The dreamer places the shell up to his ear and
hears “[a]n ode in passion uttered, which foretold / Destruction to the children of the earth / By
deluge now at hand” (5.97-99). The stranger then delineates the difference between the stone
and the shell,
The one that held acquaintance with the stars,
And wedded man to man by purest bond
Of nature, undisturbed by space or time;
Th’ other that was a god, yea many gods,
Had voices more than all the winds, and was
A joy, a consolation, and a hope. (1805 5.104-09)
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The first three lines, those dealing with geometry, do not make a fundamental break from
Enlightenment views of mathematics. That Wordsworth’s lines contain traces of the
revolutionary dreams of the early 1790s is confirmed by the changes he made in later versions
of the poem: he replaces “wedded man to man by purest bond / Of nature” with “wedded soul
to soul in purest bond / Of reason” (1850 5.104-05), eliminating the Rousseauian connotation
that geometry can create social bonds rooted in “nature.” But depicting Euclid’s Elements as a
stone suggests that its diagrams and propositions are ultimately inert, lacking the active power
of the shell of poetry. It is significant that the ode comes in the form of a voice. Like the
hooting of the owls in “There Was a Boy,” the “ode in passion uttered” conveys feeling through
pure sound, in this case channeled from a divine source. Echoing Young’s passage about lifeless
knowledge “sheathed in Erudition,” Wordsworth suggests that both the diagrams of Euclid and
the bookish “terms of art” with which utilitarian educators tried to overload childrens’ minds
lack an essential connection to the feelings. Only poetic language, Wordsworth tells us, can
convey the truth with the vitality of passionate speech. Poetry thus steps in to do what
scientific reason could not, without repeating the mistakes of the French Revolution, take it
upon itself to do: regulate the emotional attachments that motivate people to behave morally
in their actual lives.
Wordsworth’s claims for the importance of poetry were controversial in his own time,
and later critics have taken varying views on how seriously they should be taken. The early
reception of his work was decidedly mixed, and the utilitarian theories of education that he
criticized in The Prelude remained a powerful force well into the nineteenth century. But by the
1830s, the distinction between literature and science that Wordsworth advocated had begun to
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win out, and at least some of Wordsworth’s poetological gambits remain part of the received
notion of literature to this day. While not all modern conceptions of literature specifically
concern pleasure or other feelings, the idea that literary writing is distinct from scientific
writing is so deeply ingrained that it hardly seems necessary to mention it. Literary texts are, to
be sure, permitted to incorporate scientific or technical language; Walt Whitman employed
terms drawn from a variety of mechanical trades and sciences in the 1855 edition of Leaves of
Grass and, over a century later, Thomas Pynchon interpolated large amounts of engineering
discourse into his novel Gravity’s Rainbow. But such literary uses of technical terms would by
no means count as technical writing for the purposes of modern science. Scientists and
engineers are trained to avoid, at least in technical contexts, employing language in an
excessively “literary” or “poetic” fashion; permitting linguistic play or overt emotionality into
scientific texts would compromise the clarity to which scientific language aspires. The
distinction between culture and science created a space in which this sort of linguistic discipline
could exist without requiring any revolutionary change in people’s ways of life. No longer
would it be necessary to impose technical terms on a student from the earliest days of
childhood, as the Edgeworths had suggested, so that those terms are absorbed down to the
bone; scientific language could achieve the discipline it required without such an effort because
it operated only in technical contexts that required no deep connection to human feelings.
This schism between the technical and literary aspects of language marks a turn away
from the empiricist tradition of linguistic thought that extended from Locke at the end of the
seventeenth century to Maria Edgeworth at the end of the eighteenth. Empiricism remained
an important force in the nineteenth century, its most important advocate in England being
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John Stuart Mill, but nineteenth-century empiricism largely rejected the linguistic voluntarism
that had characterized Lockean nominalism. Mill, taking direct inspiration from Wordsworth
and Coleridge, enthusiastically adopted the Romantic dualism between science and feeling,
emphasizing that a healthy society requires a careful balance between the two. The separation
of science from feeling was even more pronounced in mathematics. Between the 1810s and
the 1830s, the specialized symbolic systems of algebra came to be viewed as ever more open to
arbitrary reshaping and ever less dependent on the contents of people’s minds. Wordsworth’s
characterization of geometry as “an independent world / Created out of pure intelligence” was
prophetic: at last freed of the need to maintain a perfect correspondence between
mathematical reasoning and the way people understand the world in their daily lives—because
this was now recognized as impossible—mathematicians could create worlds of their own
based solely on moving symbols around on paper according to rules that are chosen arbitrarily.
In order to make sense of these simultaneous shifts in attitudes toward mathematical
and literary languages, it is necessary to consider another great dualism that emerged in the
Romantic period: the modern division between subjective and objective perspectives. While
these words had existed since the middle ages, they did not take on their modern senses until
the early nineteenth century, due in large part to the growing popularity of ideas derived from
the work of Immanuel Kant. A particularly useful articulation of the nineteenth-century version
of this divide appears in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt. In addition to being one of the
founders of modern linguistics, Humboldt was one of the principle architects of modern
academic disciplinarity, which he put into effect as founder of the University of Berlin.67 Like
Wordsworth, Humboldt insisted that scientific knowledge should operate autonomously from
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the everyday worldview of a people; but whereas Wordsworth was primarily interested in
experience on an individual level, Humboldt’s work emphasizes the collective nature of
language. In his 1836 book on language, Humboldt employed the Kantian division between the
subjective and the objective to make sense of the seeming paradox that language is both
created by people and out of the control of the individual—a fact that seems to sharply
differentiate natural languages from the symbolic systems used in algorithms.

Kant and Humboldt: The Vindication

Although they did not find widespread use until well after the traditional end of the
Enlightenment period, the modern definitions of subjective and objective are ultimately due to
one of the most self-consciously Enlightened thinkers of the eighteenth century: Immanuel
Kant. Kant’s critical philosophy was supposed to establish the limits of what reason alone could
accomplish without the aid of the senses; he thus distinguished reason from the understanding,
which dealt with concepts based on sensory data. Pure reason was, he argued in Critique of
Pure Reason, capable only of drawing conclusions about the conditions that make experience
possible. In the hands of later thinkers, however, Kant’s articulation of the subjective–objective
divide provided a way of distinguishing inner and outer perspectives upon a wide range of
human phenomena, including, in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s work, language. Although the
outcome was not at all in line with Kant’s intentions, the Romantic version of Kantian idealism
played an important role in the rise of the algorithm. By articulating a new way of dividing the
subjective perspective from the objective one, Kant enabled something like Leibniz’s dream of a
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calculus ratiocinatur, a mechanical process of symbolic manipulation that could produce
knowledge independently of the uncertainties of ordinary language, to return in a diminished
form among nineteenth-century mathematicians and logicians.
Kant himself did not coin the terms subjective and objective; what he did was reverse
them. Prior to Kant, the terms had been part of the vocabulary of Scholastic logic, in which
they had rougly the opposite of their current meanings. As the OED puts it, objective in this
older sense means “Existing as an object of thought or consciousness as opposed to having a
real existence,” whereas subjective means “Relating to the subject as that in which properties
or attributes inhere; inherent; relating to the essence or reality of a thing; real, essential”
(“objective, adj. 3a”; “subjective, adj. 2”). But by 1852, Tennemann’s Manual of the History of
Philosophy could give exactly the opposite definitions: the objective “is the externally caused
element in our perception and knowledge” while subjective “implies the internal individual
element, in perception, feeling, and knowledge” (vii; see also Hamilton, “M. Cousin” 196-97n).
As Daston and Galison point out in Objectivity, it was Kant, along with, in the English-speaking
world, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who spurred this reversal in the definitions of subjective and
objective (30). Once it escaped from Kant’s grasp, the subjective–objective divide ultimately
underwrote a sharper division between the formal and semiotic aspects of symbolic systems
than had existed in previous periods, reinforcing the divide between the scientific and common
ways of understanding the world that many Enlightenment thinkers had attempted to unify.
The idea of objectivity that reached broad acceptance in the nineteenth century is not,
however, exactly in line with Kant’s intentions. To avoid confusion, I employ the term postKantian to refer to nineteenth-century versions of Kantian thought. For himself, Kant was still
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strongly committed to the universalism of the Enlightenment, making him, in some ways, more
akin to Locke than to Romanticism. In the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”—the brief,
relatively little-discussed second book of Critique of Pure Reason—Kant draws a distinction
between what he calls “rational” and “historical” knowledge. Knowledge is “historical,” he
writes, “if he who possesses it knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside,
whether through immediate experience or through narration, or also through instruction (of
general knowledge)” (655). Under this heading Kant captures the linguistic “inheritance” that
Herder celebrates. Kant’s point is that philosophical knowledge that is memorized through
reading or verbal instruction (as Christian Wolff intended for students to memorize his system)
is not truly rational knowledge for the student. Such knowledge, Kant thinks, is subjectively
historical even though it is objectively rational, and thus the system-memorizing student “has
grasped and retained, that is, he has learnt well and has become a plaster cast of a living
person” (655). In other words, one cannot legitimately possess philosophical knowledge until
one thinks the thoughts oneself. In this regard, Kant’s views on education are just as
dependent on an individualistic notion of reason as those of Locke, who warns, in The Conduct
of the Understanding, that a person who memorizes conclusions from books without following
their arguments “makes his understanding only the warehouse of other men’s lumber” (93).
Like Locke and Condillac, Kant categorically excludes the possibility of collaborative knowledgeproduction in the domain of pure reason, confining collaboration instead to the realm of
“historical” knowledge.
In spite of sharing Locke’s skepticism toward collective knowledge-production, Kant did
differ from the empiricists in drawing a sharper distinction between the logical content of
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philosophical thought and the concepts through which it is expressed. Condillac, recall, takes
responsibility for the clarity of his language with a disclaimer: “If you do not understand me it is
because I do not know how to write” (A Treatise on Systems 151). Kant takes no such
responsibility. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he admits
that he “can lay no claim” to “a talent for lucid exposition”; he thus leaves the task of improving
the “presentation” of his philosophy to others (20). In the preface to the first edition, he states
that he has aimed for “discursive (logical) clarity,” meaning clarity of concepts, but not
“intuitive (aesthetic) clarity,” meaning clarity through concrete examples, which he chose not
to include in his text (10; emphasis in original). Kant was certainly not the first to distinguish
the quality of thought from the quality of its expression; various thinkers going back to Aristotle
have treated the content of philosophy as more important than the words in which it is
“clothed.” But Kant’s critical philosophy provided a powerful new way of expressing this
distinction. The need to root abstractions in sensory data no longer applied to the
transcendental realm of logic; thus, the manner in which the philosopher or teacher explains it
to the student does not bear on its validity. Some of Kant’s early critics (including Herder) took
issue with the first critique’s lack of attention to language, but these responses were of
relatively little influence compared to Kant’s new definitions of the subjective and the
objective. Whereas French and British empiricists were disturbed by the nagging possibility
that the unclear words of one’s vernacular might taint one’s reasoning—the possibility that
inspired Condorcet’s attempt to depose language in the 1790s—Kant suggested that this
concern was only subjective and that writing clearly was, accordingly, nothing for a
transcendental philosopher to be worried about.
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The effents of Kant’s influence on nineteenth-century developments in science are
complex. Daston and Galison link Kant’s redefinition of the word objective to the ideal of
mechanical objectivity in the later nineteenth century, which involved following rigorously
defined procedures that leave as few traces of the self in one’s conclusions as possible (30). But
as John Tresch has pointed out, this definition of objectivity does not adequately account for
the ways scientists used the term in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century (“Even the
Tools Will Be Free” 256). Tresch argues that early-nineteenth-century advocates of scientific
objectivity, such as Alexander von Humboldt, did not attempt a suppression of the self in favor
of mechanical procedures, but rather viewed the use of instruments as a way of bringing
together multiple perspectives both subjective and objective (257). The post-Kantian
terminology did, however, provide early-nineteenth-century scientists with a way of
distinguishing the inner and outer perspectives with a greater degree of clarity than in previous
periods. As Capozzi and Roncaglia argue, Kant’s critical philosophy enabled a new approach to
logic that divided standards of logical validity in a newly absolute way from empirical facts
about how the human mind works (147). This distinction between subject and object
differentiated early-nineteenth-century science from the morally tinged scientific projects of
the Enlightenment, which pathologized any deviations from universal reason as signals of
“error” or “prejudice.” By reclassifying the factors that lead different people to different
conclusions as subjective, the new terminology enabled the personal and cultural differences
that prevented agreement to be both destigmatized and diffused of their potential to explode
logical systems.
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The Kantian turn led, in other words, to a notion of culture that celebrated, or at least
tolerated, differences rather than viewing them as impediments to the progress of reason. The
linguistic thought of the time provided a theoretical rationale for the newly positive attitude
toward language that Alexander von Humboldt so enthusiastically expressed. One of the
period’s most sophisticated version of this argument appears in the work of Alexander’s
brother Wilhelm von Humboldt, who was an assiduous reader of Kant. In his 1836 book On the
Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the
Human Species, Humboldt famously declared that language “is no product (Ergon), but an
activity (Energeia)” (On Language 49). By this declaration, Humboldt drew a distinction
between the language itself, which is a “work of the spirit” (49), and the material traces that
linguistic activity produces (see J. Walker 92). Only the latter, he thinks, can fall within the
purview of objective study: from the perspective of linguistics, form is “an abstraction
fashioned by science” by way of systematically describing the patterns that appear in people’s
linguistic practices (50). This scientific view of language can never, for Humboldt, capture the
true essence of a living tongue. From the perspective of the people who actually speak a
language, its form is not an abstraction, but “the quite individual urge whereby a nation gives
validity to thought and feeling in language” (50). This urge, which Humboldt calls the “inner
linguistic sense” (innerer Sprachsinn), exists in a dialectic with the objective sound system of a
language, which limits but does not entirely constrain the creative activity of language-making
(see Harris and Taylor 177). The language that one internalizes in this deep way is not, in
Humboldt’s view, a repository of old misconceptions, but rather a connection to the “mental
life of a people” that is necessary to the formation of subjectivity.
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The scientific linguistics that arose in early-ninenteenth-century Germany followed
Herder in taking an involuntarist view of natural languages: it denied that anyone, even the
academic elite, could alter a living language at will. Comparative grammar rested on the
assumption that language was a collective creation rather than an intentional invention of “the
learned or the priesthood,” as Franz Bopp puts it in the 1821 Analytical Comparison of the
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Teutonic Languages (14). The processes by which language
develops, in Humboldt’s terms, are difficult to “calculate” from a scientific perspective because
they depend on “the mysterious influences whereby one generation is connected with the
next” (31). For Humboldt, improving a language is thus the exclusive province of literature in
the new sense, in which language is raised above “the commonplaces of material life” to “the
pure evolution of thought, and to free expression” (151). Poetry, in particular, has an ability to
transgress and thus expand the boundaries of a language precisely because it derives from the
subjective urges that create language rather than from the analytical methods of science.
(Ralph Waldo Emerson makes a similar statement in “Circles”: “Literature is a point outside of
our hodiernal circle through which a new one may be described” [257].) In the newly emerging
field of linguistics, unlike in Condillac’s educational program, it was outside the purview of
science to help people speak their languages better or—even more heretically—to try to
improve a language. Instead, contributing to the linguistic life of a people required a poetic
engagement with that people’s mentality, their subjectivity, the interior perspective that an
analysis of the objective facts of sound and spelling can never totally capture.
In spite of its insistence on the importance of subjectivity, Humboldt’s theory did open
up a circumscribed space in which signs could be subject to a kind of intentional,
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institutionalized control. Scientific terminology (wissenschaftliche Terminologie), Humboldt
suggests in his 1836 book, may be governed in a different way from natural languages. In
discussing the ways in which common concepts like soul can acquire distinct “characters” in
different languages, Humboldt associates technical language with an objective perspective that
excludes such differences:
For here we are speaking of the expression emanating from the abundance of
mental life, not of the shaping of concepts by the school, which confines them to
their necessary characteristic marks. From this systematically exact limitation
and fixing concepts and their signs, there arises scientific terminology […]. The
dual comparison aforementioned [e.g. between words with similar denotative
meanings but different “characters”] brings in the specific and delicate
separation of subjective and objective into the light of consciousness, and shows
how both always interact with each other, and how the uplifting and ennobling
of creative power goes hand in hand with the harmonious integration of
knowledge. (English 167-68; German 223)
With Kantian imprimatur, Humboldt exempts the specialized languages of scientific disciplines
from the need to emanate organically from the “mental life” of a people. The language of “the
school” is governed by strict definitions that exclude subjective differences in the “characters”
of words. The distinction between technical and common language was nothing new; David
Hume, among others, made such a distinction in the eighteenth century (Valenza 40). But
Humboldt describes it in a distinctly Romantic way. Unlike Condillac’s well-formed language,
Humboldt’s scientific terminology does not and need not penetrate into the depths of the spirit.
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Scientific terms, he suggests, are objective precisely because their meanings are determined by
explicit definitions rather than by the organically developing mental life of a people; they could
be built and rebuilt arbitrarily in a way that the words of natural languages could not because
these definitions worked, at least to an extent, autonomously from the mindsets of the people
who use them.
Humboldt’s deployment of the terms subjective and objective provides a powerful
explanation for one of the major differences that now exists between natural languages and
mathematical ones: one can define f(x) however one likes, but making the word albatross mean
burden, as Coleridge did with “Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” takes more than just will.68 What
places natural language out of control of the individual is that its social nature grants its
strictures objectivity from the perspective of the speaker or writer. Language, Humboldt
writes, “is objectively active and independent, precisely in so far as it is subjectively passive and
dependent” (62). Thus the individual person is bound by the linguistic practices of those who
came before: “Language belongs to me, because I bring it forth as I do; and since the ground of
this lies at once in the speaking and having-spoken of every generation of men, so far as
speech-communication may have prevailed unbroken among them, it is language itself which
restrains me when I speak” (63). By contrast, what is objective in the use of the symbol f(x)—
what has the power to restrain how one uses it—is not any collective convention determining
its meaning, but rather the formal rules governing its role in algebraic operations. Thus,
whereas the meaning of a German or English word is objectively determined (in part) by
cultural factors, the meaning of f(x) is entirely subjective in the sense of personal. The practices
of others may have some influence on the choices one makes in doing algebra—and they
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certainly play a role in the development of one’s mathematical abilities, as a great theorist of
Bildung like Humboldt would surely remind us—but they have no bearing on mathematical
truth. Culture, along with the messy, “incalculable” complexities of its development, is thus, as
far as mathematical notations go, quarantined in the realm of subjectivity.
A direct statement of this application of the post-Kantian subject–object divide to
mathematics appears in the work of the German mathematician Martin Ohm. (The ohm, a unit
of measurement for electrical resistance, is named after Martin’s brother Georg.) Beginning in
1816, Ohm attempted to eliminate the paradoxes that continued to plague arithmetic,
developing the first set of consistent rules for determining the value of ab that account for
imaginary numbers. In his 1842 book The Spirit of Mathematical Analysis and its Relation to a
Logical System (published in an English translation the following year), Ohm explains his
thinking in terms that borrow from the new post-Kantian terminology (see Martin 41). His
solution to the confusions that surrounded imaginary numbers is based, he writes, on the
realization that mathematical expressions “do not represent magnitudes (quantities), but
mental acts (in systematic language: ‘symbolized operations’), which stand in certain relations
to one another” (11); thus “the whole of mathematical analysis is solely employed in the
transformation of given forms” (13). By reframing calculation in terms of “operations” (which is
to say, algorithms) rather than ideas of quantity, Ohm breaks radically with the Enlightenment
view, shared by Newton, Condillac, d’Alembert, and Descartes, that mathematical expressions
must refer to ideas derived from our understanding of or intuitions about space and time.
Addition and subtraction become matters of “mere form,” and calculation consists of “nothing
more than the construction of these forms,” which is, “objectively considered, the mere writing
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of them down” (20). The correctness of a mathematical inference, in this view, can be
determined solely through an examination of the physical marks a person makes; “subjective”
considerations such as what one thinks the symbols mean are secondary.69 Ohm represents
this formal turn as a rejection of the prevailing wisdom, claiming that, upon the first publication
of his Versuch eines vollkommen consequenten Systems der Mathematik (Attempt at a Perfectly
Consequential System of Mathematics) in 1822, several other mathematicians declared his
ideas “insane” (Spirit 10). But by the 1840s, symbolic methods were winning out over the
empiricist view of mathematics that had reigned from the time of Newton to that of
d’Alembert. Mathematics was moving from the brain to the page.
While Humboldt’s book on language came too late to have any influence on Ohm’s
system, the two developments make sense as a part of the same intellectual turn. For both
thinkers, the post-Kantian division between subjective and objective provided a way of
separating the aspects of a system that can be altered at will from those that may be restrained
by culture. Although this division may seem too common-sensical to be worthy of note, it
represented a departure from the Enlightenment theories of language on which Humboldt cut
his philosophical teeth. From Lockean and Cartesian perspectives alike, all symbolic systems
had to be backed up with clear and distinct ideas in order to bear any epistemic weight;
accordingly, the Herderian argument that the influence of one’s upbringing could never be
totally expunged from one’s way of thinking could potentially undermine claims about the
universal validity of algebra. The post-Kantian division between the subjective and objective
perspectives provided a way of circumventing this problem by separating the question of how
one interprets mathematical symbols from matters of mathematical validity. With this
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separation in place, there was no need to take precautions, as Condorcet so nervously did,
against the possibility of “vulgar” ideas finding their way into mathematical reasoning. Instead,
natural and artificial languages could work together: one’s culture would provide intuitions and
mental energy, while formal rules would provide the discipline needed to achieve objectivity. 70
The influence of one’s native tongue on mathematical reasoning was, for comparative linguists
like Humboldt and mathematical formalists like Ohm, no longer a taint, but rather a source of
vitality.
The division of semantic from formal aspects of symbolic systems produced a major
improvement in the rigor of algebra and calculus in the early nineteenth century, and it remains
a key element in attitudes toward computation to this day. One might, in particular, apply
much the same Kantian terminology that Humboldt and Ohm applied to natural and algebraic
languages to explain why computer code seems to be autonomous from culture. Consider, for
instance, this trivial piece of code in the Python programming language:
albatross = 45
print(albatross)

The first line stores the value 45 in memory and gives it the name “albatross.” The second line
displays the value named “albatross” on the screen. One can change the name “albatross” to
anything else—provided that it remains the same in both places, and provided that the new
name does not already have some other role in the program—and the program will do exactly
the same thing. This aspect of the program, as engineers say, is “arbitrary.” But it is only
arbitrary in the sense of voluntary if one considers the code from a technical, as opposed to a
cultural, perspective. If the symbols are considered as signs, such choices are not arbitrary, but
are rather constrained by the objective practices of a community: one cannot employ the name
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“albatross” among English speakers and expect it not to suggest a bird. Programming
languages are typically designed so as to make the aspects of the software that may be, in
Humboldian terms, restrained by language—namely, the choice of signifiers—as irrelevant to
the logic of the software as possible. In this sense, the modern dualism between subjective and
objective is written into the way programming languages work.
The roots of this modern view of algorithmic systems can be found in the post-Kantian
discourse of the early nineteenth century. It was in this period that mathematicians first
seriously considered the possibility that mathematical validity could be defined entirely in
terms of the arrangements of symbols on a page, independently of their meanings. Not all
advocates of symbolic algebra picked up on the post-Kantian terminology—Charles Babbage,
who was as important a figure in the development of British algebra as he was in the early
history of computers, showed little interest in German idealism—but for those who did, it
provided a compelling explanation of why the algorithmic manipulation of symbols could
produce knowledge that was seemingly independent of the varying ways people think. This
appropriation of the Kantian subjective–objective divide fit in with the broader trend in the
Romantic period toward dividing the technical details of science from “human” factors. Just as
Wordsworth had called for a “wholesome separation” of science from the affective complexity
of human life, Kantian transcendentalism seemed to nineteenth-century readers to reveal a
realm of pure reason in which logical thought could operate autonomously from the details of
actually existing human experience, which is inevitably colored by culture. This dualism
provided a way of turning some aspects of reasoning into a mechanical process without
requiring the sort of all-encompassing program of social reform that Condorcet and Stanhope
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had envisioned. The point is not that the algorithmic and semantic aspects of a symbolic
system are totally independent—the subjective and objective, as Humboldt writes, “always
interact with each other”—but rather that neither side may absolutely constrain the other.
Shuffled away to their respective sides of the dialectic, culture and the algorithm learned to
coexist in peace.
While it originates in the work of Kant, the version of the subjective–objective divide
that came to undergird modern attitudes toward algorithms is not quite in line with Kant’s
intentions. As Daniel J. Cohen notes, Victorian mathematicians such as George Boole
appropriated Kant’s ideas to identify their work with the transcendental realm of pure reason,
but this position rested on a construal of the transcendental that was, from a strictly Kantian
perspective, illegitimate (29-30). This objection was aired in the early nineteenth century,
albeit in a slightly different context. In a widely discussed essay first published in an 1829 issue
of the Edinburgh Review, the Scottish logician William Hamilton levies such a charge against the
German and French followers of Kant. Kant himself, as Hamilton points out, rejected the
Leibnizian doctrine that truths about the world could be arrived at by means of reason alone,
instead limiting the scope of pure reason to discerning the conditions under which experience is
possible. According to Hamilton, later idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, and Victor Cousin
ignored this limitation, presuming instead that pure reason could provide direct knowledge of
being; they thus, Hamilton argues, employed superficially Kantian terminology to conceal what
was actually an even “bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism” than that of Leibniz
himself (“M. Cousin’s Course of Philosophy” 197). While Hamilton does not directly address
symbolic algebra in this essay, his argument could just as well target mathematicians like Ohm

217

and Boole who employed Kantian terms to justify the use of symbolic methods. To the extent
that such algebraists claimed to produce objective knowledge about the world by shuffling
around symbols on pieces of paper, they were arguably Leibnizians in Kantian clothing.
One should not, however, overstate the extent to which Leibniz’s dream of a calculus
ratiocinatur returned in the nineteenth century. Not even the most enthusiastic advocates of
symbolic algebra had the level of confidence that Leibniz had had about the power of written
characters; formal rules could provide rigor, but they could not, within nineteenth-century
terms, serve as a guarantee that the symbols had any reference to the world. Numerous
thinkers in the early nineteenth century expressed concerns that the results of symbolic
methods would ultimately prove to be mere nonsense. In 1835, for instance, Augustus de
Morgan—one of the key figures in the development of symbolic logic—described the algebraic
practice of his time as “something like symbols bewitched, and running about the world in
search of meaning” (quoted in Fisch, “Peacock’s Treatise” 145). These complaints might be
seen as early instances of Alan Liu’s “meaning problem,” which stems from an apparent gap
between the ways algorithms work and the concepts by which people understand the world. If
the division between subjective and objective perspectives created a space where symbolic
methods could operate autonomously of culture, it did not provide a way to bridge the gap
between these two realms. At just the same time that algebra and calculus became truly
rigorous from a logical perspective, it became far more difficult to explain what their
abstractions meant.
The appearance of widespread anxiety over this gap in the early nineteenth century
marks a key difference between modern attitudes toward algorithms and the early-modern
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optimism of Leibniz and Wilkins. For all that Locke had gone out of fashion by the 1830s, one
element of his critique of real-character schemes had stuck—it was still unacceptable to assert
that non-phonetic symbols could bear meaning independently of the curse of Babel. Meaning
was now seen as something that had, inherently, to arise from human thought, regardless of
whether the signifiers were real characters or words. In order to give meaning to mathematical
symbols, then, one somehow had to connect them to the ideas in people’s heads, which meant,
in modern terms, reckoning with culture. This was not always easily accomplished, especially as
mathematics grew increasingly complex and counterintuitive over the course of the nineteenth
century. De Morgan’s comment that algebraic symbols seem to be “bewitched” captures a
sense of uncanniness in the fact that one could apparently employ algorithmic methods to
produce epistemically valid mathematical knowledge that one does not, oneself, understand.
The return of Leibniz’s dream came at the cost of creating a rift between algorithms and the
world of human life.
One of the period’s most sophisticated commentators on this problem was England’s
premier emissary of Kantian thought, Samuel Taylor Coleridge. In his philosophical writings of
the 1810s, Coleridge made the case that scientific knowledge must be “enlivened” with moral
purpose in order to avoid producing destructive outcomes. Coleridge attempted to turn the
Kantian distinction between understanding and pure reason into a rationale for the necessity of
supplementing the “mechanical” activities of science and industry with a religious perspective.
While Coleridge’s overt goal is to defend a Christian mode of social organization in the face of
utilitarian scientism, his work poses an array of problems that are relevant from a secular
perspective as well. Read against the grain, his philosophical writings suggest the disturbing
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possibility that an “unenlivened” process may be set in motion—an algorithm cut loose from
culture, prowling the world like a zombie, pursuing ends that human beings can neither
understand nor control. The lack of a stable framework for interpreting the results of such a
process creates a gap into which, since genuine morality has fallen out of the picture, the raw
exertion of power may flow. Coleridge’s work thus reveals a difficulty in discerning the ethical
consequences of algorithms, a problem that remains unresolved in the twenty-first century.

Coleridge and the Prophetic Machine

Although Coleridge was a Godwinian radical when he wrote his poem to Stanhope in 1795, his
influence was greatest as a popularizer of German idealism. Coleridge was a progenitor of the
class of writers John Holloway dubbed the “Victorian sages”—writers who offered moral
warnings against the perceived materialism and shallowness of the Industrial age (The Victorian
Sage). Coleridge’s sage writings played a major role in the popularization of Kant in England,
and they contributed an important element to the nineteenth-century dualism between
science and culture. Whereas Wordsworth emphasized the need to balance empirical
observation with feeling, Coleridge’s mature writings on science are primarily concerned with
its relation to moral philosophy. In his writings of the 1810s, he makes a variation of the
standard anti-Jacobin argument that, if mechanical methods are allowed to encroach upon the
moral domain, the consequences would be disastrous; but rather than decrying these methods
altogether, he merely stipulates that they must be guided by a “leading idea” (Works 4.II.513).
At face value, Coleridge is suggesting a form of religious social organization as a solution to the
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drawbacks of utilitarianism, but read more skeptically, his work provides a powerful analysis of
one of the costs of the division of algorithmic systems from culture that took place in the
nineteenth century: by separating scientific standards of validity from the ways people give
meaning to the knowledge science produces, the sundering of algorithm from meaning creates
an opening for ideology.
Although Coleridge’s sage writings were read in the nineteenth century as critiques of
“mechanical” philosophies broadly conceived, the arguments he makes are less condemnations
of mechanical methods as warnings about their limitations. Similarly to Wordsworth in The
Prelude, one of his primary targets is a system of education. in his 1813 book Instructions for
Conducting Schools through the Agency of the Scholars Themselves, Andrew Bell described a
system for administering schools that he calls the Madras system (3). This system, which was
also known as the monitorial system, involved employing upper-level students to tutor the
lower-level students, thus reducing the number of full-time faculty needed to run a large
school. Coleridge’s critique of Bell’s system appears in The Statesman’s Manual (1816), which is
oriented toward aristocratic readers. He later addressed a similar argument to the middle
classes in a second volume, A Lay Sermon (1817), and he planned to complete the series with a
third volume addressed to the lower classes, although this was never written. In The
Statesman’s Manual, Coleridge describes this administrative apparatus as a “vast moral steamengine” (Works 6.41); although he praises the efficiency of Bell’s system for teaching reading
and writing, he asserts that, even if it were set “in free motion throughout the Empire,” the
monitorial machine would not suffice to fulfill the goal of educating the people (6.41).
Coleridge’s objection is that Bell’s system can only provide economic efficiency, but cannot
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provide a sense of moral direction to the students. Since the monitorial system provides no
way “to stem up against the strong currents set in from an oppposite point,” it could potentially
“be driven backward by them and become confluent with the evils, it was intended to
preclude” (6.42). The metaphorics of this passage creates a dichotomy between the
mechanical and the moral, which Coleridge figures respectively in terms of speed and direction:
a “steam-engine” like Bell’s system can rapidly move the educational apparatus forward, but a
moral sense is needed to determine the direction in which it should go.
The crux of Coleridge’s critique of mechanical methods is that their practitioners
typically professed an ability to predict what the machines they created would do. Addressing
the French Revolution, he argues that advances in the arts and sciences have led “to an
assumption of prophetic power, and the general conceit that states and governments might be
and ought to be constructed as machines, every movement of which might be foreseen and
taken into previous calculation” (6.34). Throughout The Statesman’s Manual and A Lay
Sermon, Coleridge ironically casts utilitiarians as the “prophets” and “seers” of the time,
suggesting that the ability of Jacobins and utilitarians to foresee the consequences of their
reforms is just as illusory as divination by entrails. Comparing utilitarian planning to such
superstition points up not only the excessive faith that reformers had in their methods, but also
a deeper problem lurking within the idea of the mechanical that prevailed during Coleridge’s
time. As Rick Rylance has pointed out, the word machine could bear two different senses in the
nineteenth century—on the one hand, it referred to something that was intentionally designed,
and on the other hand, it meant something whose actions were entirely predictable (25). These
two senses are not coextensive: just because one designed something does not necessarily
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mean that one can predict with certainty what it will do. The possibility that people might
create mechanical processes whose actions they could not predict would reach a crisis in the
nineteenth century, most notably in the work of Charles Babbage. For Coleridge, the gap
between the two conceptions of the mechanical provided a space for moral philosophy to
enter. Utilitarian educations might have planned out every aspect of an educational
institution’s daily operations, but such planning cannot provide a way of knowing for sure that
the institution will take a morally correct direction. To claim that one can do so is to take on,
illegitimately, the mantle of a prophet.
Coleridge’s alternative to utilitarianism is a general theory of method that is supposed
to balance the benefits of mechanical activity with a sense of purpose grounded in a moral
order. His most direct statement of his views on method appears in his “Essays on the
Principles of Method,” which were first published in the 1818 edition of The Friend. In this
series, Coleridge attempts to develop an idea of method that recovers some of the positive
aspects of machine-like activities while leaving room for the sense of moral purpose that
mechanism cannot account for. In introducing his conception of method, he discusses the
cliché that a very industrious person is “like clockwork.” “The resemblance,” Coleridge writes,
“extends beyond the point of regularity, and yet falls short of the truth. Both do, indeed, at
once divide and announce the silent and otherwise indistinguishable lapse of time. But the
man of methodical industry and honorable pursuits, does more: he realizes its ideal divisions,
and gives a character and individuality to its moments” (4.II.449-50). Coleridge’s concept of
“methodical industry” combines the virtues of being “like a machine”—organization, industry,
efficiency—with the purposiveness that seems to be missing from purely mechanical activities.
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Coleridge spends most of the later essays in the sequence expounding, in terms clearly
influenced by the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding, on the distinction
between genuine science and mere “nomenclature” or “theory.” Coleridge’s main antagonist
in his discussion of science is the sort of inquiry that is purely concerned with assigning names
to things, rather than understanding them in terms of their relations to each other and places
within a whole—an approach that is exemplified by the dictionary. In contrast to this approach,
Coleridge praises Erasmus Darwin’s view of animal and plant life as complementary hierarchies
and hopes that someone will further develop this idea, “or rather the yet higher idea to which it
refers us, matured into laws of organic nature; and thence to have one other splendid proof,
that with the knowledge of Law alone can dwell Power and Prophecy (4.II.470). Coleridge
explains the difference between mere “theory” and genuine “law” within what contemporary
philosophy of science calls the theory-data distinction. In a footnote, Coleridge quotes an
“intelligent friend” who responds to a paper calling for data on the Earth’s magnetic field to be
collected and “brought together into one focus” by asking, “But what and where is the lens?”
Coleridge, however, defends the idea that data can be prior to theory, at least if “theory” is
understood in a restricted sense: “All this and much more [e.g. data collection] must have been
atchieved before ‘a sound and stable Theory’ could be ‘constituted’” (4.II.477). But, he
continues, “except as far as it might occasion the discovery of a law,” such a theory “might
possibly explain (ex plicis plana redere), but never account for, the facts in question” (4.II.477).
Coleridge contrasts this “theoretical” approach to the work of Kepler and Newton, who, he
claims, did not wait until all possible data were collected before “propounding a law” (4.II.477).
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In order to genuinely “account for” phenomena, scientists must draw upon their own intuition
as well as analyzing observational data.
In spite of his repeated diatribes against what he calls “mechanic philosophy,” Coleridge
does not so much condemn mechanical methods as deny that they can suffice by themselves.
If the gathering and analysis of data cannot, by itself, provide the insight needed to discern the
genuine laws of nature, it might nonetheless play an important role in the discovery of those
laws. Coleridge associates such “mechanical” activities with the Kantian category of
understanding, which, though Coleridge certainly valued it less than pure reason, was not as
derogatory a term for Coleridge than some scholars have assumed. As Timothy Michael has
argued, the understanding, in Coleridge’s later political thought, plays the central role of
establishing the sense data that serve as a foundation for political knowledge (446-7). In his
writings on science, as well, Coleridge offers not so much a condemnation of empirical methods
as a warning that something additional is needed. Coleridge’s objection to the “mechanic
philosophy” of the eighteenth century, as he puts it in The Statesman’s Manual, is that it
attempts to make predictions about society by means of “an unenlivened generalizing
Understanding” (6.28)—a form of thought that works entirely in concepts abstracted from
empirical data without a clear purpose to drive it. The echoes of David Hume’s celebrated
argument about the problem of induction are apparent in the essays on method. Like Hume,
Coleridge suggests that such methods can only abstract out the patterns that exist in the data
that have already been gathered; without an additional assuption about the stable nature of
reality, one cannot determine the laws of nature that will govern what happens in the future.
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While Hume’s critique of induction tends toward a general skepticism that people could
ever learn the genuine causes of things, Coleridge pushes in the opposite direction, stressing
the need to supplement empirical data with an intuitively derived sense of purpose that
“enlivens” the knowledge. Throughout his sage writings of the 1810s, Coleridge explains the
relation between the mechanical and the moral with figures drawn from natural science—the
machine that channels power, the wire that conducts electricity, the chemical compounds that
react in the presence of a catalyst—that suggest the need for an external force to drive a
physical process. Coleridge provides a paradigm for this pattern of argument in his passage on
allegory and symbol in The Stateman’s Manual, in which he states that the symbolic passages in
the Bible are the “conductors” of truth (6.29). Similarly, in the discussion of agriculture in A Lay
Sermon, he argues that “the extension of the commercial spirit into our agricultural system”
tends to alienate agriculture from the purpose of the state (6.214); but “as the specific ends of
Agriculture are the maintenance, strength, and security of the State, so […] must its ultimate
ends be the same as those of the State: even as the ultimate end of the spring and wheels of a
watch must be the same as that of the watch” (6.217). Coleridge’s reference to Bell’s system of
education as a “steam-engine” might be seen as another instance of this general type of figure.
The key implication is that such an engine is dependent on external guidance, since, as a mere
machine, it can only move in reaction to outside forces. In all cases, the driving force of the
mechanical practice is “purpose,” without which it is lifeless, meaningless, amoral. As
Wordsworth had turned away from Enlightenment radicalism in favor of a dualism between
science and feeling, Coleridge called for a balance between the mechanical aspects of science
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and a sense of moral direction, by means of which alone the potentially destructive effects of
utilitarian planning can be averted.
While Coleridge’s philosophy of method does not specifically deal with computation, it
has important implications for the relation of mechanical processes of symbol manipulation to
the construction of meaning. In piecing out these implications, it is useful to recall the example
with which this dissertation begins: the seventeenth-century poetry-generating algorithm of
John Peter. Peter’s pamphlet provides a procedure for producing Latin poems based solely on
copying letters out of a table in pre-given patterns. For Peter, apparently, the fact that the
“artificial versifying” system did not require the ability to read or write was an advantage: now,
even “illiterate Artificers” had a fully “artificial” way to make verses (4). Peter explains the
method in terms of the idea of the reciprocal harmony between the microcosm and the
macrocosm, an idea that provided other seventeenth-century thinkers, Leibniz foremost among
them, with a powerful explanation of why the mechanical processes of arithmetic could
produce real knowledge about the world. This thinking had been out of favor in England for
over a century by the time that Coleridge became a public figure. John Hughes’s satirical
description of the versifying system in The Spectator exemplifies the skepticism toward such
methods that had prevailed for most of the eighteenth century. By suggesting that an
algorithmically generated poem is able to predict the weather, Hughes lampoons the absurdity
of seventeenth-century thinkers’ claims for the power of real characters. For Peter himself, the
algorithmic nature of the system made it more trustworthy; for Hughes, it made it less so.
When Hughes holds Peter’s versifying system up as an example of “false Wit,” he draws
upon a Lockean perspective from which the understanding is the ultimate criterion to which all
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linguistic activity should be held. Peter’s method of composition is “false” because it only
involves shuffling symbols around based on rules, without a perception of what they mean.
This Lockean perspective leads, in Addison’s essay on “false wit,” to a devaluation of punning
and other forms of wordplay, which Addison sees as equally mechanical processes of
comparing and contrasting signifiers. This opposition to the algorithmic stems from an aspect
of the Lockean tradition that is commonly misunderstood by scholars focusing on the Romantic
period. While Lockean thought is often cast as one of the “mechanical” philosophies that
Romantics like Coleridge opposed, Locke himself was decidedly opposed to the proposition that
human thought could be reduced to set of mechanical rules, as were his early followers.71
While some of the eighteenth-century thinkers Locke inspired, such as David Hartley and Julien
Offray de La Mettrie, developed more overtly mechanical theories of the human mind, even
these philosophies were not especially conducive to the use of algorithms. The mechanical
processes La Mettrie and Hartley described were based on ideas, not signifiers, and their
psychological theories could provide no explanation of how a process of moving symbols
around on paper based on formal rules could produce something meaningful. From a Lockean
perspective, mechanical processes are only admissible if they are based on clear ideas, without
which they can only produce nonsense.
Coleridge was no less opposed to the mechanization of reasoning than Locke was—he
lamented, in a note in his copy of a book on Spinoza, that students turned to logic textbooks in
hopes of learning “how to think without thought” (13.lxi)—but he attacks “mechanism” from a
different angle that ultimately creates more room for algorithmic methods than the Lockean
tradition did. What the “artificial versifying” system lacks, from Coleridge’s post-Kantian
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perspective—what it would need in order to produce genuine predictions about the future—is
not conceptual clarity, but rather what Coleridge calls the copula. In order to justify drawing a
general conclusion from a limited set of observations, and, in particular, to justify making claims
about the future from a study of the past, we need a premise that cannot be derived
empirically. Appendix C of The Statesman’s Manual answers this need with the claim that “the
act of Being is the great organ of Truth” (6.78). “That, which we find in ourselves,” Coleridge
writes, “is (gradu mutate) the substance and the life of all our knowledge. Without this latent
presence of the ‘I am,’ all modes of existence in the external world would flit before us as
colored shadows, with no greater depth, root, or fixture, than the image of a rock hath in a
gliding stream or the rain-bow on a fast-sailing rain-storm” (6.78). In other words, without the
assumption of a correlation between mind and the laws of nature, we have no basis for relating
what we know of the past and the present to the future—our knowledge would merely be
insubstantial shadows with no relation to what came before or what will become after. Applied
to an algorithmic system like Peter’s “artificial versifying,” this line of thought does not entail,
as Lockean and Cartesian attitudes toward algorithms do, that a clear idea must be attached to
every individual symbol; that form of reading and writing would, indeed, be a merely
mechanical procedure for Coleridge. Instead, the system as a whole must be given a purpose,
based not on an analysis of its individual components, but rather on something that we must
find within.
This need for purpose comes into effect most importantly at the level of
interpretation—that is, at the stage when one must give the results of the algorithm meaning.
Coleridge applies this thinking specifically to the interpretation of written characters in the
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“Essays on the Principles of Method.” In the final essay, Coleridge imagines an “unlettered
African, or rude yet musing Indian” looking at a Bible that he cannot read (4.II.512). Lacking the
genuine method of reading, this reader would have to attempt to abstract categories from the
patterns on the page:
Say that after long and dissatisfying toils, he begins to sort, first the paragraphs
that appear to resemble each other, then the lines, the words—nay, that he has
at length discovered that the whole is formed by the recurrence and
interchanges of a limited number of cyphers, letters, marks, and points, which,
however, in the very height and utmost perfection of his attainment, he makes
twentyfold more numerous than they are, by classing every different form of the
same character, intentional or accidental, as a separate element. And the whole
is without soul or substance, a talisman of superstition, a mockery of science […]
(4.II.512-3)
Just like the construction of “theory” without “law,” this attempt to understand a text through
mere abstraction is “without soul or substance.” This passage shows clear traces of the
German hermeneutic tradition, which, as Kittler observes, maintained that reading involves the
perception of the spirit of a text more than a “mechanical” focus on letters (Discourse Networks
178). Coleridge goes on to imagine a “friendly missionary” arriving and explaining the meaning
of the words to the reader, after which point the “words become transparent, and he sees
them as though he saw them not” (4.II.513); once a person learns a true method of reading,
they can reach depths in the text that were previously denied to them.

230

The unenlivened form of reading that Coleridge imagines in this passage is what would
result if algorithmic methods were permitted to trespass in the realm of meaning. An algorithm
can enable the illiterate to produce lines of verse with proper grammar and meter, as Peter’s
system adequately demonstrates, but to find genuine meaning in a text it is necessary to see
through the words to a truth that is brought to life by the “eternal ‘I am,’” which, according to
Coleridge, no merely mechanical method can accomplish. From this perspective, it is not in
lacking clear concepts, but rather in lacking a clear purpose that the poems produced by Peter’s
algorithm fall short. In this Romantic notion of reading lay the origins of Liu’s meaning
problem. The abstractions of quantitative analysis—in which we may include twenty-firstcentury text-analysis methods as well as the process by which Coleridge’s “unlettered” reader
attempts to classify characters—can seem “soulless” in comparison to human interpretations
because, without the supplement of purpose, they cannot fully account for the body of intuitive
knowledge that is needed to make a text come alive with meaning. Algorithmic methods of
reading, in other words, only involve seeing the letters on the page, whereas genuine reading
means seeing through them.
Although it was not exactly Coleridge’s intention, these arguments about the need for
purpose contributed to the emergence of a disciplinary distinction between scientific and
cultural perspectives in the Victorian period. In a pair of essays published in 1838 and 1840,
John Stuart Mill cast Coleridgean thought as one of two opposing intellectual forces in Britain,
the other being the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (Mill on Bentham and Coleridge 40). Mill
argues that each of these two thinkers sees what the other fails to see. Bentham’s key blind
spots have to do with culture: he can wrap his head around neither the necessity of “self-
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education” in developing moral character nor the differences in “national character” between
countries (71; 73). Coleridge, Mill tells us, has a better understanding of these cultural factors
as well as a better appreciation for the value in older ways of thinking, but he fails to see the
errors in established institutions. While Mill expressly sides with the Benthamites’ empiricism
over the idealism of the Coleridgeans (114), he asserts the value in both perspectives,
concluding that “these two sorts of men, who seem to be, and believe themselves to be,
enemies, are in reality allies,” their powers forming “opposite poles of one great force of
progression” (140). In the eighteenth century, Mill argues, England combined the worst
elements of philosophical radicalism and institutional conservatism; in the nineteenth, he
hoped, it would come to combine the best of each, with Benthamites contributing a reforming
spirit and Coleridgeans an appreciation for what is valuable in the experiences of the past.
The meaning problem is immanent in this attempt to make two fundamentally
incompatible philosophies work together to a common purpose. Since the time of Mill, the
technical and cultural perspectives have been alienated from one another by the fact that they
stand in different relations to the past. A computer programmer can get away with ignoring
history when working on the technical details of a program; culture affects the programmer’s
motivations and ways of thinking—the subjective aspects of programming—but the practices of
the past cannot objectively restrain the logic of a program in the same way that they can
restrain the production of meaning. For technical purposes, therefore, an ahistorical
Benthamite perspective works well. But this perspective cannot be reconciled with modern
notions of culture. In his essay on the meaning problem, Liu takes issue with what he calls
“tabula rasa interpretation” (414)—the idea that an algorithm can provide a new perspective
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on a text untainted by any prior assumptions about what that text means. The fact that such
methods seem inevitably to pose a meaning problem—to be, in Coleridgean terms,
unenlivened—stems from the fact that, within the conception of culture that we have inherited
from the nineteenth century, the semantic aspects of symbolic systems are objectively
restrained by the practices of the past in a way that the algorithmic ones are not. This
recognition is a product of thinkers from the early nineteenth century, including Wordsworth
and Humboldt as well as Coleridge.72 After Romanticism, it was no longer credible to claim that
science would one day produce a complete replacement for culture, as Condorcet had
contended. Instead, technical and cultural perspectives appeared, in some cases, as
complementary forces that must work together to produce progress and, in others, as warring
disciplinary factions.
Useful as it is in making sense of the relation of technical and natural languages, this
dualism between science and culture/cultivation leaves open an ethical question that has never
been adequately addressed. Coleridge’s use of colonial imagery in the passage about the
illiterate reader exemplifies the pitfalls of his own approach to enlivening knowledge with
meaning. His purpose in describing this reader’s ill-informed interpretation as “a talisman of
superstition” might be partially a matter of rhetorical positioning, an attempt to frame what he
considers to be legitimate science as more civilized than the alternative, but as the chauvinism
of Coleridge’s presumption that a Western missionary is needed to provide the reader with the
“light” of a “leading idea” suggests, the assumption that something eternal is needed to
“enliven” knowledge creates an opening for conceptions that serve the interests of power.
Although Coleridge never says much about what the “leading idea” underlying genuine method
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is, he never leaves any doubt that it is specifically Christian, and he also presumes that it is the
possession of Western colonizers. Coleridge’s critique of the limits of empiricism leaves us with
a gap that that cannot be filled by merely mechanical methods, but it cannot provide us with a
guarantee that we have found the truth. We may instead have fallen under the influence of
our own internalized prejudices.
For all that is repugnant in Coleridge’s later political views, his sage writings remain
valuable as expressions of a negative truth: that any attempt to grant meaning to an algorithm
must rest on some form of ethical judgment. The problem that religion addresses for Coleridge
cannot be evaded so long as algorithms operate autonomously from culture. As Liu points out,
the meaning problem does not manifest itself in all instances of algorithmic methodology; the
creators of the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, he observes, employed
essentially algorithmic methods in the mid-twentieth century, and humanists do not bat an eye
about integrating its philological claims into their meaning-making discourses (417). In
Coleridgean terms, this is because the methods of the HTOED are enlivened for humanists—
they have a history and a purpose that grants them authority within the domain of culture.
Given the potential role of power in producing this sense of purpose, though, one might
question its origins. My point is not to criticize the HTOED in particular, but rather to point out
an undertheorized problem that affects all algorithmic methods. Making the leap from
algorithm to meaning, as Coleridge’s philosophical writings reveal, requires a judgment about
how the past ought to relate to the future—about how, specifically, the past practices that bear
on the creation of meaning ought to relate to the new possibilities that the algorithm will
create. This judgement must, because it involves an ought, be an ethical one. For Coleridge
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himself, the ultimate source of this judgment is always religion; for Mill and other utilitarians, it
stemmed from a more secular notion of progress. Whatever its source, the judgment that
bridges algorithm and meaning is difficult to extricate from ideology.
This problem is not specific to what we now think of as humanistic disciplines. The
example of the use of algorithmic methods in the HTOED underscores an aspect of the modern
divide between science and culture that has often been misunderstood. Although this division
did sharpen in the later nineteenth century, the two sides did not form entirely separate
disciplinary spheres—it was not the case that only the Benthamites could deal with algorithms,
only Coleridgeans with culture. Instead, the sciences and the humanities both worked within
the same fundamental division between the cultural and technical aspects of their respective
objects of study. Charles Babbage, for instance, a Benthamite if anyone was, applied cultural
thinking to the practice of mathematics. In the introduction to their 1813 book on algebra,
Babbage and John Herschel present their attempt to introduce French approaches to symbolic
algebra to England in terms of an organic metaphor much like the ones the philologists of the
period applied to language: “as if the soil of this country were unfavourable to its cultivation, it
[British algebra] soon drooped and almost faded into neglect, and we have now to re-import
the exotic, with nearly a century of foreign improvement, and render it once more indigenous
among us” (Memoirs of the Analytical Society iv). But for nineteenth-century mathematicians,
such cultural considerations were merely practical matters—from a post-Kantian perspective,
merely subjective ones—and while important, they were carefully excluded from having any
bearning on questions about the validity of mathematical results. Such discussions of cultural
factors were common in writings about mathematics throughout the nineteenth century, and
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they persist in the twenty-first century in Silicon Valley’s fixation on the importance of
“company culture” in spurring innovation.
On the other hand, some of the early nineteenth century’s most enthuastic users of
algorithmic methods were adherents of the Coleridge school. The most important such figure is
George Boole. In the 1840s, Boole developed the logical system that eventually evolved into
the one that underlies all digital electronics, including computers. It is from Boole that we
inherit the use of 1 and 0 to represent true and false and the logical operators and and or that
appear in search engines, programming languages, and circuit designs. Although Boole’s
system was eventually used for instrumental ends, his intentions were, like Coleridge’s,
primarily religious—although, to be sure, Boole’s religious views were very different from
Coleridge’s. In spite of his immense importance for the development of modern information
technologies, Boole’s writings have been almost entirely overlooked in both intellectual history
and media studies. In the next chapter, I consider how Boole dealt with the problem of
connecting algorithmic systems to the realm of meaning. In attempting to justify the use of
algorithms in disciplines other than the mathematical, he dealt directly with one of the central
questions that arises from the modern division between science and culture: how one can find
meaning in algorithmic systems when the workings of those system fail to align with the ways
human beings think.
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Chapter 5: George Boole: Faith in Algorithms

The class of problems capable of solution by the machine can be defined fairly specifically.
They are those problems which can be solved by human clerical labour, working to fixed rules,
and without understanding…
—Alan Turing, memorandum concerning a proposed Automatic Computing Engine (ACE), 1945

A Language Without Things

The period from the 1830s through the 1850s produced two projects that loom large in the
history of computation: the Analytical Engines of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace, and the
logical algebra of George Boole. Babbage and Boole had very different styles of thought, and
their paths did not cross much, but some aspects of their work run in parallel. 73 Both of them
toyed with the idea of creating a philosophical language somewhat like the real character
schemes of the seventeenth century; both ended up creating something much more like a
machine than like a language in the usual sense. Both were deeply religious, albeit in
unorthodox ways, and both explicitly connected their religious views to their use of algorithms.
While Babbage and Lovelace captured the popular imagination in the nineteenth century much
more than Boole did, it was Boole’s work that had the greater influence on the technical
development of the computer. Boole’s most important contribution was to show that certain
types of logical operation can be performed by manipulating symbolic equations that need not
have any connection to mental representations. This marks a break from the assumptions of
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eighteenth-century empiricists like Condorcet and Stanhope, both of whom held back from
embracing symbolic systems that were not backed up with comprehensible interpretations.
From Boole’s time on, logic would be seen as an entirely separate consideration from grammar
and meaning, and algorithms would have a new degree of epistemic authority within certain
restricted domains.
In the twenty-first century, the term Boolean logic refers to a system in which
statements are joined together using the connectives and, or, and not. Students and scholars
encounter Boolean logic in the search strings used in library databases, such as “logic AND
(mathematics OR algebra).” Virtually all commonly used programming languages incorporate
similar and and or operators, and Boolean logic also plays an important role in the physical
design of computers and other electronic devices. While its details have changed since Boole’s
time, the fundamental insight behind Boolean logic is the product of an early-nineteenthcentury shift in conceptions of how symbolic systems relate to the human mind and to the
world. Born in 1815, Boole published two books on logic, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic
(1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), both of which are largely concerned
with developing a method for representing propositions in the notation of symbolic algebra.
Boole mentions that this system could provide “a step toward a philosophical language”
(Mathematical Analysis 5), echoing the claims of Leibniz, Condorcet, and many others before
him. But Boole’s work differs from previous attempts at creating a universal algebra in
separating the computational aspects of the system entirely from matters of meaning. Unlike
Condorcet, Boole was not attempting to replace language with something conceptually clearer,
but rather to make reasoning about the purely formal aspects of propositions more methodical.
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By giving up on the assumption that logical deduction must rest on self-evident principles and
strictly defined concepts, Boole made the great leap that was necessary to turn some types of
ratiocination into fully mechanical processes that could operate with true autonomy from the
human mind.
In spite of his being dubbed “the ‘father’ of symbolic logic” (Peckhaus, “Was George
Boole” 271) and, more dubiously, “the father of computer science” (Cooksey 81; MacHale 82),
Boole has received virtually no scholarly attention in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
outside of specialist work on logic and mathematics, and there is considerable confusion over
his philosophical views.74 Bertrand Russell criticized Boole for assuming that logic can be
grounded in the nature of human thought (Critical Exposition 169-70), and it has since been
widely assumed that Boole’s philosophical work is hobbled by his “psychologism” (Vassallo
311). Others have defended him against this charge on the grounds that he viewed the “laws of
thought” as normative rather than descriptive (Bornet; Corcoran 282). But Boole’s views were
more distinctive than either of these interpretations suggests. Rather than viewing logic as
either a description of how human thought works (as in some forms of eighteenth-century
logic) or a system of rules for defining correctness (as in formal logic from the late nineteenth
century on), Boole was attempting to turn deduction into a clearly defined algorithm that
involves only the rule-based rearrangement of symbols without consideration of their
meanings. To an extent that few thinkers have before or since, Boole accepted the possibility
that such algorithmic methods might produce, in his term, “uninterpretable” symbolic
expressions—expressions that have no meaning within the subject area to which the logical
method is being applied. In attempting to justify the use of such expressions, his theory of logic
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grapples, with uncommon explicitness, with one of the key questions raised by the adoption of
algorithms in the production of knowledge: how one can render a jumble of symbols whose
significance is defined only by their formal relations into something meaningful to people.
Boole’s work is typically understood as part of a broad shift in attitudes toward
mathematical symbols and their relation to language in the first half of the nineteenth century.
The introduction of The Mathematical Analysis of Logic begins with a statement that sums up
the new view of algebra upon which Boole built his logical theory: “They who are acquainted
with the present state of the theory of Symbolical Algebra, are aware, that the validity of the
process of analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols which are
employed, but solely upon the laws of their combination” (3). This purely symbolic method
represented a break with the Enlightenment epistemologies of the eighteenth century.
Enlightenment mathematicians like d’Alembert had viewed algebra as a means of
representation that must be backed up with clear notions in order to be valid; but starting
around the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, mathematicians began to accept the use of
symbolic methods even in cases where their meanings could not yet be established. In the
1830s, a new generation of algebraists, including Boole’s sometime mentor Duncan F. Gregory,
redefined rigor based not on conceptual clarity, but rather on the following of formal rules
concerning the arrangements of symbols. While strict mathematical formalism was and is
controversial as a philosophical position, this formal turn had a pronounced practical effect on
the way mathematicians used symbols; algorithm began to have a degree of primacy over
meaning that it had not had since the time of Leibniz, and what relation mathematics had to
people’s intuitive views of the world came to be a more complex question.
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It has long been recognized by historians of mathematics that this formal turn involved a
change in attitudes toward algebraic signs. As the twentieth-century mathematician E. H.
Nevile puts it, if presented with a modern mathematical text, an eighteenth-century
mathematician “would feel, not that he did not know what the symbols stood for, but that he
could not see how they were being used” (146). Yet there has not been much written on how
the nineteenth-century rise of symbolic algebra relates to the linguistic thought of the period or
to the fate of the Enlightenment project more broadly. Foucault makes a brief mention of the
disentanglement of mathematics and language in The Order of Things, noting that around 1800,
“mathesis was regrouped so as to constitute an apophantics and an ontology,” whereas
“history and semiology […] united to form the interpretive disciplines” (74). Amir Alexander’s
study of biographies of mathematicians has revealed some of the cultural resonances of the
perceived departure of mathematics from common sense in the nineteenth century, which
people expressed in Romantic images of the mathematician as a mad genius (“From Voyagers
to Martyrs”). Focusing more on mathematical practice, Lorraine Daston has shown that,
starting in France in the years following the Revolution, facility in mental arithmetic went from
being a sign of mathematical genius to the mark of an idiot savant, a shift that she links to the
application of the division of labor to computation (“Enlightenment Calculations” 186). The
accounts of Alexander and Daston point to contrary movements in nineteenth century
mathematics, its theoretical aspects moving into ethereal realms at the same time that its
practicalities were devolving into mechanical drudge-work.
While some of the developments that Daston and Alexander note can be traced back to
Enlightenment projects from the late eighteenth century, the attitudes toward signs that
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prevailed in Boole’s time differed sharply from the utopian dreams of the early 1790s. As I
show in this chapter, the rise of symbolic algebra and, eventually, symbolic logic between the
1810s and the 1840s constituted a turn away from the Enlightenment project of remaking
culture on the basis of mathematical rationality. The reason Boole was able to succeed where
Condorcet and Stanhope had failed, I argue, was that he did not view mathematics as a
complete replacement for natural languages like English and French, but rather rigorously
separated the standards of mathematical validity from the cultural considerations involved in
establishing what symbols mean. The difference between Condorcet and Boole is especially
apparent in the way the two thinkers intended their systems to relate to the subject matter to
which those systems would be applied. Condorcet had intended his universal algebra to
incorporate an encyclopedic catalogue of things, thus enabling it to constitute, in itself, a
unified body of knowledge that could be used to settle disputes in any area of science or of life.
Boole, by contrast, excludes the signifying function of the algebra entirely from the domain of
logic; his logical system is meant to work together with, rather than replace, the bodies of
linguistic and conceptual knowledge that already exist in other spheres of the academy and of
society more broadyl. I link this newly narrow conception of a universal algebra to the general
skepticism toward attempts to reconstruct languages that took hold following the arguments of
Herder, Coleridge, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Boole’s approach to logic was thus suited to an
academy that was increasingly characterized by disciplinary specialization rather than by
ambitions of universal reform.
For Boole himself, the purpose of symbolic logic was emphatically not to create divides
between specialized fields. Symbolic algebra provided Boole with a way of turning logical
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inference into a rigorously defined method that could in theory be applied in any discipline.
This logical calculus was supposed to create “harmony” among the branches of knowledge
(Mathematical Analysis 14). But it was harmony Boole sought, not unity; and the way he
approached this goal created a schism between algorithm and meaning that would have been
inadmissible for d’Alembert or Condorcet. Boole denies, in a sentence that appears verbatim in
both of his books on logic, that he is setting out “[t]o supersede the employment of common
reasoning, or to subject it to the rigour of technical forms” (Mathematical Analysis 2; Laws of
Thought 12); yet his system reduces at least certain parts of the deductive process to an
algorithm that can be performed just as well by a machine as by the human mind. My reading
of Boole’s texts on logic shows that his trust in such algorithmic methods was contingent on a
division between the technical details of algorithms and the cultural construction of meaning
that was already in place by the mid-1840s, when he started his project. With this division in
place, mathematics and culture existed in separate domains where each could have some
degree of protection from the other—the first from the uncertainty of ordinary words and
notions, the second from the possibility that the mechanical nature of mathematical reasoning
would deprive culture of the breathing room that, as Romanticism had convinced the
intelligentsia of the mid-nineteenth-century, it needed to thrive.
This chapter begins with a general account of the transformation in attitudes toward
mathematical notations that occurred in the early nineteenth century. I aim, in particular, to
show that the newfound rigor that nineteenth-century algebraists gave to their science came at
the cost of creating a divide between the results of advanced mathematics and the resources a
culture at large possesses for understanding the world, creating a barrier to the realization of
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the Enlightenment project. I then examine Boole’s distinctive approach to connecting an
algorithmic system to the world of human life. While some nineteenth-century writers drew
disturbing conclusions from the apparent division of mathematics from reality, Boole’s mode of
addressing this problem errs on the reassuring side. The most creative phase of his career as a
logician (1847-1856) coincides with the Irish Potato Famine, which Boole witnessed from his
chair at Queen’s College, Cork, and the political upheavals of 1848; but his work contains few
traces of the political issues of his day.75 Boole viewed the mathematical realm in terms of the
Kantian notion of pure reason, which he adapted to apply to symbolic methods of logic.
Undergirding his trust in algebra was an unorthodox faith in the power of mathematics to
channel a divine truth that exceeded the capacity of the human understanding. On the basis of
this religious faith, he made a blind leap into the abyss that had opened up between meaning
and algorithm, accepting, as few others did, that as processes of reasoning become increasingly
mechanized and externalized from the human mind, the knowledge they produce may
ultimately prove incomprehensible to human beings.

The Splitting of the Signifier

In order to understand the conditions that enabled the emergence of symbolic logic in the early
nineteenth century, it is necessary to re-open a question that is seldom asked in the twentyfirst century, but whose answer is by no means straightforward. How do we know that
−1 × −1 = 1? We are all taught this as a fact in school. Yet early-modern algebraists had
varying views on how such a proposition must be established, and some even questioned its
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truth. These different attitudes toward negative numbers indicate different views of the
relationship between the rules for a symbol’s use—the algorithmic plane—and that symbol’s
meaning. The difficulties surrounding negatives were only resolved with the adoption of a
modern view of algorithms that gave them a degree of authority over the way people ought to
reason in the mathematical domain. With a few exceptions, this apotheosis of the algorithm
did not happen until the nineteenth century, and it involved a fundamental break with
Enlightenment views of mathematics, language, and knowledge more broadly.
It is useful to begin with some definitions. In Begriffsschrift (1879), Gottlob Frege points
out that certain types of logical statement must be considered in terms of the form of the
signifier as well as of its meaning. Suppose one writes, using Frege’s notation, 𝐴 ≡ 𝐵, which
means A is equivalent to B. If one thinks entirely in terms of the concepts to which the symbols
refer, then this statement would have the same meaning as 𝐴 ≡ 𝐴. But if this were so, the
symbol for equivalence would be useless. Somehow, it must be possible to interpret the
symbols in such a way that the difference in the shape of the letters distinguishes them in spite
of their equivalent content. As Frege explains it, “the introduction of the sign for identity of
content necessarily produces a bifurcation in the meaning of all signs: they stand at times for
their content, at times for themselves” (20-21). This distinction is similar to, but not quite the
same as the one between sense and reference that Frege would famously articulate in a later
essay (“Sense and Reference” 209). Frege’s insight in Begriffsschrift is that the operations one
can perform upon symbolic expressions, such as the ones used in his system of formal logic, do
not work the same way as mental operations performed upon the ideas to which the symbols
refer. When working with symbols, it matters not just what the symbols mean, but also which
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symbols are the same and which are different. The employment of signs in logical reasoning,
Frege argues, thus creates a division that does not otherwise exist between identity of content
(or, in other words, meaning) and identity of form.
The ability to recognize identity and difference at the level of form—not the ability to
understand meaning—is what one needs to perform an algorithm. As John Peter recognized in
the 1670s, when he wrote his pamphlet on “artificial versifying,” rearranging characters
according to a set procedure is an entirely different thing from reading, and can even be
performed by the illiterate. The only things one need do in order to perform Peter’s
“Instrumental Operation” is recognize whether inscriptions are or are not instances of the same
character—to know that 𝐴 = 𝐴 but 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵—and create new copies of them. Meaning is
irrelevant. Yet the symbols also must bear meanings if one wishes to relate the algorithm and
its results to one’s conception of the world—that is, to interpret the algorithmically generated
poem. Any signifier that is employed in an algorithmic system is therefore split: it can work
both as an ordinary signifier, its meaning determined by some collection of semiotic and
linguistic conventions, and as a physical thing to be moved around according to set procedures.
To give a contemporary example, what one thinks the word “Open” in a “File” menu means,
whether considered in isolation or in context, bears only an indirect relationship to what the
“Open” function will do. One depends on the body of linguistic and practical knowledge in
one’s head that is partly one’s own, and partly shared with a community; the other depends on
the way a particular assortment of machines are programmed, connected, and operated by
human beings one will in most cases never meet. If the meaning does not line up well with the
workings of that system, then typically, one will end up either frustrated or deceived.
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The possibility of discord between the algorithmic and semantic planes has troubled
mathematicians since the very earliest flowerings of modern European algebra. The Italian
algebraist Gerolamo Cardano encountered a version of this problem in the sixteenth century.
While Cardano did not use symbolic methods, he did employ algorithms, and his concern was
largely with describing general procedures for solving a variety of equation types. In his 1545
book Artis Magnæ, dive de Regulis Algebraicis (The Great Art, or the Rules of Algebra), Cardano
considers the equation that would be written in modern notation as follows: 𝑦 3 = 8𝑦 + 3
(103). Following his algorithm for solving this equation produces an expression that includes
imaginary numbers, making the solution, in his language, “sophistic” (sophistica) (220).76
Cardano generally treated such solutions as mere curiosities and denied them any
mathematical validity. Yet, as Helen M. Pycior observes, the imaginary numbers in this
particular solution cancel each other out, producing a real solution that is clearly correct: 𝑦 = 3
(Pycior 23). As Pycior notes, Cardano glosses over the fact that his method for producing the
solution involved imaginary numbers, and he elsewhere expresses puzzlement at the fact that
imaginary solutions can result from the application of seemingly trustworthy algebraic
algorithms. In Pycior’s account, Cardano never reconciled himself to the use of imaginary
numbers and even, late in his life, developed reservations about the legitimacy of negative
numbers. In the posthumously published book De Regula Aliza (1570), Cardano considered the
possibility that −1 × −1 = −1, justified by the fact that negative numbers are “alien” to our
experience of the world: something alien multiplied by something alien could only, Cardano
reasoned, produce more alienness (Pycior 25). The fact that a “sophistic” method involving
“alien” numbers could, to the contrary, apparently lead one to correct, positive, perfectly
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comprehensible solutions did not prove that method’s worth for Cardano, as it might for a
modern pragmatist, but rather suggested that an unresolved metaphysical problem lurked in
the foundation of algebra.
While few mathematicians accepted (or were aware of) Cardano’s late-career disavowal
of negative numbers, the reluctance to employ methods that could not be backed up with the
gold bullion of clear and distinct concepts persisted until around the end of the eighteenth
century. For d’Alembert and other thinkers of his generation, one of the key problems of the
philosophy of mathematics was how one can explain the meanings of such puzzling entities as
negative and imaginary numbers. In his entry for “Negative” in the Encyclopédie, d’Alembert
notes that to define negative numbers as quantities “below nothing,” as Euler and many other
authors did, was to propose something inconceivable (“Négatif” 11:72; my translation). 77
D’Alembert attempts to show how the “true notion” of a negative number is simply a real
number oriented in the opposite direction along a line from positive numbers (11:73). Even this
geometric interpretation was not clear enough for some eighteenth-century mathematicians.
The English lawyer and polymath Francis Maseres developed an elaborate theory of negation
that was supposed to eliminate the need to admit the existence of negative quantities, which
he called “mere nonsense and unintelligible jargon” (2). In Maseres’s theory, which he presents
in the 1758 book A Dissertation on the Use of the Negative Sign in Algebra, -5 represents not a
number, but rather the operation by which five is subtracted from a number greater than or
equal to five. William Frend similarly questioned the comprehensibility of negative numbers in
1796 (x). The amount of effort that went into constructing these conceptual armatures
illustrates the ardor with which eighteenth-century mathematicians defended the alignment

248

between meaning and algorithm. While French and English mathematicians worked within
different epistemologies at the time (see Richards), they shared the emphasis on rooting
methods in clearly defined notions and self-evident principles. The goal of mathematics was
not just to develop methods of ratiocination, but also to create a system of ideas that would
work together with the symbols to form a comprehensible representation of the spacial and
numerical aspects of the world.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, though, algorithms had gained a new degree
of autonomy from meaning within certain, limited domains of knowledge. In the
Enlightenment imaginary, the mechanization of thought was a utopian end-state that would
obtain after a perfect system of concepts—la vraie philosophie—is created. By contrast, the
new, nineteenth-century approach put the mechanical first: one could start by defining the
rules by which symbols are to be moved around and work out what it all meant afterward. The
roots of mathematical formalism lie in the eighteenth-century work of Leonhard Euler and Karl
Friedrich Gauss, both of whom embraced symbolic methods to a greater extent than was
generally accepted at the time. Between the 1810s and the 1840s, such approaches rose to
preeminence internationally. It is not the case that people accepted the use of symbols that
have no meanings; in some areas of mathematics and symbolic logic, this never happened. But
there was a reversal of the manner in which the alignment of algorithm and meaning was to be
established. The algorithms were no longer required to follow from the application of selfevident principles to the meanings of the symbols, but rather could themselves serve as the
standards to which the meanings had to conform. The shift from conceptual to formal
standards of validity made it possible to imagine the mechanical use of symbols not just as a

249

means of operationalizing knowledge that had already been established by means of natural
reason, but also as a way of cutting new paths into uncharted mathematical territory.
This shift took place on an international scale. At around the same time that Martin
Ohm introduced his “perfectly consequential” system of algebra in Germany, the Cambridge
Analytical Society, founded in 1811 by the then undergraduates Charles Babbage and Edward
Ffrench Bromhead, began promoting symbolic methods in Britain.78 The stated purpose of the
Society was to advocate the use of Leibniz’s symbolic notation, which had (at least in their view)
been unfairly overlooked in England due to a nationalistic preference for Newton (Babbage,
Passages 29; see Becher 406). In 1816, Babbage along with two other members of the society,
John Herschel and George Peacock, published an English translation of a calculus textbook by
the French mathematician Sylvestre François Lacroix as a way of promoting the symbolic
approach of Continental mathematicians. While the Analytical Society were enamored (in a
way that was politically dangerous during the Napoleonic Wars) with the late-eighteenthcentury French tradition that viewed algebra as a form of “analysis,” Peacock would later take a
major step beyond this tradition into fully formalist methods. In the 1842 edition of his Treatise
on Algebra, Peacock characterizes algebra as “a science, which regards the combinations of
signs and symbols only, according to determinate laws, which are altogether independent of
the specific values of the symbols themselves” (vii). Peacock’s theory is meant in part to
resolve the difficulty surrounding negative numbers by showing that their significance is
determined not by their reference to some notion of quantity, but rather solely by the rules
that govern their use. Algebra, Peacock suggests, is not a means of representation, as it was for
the eighteenth-century empiricists, but rather a way of transforming symbolic expressions that
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“is governed by laws which must likewise govern, and to a certain extent determine, their
interpretation, and not conversely” (xiv).79 There cannot be a clearer statement of dissent from
the Cartesian epistemology advanced by d’Alembert’s Preliminary Discourse, in which rigor’s
first demand was to ground the method on clear notions that would determine the meanings of
the symbols. For Peacock, the symbols would lead the way, and meaning would follow.
The shift to these new standards of validity gave mathematicians a great deal more
leeway to produce counterintuitive results than they had under the sign of Enlightenment.
Bernard Bolzano’s 1810 book Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik
(Contributions to a Better-Founded Presentation of Mathematics) presented a theory of calculus
that was meant to be more rigorous than previous ones because it did not involve intuitive
notions of space and time—a premise that is itself indicative of the break with Enlightenment
norms of rigor. Along with Peacock, Évariste Galois contributed some of the rudiments of
abstract algebra, which enabled the creation of arbitrarily defined algebraic systems that did
not necessarily correspond to the way numbers ordinarily worked. Perhaps most importantly,
non-Euclidean geometries arrived in earnest in the early 1830s. For centuries, it was believed
that Euclid’s fifth postulate—roughly, that two non-parallel lines must intersect at some point—
could be proven either from his other four axioms or (as in Kant’s view) from undeniable truths
of reason; but in the early nineteenth century it became clear that it was an arbitrary
assumption and that other geometries could be developed without it. This event has long been
viewed as the point at which mathematics began to move away from making truth claims about
the world since, as Bertrand Russell writes in the 1903 book Principles of Mathematics (which is
not to be confused with the later book Principia Mathematica), it showed “that pure
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mathematics has no concern with the question of whether the axioms and propositions of
Euclid hold of actual space or not” (5). In doing so, it broke the chain of mental representations
that, for d’Alembert, linked geometry to the sensible world. For this new generation of
mathematicians, the validity of results was less a matter of their comprehensibility (as
Cartesians and Lockeans alike had had it) than of their accordance with formal rules; what went
on in the researcher’s brain was of less and less epistemological significance.
While the symbolic turn of the early nineteenth century is generally considered to have
advanced the rigor of mathematics significantly, this rigor came at the cost of placing a rigid
barrier between mathematics and the way people thought in daily life. This barrier was
reinforced by the emergence of nineteenth-century notions of culture, which viewed natural
languages as developing in an organic fashion that was seemingly at odds with the
“mechanical” and intentionally constructed nature of mathematical notations. As the
involuntarist views of language put forth by Herder and Humboldy gained in influence
internationally, it became much more difficult to believe that an algebraic language could serve
as a full replacement for one’s native tongue, as some of the more radical Enlightenment
language-reform projects had presumed. The nineteenth-century notion of culture also gave
natural languages a much more positive valence than they had for Enlightenment thinkers like
Condorcet, who were out to exterminate old prejudices and errors from the world. The parallel
transformations toward formalism in mathematics and toward involuntarism in linguistics
resolved one of the epistemological problems that had troubled eighteenth-century
mathematicians: no longer was it necessary to purify mathematics of all traces of the “vulgar”
ideas embedded in ordinary language, as Condorcet and, in a less extreme way, d’Alembert had
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attempted to do. Now, the concern was much the opposite: that the mechanical nature of
mathematical reasoning would deprive its results of the meaning that only a connection to the
“mental life of a people,” as Humboldt calls it, could provide.
Complaints about the divide between algorithm and meaning were common in critical
discussions of the new symbolic algebra. While it is now a cliché that algebra involves the
“manipulation of symbols,” this phrase was novel in the nineteenth century, and it often served
as a way of mocking the perceived shallowness of symbolic methods. In the Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London for April 15, 1858, for instance, the Rev. James Booth castigates English
mathematics teachers for focusing on “nimble dexterity in the manipulation of symbols” rather
than on “the knowledge of principles” (176). John Venn uses the phrase in a similarly negative
way in his 1866 book Logic of Chance, questioning whether Pierre Simon Laplace’s theory of
induction can provide anything more valuable than “formulæ for the manipulation of symbols”
(164). These comments suggest a class-based fear of mathematics becoming a physical activity
rather than an intellectual one—“manipulation” referred primarily to physical acts, especially
with the hands—as well as an apprehension that mathematical theories were becoming
disconnected from reality. Even mathematicians who advocated symbolic methods, such as
Herschel, expressed the concern that such methods would enable students to pass their
mathematics exams by “cramming”—that is, learning symbolic proofs by rote without
understanding them (Becher 413-14). The mechanical nature of modern algebra was clearly
useful, but only insofar as one could eventually carry its results back to the realm of meaning
and thus secure their place in the temple of culture.
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These criticisms functioned within a cultural matrix that elevated mental above physical
labor, especially in fields with pretentions to being scholarly. From Burke’s anti-Jacobin writings
through Arnold and Ruskin, English social critics defined high culture in opposition to the
“mechanical,” broadly considered. A commonly cited reference point for Victorian attitudes
toward the mechanical is Thomas Carlyle’s 1829 essay “Signs of the Times,” which declares the
nineteenth century the “Age of Machinery,” “in every outward and inward sense of that word”
(100). Carlyle’s primary target in the essay is a mode of social organization based on rational
planning rather than tradition and moral conviction, which for him constitutes the imposition of
mechanical rules upon the populace. Matthew Arnold references the idea of the mechanical in
a similarly negative way in his famous definition of culture in Culture and Anarchy (1869).
Culture, he writes, is “a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the
matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world, and,
through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and
habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue
in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically”
(viii). As Raymond Williams has pointed out, the nineteenth-century notion of culture was used
to distinguish human development from the material advances of civilization, which were seen
as imposing a mechanical form of rationalism upon people (Keywords 52). By adopting
algorithmic methods, mathematicians risked aligning their work with the merely material and
instrumental. While some (like Babbage in his industrialist mode) were fine with this
alignment, others demurred. If the adoption of symbolic methods caused trouble for the
Enlightenment dream of a universal algebra that could handle the meaning-making functions of
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a language as well as providing a means of computation, this new notion of culture made the
prognosis even worse. By extending the rigor of mathematics to other areas of life that fell
within the domain of culture, such a project would, under the definitions of mathematics and
culture that prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century, risk turning people into machines.
In stark contrast to the Enlightenment conflation of mathematics with reason itself, the
epistemological texts of mid-nineteenth-century Britain handled this problem by separating
algorithmic and semantic aspects of symbols into autonomous spheres. Keeping algorithm
carefully apart from meaning enabled the mechanical methods of symbol manipulation
advocated by Peacock, Babbage, and Gregory to coexist peacefully with a humble and at times
even reverential attitude toward natural languages. By way of example, consider Philosophy of
the Inductive Sciences (1840) by the Cambridge philosopher William Whewell. Whewell’s book
contains in its preface a lengthy series of “aphorisms concerning the language of science” that
is by-and-large directed against the idea of remaking language from the ground up (xlviii).
According to Whewell, in the “ancient” period, scientific words were formed “casually” based
on words from common speech, whereas in the “modern” period they are “constructed
intentionally, with set purpose, with a regard to its connexion, and with a view of constructing a
system” (xlviii-xlix). The modern approach, Whewell argues, has the advantage of protecting
scientific texts from misinterpretation based on the “vague” ideas of common language (lii).
But, citing Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning, Whewell declares that “the appropriation of
old words is preferable to the invention of new ones” (lxvii). Given the difficulties involved in
introducing words that do not draw upon existing meanings and associations, he argues,
scientists should avoid introducing entirely new terms unless it is absolutely necessary (lxxi);
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and if one does find the need to create a new word, he suggests that one should strive to
preserve the “philological analogies” that exist in a language (cv). While Whewell allows for the
coining of terms that violate these analogies when it is scientifically necessary, he advises
people to strive as much as possible not to disturb the existing order of a language when
developing scientific terminology. Language has come, in the second quarter of the nineteenth
century, to be viewed as the sacred property of a people, and changing it something to be
lamented rather than celebrated as a step toward enlightenment.
This deference toward existing linguistic practices contrasts sharply with Whewell’s
treatment of algebra in his chapter on higher mathematics. The “philological” concerns
Whewell discusses in the preface would seem to apply only to words, not to the “arbitrary
symbols” of algebra (142). Citing Peacock’s Treatise, Whewell declares that the principle of
symbolic algebra is “[t]he absolute universality of the interpretation of symbols” (143). In
contrast to technical terminologies, the use of which must be preceded by the establishment of
clear definitions based (ideally) on a thoughtful consideration of the existing linguistic practices
of the community in which the new words are to be used, algebraic symbols may be used
without having fixed meanings, provided that the rules for using them are clearly specified. It is
the fact that the meanings of algebraic symbols are not determined in advance that enables
algebraic symbols to “reason for us,” as Whewell puts it, leading mathematicians to new truths
even in cases in which they do not yet know how to interpret them (143). As an example of the
way algorithm may forge ahead of meaning in the use of mathematical symbols, Whewell gives
the notation for negative numbers, which, “although destitute of meaning according to the
original conventions of their institution, still pointed out truths which could be verified in other
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ways” (142-43). In spite of his endorsement of symbolic algebra, Whewell still assumes the
results must be given a meaning in some way—one may use purely symbolic methods to chart
out new mathematical territories, but one must still tame and cultivate the land before it
becomes inhabitable. Whewell’s division of algorithm from meaning suggests a very different
perspective from the Condillacian view of algebra as a well-formed language that one may
imagine one day replacing French or English. The peculiar power of symbolic algebra results,
for Whewell, Peacock, and other nineteenth-century mathematicians, not from its superior
clarity, but rather from the fact that it enables a form of ratiocination that works independently
from the process by which signification is established, and that thus can run ahead as a scout in
regions where meaning has not yet taken root.
This division is even more overt in John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843), which is
notable for being the last major British logic text published before the symbolic revolution
inaugurated by Boole and De Morgan. As an addendum to Whewell’s discussion of language,
Mill offers the following “aphorism”: “Whenever the nature of the subject permits the
reasoning process to be, without danger, carried on mechanically, the language should be
constructed on as mechanical principles as possible; while in contrary case, it should be so
constructed that there shall be the greatest possible obstacles to a merely mechanical use of it”
(Mill II.292). The “danger” that mechanization poses, Mill explains, is the potential that, in their
eagerness to extend the power of algebra to other areas of knowledge, philosophers will lose
sight of the sensible meanings of the symbols (Mill II.293). It is possible to produce
mathematical knowledge without regard for meaning, Mill argues, because of the purely
deductive nature of algebraic reasoning (II.294). In other areas of science, new knowledge
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cannot be produced through the contemplation of names and definitions alone, and so,
“instead of contrivances to prevent our attention being distracted by thinking of the meaning of
our signs, we require contrivances to make it impossible that we should ever lose sight of that
meaning even for an instant” (II.296). Like Wilhelm von Humboldt, of whose work Mill would
later become England’s greatest champion, Mill held that the creation of meaning was
inherently connected to the linguistic practices of a human community (see I.49; I.207-08). His
remarks on language in System of Logic contains a distinct, if unspoken, undertone of anxiety
about the violence that resulted from the French Jacobins’ attempt to expunge the errors of the
past from their language and culture. In express repudiation of Condillac’s program of linguistic
reform, Mill endorses “the doctrine […] of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people
among whom culture is of an old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all ages, and which
no one age should consider itself empowered to alter” (II.261). Seen in this context, Mill’s
aphorism about mechanization is suggesting a division between technical and cultural matters
as a hedge against the destructive consequences of the Enlightenment’s attempt to remake
culture on rational principles. The utility of algorithmic methods must be recognized within the
circumscribed field of algebra, it suggests, but they also must be kept carefully apart from the
domain in which meaning is the rightful sovereign.
For all these attempts to restrict symbolic methods to where they could do no harm to
culture, mathematics was still threatening to trouble peoples’ views of the world. The
hyperbolic geometries that appeared in the 1830s—geometries in which non-parallel lines may
fail to intersect—were scandalous because they appeared to be logically consistent even
though they had no apparent foundation in either intuition or the senses. Karl Friedrich Gauss
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claimed that, although he had realized the possibility of such a geometry in the 1790s, he did
not write the idea down until 1831 because he feared it would provoke “the uproar of the
Boeotians” (quoted by Torretti 53; see Ewald 297). This fear was not without grounding. The
possibility of non-Euclidean geometries continued to disturb people for over a century. In the
1928 horror story “The Call of Cthulhu,” H.P. Lovecraft depicts the “geometry” of the alien city
of R’lyeh as “abnormal, non-Euclidean, and loathsomely redolent of spheres and dimensions
apart from ours” (166); one of the characters dies by being “swallowed up by an angle of
masonry which shouldn’t have been there” (167). Rather than representing our world with
mathematical precision, the new geometries were seen as describing other realities and (in
Lovecraft’s view) potentially disturbing ones. In the early nineteenth century, these anxieties
found an expression in a proliferation of stories (often embellished or fabricated) about
mathematicians going mad after losing themselves in worlds of abstraction (Alexander, “From
Voyagers to Martyrs” 30-31; 43; Kittler, “Take-off” 75-76). The alien aspects of mathematical
thought—aspects that mathematicians from Cardano to d’Alembert had attempted to reason
away—now seemed to be around for good. By widening and deepening the divide between
mathematics and the world of daily life, the adoption of formal criteria of validity made it
difficult to believe d’Alembert’s claim, in the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie, that the
simplicity and certitude of geometry and algebra would bestow enlightenment upon humanity
(35), or Condorcet’s vision of a final epoch in which people would work out their political
differences in an algebraic language. Even as the certainty of mathematics apparently
increased, determining what the results meant, in the sense of their significance within a
common-sense understanding of the world, was becoming harder and harder.
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The question of how one can draw the honey of meaning from the rock of an
algorithmic system is central to Boole’s writings on the philosophy of logic. While Boole
created what was arguably the most mechanical logic system yet realized by the 1840s, he
takes the pitfalls of mechanization just as seriously as Mill. In the preface to his first book, The
Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), Boole quotes Mill’s “aphorism” about the distinction
between subjects whose languages can be mechanized “without danger” and those that cannot
(quoted by Boole 2; see Mill II.292).80 For Boole, what renders logic safe to mechanize is the
belief that it rests on a set of “laws of thought” that govern how one may combine and
recombine ideas. Boole sought to secure the meaningfulness of his mechanical methods by
combining a variant of Kantian thought with a religious faith in the revelatory power of algebra.
Through his application of symbolic methods to logic, Boole inadvertently—and almost
certainly against his intentions—made possible the construction of first machines that could
perform logical deductions with true independence from the human mind. In his philosophical
writings, he addressed with an uncommon level of explicitness a question that continues to
haunt such machines in the twenty-first century: how one can justify trusting a system whose
workings are alien to one’s own way of thinking.

Journeys Through the Uninterpretable

While it emerged around the time when the boundaries of academic disciplines were beginning
to ossify, Boolean logic was not a result of intensive disciplinary training. Growing up in a
lower-class household in Lincolnshire, England, Boole had little formal education past primary
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school. He was, however, fortunate enough to have the time and opportunity to read
extensively on his own, teaching himself modern and classical languages, reading Kant in the
original German, and studying symbolic algebra and calculus; by the 1840s, he had established
himself as a respected scholar without ever earning a degree. Although he initially planned to
join the clergy, his religious views early on deviated from Anglican orthodoxy; he gravitated
toward mathematics, the harmony and abstraction of which comported well with his
idiosyncratic faith. In 1849, he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Queens College in
Cork, Ireland, where he lived until his death at the age of 49 of an illness he acquired while
walking in the rain to give a lecture. A major thread running throughout his work is a concern
with method, a desire to make reasoning into a more thoroughly rule-based procedure. His
first major publication, the 1844 article “On a General Method of Analysis,” was primarily an
attempt to establish a “perfectly general method” for solving a type of equation that had been
previously described by Euler and Laplace (227). His work in formal logic takes a similarly
methodical approach.81 In The Laws of Thought, Boole claims that his logic surpasses
Aristotelian logic by offering “a directive method” for answering logical questions—that is, not
just a set of formal criteria for determining whether a given chain of reasoning is correct (as
syllogisms provide) but also a rigorously defined procedure for deciding which deductions to
make (11). In this method lies one of the major tributaries of the modern computer. Boole was
certainly not the first to envision an algebra-like language that would turn all sorts of reasoning
into a mechanical process, but he showed, in a way that Leibniz, Lambert, and Condorcet had
all failed to do, how this sort of algorithmic symbol manipulation could really work as a way of
producing new knowledge.
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Boole’s logic system is generally understood to exist at the confluence of two
intellectual currents in early-nineteenth-century Britain. One is the spread of symbolic algebra
in Britain. Boole encountered the new algebra most directly through the work of his friend
Duncan F. Gregory, whose 1840 essay “On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra” attempts,
building on the work of Peacock, to clarify the principles on which algebra is based (208; see
Despeaux 49).82 While Grattan-Guinness notes that Boole never mentioned Peacock in his
writings (xliv), his attitude toward the relation of algorithm and meaning closely resembles that
of the Cambridge mathematician in that, for both Peacock and Boole, it was permissible to
experiment with formal transformations before establishing the meanings of symbols.83 The
formal turn in algebra laid the groundwork for symbolic logic by showing that algebra could
admit multiple interpretations apart from the usual one involving numbers. The other current
that fed Boole’s work was revival of interest in logic triggered by the publication of Richard
Whately’s 1826 book Elements of Logic, which was expanded from an entry in Coleridge’s
Encyclopædia Metropolitana. In this book, Whately attempts to refute the “prejudice” of the
Lockean tradition against formal logic by showing that logic can be a “Science” as well as an
“Art” (1). Isaac Watts and other eighteenth-century logicians, Whately claims, failed to be
scientific because, in aiming to teach reasoning in general, they left the bounds of their
discipline vague; Whately, by contrast, strictly limits logic to dealing with formal relations of
propositions (10; 37). Whately inspired a new wave of logic texts that emphasized rigor and
systematicity to a greater extent than the didactic logics of the Enlightenment and emboldened
the logicians of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, including Sir William Hamilton
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and Augustus De Morgan, another close friend of Boole’s, to develop formal methods that
departed from the Aristotelian tradition to a greater extent than had been done for centuries.
Boole’s logical theory, which is mostly unchanged from The Mathematical Analysis of
Logic (1847) to The Laws of Thought (1854), proceeds from the insight that the nineteenth
century’s newly flexible system of algebra could be applied to the analysis of logical form.
While it was not an entirely new idea, Boole is often credited for noticing that and and or
function in ways that are analogous to multiplication and addition. Based on this analogy,
Boole developed a system for representing logical propositions using the symbols of standard
algebra. While it is sometimes claimed that Boole created the logic system used by modern
computers (see Shenefelt and White 205), this is an oversimplification; the logical calculus
Boole created is somewhat different from and much more complex than what ultimately came
to be known as “Boolean logic.”84 In Boole’s system, addition represents the combination of
two mutually exclusive categories85, so that ℎ + 𝑧, for instance, might mean the class of things
that are either horses or zebras; multiplication represents the intersection of categories, so that
𝑏𝑟 might represent brown rabbits; and subtraction represents the exclusion of a subcategory,
so that 𝑠 – 𝑐 might represent snakes that are not cobras. This system uses 1 to represent
everything in the universe of discourse and 0 to represent nothing; thus 1 – 𝑠 might represent
everything that is not a snake. Boole also presents a second interpretation of his algebra that
deals with truth values rather than categories; in this interpretation, 1 represents always true
and 0 never true.86 Both versions of Boole’s system maintain a close analogy with ordinary
numerical algebra, differing only in the addition of one law: 𝑥(1 − 𝑥) = 0. This law, which he
called the law of duality, represents the logical fact that no category overlaps with its
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opposite—nothing can be both a snake and not a snake. Adding this additional law to standard
algebra makes the logical equations behave somewhat like linear differential equations,
enabling Boole to develop a general algorithm for solving them. To adapt one of his examples,
suppose one is given the premise that “Every poet is a man of genius” (26), and one needs to
know what this tells us about “men of genius.”87 One represents the premise as 𝑝(1 − 𝑔) = 0,
which means, more literally interpreted, that the category of entities that are poets (𝑝) and not
men of genius (1 – 𝑔) is empty; one then solves for g using Boole’s method.88 The result, 𝑔 =
𝑝 + 𝑣(1 − 𝑝), states that the category “men of genius” contains all poets along with some
indefinite number (represented by v) of other beings who are not poets.
Boole discusses the linguistic implications of this system of symbolic reasoning in the
most detail in his second book on logic, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854). After
an introduction explaining his overall purpose in the book, Boole enters into a discussion of
“signs and their laws” (24). He defines a “sign” as an “arbitrary mark” with a “fixed
interpretation, and susceptible of combination with other signs in subjection to fixed laws
dependent upon their mutual interpretation” (25). He then attempts to show that a subset of
such signs—those that express things or qualities of things—follow laws of combination that
are equivalent to the basic laws of algebra. The order in which such terms appear, he argues,
makes no difference; “rivers that are estuaries” means the same thing as “estuaries that are
rivers” (29). This equivalence translates to the commutative law, 𝑥𝑦 = 𝑦𝑥. Likewise,
“European men and women” means the same thing as “European men and European women,”
which translates to the distributive law, 𝑧(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑧𝑥 + 𝑧𝑦 (33). Boole also shows how if,
not, and various other connecting words map onto algebraic expressions. Any elements of
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language that are left out of this algebraization, he declares at the end of the chapter, serve
only “to express some emotion or state of feeling accompanying the utterance of a proposition,
and thus do not belong to the province of the understanding, with which alone our present
concern lies” (38). Boole’s algebraic logic is thus meant to capture all those aspects of language
that logic has to do with, and do so in a way that is far more amenable to mechanical
manipulation than natural languages.
So far, this argument might not seem too different from Condillac’s claim that all
reasoning is fundamentally algebraic. But unlike Condillac, Boole makes a clear distinction
between the algebraic laws that supposedly govern thought and the grammatical laws that
govern languages. The identity 𝑥𝑦 = 𝑦𝑥 is a logical, rather than a linguistic truth for Boole; the
reversibility of terms is a universal law of thought despite the fact that one cannot ordinarily
replace brown bear with bear brown in standard English. Boole uses three quotations from
Milton’s Paradise Lost to illustrate how a phrase can retain its logical structure even as it
violates the grammar of the English language:
“Offspring of heaven first-born.”
“The rising world of waters dark and deep.”
“Bright effluence of bright essence increate.” (Laws of Thought 30)
The comprehensibility of such inversions results, according to Boole, from “the intimate laws of
thought” that determine how ideas may be combined in the human mind, independently of the
strictures imposed by particular languages (31). This view of things produces a parallel
between symbolic logic and poetry, since both forms of writing apparently have a degree of
autonomy from the grammatical rules that govern prose. The comprehensibility of poetic
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syntax, according to Boole, is due not to one’s knowledge of any particular language, but rather
to universal laws of reasoning that transcend linguistic strictures (see also Selected Manuscripts
70). The primary feat of Boole’s logical system is to recast these laws in a mathematical, rather
than a verbal form. Since the quiddities of natural languages have no bearing on the laws of
thought, Boole finds it “permissible” to eschew words altogether and express logical truths in
algebraic notation (28). As he puts it in the postscript to The Mathematical Analysis of Logic:
“Language is an instrument of Logic, but not an indispensible instrument” (81).
However independent logic is from language, however, one must still be able to
translate the results of one’s logical computations into meaningful sentences for the system to
be of any use. One of the prime dangers of applying algebraic methods to logic, Boole
concedes in The Laws of Thought, is that such methods might produce expressions that are
“uninterpretable in that sphere of thought which they are designed to aid” (67). Such
uninterpretable statements occur frequently in Boole’s text. For instance, one of his examples
begins with the following definition: “Responsible beings are all rational beings who are either
free to act, or have voluntarily sacrificed their freedom” (94-95). In symbolic notation, he
renders this statement as “𝑥 = 𝑦𝑧 + 𝑦𝑤,” with 𝑥 being responsible beings, 𝑦 being rational
ones, 𝑧 being those free to act, and 𝑤 being those who have voluntarily sacrificed their freedom
(95). This equation has a clear interpretation given Boole’s definitions of multiplication,
addition, and equality. Yet in analyzing it, he winds up with an equation that does not have any
well-defined logical meaning:
1−𝑦 =

𝑧+𝑤−𝑥
𝑧+𝑤
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While this equation is equivalent to 𝑥 = 𝑦𝑧 + 𝑦𝑤 in ordinary numerical algebra89, it bears no
logical meaning that can be translated into English, since, unlike the other basic algebraic
operators, division has no logical counterpart.90 The only way to make sense of it is to
transform it using Boole’s algorithm, which produces a much longer equation that can finally be
translated into an English sentence, albeit a less-than-elegant one: “Irrational persons consist of
all responsible beings who are either free to act, or have voluntarily sacrificed their liberty, and
are not free to act; together with an indefinite remainder of irresponsible beings who have not
sacrificed their liberty, and are not free to act” (98).
The danger of wandering into a realm of uninterpretable nonsense is the price one pays
for turning logic into a mechanical process. The possibility of producing expressions that lack
meanings, Boole explains, is specific to symbolic methods, since “this apparent failure of
correspondency between process and interpretation does not manifest itself in the ordinary
applications of human reason” (67). Boole does not, however, take this as a knock against
algebraization. It is valid, Boole contends, to employ symbols “in obedience to laws founded
upon their interpretation, but without any sustained reference to that interpretation, the chain
of demonstration conducting us through intermediate steps which are not interpretable, to a
final result which is interpretable” (69). As an example that, in his view, proves the rule, he
takes “the uninterpretable symbol √-1,” which, devoid as it is of any sensible meaning, may
nonetheless be used “in the intermediate process of trigonometry” (69). Just as Ohm had
resolved the difficulties surrounding the value √−1 by giving up on the idea that mathematical
formulæ always had to represent magnitudes, Boole would give mathematical rigor to logic by
freeing it from its dependence on language. This formal turn provided a directive method for
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reasoning at the cost of creating a rift between logic and “ordinary” thought that would have
been unacceptable for Enlightenment thinkers like Condillac. Despite Boole’s protestations
that one must always clearly understand the meanings of the symbols one uses—protestations
that closely resemble ones Ohm makes in the preface to The Spirit of Mathematical Analysis
(vi)—this requirement is only really relevant at the beginning and end of the logical process,
when it is necessary to translate between algebraic notation and the language of another field
of study. In the midst of Boole’s algorithm, interpretation is both needless and, in the case of
“uninterpretable” expressions involving division, futile. When formal rules lead one into the
realm of the meaningless, it is only more formal rules that can light the way back out.
But this return from the abyss of the uninterpretable is only possible if the procedures
one is using are the right ones. Boole’s confidence that his deductive algorithm can produce
meaningful statements in any science is founded on the belief that this particular procedure is
based on rules that are not arbitrary, but rather are imposed on us from without. As he puts it
in an manuscript probably written in 1854, because “methods and processes are truly the
consequences of laws and do not spring up arbitrarily into existence,” one can presume that
any complete method rests on a basis that is “not merely empirical or analogical” (Selected
Manuscripts 53). This assumption of the non-arbitrariness of algebra enables Boole to turn
reasoning into a mechanical—indeed, an algorithmic—process without at all embracing
instrumentalism. In some of his discussions of method, Boole sounds similar to Coleridge, who
insisted that the “eternal I AM” must rule over the methods of science; Boole, too, sought to
give scientific reasoning a method that is motivated by a higher moral purpose.91 But whereas
Coleridge wanted scientists to root their methods in a version of Christianity that subordinated
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the individual to the state, Boole’s method derives its authority from the belief that the human
mind is directly subject to a divine imperative to reason in a certain way.92 The logical algebra
can be trusted to produce meaningful results, Boole asserts, because (in spite of its occasional
incomprehensibility) it is based on the form that correct thought is already—in all times and all
cultures—ordained to take.93 Given this Universalist rationale, the fact that the algebra
produces uninterpretable statements could be brushed off as resulting not from the limitations
of the method, but rather from the finitude of the human understanding. In an 1855 letter to
John Penrose, Boole gives “infinite space, eternal duration, […] perfect goodness and purity,
unchanging rectitude and truth etc” as examples of terms that cannot be given clear and
distinct meanings, but that one can nonetheless reason about with certainty by following the
laws of thought (Selected Manuscripts 200). So long as one uses symbols in “obedience” with
these laws, one cannot produce anything that is out of sync with the order of nature, however
little we mere temporal beings may be able to understand the expressions our reckoning
produces.
Underlying this theologico-philosophical rationale for trusting algorithms is a vision of a
harmonious universe in which all the differences that exist in people’s manners of thought are
superficial. Logic, Boole suggests in the final chapter of The Laws of Thought, forms a common
ground that unites all philosophies, religions, and political outlooks, all of which are reduced, in
his view, to different interpretations of the same fundamental truth. While Boole was cagy
about his spiritual beliefs in his own writings, his wife, Mary Everest Boole, recorded and
expanded on them after his death.94 In her 1884 book Symbolical Methods of Study, she
mentions George’s “idea that the perfect friendship is that which exists between two persons
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of exactly opposite tastes, opinions, and habits of thought harmonized by similar aims and
views of life” (vii). This fixation on harmony was a common factor between Boole’s personal life
and his logical work. In The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Boole expresses the “conviction,
that with the advance of our knowledge of all true science, an ever-increasing harmony will be
found to prevail among its separate branches” (14); in The Laws of Thought, he takes the fact
that the same algebra can be used to reason about numbers, things, and facts as evidence of
the “harmony and uniformity” endowed to the world by its creator (159). In the reflections at
the end of the latter work, Boole gestures toward something like the early-modern doctrine of
harmony between microcosm and macrocosm by speculating that “the constitution of things
without may correspond to that of the mind within” (417). This belief in the harmony of all
things provided Boole with a way of connecting algorithmic systems to the world that did not
depend on the potentially noisy channel of signification. Whether or not one can make any
conceptual sense of the results has no bearing on this analogy between algebra and nature,
which is, as Boole tells us at the beginning of Mathematical Analysis, purely a matter of form.
The Leibnizian resonance of these statements about harmony is hard to deny. Boole’s
work could be taken as the starting point of a resurgence, after over a century, of Leibniz’s
dream of turning reasoning into a mechanical process, this time with apparent success. Yet the
resemblance between Boole’s views of algorithms and those of Leibniz should not be
overstated. Boole does not seem to have known much about Leibniz’s work until after he
wrote The Laws of Thought, despite the fact that an extensive collection of Leibniz’s papers was
published in 1840 (Grattan-Guinness xliii). Mary reports that he reacted with “childlike delight”
upon finding out that Leibniz had anticipated his law of duality (Symbolical 35). Yet Boole’s
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thinking was tempered by a circumscribed post-Whatelyan notion of logic that restrained him
from placing the sort of blind faith in real characters that spurred Leibniz’s project. In a
manuscript fragment, he notes that Leibniz wrote of the power of symbolic logic “in language
which to those imbued with later and juster views of the functions of Logic must appear
extravagant” (Selected Manuscripts 188). For all that Boole’s system resembles that of Leibniz,
his rigorous division of form from subject matter marks him as distinctly of the nineteenth
century. There is no question, from Boole’s perspective, that a logical calculus could
incorporate an encyclopedic catalogue of things, as Leibniz had envisioned doing with the
characteristica universalis.95 To the contrary, the unique power of algebra was that, considered
purely as a symbolic method, it had no reference to sensible things at all.
The language with which Boole describes this division between logical form and content
bears the distinct markings of Kantian thought, and, in particular, the first critique’s perceived
elevation of pure thought over mere understanding. Boole studied the Critique of Pure Reason
in detail in the 1840s, and his work contains numerous Kantian-sounding references to the idea
that logic and mathematics deal only with the conditions that experience must meet rather
than with the sensory content of any particular experience.96 He represented this study of
formal conditions as a way of getting at the transcendental truths beyond the empirical. As
Cohen points out (91), the Kantian influence is apparent in one of the hundreds of poems Boole
wrote, a sonnet “To the Number Three”:
When the great Maker, on Creation bent,
Thee from thy brethren chose, and framed by thee
The world to sense revealed, yet left it free
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To those whose intellectual gaze intent
Behind the veil phenomenal is sent
Space diverse, systems manifold to see
Revealed by thought alone; was it that we
In whose mysterious spirits thus are blent
Finite of sense and Infinite of thought,
Should feel how vast, how little is our store;
As yon excelling arch with orbs deep-fraught
To the light wave that dies along the shore;
That from our weakness and our strength may rise
One worship unto Him the Only Wise. (quoted in M. Boole, Symbolical 17)
This sonnet, written in the late 1840s, is as much a hymn to the human intellect as to the
Abrahamic God. Whereas Stanhope’s comet had stood for something unproblematically
accessible by means of the senses, Boole identifies “yon excelling arch with orbs deep-fraught”
with the infinite and eternal. Our ability to grasp such things lies not in our senses, which are
finite, but in “pure thought,” through which may gaze at “systems manifold” that exist
“[b]ehind the veil phenomenal.” In the final couplet, Boole asserts his confidence that our
senses and our capacity for “pure thought” will harmonize both with each other and with
revealed religion. Mathematics gains its peculiar power, Boole suggests, from the fact that it
works “by thought alone,” untainted by the influence of the empirical; as such it can lead us
infallibly to truths about quantity and the divine nature alike.
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What is paradoxical in this association of symbolic logic with the “intellectual gaze”—a
paradox that echoed far and wide in the nineteenth century—is that, at the same time that
formalization elevated logic to the ethereal realm of pure thought, it also deepened its
dependence on the physical embodiments of symbols. While Boole represents mathematical
reasoning as working independently of the finite human senses, this is only strictly true to the
extent that one performs that reasoning entirely in one’s head. When one is using a pen and
paper, the senses do play a role in the process: one must see the symbols on the page. Boole’s
apparent unconcern about the role of vision in symbolic mathematics is a key sign of the shift in
attitudes toward symbols that accompanied the rise of algorithmic methods in the nineteenth
century. What matters epistemologically, for formalists like Boole, is only that one performs
the operations correctly; what cognitive aids one uses to do it—whether one does it with the
imagination alone, with one’s eyes and hands, or with a machine—is a secondary consideration.
As Mill puts it in System of Logic, logic deals only with “how to do the thing,” not “how to make
ourselves capable of doing it” (I.439; see also II.201-02).97 The formal logic of the nineteenth
century, starting with Whately, drew much of its revitalized power from an embrace of postEnlightenment disciplinary specialization, and, in particular, the creation of a newly sharp divide
between the formal considerations of logic and the practicalities of putting logical systems into
use. From this point on, even for as thoroughgoing an empiricist as Mill, logic would be
concerned only with articulating the rules by which reasoning is supposed to work, leaving it to
other disciplines to deal with the messiness of the processes by which people employ these
rules in practice. This divide enabled Boole and other thinkers of his time to turn a blind eye to
the role of physical matter in the practice of symbolic algebra and admit mathematics
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unilaterally into the realm of pure reason, even as, from a practical perspective, it was
becoming ever more dependent on the use of written notations. To reach truths beyond the
empirical, within the new epistemic order that succeeded the Enlightenment criterion of
conceptual clarity, one need only perform the right operations; whether one uses a pen and
paper to help one out is beside the point.
This erasure of the materiality of logic constituted a radical reversal of the assumptions
of Lockeans like Condillac and Stanhope, for whom maintaining a grounding in the senses was
paramount. The difference becomes particularly apparent through a comparison of the
pedagogical approaches taken by the eighteenth-century logicians and those taken by Boole.
While Boole did not write much on the topic of education, Mary Everest Boole recorded some
of his views in her writings. According to an essay she published in 1878, he thought it
important that children “should spend a great deal of time over some mechanical work which
could be done without the presence of a teacher, and which they must concentrate their whole
energies upon, and do with perfect accuracy” (“Home-side” 109). Students must be taught how
to work a sum before the rule is explained to them; they are “to obey first and understand
afterwards” (109). This pedagogy, which was perhaps inspired by Whately’s remarks about the
importance of beginning with concrete examples in teaching complex concepts (Whately 16),
contrasts with Lockean views of education, in which one had to build concepts from the ground
up through the analysis of simple sensory impressions, and in which the use of strict rules of
any sort was discouraged (see especially Locke, Some Thoughts 38-39). While Boole still held
that learning should begin with the concrete and gradually increase in abstraction (see
MacPhail 26), this chain did not begin, for him, with the simple ideas of the senses, but rather
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with physical skills of measuring and computation. By performing the same procedure over and
over, precisely and mechanically, the student is meant to reach a moment of epiphany in which
she finally grasps the principle by which that procedure works.98 Epistemologically, this
approach is founded on the opposite of the Lockean doctrine. For Locke, the clarity of concepts
is a necessary precondition for correct reasoning, and no algorithm may be employed until this
clarity has been established. For Boole, on the other hand, the algorithm comes first and must
be trusted to produce, eventually, (hopefully,) a clear understanding in the student’s mind.
This reversal of the relation between process and meaning granted algorithms a degree
of authority over human reason that would have been unthinkable just a few decades before,
when Stanhope’s ivory ball met its bemused reception.99 The amenability of Boole’s philosophy
of logic to a division of intellectual labor, in which an army of clerical workers mechanically
perform computations that only the experts understand, is apparent. Making the leap from
obedience to understanding might be critical in the cultivation of students’ intellectual
faculties, but as far as logical validity goes, one can easily drop the understanding step and
merely require obedience: just about anyone can learn to follow Boole’s procedures and,
provided that they follow them correctly, they will all get the right answer, whether they
understand what they are doing or not. As if in acknowledgement of the fact that some
students will never progress beyond blind trust, the sonnet “To the Number Three” limits the
revelation of the starry truth to an unspecified subset of humanity. This failure of universality is
much less of an epistemological problem for Boole than it would have been for Condorcet,
Stanhope, and others in the Lockean constellation because, unlike Stanhope’s Demonstrator,
Boolean logic does not claim to help people reconstruct a series of inferences mentally; instead,
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it only aims to produce the results.100 The idea that the laws governing the algorithm will reveal
their self-evidence to anyone who thinks about them enough, crucial as it is to Boole’s
philosophy, is superfluous from a practical perspective. Boole’s system works the same
whether it is a divine being imposing the rules upon us or merely a schoolmaster.
It would be left to later thinkers to work through the instrumental implications of
Boole’s ideas. After The Laws of Thought met with a lackluster reception, Boole attempted for
several years to write a non-technical book on the philosophy of logic, but he appears to have
abandoned this project well before his untimely death in 1864. When Boole’s work finally met
an audience a few years later, it was his innovations in the use of symbolic notation, more than
his philosophy, that proved influential. Important early champions of Boole’s work were the
English logician and economist William Stanley Jevons, whose 1870 textbook Elementary
Lessons in Logic presents a simplified version of Boole’s inference algorithm (191-201), and
John Venn (of Venn Diagram fame), who discusses Boole’s ideas extensively in his 1881 book
Symbolic Logic and credits him as the first writer to turn mathematical logic into a “system”
(xxix). Boole’s work also inspired Gottlob Frege, C.S. Peirce, and Bertand Russell, although all
three took very different positions than Boole on the philosophy of logic. Less successfully,
Mary Everest Boole worked to promote her husband’s ideas about education and religion and
to push back against the instrumental views of Jevons and other late-nineteenth-century
logicians who took up the practical aspects of Boole’s work. In the 1884 book Symbolical
Methods of Study, she calls the law of duality, 𝑥(1 – 𝑥) = 0, “the equation of Nirvana,” and
argues that it represents a state of completion produced through the fusion of opposites (viii).
In her 1890 book Logic Taught by Love, she claims that Boole’s intentions in creating his logical
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calculus were entirely religious, executed in “obedience to the commands of the Pentateuch,”
and that he only included examples of practical applications “to show that his system was not a
mere fanciful outcome of religious fervor” (55). In spite of Mary’s efforts, the theological
underpinnings of Boole’s work were largely lost in the shuffle as his logical system was
transformed into the standardized logical calculus that is taught and used today. Boolean logic
was fated to be more often encountered as an element of computer hardware than as a system
of thought, much less a devotional one.
In practical terms, Boole’s most important contribution was to show that logical
inference could be done entirely through a mechanical procedure that does not depend at all
on the meanings of symbols. The idea of using algebraic operators in logic had, as Venn points
out, already been explored to some extent by Leibniz and Lambert (Symbolic Logic xxxi-xxxiv),
and Whately and others had already put forth the precept that logical validity depends solely
on form; but Boole showed, in greater detail than anyone had before, how a purely algorithmic
method of deduction could function in practice. As symbolic logic gained wide acceptance
among logicians, Leibniz’s dream of a calculus ratiocinatur—an idea that had largely lain
dormant during the long ascendancy of Lockean thought—returned in force, albeit in
diminished form. Starting in 1890, Ernst Schröder extended the ideas of Boole and Ohm into an
“absolute algebra” that would, he wrote, constitute “a scientific universal language” that would
fundamentally differ from spoken languages (quoted by Peckhaus, “19th Century Logic” 442).
Similarly, in his epochal 1879 pamphlet Begriffsschrift, Gottlob Frege described his own logical
notation as a small step toward Leibniz’s “idea of a universal characteristic, of a calculus
philosophicus or ratiocinatur” (6). While Frege concedes (similarly to Boole) that a logical
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“ideography” cannot do everything that Leibniz had intended, he nonetheless frames symbolic
logic as a continuation of the longstanding Baconian quest “to break the domination of the
word over the human spirit” (7). This renewed interest in Leibniz’s idea of mechanizing thought
was buttressed by the establishment of a newly absolute divide between matters of logical
form and those of interpretation, an intellectual turn that rendered suddenly plausible what
had once been a utopian dream. Logic could now concern itself with the algorithmic plane
alone, leaving the complexities of meaning, culture, and actual human thought to the
humanistic disciplines.
While Boole would doubtless have been appalled to see the utilitarian ends to which his
ideas were applied, his work proved to be a critical turning point in the automation of cognitive
labor. In 1869, Jevons used his simplified
version of Boolean algebra to develop a “logic
piano” that did, in fact, mechanize the process
of drawing certain types of logical conclusion
(Figure 18). Jevons’s machine, which Harley
used as a pretext for publishing his 1879 article
about Stanhope (Harley 193), works by
eliminating possibilities that are inconsistent
with a given set of premises (see Barrett and
Connell; Maas). Boolean logic also formed the
basis of a different sort of machine that aimed

Figure 18. Jevons’s "logical machine," as depicted in the
frontispiece of the 1913 edition of his book The Principles of
Science.
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not to solve logical problems, but rather to turn symbolic logic into a general- purpose model of
signal processing. Credit typically goes to the American mathematician C.E. Shannon, later
known as the founder of statistical information theory, for noticing that Boole’s two-valued
algebra corresponded to the structure of certain types of electrical circuits. Shannon’s Master’s
thesis, “A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits,” which was written in 1937 and first
published the next year, shows that the arrangements of switches in an electrical circuit (or,
equivalently, relays, vacuum tubes, or transistors) can be analyzed and designed using an
algebraic system similar to Jevons’s version of Boolean logic (2-3; 8). In effect, Shannon
replaced the interpretation step that comes at the end of the Boolean algorithm with the
construction of a circuit. This connection between logic and switching circuits was an important
step in the development of modern electronics and, in particular, computers, in the design and
programming of which Boolean logic still plays a pervasive role.
While Shannon’s insight was a product of a very different moment from the one in
which Boole developed his logical system, the path he took was prepared in the nineteenth
century. For eighteenth-century empiricists like Condorcet and Stanhope, the construction of
reasoning machines could only work as part of a broader program of eliminating prejudice and
developing an enlightened well-formed language. These Enlightenment systems could be torn
apart easily with the observation that one’s membership in a human community plays a
necessary role in establishing the meanings of symbols; such an argument would show that the
sort of absolute certainty Stanhope wanted to establish would only be possible if people were
able to throw out all their existing knowledge and start from the ground up. Boole, Ohm, and
other nineteenth-century formalists discovered a way of sidestepping this problem. By defining
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their standard of validity based on the following of procedures rather than on the clarity of
concepts, they could separate matters of technical rigor—defining the rules that reasoning
must follow—from the all-encompassing complexity of Bildung. This separation was
undergirded by the subject–object divide that was made available by the broad absorption of
Kant’s critical philosophy. The fact that what was supposed to take place in the realm of pure
thought, as Kant himself would have had it, was now happening on sheets of paper and in
machines inspired few scruples. It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that, by
separating transcendental reason from sensory experience, the Kantian turn ultimately enabled
logic to move out of the human mind and into the physical realm. After the link to the senses
was cut, mathematical and logical validity came to have less to do with how one thinks than
with what one does; culture only entered the picture at the practical level of ensuring that
people are capable of performing the operations correctly.
While it enabled the creation of ever more complex algorithmic systems, the literal
mechanization of logic only deepened the rift that symbolic algebra had opened between
algorithms and other areas of life that still depended on meaning. Boole confronted this
possibility with a boldness that is hard to find in later writers, accepting that the processes of
symbol manipulation may sometimes be impossible to interpret but nonetheless asserting the
relevance of the algorithms to meaning-making disciplines. Boole’s use of “uninterpretable”
expressions was never widely accepted, and it is now generally regarded as problematic among
logicians (see Marciszewski and Murawski 146-47; Brown 308; c.f. van Evra). In his early book
Pure Logic (1864), Jevons criticizes Boole for using “obscure symbols” that lack logical meanings
(76); Jevons’s book presents an alternative logical system that is meant to be more transparent
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than the “dark and symbolic processes” of the Boolean algorithm (66). Later practitioners of
symbolic logic mostly followed Jevons on this point, attempting to ensure that, however
mechanical the use of logic systems became in practice, it was always theoretically possible to
find meaning in the symbols. But for the majority of people, turning these mechanical
processes into literal machines makes the interpretability of algorithms more a comforting
illusion than a reality. To the typical user, the inner workings of a computer are just as dark and
obscure as Jevons found Boole’s system to be. Instead of attempting to prevent this “failure of
correspondency between process and interpretation” (Laws of Thought 67), as virtually all
logicians and mathematicians have done since, Boole embraced the fact that the workings of
algorithms would sometimes be mysterious. The religious underpinnings of his work provided
him with an explicit justification for doing what every computer user tacitly does—placing trust
in a system that one does not understand.
In spite of this faith, the rise of the algorithm did not bring the harmony Boole
envisioned, but rather led to fragmentation. The development of increasingly complex logic
machines from the 1870s on brought with it a widening division between those who knew the
principles on which those machines worked and those who merely used them. Algorithms
were no longer required conform to the way people thought; instead, those who wished to
understand would have to alter their way of thinking to correspond to the algorithms. The
ability to discern the meanings of circuit diagrams and computer code became the province of
engineers and programmers, who could interpret such arcane runes because they had learned
to think algorithmically. With the acceptance of this division, one of the key goals of the Radical
Enlightenment—creating a complete system of knowledge that could at once contain the best
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teachings of scientific rationality and serve as a way for “the people” to think in their day-to-day
life—gave way to the construction of technical discourses that were to some extent alienated
from other sectors of society.
The roots of what came to constitute this technical mode of thought lie in a different
strain of nineteenth-century thought from the one Boole made his intellectual home—not in
high-flown notions of pure reason, but rather in the control systems of the factory. Boole was a
pure mathematician and a philosopher of logic, not anything like a programmer. In the 1985
essay “Algorithmic Thinking and Mathematical Thinking,” Donald E. Knuth, one of the founders
of computer science, attempts to discern what differentiates his discipline from mathematics,
which appeared to be its closest neighbor. Algorithmic thinking, Knuth concludes, is
distinguished from mathematical thinking in two ways: first, it involves a “notion of ‘complexity’
or economy of operation,” and second, it deals with “the dynamic notion of the state of a
process” (181). For a pure mathematician like Boole, algorithms are only important as means
of reaching eternal truths; whether they provide efficient ways of accomplishing practical ends
is secondary. But for someone designing a computer system, efficiency is paramount. The
manner of thought that Knuth describes as characteristic of computer science can be traced
back to the industrial efficiency movement of Frederick Winslow Taylor and ultimately to his
predecessor Charles Babbage, who was not just the creator of famous computing engines, but
also the author of a treatise on factory management titled On The Economy of Machinery and
Manufactures. The next chapter considers Babbage alongside one of his most complex
interlocutors, Edgar Allan Poe. Taken together, the writings of Babbage and Poe reveal one of
the social costs of the transformation that the idea of the algorithm underwent as
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Enlightenment notions of progress gave way to industrial ones: the establishment of a deep
divide between the increasingly small, perhaps even vanishing number of people who are able
to maintain control over algorithmic systems and those who must be content to obey.
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Chapter 6: Babbage, Poe, and the Unruliness of Matter

How many bad machines are suggested every day by men who imagine that levers, wheels,
pulleys, and cables perform in a machine as they do on paper!
—Denis Diderot, “Art” (trans. Hoyt)

Metal and Glass

An often-repeated story about Charles Babbage is that a member of Parliament, having heard
that he had built a machine that could compute numerical tables without the possibility of
error, approached him with a question: “Pray, Mr. Babbage, if you put into the machine wrong
figures, will the right answers come out?” (Passages 67). Babbage claims that he was asked this
question twice, once by a member of the House of Lords and once by a member of the House
of Commons.101 “I am not,” he writes, “able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas
that could provoke such a question” (67). Yet he does concede that, strictly speaking, it is
possible to build an engine that will produce right answers after wrong numbers are entered.
An Analytical Engine may be constructed so that one may change the values on the display in
the midst of a computation, thus making the results appear to be whatever one wishes, right or
wrong; “yet,” he writes, “after each of these apparent falsifications the engine will be found to
make the next calculation with perfect truth” (67).102 He thinks, however, that such tomfoolery
ought to be prevented. “The whole of the mechanism,” he concludes, “ought of course to be
enclosed in glass, and kept under lock and key, in which case the mechanism necessary to give
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it the property alluded to would be useless” (67). The engine itself, Babbage suggests, cannot
lie—it will only compute truthful results based on the numbers it is given—but it can be
configured in misleading ways, and so it must be locked away from the meddling hands of those
who might wish to use it to deceive.
The figure of a machine locked in glass captures the intersection of two dimensions of
Babbage’s views of knowledge. With his influential theory of the “division of mental labor,”
which he articulated in his 1832 book On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures,
Babbage established a practical separation between the (presumably trustworthy) people in
charge of designing and maintaining a computing machine and the mere users of its results,
who had no business messing around with its insides.103 Yet he did not want those insides to be
hidden—in Enlightenment fashion, he wanted to spread knowledge about how his computing
machines worked as widely as possible. While Babbage was sanguine about the possibility of
reconciling industrial mechanization with the goal of enlightening the populace, his embrace of
machinery did not always fit together amicably with his Enlightenment aims. As the example of
the number wheels that falsify the computation going on behind them suggests, simply
allowing people to see inside a machine is not necessarily enough to keep them from being
deceived; the real power belongs to those who hold the keys. Although Babbage resisted it to
the last, this divergence between the practical knowledge of engineering and the theoretical
knowledge of science represented a grave threat to the dream of a unified body of knowledge.
Once words and ideas give way to wheels and cogs, the Enlightenment project is in jeopardy.
This chapter examines the epistemological consequences of mechanization by putting
Babbage in dialogue with another nineteenth-century writer who was deeply concerned with
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deception, Edgar Allan Poe. In both his poetry and his prose work, Poe embraced some of the
disturbing implications of the embodiment of ideas in matter that Babbage shrugged off. Poe
only mentions Babbage by name in one text—“Maelzel’s Chess Player,” which is his attempt to
debunk the chess-playing Turk of von Kempelen—but he draws on Babbage’s ideas in at least
three other works.104 Scholarship on the transatlantic connection between Poe and Babbage
has mostly focused on Poe’s self-consciousness about his status as an author; as a magazine
writer who had to tailor his work to particular audiences, he faced the charge of manufacturing
stories like one of Babbage’s machines and, in John Tresch’s reading, he sometimes accepts the
image of being a poetry-writing machine (“Potent Magic” 290). My purpose is less to illuminate
Poe’s authorial position than to show that his distinctive way of thinking about language can
provide a valuable perspective on the theoretical problems raised by the employment of
algorithms. In his later writings, Poe put forth an atomistic cosmology that coincides
significantly with the one Babbage presents in his 1837 work of natural theology, The Ninth
Bridgewater Treatise: A Fragment. But Poe pushes the linguistic implications of this
mechanistic view of the universe much further than Babbage does, emphasizing the ways in
which the physical embodiments of words in ink or sound can have effects on the world
independently of their meanings. Poe’s work thus contends with one of the implications of
algorithmic thinking that was most at odds with Enlightenment precepts: that the physical
processes symbols undergo could take on lives of their own, ultimately eclipsing the importance
of the symbols’ meanings.
For Babbage, this possibility arose from treating methods of computation explicitly as
objects of design.105 While Babbage’s most advanced thinking on algorithm design appears in
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his work on the Analytical Engines in the 1830s and 40s, I contend that Babbage made an
important step into algorithmic thinking in the very earliest phase of his work on computing
machines. In an overlooked 1822 journal article titled “On the Theoretical Principles of the
Machinery for Calculating Tables,” Babbage describes a simple algorithm that produces a
seemingly enigmatic sequence of numbers, then attempts to find a mathematical formula that
can predict its behavior (H. P. Babbage 216-19). By doing so, he reverses the procedure that
had usually characterized the use of algorithms in the eighteenth century: instead of deriving an
algorithm from known mathematical principles and then using it to solve pre-given problems,
he begins by constructing an arbitrary algorithm and only then attempts to find a theoretical
explanation of it. Rather than founding algorithms on the meanings of the symbols, Babbage
treated algorithms themselves as the foundation onto which meaning must be built.
This reversal of the relation of algorithm and meaning, I show in this chapter, led
Babbage into difficulties that Enlightenment epistemologies were ill-equipped to handle.
Unlike Boole, Babbage had no religious justification for placing blind faith in the algorithms he
designed; instead, his position was that computing machines could only be useful as long as
people were able to understand them well enough to control them. Babbage grapples with this
issue most directly in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, in which he states, with evident reference
to his 1822 article, that even very simple algorithms can produce behaviors that are “beyond
the utmost reach of mathematical analysis” (42). Until one can attain an analytical
understanding of such an algorithm, one can only predict its behavior (short of performing it
and seeing what it does) by means of induction; but Babbage demonstrates that inductive
methods are insufficient to predict the behavior of a programmable computing machine. The
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Ninth Bridgewater Treatise uncovers a problem that continues to trouble computer scientists in
the twenty-first century with the development of artificial-intelligence methods whose
behavior cannot be predicted in any straightforward way, requiring practitioners to use
experimental methods to study their own creations. Babbage was one of the first to perceive a
possibility that has now been realized, that one could set in motion a computational process
that one cannot truly understand.
Babbage ultimately recoiled from this possibility. In his approach to the representation
of machines, Babbage takes a position similar to the Enlightenment epistemology of Condillac,
who wrote in Logic that to understand a machine “is to have a thought made up of as many
ideas as there are parts of the machine itself, ideas that represent each part exactly, and that
are arranged in the same order” (355). As he developed his computing machines, Babbage
went to great lengths to maintain reliable representations of their inner workings, developing
an elaborate system of “mechanical notation” that analyzed machines into their component
parts. In a pamphlet he published on this notation system, he claimed that, if adopted, this
notation “will form as it were a universal language”—a statement that could be taken as an
echo of Condillac (H. P. Babbage 240). But if it is true that algorithms can be unpredictable
even to their creators, then this sort of analysis is inadequate as a means of controlling them; a
machine can still surprise even if it is stored in a glass case and one has had the opportunity to
inspect every single part of it. Babbage ultimately brushes off these concerns by concluding
that one should only use algorithms that one can fully control, rescuing his commitment to
Enlightenment epistemology by dismissing these unruly algorithms as mere curiosities of no
practical significance.
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Poe’s treatment of deception is not so reassuring. Poe denied, like Babbage, that
machines could be truly intelligent, but he was less confident than Babbage that the
mathematical sciences would enable human beings to exert total control over matter. Poe
presents an influential model of analytical thought in his three tales about the character C.
Auguste Dupin, who is generally regarded as the first literary detective. These stories, I argue,
present a challenge to the confidence of Enlightenment thinkers like Babbage that a wellformed system of signs is sufficient to prevent deception. In Poe’s final detective story, “The
Purloined Letter” (1844), Dupin argues at length that someone who is both “poet and
mathematician” will have the advantage over a “mere mathematician,” who would fall into the
villain’s trap on account of being unable to think outside of mathematical rules (Mabbott
III.986).106 While this passage is commonly read as a criticism of mathematics tout court, it
quite clearly targets the French Enlightenment tradition that equated analysis with algebra and
treated mathematics as the epitome of reason itself. Far from repudiating mathematical
thinking, Poe’s later work as a whole embraces one of the more disturbing consequences of the
algorithmic methods that Babbage and other algebraists were developing in the early
nineteenth century: that symbols can have the power to do things in the world independently
of our ability to understand their meanings and, indeed, even if they have no meanings at all.
This poetic critique rests on a modified version of the Romantic view of language that
became most widespread in the nineteenth century, deriving from Wordsworth, Coleridge, and
Goethe. Wordsworth and Coleridge both made statements to the effect that words are things.
In his note to the poem “The Thorn” in the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth suggests
that a poet can employ words as “things, active and efficient, which are of themselves part of
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the passion” (140); Coleridge, in an 1800 letter to William Godwin, states that he “would
endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of Words & Things, elevating, as it were, words into
Things, & living Things too” (Letters I.626). Poe, adding characteristic morbidness and selfconsciousness about his status as an author, wrote that “[w]ords—printed ones especially—are
murderous things” (Pollin II.236). For Wordsworth and Coleridge, the claim that words are
things is positive—words are real things, “too awful an instrument for good and evil to be
trifled with,” as Wordsworth put it (Literary Criticism 154), not to be discarded blithly in the
manner in which Enlightenment reformers had sought to do. By writing that words are things,
they rebuke linguistic voluntarism of the sort advocated by the idéologues and suggest a
revision of the Baconian mandate to study things and not words. But Poe took the idea that
words are things in a different direction: words are physical things, he suggests, inherently
possessing no more or less meaning than any other physical things. What prevents us from
understanding the power of language is not, Poe suggests, a lack of attention to or respect for
the cultural heritage that governs meaning; instead, the problem for Poe is the idea of meaning
itself, which covers over our ignorance of what the linguistic systems we create will do. This
attitude toward language fit well with Poe’s affinity for the uncanny, which, indeed, could well
describe the experience of seeing symbols moving around of their own volition on the wheels
of a computing machine. In this way, Poe embraced the turn away from Enlightenment views
that accompanied the rise of the algorithm to an extent that even Babbage and Boole did not.
This chapter begins with a discussion of how Babbage negotiated the possibility that an
algorithm could do things that its creator cannot understand. Combining French Enlightenment
influences with an involvement in British industrialism, Babbage designed the most
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sophisticated computing machines yet conceived in his time; yet he held back from admitting
that such machines could have any agency of their own, insisting that they remain under the
control of human operators. I then examine Poe’s response to the potentially deceptive quality
of machines. In the Dupin stories, Poe presents an early depiction of forensics—the practice of
attempting to reconstruct past events by analyzing the material traces that people’s actions
leave behind. Yet Poe resists the materialistic implications of this approach, developing a form
of forensics that is just as skeptical of scientific methods of analysis as it is of interpretive ones.
I end the chapter and the dissertation by returning briefly to Babbage, examining his writings
about the Great Exhibitions of the 1850s and 60s. As people around the world flocked to
London to see the latest fruits of industry, Babbage made a last-ditch effort to put his
Enlightenment views into effect; yet his dream of disseminating knowledge universally proved
to be at odds with the intentions of the organizers. The mid-century exhibitions signaled the
emergence of an epistemic division that Babbage and Poe were both, in different ways, trying
to resist—the division between those with technical knowledge and the mere consumer, who
had to take some aspects of the workings of machines on trust.

The Hidden Wheel

It was before his arrival at Cambridge, according to his memoir, that Babbage first conceived of
the idea of creating a universal language (Passages 25). With characteristic industry, he
devoted a significant amount of energy to the scheme, producing a dictionary and “a kind of
grammar” (25). After finding out that John Wilkins had anticipated his ideas, he studied
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Wilkins’s Essay in some detail and concluded, as his authorized biographer writes, that the
failure of such schemes “was to be attributed to the means which they had adopted, rather
than to any real difficulty which might exist in the undertaking itself” (Buxton 347). While
Babbage soon abandoned the idea of creating a universal language, he took up a different,
distinctly industrial approach to the Baconian project of eliminating errors. In 1812 or 13, he
claims, while he was sitting over a table of logarithms “in a kind of dreamy mood,” he conceived
the idea of creating a machine that could produce these tables with perfect accuracy (42).
While none of Babbage’s designs ever saw practical use, he made massive conceptual advances
over his predecessors, eventually creating the first detailed plans for a general-purpose
computer with stored programs, memory, and recursive control structures—a project that
would, Ada Lovelace wrote, provide “a new, a vast, and a powerful language […] for the future
of analysis” (H. P. Babbage 25). Yet mechanization raised philosophical issues that the
empiricist thought of the time was ill-prepared to handle. In experimenting with the
development of ever more complex algorithms, Babbage confronted a possibility from which,
on account of his continuing commitment to Enlightenment aims, he ultimately shrank—that
people may be able to design and even bring into mechanical being algorithms whose behavior
is governed by laws of nature that they cannot comprehend.
In spite of his role in promoting British industrialism, Babbage’s early influences were
predominantly French. As the founder of the Cambridge Analytical Society, Babbage was a part
of the push to introduce the symbolic methods of French mathematicians like Lacroix and
Lagrange into England. Some scholars have also traced Babbage’s thinking about language back
to Condillac. William J. Ashworth links Babbage’s preoccupation with “systemization and
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economizing mental labor” to the notion of analysis promoted by Condillac and other
eighteenth-century French philosophers (640); similarly, Eduardo L. Ortiz argues that one of
Babbage’s early projects, the development of a new notation for the representation of
mathematical functions in 1815-16, was influenced by Condillac’s statements about the
importance of language for science (“Babbage and French Idéologie” 14).107 By the time he
began his work on computing machines, however, Babbage appears to have turned away from
the extreme positions of the Condillac school in favor of the more nuanced views of the later
idéologues. In an 1821 essay On the Influence of Signs in Mathematical Reasoning, Babbage
approvingly cites Joseph Marie de Gérando, one of the French philosophers who criticized
Condorcet’s universal language project in the late 1790s (8-9). In the chapter from which
Babbage quotes, De Gérando argues that the certainty of algebra was a result of the special
nature of the ideas it dealt with, not of its language—a repudiation of Condillac’s late view that
all reasoning is fundamentally algebraic (2.223). De Gérando and other French thinkers
provided Babbage with an appreciation for “the immense power of signs in aiding the reasoning
faculty,” which he cited, late in life, as one of the reasons for his success (Passages 485), along
with, critically, a recognition of the limits of algebraic methods.
But where the idéologues were primarily concerned with programs of social and political
levelling, Babbage’s watchword was efficiency. The Cambridge Analytical Society’s one official
publication, Memoirs of the Analytical Society (1813), suggests that symbolic methods can
contribute to the “œconomy” of mathematical practice (ii).108 As Simon Schaffer has pointed
out, Babbage’s work on computing machines is based on the same thinking that led him, in The
Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, to argue that the division of labor is advantageous
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because it separates operations requiring different degrees of skill—an argument that came to
be known in the field of economics as Babbage’s Principle (Schaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence”
209). A direct inspiration for this economic approach to calculation was the French
mathematician Gaspard Riche de Prony (see Babbage, Economy 153-63; Hyman 43-44).
Starting in 1791, with the support of the National Assembly, Prony organized an effort to create
a massive book of logarithms by dividing the work up among almost a hundred mathematical
workers, organized into a three-level structure (Daston, “Enlightenment Calculations” 193).
Babbage learned about Prony’s project while visiting Paris as a young man (H. P. Babbage 339),
and he later represented the Difference Engine as an improvement upon Prony’s method
(Economy 157). Babbage pushed Prony’s idea of applying the division of labor to computation
in a new direction that would ultimately prove it to be at odds with Enlightenment precepts.
For Babbage, the development of scientific theories was a separate consideration from the
carrying out of algorithms; having correct ideas in one’s head was only important for the
former. This separation of understanding from algorithm differentiates Babbage from
Stanhope, who meant the workings of his Demonstrator to correspond directly to the mental
representations in its users’ heads. Unlike Stanhope, Babbage did see his computing machines
as embodiments of reason; instead, the point was to automate the “mechanical” parts of
mathematical practice that were beneath the dignity of an intelligent being.
This division is particularly apparent in Babbage’s approach to creativity. In his memoir,
he suggests that the key to discovery in science and art alike is generalization: “One of the
principles of discovery in many subjects is, to generalize from the individual case up to the
species, and thence to descend to other individual instances” (Passages 364). It is the
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“combining and generalising faculty,” he writes elsewhere, that “gives to human intellect its
greatest development” (Bridgewater 25). This notion of generalization may have roots in
French idéologie; in his essay On the Influence of Signs, Babbage attributes to de Gérando the
insight that algebraic signs gain their special power by combining simplicity with generality (7;
see also Memoirs xvi and Buxton 35). But Babbage’s notion of generalization goes far beyond
algebra, encompassing a wide range of creative acts.109 He uses it, for instance, as a
distinguishing factor between fine art and manufacture, writing that “[t]he fine arts idealize
nature by generalizing from its individual objects: the industrial arts realize identity by the
unbounded use of the principle of copying” (Exposition 49). In spite of Babbage’s
Enlightenment roots, this elevation of the creative faculty above industrial practice bears the
clear markings of the post-Romantic notion of art in which, as Michael L. Jones puts it,
“[m]anufacture and creativity were to be divided” (227). Whether or not there is any sense in
characterizing a master sculptor’s practice as “generalization,” the idea provided Babbage with
a distinguishing factor between truly creative work, for which human intelligence was required,
and the merely “mechanical” forms of mental labor involved in industrial production.
But it also created a problem that did not arise for sensationalists like Stanhope: if
algorithm and reason are to be separated, then there is a possibility they might fail to align. A
suggestive example occurs in the early pages of his memoir. As an example of his idea of
generalization, he explains how he learned to imitate the sermons of one Rev. Charles Simeon:
Every Sunday I had to write from memory an abstract of the sermon he preached
in our village. Even at that period in my life I had a taste for generalization.
Accordingly, having generalized some of Mr. Simeon’s sermons up to a kind of
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skeleton form, I tried, by way of experiment, to fill up such a form in a sermon of
my own composing from the text of “Alexander the coppersmith hath done us
much harm.” As well as I remember, there were in this sermon some queer
deductions from this text; but then they fulfilled all the usual conditions of our
sermons: so thought also two of my companions to whom I communicated in
confidence this new manufacture. (Passages 23)
Babbage recounts that some of the other boys remembered this parody as if it had really been
delivered by the Reverend, leading to “an awful explosion” that Babbage declines to recount
(24). While Babbage’s prankish “experiment” should not be taken too seriously, it is suggestive
of the way his idea of generalization different from the Enlightenment notion of abstraction.
One might usefully compare it to an analogous passage in another fragmentary memoir written
by an inventor, Part One of Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography (1771). Franklin, writing almost
a century before Babbage, describes how he taught himself to write good prose using The
Spectator of Addison and Steele as a model. Franklin began by preparing “short Hints of the
Sentiment in each Sentence,” and then attempting to reconstruct the original passage based on
these hints (12). “I also,” he writes, “sometimes jumbled my Collections of Hints into
Confusion, and after some Weeks, endeavored to reduce them into the best Order, before I
began to form the full Sentences, and compleat the Paper. This was to teach me Method in the
Arrangement of Thoughts” (12). Franklin wanted to reconstruct passages from their
component ideas, relying on his reason to guide him to the correct structure at both the
sentence and paragraph levels. Babbage, on the other hand, began with the structure and
fashioned ideas to fit it, without any regard to whether the results made sense or not.
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Unusual as Franklin’s specific approach to self-teaching may be, it rested on set of
Enlightenment attitudes toward rationality that were widespread in the eighteenth century,
and from which Babbage’s notion of generalization represented a departure. Franklin’s method
might be compared with the one Condillac advocates in Traité de l’Art d’Écrire (Treatise on the
Art of Writing), which was part of the course of studies he prepared for the Prince of Parma
between 1767 and 1773. There is, Condillac writes, a “subordination that links [ideas] with one
another,” and the one secret of good writing is to “express sensibly that order, that
subordination, that linking” of ideas (12; my translation). Like Condillac, Franklin seems to
presume that, by means of natural reason, the student will be able to sense what connections
exist between a set of ideas even if they are jumbled up; his approach, like Condillac’s,
presumes that there is a single right order in which the sentences should flow, a rational order
whose light will shine through for the young tyro and Joseph Addison alike. By contrast, the
ultimate standard to which Babbage’s exercise tends is simply the style of the Rev. Simeon,
whether it is good or bad, rational or not. The “skeleton” he describes is based not on any
universal standard of reason, but rather on the particular set of existing texts from which he
abstracted it. Whether the results are right or wrong in any moral, aesthetic, or logical sense is
beside the point.
While his youthful “manufacture” of sermons was essentially a joke, Babbage would go
on to apply much the same generalizing method to more serious ends. Although it was not a
totally original idea, Babbage played a role in popularizing the sort of blank form that is now
ubiquitous in bureaucracies.110 In The Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, he suggests
that readers prepare blanks ahead of time when they go to take notes about factories (Figure
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19). By employing these forms—
which Babbage calls “skeletons”
here as well—it is possible to
reduce the time spent writing
and thus observe without
interruption (93). In effect, these
forms relieve the user of the
need to think about how ideas fit

Figure 19. Part of Babbage’s example “skeleton” for notes taken during factory
observations (Economy 95).

together, making the writing of notes into as automatic a process as possible. Babbage applied
much the same generalizing method to computation as well. In his book on the Great
Exhibition, he describes an astronomer reducing a series of calculations to “a skeleton form” so
that the tedious parts of the task “may be executed by persons of very moderate attainments”
(Exposition 191). The work of the people who perform the additions, as Babbage represents it,
is of a mechanical nature, like filling in the blanks on a form based on a set rubric; the need for
genuine intelligence and genuine creativity is restricted to the people who design the
algorithms they perform.111
The potential for such a procedure to go the way of Babbage’s sermon-writing
experiment—for the mechanical procedures to produce nonsensical results and “queer
deductions”—is latent in the generalizing method. In order to maintain its rationality, this
method requires a hierarchy: the intelligent planner must be firmly in control of both the
algorithms and the agents performing them in order to ensure the right results. Babbage states
at a number of points that computing machines will grant users “control” over the operations
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they automate (Passages 113; 123; 148); to maintain this control, he made a special effort to
ensure the “security” of the machinery—to make it physically impossible for the gears to move
in any way but the intended one.112 But apart from cases of actual malfunction, Babbage
encountered a subtler way in which people could lose control over machines. One can
understand a computation well enough to implement it mechanically—can even succeed in
building the machine—without having an adequate theoretical framework to understand its
behavior. Technê (τέχνη), knowledge of how to do something, is no substitute for epistêmê
(ἐπιστήμη), conceptual knowledge about what one is doing. This is an issue that Stanhope,
who was only trying to mechanize the well-understood operations of addition, multiplication,
subtraction, and division along with the syllogistic operations of his logical theory, did not have
to grapple with. The possibility of the machine getting ahead of the theory is one of the
tradeoffs of generalization as a paradigm for invention: one can readily produce new,
mechanizable algorithms by generalizing the procedures people use, but there is no guarantee
that one will be able to make sense of the output. This method, as Babbage discovered while
manufacturing sermons, can produce the irrational just as well as it can produce the rational.
This possibility arose in the earliest phase of Babbage’s work on computing machines.113
Babbage’s first class of machines, the difference engines, were meant to do with brass and iron
what Prony had done with rooms full of workers, churning out printed numerical tables without
human intervention through a computational technique known as the method of difference.
This method, variants of which have been known since the sixteenth century, provides a
shortcut for tabulating the values of mathematical functions.114 Babbage was not the first
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Figure 20. The completed portion of Babbage’s Difference Engine No. 1, assembled in 1832-33. For a
clear explanation of what the different wheels represent, see Buxton (133-48). Note that, in this
depiction, moveable shades have been shifted up so as to hide the lowermost number wheels of the
middle and right columns. Image from Harper's new monthly magazine, vol. 30, no. 175 (34) via
Wikimedia Commons.
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person to notice that the method of differences could be performed by a machine; the German
engineer Johann Helfrich Müller had already designed such a machine in 1784, although he
never attempted to build it (Lindgren 13). But Babbage attracted far more attention for his
project than any previous designer of computing machines. Babbage, along with the expert
craftsman Joseph Clement and a group of workers typically numbering eight to ten, spent
approximately eight years (with some pauses) working on what has come to be known as the
Difference Engine No. 1.115 This machine was supposed to compute mathematical tables and
automatically typeset its results, eliminating the potential for human error both in calculation
and compositing. Between 1823 and the project’s collapse in March, 1833, the British
government provided him with funding for the project totaling around £17,000—an enormous
amount of money in the early nineteenth century, far in excess of the funding allotted to any
other scientific project in the period (Lindgren 60). Only a part of the machine was finished
(Figure 20). The project was not a technical failure—the completed portion, which consisted of
a small section of the unit that performed the additions, worked perfectly and still does. But
for reasons that historians have debated, Babbage and Clement never built the full engine.
Work stopped in 1833, and the government finally decided to terminate the project in 1842.
Later in the 1840s, Babbage designed an improved model that he called the Difference Engine
No. 2, but it was not built until long after his death.116
Although it is highly limited compared to Babbage’s later computing machines, the
Analytical Engines, some contemporary commentators viewed the Difference Engine as
altogether miraculous. The most detailed contemporary account of the machine was an article
by Dionysius Lardner, written with input from Babbage himself and published in the July, 1834
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issue of the Edinburgh Review (H. P. Babbage 51-82). Near the beginning of the essay, Lardner
apologizes for Babbage’s failure to make the machine comprehensible to the public: “To bring
the practicability of such a project within the compass of popular belief was not easy: to do so
by bringing it within the compass of popular comprehension was not possible. It transcended
the imagination of the public in general to conceive its possibility; and the sentiments of
wonder with which it was received, were only prevented from merging into those of
incredulity, by the faith reposed in the high attainments of its projector” (51-52). Such
expressions of awe at the results of mechanical actions were common in the nineteenth
century, as Herbert Sussman has noted (“Machine Dreams” 197). While Lardner’s stated
purpose in the essay is “to convert the vague sense of wonder […] into a more rational and
edifying sentiment” (52), his essay did little to dispel the aura of magic surrounding Babbage’s
attempt “to throw the powers of thought into wheel-work” (51). Lardner intimates that
Babbage’s machine had already surpassed its creator’s understanding, at least in certain
directions: “Equations have been already tabulated by the portion of the machinery which has
been put together, which are so far beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics,
that no distant term of the table can be predicted, nor any function discovered capable of
expressing its general law” (74). Lardner was not the first to make such claims. A letter in the
United Service Magazine for December, 1833, signed “Z. Z.,” states that Babbage’s machine
“performs calculations, the mathematical laws of which are beyond the present reach of
analysis” (544). The Difference Engine was based on well-known and not enormously complex
mathematical principles, but it was hard for Babbage’s contemporaries to resist viewing it as a
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miracle, as a machine that could, to an extent that was unprecedented at the time, exceed the
powers of human thought.
Some scholars have written off the Lardner article as a piece of puffery. Hyman
dismisses Lardner as “a scientific Falstaff” (148), and Michael Lindgren characterizes Lardner’s
statement that the machine could go “beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics”
as a “mystification,” a fuzzy claim that obscures the technical details of the machine with a
“metaphysical fog” (110). It is true that Lardner’s statement is imprecise, and his article is
misleading on a number of other points as well. Yet there was a sense in which Babbage’s work
on computing machines truly was pushing the limits of the analytical techniques of the time.
Lardner and the pseudonymous letter-writer appear to be referring to a mathematical puzzle
that Babbage discussed in an 1822 journal article and, later that year, in a lecture before the
Astronomical Society (H. P. Babbage 216; 220). At this time, Babbage was experimenting with a
prototype difference engine that preceded the planning of the Difference Engine No. 1. In the
article, Babbage considers a numerical series inspired by his work on computing engines. The
series is similar to an arithmetic progression like 2, 4, 6, 8, in which each number differs from
the last by a fixed difference; but for each term in this series, the last digit of the preceding
term is added to the difference. The first few numbers in the resulting series are 2, 2, 4, 10, 16,
28, 48. This series, as Babbage points out, could easily be produced by a difference-engine-like
machine (216); yet the familiar methods of algebra are insufficient to predict its behavior.
Babbage has to apply two separate mathematical techniques, one “a kind of induction,” the
other “quite unexceptionable,” to produce a general method for computing the nth term in the
sequence (217). Even at this very early stage in his career, Babbage had encountered a
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particular sort of disconnect between algorithm and theory that would come to haunt the field
of computer science in the twenty-first century: knowing how to implement an algorithm is
quite a different thing from knowing what it will do.
Babbage came closest to acknowledging this epistemic gap in his 1837 book The Ninth
Bridgewater Treatise. This short book is a response to a series of treatises on natural theology
commissioned by the Earl of Bridgewater, who died in 1829. In his will, the Earl left £8,000 to
support the publication of books “On the Power, Wisdom, and goodness of God, as manifested
in the Creation” (quoted in Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics ix). The Royal Society
distributed the money to eight writers, each of whom produced a volume in the series.
Babbage took issue with a statement in William Whewell’s entry denying that the speculations
of “mechanical philosophers and mathematicians of recent times” can shed any light on “the
first cause and supreme ruler of the universe” (Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics 334).
Babbage’s primary purpose is to show that a mathematician (namely, himself) can be qualified
to write on divine matters, to which end he offers a series of arguments in favor of the
compatibility of science and religion based, for the most part, on examples taken from his work
on computing machines.117 While his primary thesis is that a belief in the miracles recounted in
the Bible is compatible with the idea of a universe governed by inviolable laws, contemporary
readers took away conclusions that were more about the machines than about the universe,
and that only reinforced the impression that the Difference Engine was working a sort of magic.
His first argument uses the Difference Engine No. 1 as an example. Suppose, he writes,
that one is presented with a machine that is ticking off the natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. He
challenges the reader to determine what “law” is governing the machine: “Now, reader, let me
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ask how long you will have counted before you are firmly convinced that the engine, supposing
its adjustments to remain unaltered, will continue whilst its motion is maintained, to produce
the same series of natural numbers?” (35). “After seeing five hundred terms,” he surmises,
“few will doubt; and after the fifty-thousandth term the propensity to believe that the
succeeding term will be fifty thousand and one, will be almost irresistible” (35). But after a
hundred million terms have passed, he suggests, there is a change that invalidates this “vast
induction”:
1
2
3
4
5
...
...
.....
.....
99,999,999
100,000,000
regularly as far as 100,000,001
100,010,002 :—the law changes
100,030,003
100,060,004
100,100,005
(Ninth Bridgewater Treatise 36)
In such a way, Babbage argues, the laws governing the universe might change—as, in the view
of some pre-Darwinian evolutionary theorists, most notably Georges Cuvier, they had between
the time of dinosaurs and the present—without the need for divine intervention. The laws we
observe governing the universe, he argues, might only be fragments of a “wider law” that
encompasses the varying mechanics of all the periods of natural history (42). But while it is
framed as an intervention in natural theology, Babbage’s argument would also seem to have
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important philosophical implications about the Difference Engine itself. If one lacks an
analytical understanding of the laws governing a machine, one might attempt to reason about
its behavior through induction; but induction, at least in the form that Babbage discusses, is not
an adequate way of predicting the behavior of a general-purpose computing machine. Quite a
simple algorithm, as Babbage shows, can stymie it.
This argument was not merely a thought experiment. The completed portion of the
Difference Engine No. 1 included a special feature for demonstrating that a machine can change
its behavior in mid-run without human intervention, and Babbage delighted in baffling his
dinner-party guests with it (Passages 66; 387-89). The impressive effect of the sudden change
in the machine’s behavior rests on a knowledge gap between the two characters in the
scenario—the “contriver” of the machine, who knows what is happening inside it, and the
“observer,” who merely looks at the number wheels (Bridgewater 40; 39). The Difference
Engine was specially designed so as to withhold information from the latter; the wheel that
causes the behavior change was hidden behind “a shade which is never removed, and to which
the reader’s attention need not be directed” (Passages 63; see Buxton 137). One can see this
shade in the engraving reproduced as Figure 2. As he performed it for his guests, the exercise
ended with a reveal: he removed the shade and explained what was going on inside the
machine, collapsing (at least ideally) the difference between contriver and observer and
dispelling the mystic haze. But the exposition of the argument in The Ninth Bridgewater
Treatise contains a hint that, at least in some cases, sliding the shade away might not be
enough. Using language reminiscent of Lardner’s, Babbage notes that “[t]he full expression of
that wider law [governing the mechanical system], which comprehends within it an unlimited
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sequence of minor consequences, may indeed be beyond the utmost reach of mathematical
analysis,” even though such a protean computation may be produced by a mechanism that “is
itself of the simplest kind” (42; 43).118 Similarly to the Lardner essay, this passage admits the
potential for a gap to open between between technê and epistêmê, between process and
theory: designing an algorithm and even implementing it in wheelwork might be far easier than
understanding its behavior. Whereas Babbage’s parlor exercise is reassuring, attributing all the
mystery surrounding the Difference Engine to the shade hiding part of it from view, the passage
in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise hints that even the contriver, armed with complete
knowledge of the wheels and cogs inside, may be unable to predict what a machine will do.
Babbage gives an even more powerful argument for the potential unpredictability of
computing machines later in the book, in the unfinished chapter on free will. In this passage,
Babbage invites us to imagine a computing machine that begins by producing a series of square
numbers—1, 4, 9, 16—but switches to producing cubes once it reaches a square number
ending with the figures 269696. This event will occur, he points out, “at the 99736th
calculation; and whether the fact is known to the person who adjusts the machine or not, is
immaterial to the result” (168). In this example, Babbage encounters the potential of recursive
algorithms to produce complex, unpredictable behaviors, a potential that would become a
major topic of discussion in the twentieth century with the work of Douglas Hofstadter, among
others. Since what the machine will do next is determined by the digits of its previous output
(the machine, as Babbage would say, is eating its own tail), it is not easy to guess ahead of time
when the program will change its behavior, or even if it ever will. (Here as in the 1822 article,
defining operations in terms of individual digits rather than whole numbers provided Babbage
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with a handy way to widen the gap between algorithm and theory—a strong illustration of the
dependence of algorithmic thinking on the Hindu–Arabic numeral system.) Babbage’s point in
this chapter is that the universe might be programmed to pause and accept user input at
certain pre-determined points, thus enabling people to affect its behavior—a reassuring, if not
particularly compelling, argument for the compatibility of divine design and free will (see
Forbes-MacPhail 149-50). Yet one can easily put the pieces together into a different picture
from which Babbage would likely recoil. His example of a machine that changes its behavior
once it produces a number ending in 269696 would seem to suggest that machines can have at
least a relative kind of free will—since the one who configures the machine does not
necessarily know ahead of time what the output will be, the machine has the capacity to
surprise even though it operates based on entirely deterministic rules. Here Babbage teeters
on the edge—although he does not take the leap—of admitting the Frankenstein-like possibility
of a creation outpacing its human creator.
Babbage later came to regret publishing this passage. During the 1862 London
Exhibition, Buxton writes, Babbage discovered that The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise had given
some readers the impression that the Difference Engine “had been the means of discovering
certain mysterious laws of numbers, which discovery, without its aid, could never have been
accomplished” (361). This was not strictly true, and Babbage took pains to disabuse people of
the illusion that the Difference Engine “was endowed with mysterious powers” (362). The
official position of both Babbage and Lovelace was that, because computing machines could
only operate by rules that were defined by human beings, they could not create. “The
Analytical Engine,” Lovelace writes, “has no pretensions whatever to originate anything” (H. P.
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Babbage 44); it can only follow rules that a human being sets up for it, and as such, she argued,
it cannot be said to think. Babbage, likewise, states that “the Analytical Engine cannot invent or
originate anything; though it is capable of following out to an unlimited extent, any laws which
may be impressed upon it” (Buxton 250). In spite of these protestations, the repeated
statements about the “mysterious” properties of computing machines contained a grain of
truth. In experimenting with algorithms not based on any known theory, Babbage had
discovered a possibility that called his rigid distinction between mechanical and creative
activities into question. Even if a computing machine only follows pre-determined rules, there
is no guarantee that the designer will know what the outcome will be. Whether the machine or
the designer should get credit for the originality, such methods certainly could produce results
that were, for all intents and purposes, new.
Babbage’s attachment to the Enlightenment project held him back from accepting the
most radical implications of his embrace of algorithms. Even if it did turn out that brass and
iron could possess creative power, Babbage’s program of applied science, with its insistence
that theoretical knowledge remain at the helm of industrial practice, had no place for a
computing machine with agency. In The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, he suggests that the
unexpected side-effects of generalization, those algorithmic results that defy analysis, can have
no place in the canon of scientific knowledge until they are tamed by theory:
When the construction of the [difference] engine was first attempted, I did not
seek to give it the power of making calculations so far beyond the reach of
mathematical analysis as these appear to be: nor can I now foresee a probable
period at which they may become practically available to human purposes. I had
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determined to invest the invention with a degree of generality which should
include a wide range of mathematical power; and I was well aware that the
mechanical generalizations I had organized contained within them much more
than I had leisure to study, and some things which will probably remain
unproductive to a far distant day. (97-98)
Those results some people saw as “mysterious,” interesting as they might be, are mere
curiosities unless they can be brought to bear on practical concerns. The fruits of generalization
are only “practically available to human purposes,” in Babbage’s view, to the extent that people
have learned to control them. “Numbers,” he later wrote, “are the masters of the weak, but
the slaves of the strong” (Passages 410). Babbage thus suppressed the possibility that the
algorithms we create might prove stronger than the best of us, that they will be able to do
things that no human being will be able fully to understand.
But the trap was sprung. The religious arguments of The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise
seemed to provide a license for people to view the Difference Engine as a genuine miracle. At
one point, he asks us to imagine a computing machine programmed to produce the square
numbers in order, except that, in a single isolated instance, it produces a cubic number instead
of a square (94-95). Likewise, he argues, induction from experience might lead us to the rule
that no man dies, but the higher law governing the universe could still be, no man dies but
Christ. While his main point in this passage is theological, the analogy works both ways: the
single cubic number in a series of squares, it suggests, is quite literally a miracle, and anyone
who knows that it will happen is endowed with the power of prophecy. This claim has very
different implications depending on whether the epistemic gap between the “prophet” and the
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mere observer is entirely dependent on the fact that certain parts of the machine are hidden,
or whether algorithms can actually behave in ways that cannot easily be predicted. In the
former case, the appearance of miraculousness is merely a result of the observer’s ignorance—
a conclusion that would not be out of place in the writings of d’Alembert or even Voltaire. But
if the gap between algorithm and theory is irreducible, then the miraculous (in Babbage’s
definition) appearance of machinery cannot be written off as a mere illusion. The machine, in
that case, might work in ways that even its designer cannot foretell. Babbage spent the later
years of his life trying to convince people that this was not the case, that his machines did
nothing one could not understand. Poe, on the other hand, found in the possibility of matter
getting out of hand a fatal challenge to the dreams of the Enlightenment.

A Mathematician and a Poet

In 1844, Poe published an article in the New York Sun bearing a sensational headline:
“ASTOUNDING NEWS! BY EXPRESS VIA NORFOLK! THE ATLANTIC CROSSED IN THREE DAYS!
SIGNAL TRIUMPH OF MR. MONCK MASON’S FLYING MACHINE!!!” (Extra, April 13, 1844, 1).
“The air,” Poe informs us, “as well as the earth and the ocean, has been subdued by Science”
(1); a hot air balloon has been contrived that could cross the ocean with unmatched speed. The
article was, as one might guess, a hoax, intended to prey on the credulity of both the public and
the editors of The Sun. Poe discussed the excitement surrounding the story in a letter to The
Columbia Spy:
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Of course there was great discrepancy of opinion as regards the authenticity of
the story; but I observed that the more intelligent believed, while the rabble, for
the most part, rejected the whole with disdain. Twenty years ago credulity was
the characteristic trait of the mob, incredulity the distinctive feature of the
philosophic; now the case is exactly conversed. The wise are disinclined
to disbelief—and justly so. The only grounds, in this instance, for doubt, with
those who knew anything of Natural Philosophy, were the publication of the
marvel in the suspected “Sun” (the organ of the Moon-Hoax) and the great
difficulty of running an Express from Charleston, in advance of the mail. (Doings
of Gotham 33-34)
Even though the story was a hoax, Poe suggests, the “wise” should have been open to the
possibility of its truth. The only marks against it, according to Poe, are extrinsic to science—the
fact that it was published in the disreputable Sun and the implausibility of the claim that the
news had arrived from Charleston, SC ahead of the mail. To dismiss fantastic reports of
discoveries and inventions just because they are fantastic, Poe suggests, is a characteristic of
“the mob,” not of the highly educated reader.119
Poe’s remarks about the Balloon Hoax registers a broader shift away from the learned
skepticism that was widespread during the Enlightenment. In 1760, the Scottish astronomer
James Ferguson observed that the illiterate tended to take “almost everything […] upon the
authority of others,” whereas learned people disbelieved things that struck them as
unreasonable (quoted by Maddaluno 58). On the continent, Kant characterized trust in
authorities, at least on matters of truth and falsehood, as a form of “immaturity” opposed to

312

true enlightenment (Political Writings 54); Turgot claimed that “the less one knows the less one
doubts” (328), and Diderot, sympathizing more with the mechanic than Turgot did, castigated
Montaigne and Descartes for being too skeptical about inventions (“Art” 1.717). But in the
nineteenth century, such skepticism was buckling under an inundation of scientific discoveries
that seemed beyond belief. As Babbage points out in his book Reflections on the Decline of
Science in England (1830), the mere “strangeness” of a scientific artifact is insufficient grounds
to doubt its genuineness; natural phenomena are varied, and one cannot rule out the existence
of things just because they are unfamiliar (176).120 A well-known example was the platypus,
which was first encountered by Europeans in the 1780s. The first natural historian to examine a
specimen, George Shaw, initially believed that it was a hoax, a chimera assembled from pieces
of a duck and a mammal (Moyal 7). Yet he was wrong—odd as it looked, the specimen was
real. Similar issues arose with machines, since inventors were widely perceived to be
accomplishing unprecedented things with regularity. How could one tell real from fake when
experience was no longer a reliable guide? For Babbage, the solution was to reveal the inner
workings of a machine—to put it in a glass case—so as to ensure that people can discern the
principles on which it works. But in his later work, Poe offered an alternative response to
deception that called into question the adequacy of empirical methods, instead suggesting the
need to combine mathematical knowledge with a “poetic” mode of thought.121 In doing so, he
challenged not only the universalism of the Enlightenment, but also the division between
technical and humanistic fields that would eventually take its place.
Poe’s sole mention of Babbage’s name occurs in one of his earlier essays about hoaxes.
The essay “Maelzel’s Chess Player,” first published in the April, 1836 issue of the Southern
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Figure 21. “The Turk”—Wolfgang von Kempelen’s supposed chess-playing automaton. As some observers, including
Poe, surmised, the machine was a fraud—there was a human chess master hidden in a chamber below the board. See
Shaffer, “Enlightened Automata.” Engraving from Joseph Friedrich Racknitz’s Ueber den schachspieler des herrn von
Kempelen und dessen nachbildung (n.p.) via Wikimedia Commons.

Literary Messenger, is Poe’s attempt to debunk Wolfgang von Kempelen’s famous chess-playing
“Turk,” which was being exhibited in the United States by a showman named Johann Nepomuk
Maelzel (Figure 21). Poe begins the essay by listing some of the “many and wonderful
automata” that have already been constructed (318); he ends with Babbage’s Difference
Engine, which is presumably meant to be the most astounding of all. This list, which Poe takes
mostly from David Brewster’s book Letters on Natural Magic (Wimsatt 146n), preempts the
response that Poe is dismissing the Turk for its novelty alone: many astounding machines, Poe
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concedes, have already been invented. But he contends that a chess-playing automaton would
be more astounding than any of the examples he lists; if the chess-player truly is “a pure
machine,” he claims, then even Babbage’s computing machine “is altogether beneath it”
(319).122 While Poe’s much-discussed argument that a machine could not play chess is logically
flawed, his essay nonetheless makes sense as an attempt to negotiate the problem posed by
the proliferation of inventions that do what once seemed impossible. Babbage’s Difference
Engine stands, for the purposes of Poe’s argument, as the pinnacle of what has been
accomplished; if he can show that a chess-player would be far above it, as he attempts to do,
then he can rescue the case for skepticism.123 No machine remotely this wondrous has ever
been built, he argues, ergo we ought to doubt it.
This argument is founded on a view of the mechanical not fundamentally different from
that of Babbage. Poe presumes, like Babbage, that a machine must be governed by a wellfounded scientific theory: “The Automaton does not invariably win the game. Were the
machine a pure machine this would not be the case—it would always win. The principle being
discovered by which a machine can be made to play a game of chess, an extension of the same
principle would enable it to win a game—a farther extension would enable it to win all games—
that is, to beat any possible game of an antagonist” (323). C. E. Shannon would later hold up
this argument as evidence of Poe’s poor understanding of machines (“Programming a
Computer for Playing Chess” 2), and it is certainly problematic from a modern perspective—
chess-playing machines can and have lost to humans. But it would be wrong to chalk it up to
Poe’s ignorance of the mechanical arts of his time. Babbage, who understood machinery as
well as anyone, considers the possibility of building a (real) chess-playing machine in his
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memoir, and he leaps immediately to the question of how one could make a machine that
would always win (Passages 466; see Buxton 346). The thinking is that, in order to mechanize a
task, one must first reduce that task to a “principle,” and to do this, one must come up with a
general method to solve the problem. In the case of chess, this meant a general method to
win. Neither the Poe of “Maelzel’s Chess Player” nor Babbage were pragmatist enough to
accept a machine that was just good enough—both held machine intelligence to a universal
standard of rationality.
But this view can only be upheld so long as machines are based on fully developed
theories that entirely determine the correct way they should behave. By 1836, Babbage had
already discovered cases in which a machine could perform operations not based on any known
principles, and, a year after the publication of Poe’s essay, he would present them to a wide
audience in The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise. As Babbage showed with the example of a
machine that changes its behavior after producing a square number ending in 269696, simply
knowing how a computing machine is programmed is not necessarily enough to predict its longterm behavior. Whereas Babbage shrugged off the difficulties such cases created for
Enlightenment models of rationality, leaving the conflict between his mechanical methods and
his Enlightenment aims unresolved, Poe employed the difficulties raised by The Ninth
Bridgewater Treatise to undermine the faith of industrialists like Babbage in the inevitable
triumph of mind over matter. In his later work, Poe presented an alternative paradigm of
rationality through his much misunderstood claim that someone who is both a mathematician
and a poet would reason better than a “mere mathematician,” a claim that represents,
considered in context, a rebuttal of the empiricist epistemology to which Babbage clung.
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This statement appears in Poe’s third and final detective story, “The Purloined Letter”
(1844). While this story contains a number of ambiguities that make it difficult to summarize
adequately, the surface plot is quite simple. The Prefect of the Parisian Police approaches Poe’s
detective figure, C. Auguste Dupin, with a case that is, he says, “very simple indeed” and
“excessively odd” (Mabbott III.975). The Prefect reports that the Minister D––––, a known
miscreant, has stolen a letter from the Queen and is using it to blackmail her. The police know
that the letter is in the Minister’s house, but they have searched the building inch by inch, even
checking for hidden cavities in the furniture, and been unable to find it. The Prefect asks
assistance from Dupin, who finds the letter forthwith. Dupin explains that, while the police
were right that the letter was hidden in the Minister’s house, it was not “deposited within the
range of their search” (III.983); instead of hiding it in a secret nook, the Minister altered its
appearance, making it look like an unimportant letter, and left it in plain sight on his desk. The
bulk of the text consists of Dupin’s enigmatic explanations of the method by which he solved
the puzzle.124 Poe depicts the Prefect as a caricature of an empiricist who is dependent on
scientific instruments and contemptuous of poets (III.979). The Prefect is unable to make sense
of his enemy, Dupin tells the unnamed narrator, because he is too beholden to a single method.
If the Minister were a “mere mathematician,” he “would have been at the mercy of the
Prefect,” whose methods were capable of defeating any mode of concealment based on
mathematical thinking; but since the Minister was both a mathematician and a poet, he was
able to outsmart him (III.986). Dupin launches after this remark into an extended diatribe
against mathematicians, claiming that they foolishly suppose “that even the truths of what is
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called pure algebra, are abstract or general truths”—that is, that they apply algebraic thinking
haphazardly to areas where it does not belong, such as morality and chemistry (III.987).
While it is tempting to read this passage in terms of the “two cultures” divide that later
came (at least in C. P. Snow’s view) to separate science and literature (see Snow, The Two
Cultures), nineteenth-century attitudes toward mathematics and poetry did not fall out so
clearly along these lines. It has long been known that some of Dupin’s statements about
mathematicians are lifted from Horace Binney Wallace’s 1838 novel Stanley: or, the
Recollections of a Man of the World (Irwin 358); scholars have also suggested more indirect
sources for Poe’s attitudes toward mathematics. John T. Irwin argues that Poe’s conception of
algebra was influenced by the Cambridge Analytical Society, whose ideas played a role in the
curriculum of the University of Virginia at the time when Poe was attending (366-67). Looking
at the history of the period more broadly, Lynne L. Doty links Dupin’s speech to a supposed
hostility toward mathematics among the British Romantic poets, who sometimes used it as a
metonymy for mechanistic rationalism (120). But the alignment of mathematics with scientific
rationality was not universal at the time. One of the early nineteenth century’s most noted
critics of mathematics was the celebrated English physicist Michael Faraday, a prominent
investigator of electricity who did his most important work from the 1810s to the 30s. Faraday
preferred observation and experiment to the use of algebraic “hieroglyphics,” as he called them
in an 1851 letter to James Clerk Maxwell (quoted by Cantor 217). As Cohen points out, Faraday
was a member of the Sandemanian Church, a Protestant sect opposed to artificial signs and
languages (129); he thus viewed the divide between algebra and ordinary speech with
trepidation. From his perspective, symbolic algebra was not the epitome of reason, but rather
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a mechanical activity that blinded people to the true complexities of natural phenomena, which
could only be truly appreciated through hands-on practice.
Such views were not exclusive to the Sandemanians. A more secular critique of
mathematics than Faraday’s—and one more likely to have attracted Poe’s attention—appeared
in a notorious 1836 Edinburgh Review essay by the Scottish logician William Hamilton.125
Hamilton’s primary target in this piece is William Whewell, who had argued in an 1835
pamphlet that mathematics is a better way to inculcate good reasoning skills than logic. The art
of reasoning, Whewell had written, is “taught better by practice than by precept, in the same
manner as fencing or riding, or any other practical art, would be”; mathematical instruction can
provide this practice, whereas studying syllogistic rules is like “learning horsemanship by book”
(Whewell, “Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics” 140). Taking umbrage at Whewell’s
criticism of logic, Hamilton contends that mathematical sciences only involve a narrow set of
mental faculties, and that “the tendency of a too exclusive study of these sciences is,
absolutely, to disqualify the mind for observation and common reasoning” (“Study of
Mathematics” 412). Turning Whewell’s equestrian metaphor around, Hamilton questions
whether “we shall come best trained to the hunting-field of probability by assiduous
locomotion on the railroad of demonstration” (414). Hamilton’s concern is that a student who
has spent too much time lost in mathematical abstraction, becoming too dependent on the
artificial aids of symbolic notation, will be incapable of thinking on his or her feet; he thus
concludes that mathematical studies “exercise only to distort the mind” (450).126
While Hamilton’s inflammatory tone in this essay did not win him many friends among
mathematicians, his argument is not out of line with the prevailing attitudes toward
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mathematics in the mid-nineteenth century. Hamilton and Whewell share common ground in
assuming that mathematics is a specific domain of knowledge defined by dealing with formal
relations. Far from holding up mathematics as “the reason par excellence,” as the narrator of
“The Purloined Letter” puts it, Whewell treats it as one mode of inquiry among many; the
question he addresses is not whether mathematics is the sine qua non of all reason, but
whether the skills learned from practicing it can be transferred to other areas. By the second
quarter of the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment identification of mathematics with
reason itself, as exemplified by the later work of Condillac and the social mathematics of
Condorcet, was decidedly out of fashion; the idea that one could reason about morals in the
same way one reasoned in geometric proofs—a common claim in eighteenth-century logic
textbooks—was no longer on the table. Logic still had some claim to universality, but
mathematics was falling into its place as one discipline alongside others.
In “The Purloined Letter,” Poe quite explicitly locates the fading Enlightenment view
that mathematics is “the reason par excellence” in a Revolutionary French context. Near the
start of his diatribe, Dupin laments that mathematicians “have insinuated the term ‘analysis’
into application to algebra” (III.987). “The French,” he tells the narrator, “are the originators of
this particular deception; but if a term is of any importance—if words derive any value from
applicability—then ‘analysis’ conveys ‘algebra’ about as much as, in Latin, ‘ambitus’ implies
‘ambition,’ ‘religio’ ‘religion,’ or ‘homines honesti,’ a set of honorable men” (III.987). Although
the narrator states that the story takes place in “18––” (III.974), this attack singles out an
Enlightenment school of thought that was a trademark position of the first generation of
idéologues and their godfather, Condillac—the paired ideas that all analysis is fundamentally
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algebraic and that all language is subject to reworking at will. The narrator reinforces the
French positioning of this view by noting Dupin’s quarrel with “some of the algebraists of Paris”
(III.987); Dupin further directs attention to Revolutionary trauma by quoting Chamfort, who
died during the Terror (III.986). Poe’s source, Stanley, clearly expresses an upper-class anxiety
about political upheaval, as Irwin notes (359), but the specific references to the French
mathematical tradition were all added by Poe. Whereas the narrator of Wallace’s novel
attributes to mathematics a conservative “tendency to check and chill the airy dreams of
modern philosophy” (209), Dupin associates algebra with the “wild doctrines” of the
Enlightenment, as Poe called them elsewhere (Mabbott II.703)—with a naïve universalism and
an excessive willingness to wrest words like analysis from their etymological meanings so as to
suit the latest theories.
The traces of this post-Revolutionary anxiety are not hard to discern in Dupin’s speech
about mathematicians. Dupin characterizes the algebraists as “Pagans” (III.988), and he
suggests that they have a propensity for unwarranted violence: “Say to one of these gentlemen,
by way of experiment, if you please, that you believe occasions may occur where 𝑥 2 +
𝑝𝑥 is not altogether equal to 𝑞, and, having made him understand what you mean, get out of
his reach as speedily as convenient, for, beyond doubt, he will endeavor to knock you down”
(III.988). While one should not too hastily assume that Poe thought violence was bad—he was
certainly no moralist—the attitude toward algebra that prevailed among the idéologues went
directly against Poe’s anti-progressive view of the world. “I have no faith,” Poe wrote in an
1844 letter to James Russell Lowell, “in human perfectibility” (Letters I.449); the French
Enlightenment’s pretentions of replacing old “prejudices” with a more rational way of thinking

321

was anathema to Poe’s sensibility. A possible reference point for Dupin’s speech is Condorcet,
whom Poe elsewhere associated with the notion of perfectibility he detested.127 Poe was
almost certainly unaware that Condorcet had actually attempted to apply algebraic methods to
morals, but the quantifying spirit Condorcet represented was widely known. Dupin counters
such optimism by attributing to the “algebraists of Paris” a dunderheaded inability to see what
is right before their eyes and accusing them of violently silencing anyone who dares question
their algebraical dogmas.
Poe’s alternative to this Enlightenment optimism, at least if we take Dupin at his word,
is to supplement the mathematical understanding of the world with a poetic sensibility. “As
poet and mathematician,” Dupin states, the Minister “would reason well” (III.986). In the early
nineteenth century, the idea of fusing the scientific with the poetic was less a disciplinary
transgression than a commonplace. Ada Lovelace’s call for a “poetical science” was heeded by
geologists, chemists, and mathematicians alike (see Forbes-MacPhail). George Boole not only
wrote a large volume of poetry, but also reportedly said that a “real mathematician […] must be
something more than a mere mathematician, he must be also something of a poet” (M. Boole,
“Home-side” 106); the German mathematician Karl Weierstrass made a similar comment in
1883 (Anon., Compte rendu 149). Humphry Davy, Alexander von Humboldt, and Louis Agassiz
all attempted to infuse a poetic sensibility into their writing about natural philosophy. Although
these remarks might resemble the contemporary commonplace that one must consider
“human factors” while practicing technical fields, the Romantic notions of poetry on which they
drew were more complex than this. Poetry, Poe writes in “The Poetic Principle,” is “no mere
appreciation of the Beauty before us—but a wild effort to reach the Beauty above” (Griswold
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III.7); its defining characteristic is an “airy” or “ethereal” indefiniteness that enables its reader
to catch brief glimpses of celestial truths that elude the understanding. Poe’s combination of
mathematics and poetry does not, then, simply mean an appreciation for both technical and
cultural factors, for both algorithm and meaning; instead, it means an abdication of the desire
to make mathematics fit together with a common-sense view of the world at all.
Poe comes closest to a fusion of the mathematical and the poetic in the most
problematic of his theoretical texts: the 1846 essay “The Philosophy of Composition.” This
essay, at least if taken at face value, is an exposé of those aspects of creativity that are typically
hidden from the reader of poetry. Poets, according to Poe in this essay, “prefer having it
understood that they compose by a species of fine frenzy—an ecstatic intuition,” and recoil at
having the secrets of their work revealed (Griswold II.260). Poe aims to change this by “letting
the public take a peep behind the scenes” at his writerly practices, “in a word, at the wheels
and pinions” of poetic composition (II.260). To this end, he describes the whole process by
which he supposedly wrote “The Raven” (1845). In contrast to earlier Romantic depictions of
creativity like Coleridge’s famous account of writing “Kubla Khan” in an opium haze, Poe
describes the composition of “The Raven” as an entirely rational process in which he was aware
of the purpose of each decision he made. He assures the reader that “no one point in its
composition is referible [sic] either to accident or intuition—that the work proceeded, step by
step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem”
(II.261). The secret of poetic composition, Poe tells us, is fitting the pieces together in a novel
way, a process that apparently resembles the work of the mathematician more than the
reveries of the opium eater.
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Scholars have reached differing judgments both on how serious Poe is being in this
essay and on what he is saying about the creativity of poets. The majority opinion is that the
essay is a satirical takedown of manufactured magazine verse, along the lines of his earlier
satire of sensation tales, “How to Write a Blackwood Article” (1838); others, however, have
taken the article as a genuine challenge to Romantic notions of authoriality. Among the latter is
Tresch, who takes Poe’s essay as an attempt “to astound the machine-hungry crowds and
critics by presenting himself explicitly as a poetry-automaton” (“Potent Magic” 289). But the
claim that Poe wanted to present himself as a machine does not accord with all of the remarks
he makes in the essay. Just before his remark about wheels and pinions, Poe promises the
reader a peek “at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought—at the true purposes
seized only at the last moment—at the innumerable glimpses of idea that arrived not at the
maturity of full view—at the fully matured fancies discarded in despair as unmanageable—at
the cautious selections and rejections—at the painful erasures and interpolations” that go into
the composition of a poem (II.260). The process Poe describes here is not a mechanical one,
with clearly defined rules for how one should proceed from one step to the next, but rather a
painful process of trial and error. If it has an analogue in mathematics, it is less computation
(which had been recognized as mechanical for centuries) than the construction of a
mathematical proof, a process that often involves dead-ends, frustration, and rethinking of
one’s goals, and which is almost impossible to reduce to an algorithm.128 Far from presenting
himself as a poetic version of one of Babbage’s calculating machines, Poe is positioning himself
at the level of Babbage himself—not a machine, but the designer of a machine.
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The parallel with Babbage’s notion of creativity is reinforced by the way Poe handles the
relationship of form and content in his account of the writing process. Just like Babbage’s
“manufacture” of sermons, the process Poe describes in “The Philosophy of Composition”
reduces the selection of ideas to the filling in of blanks. Poe began, he tells us, by selecting the
form of “The Raven”—the length of around a hundred lines, the use of a repeating refrain, the
decision to limit the refrain to a single word. Before even choosing a topic, he decides that the
refrain will use “the long o as the most sonorous vowel, in connection with r as the most
producible consonant” (II.264). The narrative of the poem falls into place as an inevitable
consequence of these formal choices. In selecting a word for the refrain, “it would have been
absolutely impossible to overlook the word ‘Nevermore.’ In fact, it was the very first which
presented itself” (II.264). Again, after he deems it best to have a “non-reasoning creature”
deliver the refrain, “very naturally, a parrot, in the first instance, suggested itself, but was
superseded forthwith by a Raven” (II.264). Rather than imagining a situation and then putting
it into verse, Poe layers on formal constraints that (he claims) largely determine the content for
him. The poem is like a machine because each part is calculated to serve a particular purpose
within the whole, all in the service of producing a singular poetic effect. Hanging over this
machine is the poet, who makes up for his lack of “ecstatic intuition” by maintaining complete
control over how these parts are configured. The only aspect of the poem to which this control
does not seem to extend is the selection of individual words and images, which are, in Poe’s
account, rendered inevitable by their positions within the apparatus of the poem as a whole.
Disingenuous as Poe’s peek behind the curtains may be, it rests on assumptions about
the nature of poetry that are not out of line with Poe’s other, presumably more serious writings
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on poetics. At the end of the essay, Poe uses the elevation of form above content to ground a
distinction between poetry and prose. To avoid the “hardness or nakedness” of entirely
naturalistic subject matter, Poe writes,
Two things are invariably required—first, some amount of complexity, or more
properly, adaptation; and secondly, some amount of suggestiveness—some
under current, however indefinite of meaning. It is this latter, in especial, which
imparts to a work of art so much of that richness (to borrow from colloquy a
forcible term) which we are too fond of confounding with the ideal. It is the
excess of the suggested meaning—it is the rendering this the upper instead of
the under current of the theme—which turns into prose (and that of the very
flattest kind) the so called poetry of the so called transcendentalists. (II.270)
Poe’s criticism of the American transcendentalists targets a form of poetry that sought to
ground truths about the transcendental realm in the natures of the mundane things denoted by
words. In the 1844 essay “The Poet,” Ralph Waldo Emerson had positioned poetry as both the
source of language and the medium by which the spiritual truths it contains can be revealed.
“The poets,” as Emerson puts it, “made all the words, and therefore language is the archives of
history, and, if we must say it, a sort of tomb of the muses” (Essential Writings 296). For Poe,
the transcendental realm cannot be accessed through such semantic means. A poem, Poe tells
us, must have an “under current” of meaning, but to be truly poetic, it must keep this current
to a mere suggestion. Add too much meaning, and the poem will lapse into prose. Poe’s poetic
style places less emphasis on a poem’s reference to material things than on the “complexity, or
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more properly, adaptation” of its structure—the intricacy of interrelations that locks each word
squarely into its place.
Some aspects of Poe’s poetic work, especially from 1845 on, bear these claims out.
Some of the negative criticism of Poe’s poetry has found it to have just the defects that one
would expect to emerge from the method he describes in “The Philosophy of Composition”—
verse that is excessively assertive in its meter, excessively complex in its patterns of rhyme,
assonance, and other sound effects, and excessively vague in its meaning. A particularly
controversial example is the 1847 ballad “Ulalume.” This poem employs some of the same
formal devices as “The Raven,” but in an ostentatious way that has made it a favorite target for
Poe’s detractors. The first stanza sets up a pattern of repeated rhyme words that is continued,
with variations, throughout the poem:
The skies they were ashen and sober;
The leaves they were crispéd and sere—
The leaves they were withering and sere;
It was night in the lonesome October
Of my most immemorial year;
It was hard by the dim lake of Auber,
In the misty mid region of Weir—
It was down by the dank tarn of Auber,
In the ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir. (Mabbott I.415-16)
Replete with repetitions, references to nonexistent places, and “atmospheric” imagery, this
stanza poses significant challenges for interpreters intent on finding meaning in every word.
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While scholars have found potential sources for the names “Auber” and “Weir,” their lack of
specific semantic associations seems more the point. Without clear images to attach to the
words, one’s attention is drawn powerfully to their sound, their appearance on the page, and
the unusual rhyme/repetition scheme in which they are enmeshed—in effect, to the
algorithmic plane rather than the semantic.
Thematically, “Ulalume” deals with one of Poe’s recurring obsessions—an inescapable
memory. The plot of the poem may be summarized as follows. “In the misty mid region of
Weir,” the speaker is led down a wooded path by a star that he identifies as Astarte. Psyche,
his soul, warns him to leave, but he refuses to take her advice. At the end of the path, he finds
the tomb of his dead lover, Ulalume, the memory of whom he had attempted to repress. The
speaker reacts to the discovery in the penultimate stanza, which echoes lines from the first:
Then my heart it grew ashen and sober
As the leaves that were crispéd and sere—
As the leaves that were withering and sere—
And I cried—“It was surely October,
On this very night of last year,
That I journeyed—I journeyed down here!—
That I brought a dread burden down here—
On this night, of all nights in the year,
Ah, what demon hath tempted me here?
Well I know, now, this dim lake of Auber—
This misty mid region of Weir:—
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Well I know, now, this dank tarn of Auber—
This ghoul-haunted woodland of Weir.” (I.418)
Read out loud, the poem makes memory an active part of the aesthetic experience as well as a
theme. The second and third lines in this stanza recall the corresponding lines in the first
stanza: “The leaves they were crispéd and sere— / The leaves they were withering and sere.”
Through its formal devices, the poem places the audience in an analogous position to that of
the speaker, that of being forced to remember but unable totally to recapture the events of the
past. The repetitions induce the listener to recall earlier parts of the poem, while at the same
time, the variations—“The leaves they” to “As the leaves that”—highlight the disjunction
between the mementos that exist in the present and the actuality of the past.
During the Anglo-American Poe revival in the early twentieth century, “Ulalume” was a
thorn in the side of Poe’s reputation. In their 1938 book Understanding Poetry, Cleanth Brooks
and Robert Penn Warren dismissed it as overloaded with “stale devices of mystification” that
have “little or no real reference to the meaning of the poem” (360). In a 1930 essay, Aldous
Huxley singled “Ulalume” out as evidence that, contrary to the judgment of Baudelaire and
other French admirers, “Poe is not one of our major poets” (158). The poem, Huxley argues, is
excessively ornamented, like wearing “[d]iamond rings on every finger” (158), and its insistent
rhythm provides Poe with “a kind of short cut to musicality”: “He does not have to create a
music appropriately modulated to his meaning; all he has to do is to shovel the meaning into
the moving stream of the metre and allow the current to carry it along on waves, that, like
those of the best hairdressers, are guaranteed permanent” (158). The poem flagrantly violates
the organic unity of form and content that Huxley takes as an essential part of good taste (and,
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apparently, female appearance); even less forgivably, one might suspect that, like Babbage in
his youthful manufacture of sermons, Poe came up with the form first and fashioned the ideas
to match. A part of the reason why the poem so offended the Modernist sensibilities of Huxley,
Brooks, and Warren was its ostentation, but they also emphasized the complaint that it was all
surface, no depth. The word meaning comes up again and again in the debate over “Ulalume.”
In 1963, one of the poem’s defenders, Eric W. Carlson, attempted to rebut Brooks and Warren
by showing that, “under the surface” of Poe’s vague imagery, “there is a psychological
meaning” (37). In an attempt to rescue the poem from critical oblivion, Carlson reads symbolic
significance into its sounds—Weir resembles weird, Ulalume conveys doom and gloom, Auber
picks up the association with sober. Although he disagrees with Brooks and Warren, Carlson
employs much the same criterion of poetic merit that they do in their note on “Ulalume.”
Either one can find some way of transmuting Poe’s complex sound patterns into meaning, or
else the poem must be expelled from the temple of taste.
This fixation on a single question about Poe’s poem—whether or not it has enough
meaning to justify its complexity—stems from a mismatch between Poe’s poetics and the
disciplinary structure in which the New Critics worked. Literary critics dealt with meaning;
studying the non-semantic aspects of texts was the business of the white-collar intellectuals
working at Bell Labs and Bletchley Park, where Britain’s code-breaking operation was based
during World War II. Friedrich Kittler has discussed the obsessive attempts to expunge meaning
from communications engineering around 1900 (Discourse Networks 206-12), a turn that
crescendoed right around the height of the New-Critical debate over Poe’s poetic merits. In his
pivotal 1948 essay “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” C. E. Shannon specifically
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excludes meaning from his disciplinary purview as an engineer: “Frequently the messages have
meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical
or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
engineering problem” (379). Conversely, thinking about a text without considering its meaning
was anathema to the New Critics, who defined themselves as humanists in contradistinction to
engineers. Poe’s poetry does not dutifully line up on the critics’ side of this disciplinary division;
from the perspective of New-Critical hermeneutics, “Ulalume” looks more like one of Shannon’s
switching circuits than like a well-wrought urn. But Poe’s views on language do not fit well on
the engineering side either. While nineteenth-century mathematicians like Boole were laying
the groundwork for Shannon’s information theory by rigorously separating form from meaning,
Poe’s poetics suggested an even more radical break with Enlightenment thought—a belief that
words could have an effect on the world without the need for meaning at all.
Poe makes this suggestion most explicitly in the 1845 text “The Power of Words.” This
work is one of Poe’s “angelic colloquies,” dialogues between incorporeal beings in the afterlife.
In this dialogue, the wise angel Agathos attempts to convince “a spirit new-fledged with
immortality,” Oinos, that the words people speak in life possess a creative power that extends
to the farthest reaches of the celestial realm (Mabbott III.1211). In contrast to the Lockean
view that words are arbitrary signs of ideas, Agathos locates the power of words entirely in the
physicality of sound—in the waves that reverberate in the atmosphere of Earth and the “ether”
of outer space. This text is, as Terence Whalen has pointed out, almost certainly based on two
passages from Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (Whalen 19).129 In a chapter entitled “On
the Permanent Impressions of our Words and Actions on the Globe We Inhabit,” Babbage
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presents the idea that sound waves echo through the air eternally, preserving a record of every
word ever spoken (108). As Babbage puts it, “[t]he air itself is one vast library, on whose pages
are for ever written all that man has ever said or woman whispered” (112). There is no direct
evidence that Poe took the idea from Babbage; it is possible that both writers took it
independently from Pierre Simon Laplace.130 However, the extent of the similarities between
the texts of Babbage and Poe suggest otherwise.
For Babbage, the point was that the existence of a physical record of all that is said and
done provides a scientific basis for the Christian doctrine of punishment. In a later chapter,
Babbage imagines a future state in which people’s senses are more acute then they were in life,
enabling them to perceive the faint vibrations emanating from past events (164). Babbage
depicts this awareness of the past as a form of torment, since it forces people to perceive all of
the bad consequences of their actions in life. He contrasts this Hell of remembrance with a
Heaven in which the soul can essentially undertake scientific research for eternity:
[I]f, in a future state, we could turn from the contemplation of our own
imperfections, and with increased powers apply our minds to the discovery of
nature’s laws, and to the invention of new method by which our faculties might
be aided in that research, pleasure the most unalloyed would await us at every
stage of our progress. Undogged by the dull corporeal load of matter which
tyrannizes even our most intellectual moments, and chains the ardent spirit to
its unkindred clay, we should advance in the pursuit, stimulated instead of
wearied by our past exertions, and encountering each new difficulty in the
inquiry, with the accumulated power derived from the experience of the past,
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and the irresistable energy resulting from the confidence of ultimate success.
(165)
What is odd in this passage is that Babbage seems to envision scientific progress continuing to
roll on even in the afterlife, as if the only sort of self he could imagine outliving the body is the
subject of scientific knowledge. Heaven is not a state of perfect knowledge for Babbage, but
rather a state in which people are able to perceive the minute vibrations of atoms that no
worldly instruments could measure, thus providing a widened field of scientific inquiry for
people to explore forever, blissfully.
Poe’s text contains echoes of both of these chapters from The Ninth Bridgewater
Treatise. Similarly to Babbage, Poe suggests that, while they are not “cognizant of all things,”
the angelic beings possess a form of “spiritual vision” that is more acute than that of living
humans (III.1212). Recalling Babbage’s dream of doing science in heaven, Agathos suggests
that, “of this infinity of matter, the sole purpose is to afford infinite springs, at which the soul
may allay the thirst to know which is for ever unquenchable within it—since to quench it would
be to extinguish the soul’s self” (III.1212); as Babbage characterizes perfect remembrance as a
hellish state, Agathos tells Oinos that “to know all were the curse of a fiend” (III.1212). Agathos
and Babbage also share a fixation on algebra as the way of knowing most worthy of the angels;
as Agathos puts it, the vibrations created by words are “accurately traceable through the
agency of algebraic analysis,” which, as it increases in perfection, can approach closer and
closer to a perfect understanding of the events whose consequences reverberate throughout
time (III.1214). Like Babbage, Poe presents us with a vision of a deterministic universe in which
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God plays no role after the initial creation, a universe governed by laws that are best
understood by means of mathematics.
Yet Poe was not as optimistic as Babbage about the possibility that scientific knowledge
would grant people an expanding dominion over matter. Poe’s “The Power of Words” twists
Babbage’s image of sounds resounding for all eternity into a thoroughly anti-progressive idea—
an assertion that actions of the past do not fade away, but rather become harder and harder to
ignore as their waves spread throughout the cosmos. Unlike Babbage’s chapter, “The Power of
Words” ends on much the same note as “Ulalume,” with a being who is tormented by the
memory of a lost love. Agathos challenges Oinos with a question: “did there not cross your
mind some thought of the physical power of words? Is not every word an impulse on the air?”
(III.1215). Oinos does not answer, but rather asks Agathos why he is weeping as they pass by a
star, “the greenest and yet most terrible” one they have seen (III.1215). Agathos replies: “This
wild star—it is now three centuries since with clasped hands, and with streaming eyes at the
feet of my beloved—I spoke it—with a few passionate sentences—into birth! Its brilliant
flowers are the dearest of all unfulfilled dreams, and its raging volcanoes are the passions of the
most turbulent and unhallowed of hearts” (III.1215). This statement, which concludes the
dialogue, suggests that the power of words works not through signification, but rather through
a direct identity between matter and the seemingly immaterial. Words have a “power,” but not
on account of what people think they mean. Their ability to create a terrible green star is due
only to the acoustic properties of sound waves.
Reading “The Purloined Letter” in this light reveals the breadth of the gap between
Dupin’s analytical method and that of the idéologues. Whereas Condillac and his followers
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employed analysis as a means of clarifying the meanings of signs, Dupin’s poetic approach
focuses on the signifiers—the physical traces that his rival could not help but leave behind. The
Minister adeptly uses conventional systems of meaning to deceive the police, and it is only by
treating these systems with suspicion that Dupin can outmaneuver him. The letter, Dupin tells
the narrator, is addressed in a “diminutive and feminine hand,” which contrasts with the “bold
and decided” hand that the Prefect described (III.991); the careless manner in which it was
placed into the rack, along with the fact that it is partially torn, seem calculated to suggest its
unimportance; further, the paper is dirty, which Dupin takes as an attempt “to delude the
beholder into an idea of the worthlessness of the document” (III.991). Rather than taking these
apparently intentional signs at face value, Dupin fixates on the creases on the paper, which, he
claims, “presented the broken appearance which is manifested when a stiff paper, having been
once folded and pressed with a folder, is refolded in a reversed direction, in the same creases
or edges which had formed the original fold” (III.992). Semantic conventions have no direct
bearing on whether or not this inference holds; instead, Dupin thinks in terms of the physical
limitations of the medium, about which he can reason with a level of certainty that interpretive
methods do not allow.
For Poe, then, thinking like a mathematician and a poet does not mean considering both
algorithm and culture, a mandate that is now a platitude among designers of computer
interfaces; instead, it means not thinking in terms of meaning at all. This notion of the poetic
would become part of a counter-tradition that has existed in opposition to the idea of culture
as an organically developing totality. The influence of Poe’s Dupin tales was most important in
detective fiction, although some later iterations of the form became much more epistemically
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reassuring than Poe’s ambiguous texts. Poe’s poetry won the greatest following in France,
where his work was translated by Charles Baudelaire and Stéphane Mallarmé. Descendants of
Dupin’s skepticism toward meaning might also be found in materialist approaches to media
studies that I previously called computational brutalism—Lori Emerson’s critique of graphical
user interfaces and the Berlin School of Friedrich Kittler, for whom computer interfaces are
mere “surface effects” that bely what is really going on inside computers, where “everything
becomes a number” (Gramophone, Film, Typewriter 1). These critical approaches treat the
semantic aspects of computational systems as potentially misleading and emphasize, instead,
the physicality of the medium. Like Dupin, they question the primacy of the semiotic
conventions that govern the ways people understand computers, reminding us that, for all the
meanings people assign to them, computing machines are just complex arrangements of
subatomic particles operating according to physical laws.
But Poe’s own views are just as far from Kittler’s anti-hermeneutic stance as they are
from Cleanth Brooks’s school of close reading. In “The Power of Words,” Agathos states that “a
true philosophy has long taught that the source of all motion is thought—and the source of all
thought is—” (III.1215); Oinos completes the sentence: “God” (III.1215). This God is not Boole’s
benevolent God who gives us laws of thought that will harmonize the world. Poe’s God is
unknowable, especially to the living; it is only by means of intuition that we can come close.
From this perspective, the Berlin School’s confidence that mathematical methods can provide
authentic access to the reality of technical media is just another delusion; the mathematically
oriented media scholar is just as blinkered as the Prefect in “The Purloined Letter,” whose
tenacious belief that 𝑥 2 + 𝑝𝑥 always equals 𝑞 leads him into a trap. The fact that Poe resists
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assimilation both to modern hermeneutics and to modern anti-hermeneutics—to the New
Critics on one side and to the Berlin School on the other—is indicative of the difference
between Poe’s Romantic outlook and the disciplinary fragmentation that characterizes
modernity. For Poe, as for Wordsworth, poetry and mathematics were two halves of a single
whole, whereas Kittler worked within a disciplinary formation that alienates the two. The
solidification of this formation is the last major event in my account of the rise of the algorithm.
A key site in the development of the modern disciplinary formation was the series of great
international exhibitions that began in the 1850s, events in which the Enlightenment dream of
spreading technical knowledge universally gave way to a newly fractured social arrangement in
which most people had to entrust technical matters to the experts. A prominent voice in the
conversation surrounding them was that of Babbage, who, as one might predict, resisted these
implications to the last.

Miracles on Exhibition

Although his computing machines were his greatest obsession, Babbage also devoted a
significant amount of energy, starting in the 1820s, to a polical campaign for science education.
A key early part of this campaign was the 1830 book Reflections on the Decline of Science in
England, and on Some of Its Causes, which attempts to explain why British science has lost its
international prestige since the time of Newton (1-2). This book was inspired in part by a trip to
Berlin, where Babbage met Alexander von Humboldt and was impressed by the degree of
support the Prussian regime provided to scientists (Exposition 13-16); Babbage reprints a
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speech by Humboldt in an appendix, presumably in an attempt to promote the German
approach to science in Britain (Decline of Science 216-21). The controversy surrounding the
publication of this book led to the formation of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science (Hyman 73; 150-56). But Babbage’s campaign was a lost cause in the face of a growing
shift toward social compartmentalization in the mid-nineteenth century. Babbage frequently
framed his polemics about science in terms of the perceived inferior situation in Britain
compared to Continental Europe, and his biographer Hyman takes him at his word that the
problem was the British government’s lack of appreciation for the connections between science
and industry (102). Yet the problems Babbage faced were not entirely specific to Britain. The
Great Exhibitions heralded a new cultural formation whose implications were global, and that
Babbage was struggling in vain against: the fusion of industry with consumerism.
If there is a point of contact between Babbage’s political campaign and his work on
computing machines, it is in his insistence that the “superintendents” of those machines
maintain total control over how they run. The argument of Decline of Science is based on the
belief that science ought to be at the helm of industry, producing a continuum between theory
and practice.131 To fulfill this goal, it was necessary to educate people outside of scientific
circles about the latest discoveries. For Babbage, it was not the commoner who was shamefully
unenlightened about science, but the statesman—a point that he made directly in a polemic
against hereditary peerage, written in 1833 and published in 1856 (A Word to the Wise 5; see
also Decline of Science 8; Economy v). He took up the task of spreading scientific and technical
knowledge to the middle and upper classes directly in his own writings. The first major division
of The Economy of Machinery is a compendium of non-technical descriptions of various
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manufacturing techniques (3-92). He ends this section by explaining, in reverse order, the
series of processes that produced the book presently in the reader’s hands—an apparent
attempt to give the reader a better appreciation for the dependence of familiar products like
books on the arts of industry (90-92). Babbage’s descriptions of industrial machines could be
seen as an extension of Diderot’s endeavor to write down previously unarticulated mechanical
knowledge for the Encyclopédie, another project that sought to help epistêmê keep pace with
technê.132 Yet Babbage lived in a very different political climate from that of the
Encyclopédistes, and his campaign ultimately proved to be untenable in face of the social
compartmentalization that industrialism imposed.
A key moment in
this shift was the London
exhibition of 1851—the
first of the international
industrial showcases that
eventually morphed into
the World’s Fairs. These
events began in part as
an offshoot of the British

Figure 22. The London Crystal Palace as viewed from the Knightsbridge Road. Image by
Read & Co. Engravers & Printers, 1851 via Wikimedia Commons.

Association for the Advancement of Sciences.133 At Babbage’s suggestion, the 1838 and 39
meetings of the Association were accompanied by exhibitions of industrial products, an
attempt to promote the harmony of science with industry (Exposition 18-20; Passages 432-33n;
Hyman 152-53). While these early exhibitions were not a particular success, England would, a
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little over a decade later, host the first of the great international exhibitions, an event that
would form an important focal point for the emerging narrative of technological progress in the
second half of the nineteenth century. The 1851 Exhibition, housed in a massive glass structure
known as the Crystal Palace (Figure 22), ran for almost six months in London’s Hyde Park and
attracted a great deal of attention worldwide.
Babbage had little involvement with the Crystal Palace exhibition apart from publishing
a book, The Exposition of 1851 (1851), which essentially explains, in a rather bitter tone, how he
would have run the event had he been in charge. (The London and New York events were
officially called exhibitions, but Babbage, like his fellow Francophile Walt Whitman, preferred
the word exposition.) Babbage’s book, which was written before the exhibition but not
published until after, suggests that the event should serve as a means of promoting free trade,
cultural exchange, and the diffusion of knowledge. The convergence of people upon the Crystal
Palace, in his view, provides an opportunity to “instruct the consumer in the art of judging the
character of the commodity he is about to purchase” (129); he hopes that the exhibitions will
remove the “veil of mystery” covering the principles of manufacture, science, and the fine arts
(131). Yet Babbage was sorely disappointed with how the Great Exhibition was managed. If the
British Association had retained control over the event, he writes, it “would have found itself
led by the science of the country” (20); but instead, he feared that it had been taken over by
scientifically illiterate aristocrats. The organizers of the later exhibitions did not take Babbage’s
advice, and he became increasingly resentful.
The difference of opinion between Babbage and the organizers is apparent from the
way he managed the display of his own mechanical creations. Nothing of Babbage’s appeared
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in the Crystal Palace, but his work and its derivatives were displayed in later exhibitions. The
organizers of the 1853 New York exhibition requested permission to display the Difference
Engine No. 1, but the British government declined (Passages 149). The 1855 Universal
Exposition in Paris featured a later difference engine built by the Swedish father–son team
Georg and Edvard Scheutz; it won a gold medal, thanks in part to Babbage’s lobbying (Lindgren
195). One of Babbage’s greatest concerns during the exhibition of the Scheutz engine was that
the spectators have ample opportunity to learn about the principles on which it was based. He
was in contact with the Scheutzes, and he had his son Henry prepare plans for the machine so
that they could be displayed alongside the machine itself (Passages 155; H. P. Babbage 261n;
see Lindgren 263). During and after the Exhibition, Babbage also handed out free copies of a
pamphlet explaining how to read the plans (H. P. Babbage 242). In Passages, he suggests that
the engines could be displayed while in use, “in constant but slow motion,” accompanied by an
attendant who could explain the principles on which they are built (152). As Hyman points out,
Babbage insisted on slowing the machines down because fast motion, impressive as it may be,
made it impossible for spectators to make out the internal structures of the machines (223).
Babbage’s insistence on running machines slowly and displaying the plans beside them shows a
desire to keep machines from becoming detached from the ideas they embody in the minds of
the public—to ensure that people appreciate the theory as well as the machine itself.
But in spite of Babbage’s hopes, the Great Exhibitions were not particularly concerned
with spreading technical knowledge. The displays of industrial machinery were about the
exhilarating speed, size, and complexity of it all, goals that did not line up well with the
Enlightenment dreams to which Babbage continued to cling. That Babbage and the
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commissioners were at loggerheads was undeniable by the 1862 exhibition in London. At this
exhibition, the completed portion of the Difference Engine No. 1 was finally displayed, almost
three decades after its construction, and Babbage was far from satisfied with how the
exhibition treated his work. In his memoir, he spends almost ten pages criticizing the
commissioners of the 1862 exhibition (Passages 157-65); among many other complaints, he
lambasts them for placing the Difference Engine No. 1 in a less prominent location than a
display of children’s toys, “whose merits, it is true, the Commissioners were somewhat more
competent to appreciate” (159). More importantly, in spite of Babbage’s success in finding
someone qualified and willing to take on the job, the commissioners declined to hire a
mathematical expert to explain the machine to visitors (158). The Difference Engine ended up
“in a small hole in a dark corner,” given neither the glory Babbage thought it deserved nor the
exposure to understanding eyes of the public (159). Whether Babbage’s work on computing
machines was a failure or a success depends on how one views it, but his attempts to influence
the organizers of the Great Exhibitions certainly did fail, leaving him angry and frustrated. In
the years of the exhibitions, he descended into a bitterness that reached its boiling point in the
1860s, when he undertook a notorious legal campaign against street musicians and other noisy
“nuisances,” earning himself a reputation as a cranky old man.134
One reason for the failure of Babbage’s campaign was that the theories behind his
computing machines were too complex and abstruse to interest the general public. For all his
efforts to explain his work, only a fraction of the people willing to listen really came away with
an adequate understanding of his ideas. Martineau recounts that, in spite of Babbage’s
patience in explaining the principles of the Difference Engine to his houseguests, “a lady, to
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whom he had sacrificed some very precious time, on the supposition that she understood as
much as she assumed to do,” nonetheless came away thinking it could produce right answers
from wrong numbers (268). A later biographical note on Babbage declines even to attempt to
explain what a difference engine does: “No reader unversed in the higher mathematics need
attempt to form any idea of the machines, or their methods of working, or even the results of
their operations. At least, he is not likely to make much of it if he does” (Fyvie 186). This is an
overstatement—the basic idea behind difference engines can be explained in terms of what is
now high-school-level algebra. Just about anyone could understand it given a patient enough
teacher. But whether those who were not already mathematically inclined would find it worth
the trouble is dubious. Most of the non-scientific acquaintances to whom Babbage showed his
machine were, it would seem from the accounts of contemporaries, content to nod politely and
stare in wonder.
Apart from the pedagogical difficulty of explaining the theories behind complex
machines like the Difference Engine, the social relations of consumer capitalism that were
beginning to emerge at the time of the first great exhibitions created few incentives for (to
travesty the seventeenth-century educational theorist Comenius) everyone to learn everything.
The realities of industrial production meant that only those who either owned their own capital
or worked in engineering could have much of a role in designing machines. For the most part, it
was necessary to use whatever products were available on the market; people in corporate
offices would design them, those who worked in the factories would deal with the technical
aspects of production, and everyone else would be mere users. One of the later exhibitions,
the 1933 Century of Progress International Exposition in Chicago, touts this hierarchical
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arrangement by asserting that “SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES—MAN CONFORMS” (Tozer
81). By this high-Modernist moment, “man” had gone from the producer of scientific
knowledge to the passive consumer of industrial goods. Most people were doomed to look at
machines as if through a pane of glass, marveling at them, perhaps understanding how they
work, perhaps not, but in any case unable to have much say in how they are configured.
This notion of science and industry as drivers of cultural change became a foundational
element of the modern narrative of technological progress. This narrative only gained in
strength over the course of the twentieth century. The 1939 World’s Fair in New York City
made this forward-looking narrative explicit, taking “The World of Tomorrow” as its official
theme and including an exhibit called Futurama, produced by General Motors, which was
supposed to show what the world would look like in twenty years.135 This exhibit included
some technologies that were actually realized, such as a nationwide motorway system. General
Motors created a second Futurama exhibit when the World’s Fair returned to New York in
1964. This exhibit, Futurama II, featured a recorded narration promising a glimpse into “a
future not of dreams, but of reality.”136 The dioramas of Futurama II offer a vision of a world
tending inexorably toward automation, the expanding exploitation of natural resources, and
global capitalism. The course we take, the narrator assures us, will be one “that frees the mind
and the spirit as it improves the wellbeing of mankind.” In spite of the claims of some latetwentieth-century cultural theorists that we have entered a postmodern age in which such
grand narratives have lost their power, this narrative of technological progress retains a
significant degree of influence in the twenty-first century.137 If anything, the narrative’s grip
tightened in the early 2000s, as younger members of the middle and upper classes, especially in
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First World countries, came to face a powerful social imperative to adopt “cool” new
technologies and media platforms and to discard (except for the purposes of nostalgia or
contrarianism) such “legacy” forms as the landline phone and the print magazine.
The rise of the modern narrative of technological progress represents a definitive break
from the Enlightenment dreams that Babbage continued to defend. While the idea that
humankind marches inexorably forward might serve the purpose of giving technology
meaning—of enlivening it, as Coleridge might put it—it lacks the epistemological egalitarianism
of the radical Enlightenment. The teleology of Futurama II tends not toward enlightenment in
the Kantian sense of independence from authority, but rather toward greater dependence on
machines and infrastructural systems that one does not necessarily understand. This is not to
say that the Enlightenment epistemology Babbage employed came to an end in the nineteenth
century. It did not; indeed, the circuit diagrams and flowcharts used in twenty-first-century
engineering rest on methods of analysis not fundamentally different from the one described by
Condillac. But the early idéologues’ utopian dream of making such an analytical language
universal—of teaching everyone to speak, write and think in the same well-formed language
with the same set of scientifically rigorous ideas—has moved to the margins. Technical
language bleeds into the language of common life and vice versa, but the two are distinct; the
former can be subject to strict, institutionalized control—“regimentation,” as the twentiethcentury analytic philosopher W.V.O. Quine calls it (Word and Object 143)—whereas the latter
has a life of its own. Technical discourses have been shuffled off into a separate sphere from
the culture at large.
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This epistemic rift between engineers and consumers is exactly what Babbage was
struggling to prevent in his campaign for science. Just as he feared, most people can never fully
know what is going on inside the machines they use; only the experts truly understand. The
compartmentalization that emerged around the end of the nineteenth century only, however,
realized one half of Babbage’s fears, placing those without technical training in the dark but
enabling some elements of Enlightenment epistemology to persist in expert discourses. The
Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, and especially Poe’s reworking of it, revealed a possibility that
would, if realized, produce a more total break from the Enlightenment: that no one, not even
the experts, will fully understand how our machines work. If practice gets ahead of theory—if
people begin to deploy algorithms for practical purposes without first learning how to predict
their behavior reliably—then humanity will be just as helpless as Agathos in the face of the
terrible green star that he unwittingly spoke into being. In the present day, as algorithms are
becoming increasingly entangled with the messy and unpredictable details of culture, and as
artificial intelligence techniques reach new levels of complexity, the fear that technologists
have created something they cannot control has entered the public consciousness. In what
follows, I consider some ways in which the technical and humanistic perspectives may be
brought together more fruitfully to respond to the consequences of these entanglements. In
order to better take responsibility for the cultural effects of algorithms, I argue, it will be
necessary to reconcile ourselves to the fact that, once they leave the laboratory and enter the
world, they can never be entirely tamed by theory as Babbage had sought to tame his
computing machines.
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Coda

[A]nd I thought some good novel humbug, that smacked of the marvelous, that appealed to the
imagination, that made faith, and plenty of it, a sine qua non, and that was spiced with science,
or based upon it—for of all the humbugs with which the world has been humbugged since the
serpent humbugged Eve, and Eve humbugged Adam, and all their sons and daughters have
since humbugged each other, there is none so glorious, so radiant, as scientific humbug.
—P.T. Barnum

Culture and the Switching Circuit

If the second half of the nineteenth century was the period when modern disciplinary
boundaries formed, the past half-century has been fixated on unravelling them. Calls for a
blending of technical and humanistic perspectives have been frequent in recent decades,
coming from engineering and humanities fields alike. Ted Nelson, a major figure in the
development of the World Wide Web, makes one such call in his 1980 book Literary Machines.
Citing C.P. Snow’s 1959 essay on the “Two Cultures,” Nelson contrasts the perspectives of
“Technoids,” who place an excessive emphasis on mathematics and logic, and “Fluffies,” who
have “a humanistic background, in literature, history, the arts, etc.” (1/11). Although one can
detect that Nelson respects the “Technoids” more, he argues that computational media will
require a mode of thinking that escapes the dichotomy between the two perspectives (1/13).
Such thinking has been influential both in business circles and the academy. As Alexander
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Galloway has pointed out, in the Silicon Valley of the 1990s, it was a running joke that “if you
wanted a mediocre job at a dot-com, study computer science, but if you wanted to run the
company, study semiotics” (Galloway, “Interview”); starting a successful technology enterprise
was recognized to require both technical skill and a knack for “human factors.” Digital
humanists such as Stephen Ramsay have characterized themselves as similarly fusing technical
and interpretive perspectives, something that Ramsay sees as necessary to keep critical theory
relevant in the technocratic twenty-first century (“Why I’m In It”). Given the increasing
entanglement of technology and culture, Poe’s character Dupin, who unites the abilities of a
mathematician and a poet, is a compelling model for emulation.
But attempts to create such a fusion have been running into snags. Confirming
Habermas’s observation that attempts to recombine the alienated value spheres of modernity
tend to lord one sphere over the others (“Modernity” 11), projects that claim to blend the
technical and the humanistic have tended to privilege one of the two. On the technical side are
computational brutalists like Kittler, for whom the desire to think about technical issues like a
humanist is a vice. In his 1995 essay “There is No Software,” Kittler argues that “the so-called
philosophy of the computer community tends to systematically obscure hardware by software,
electronic signifiers by interfaces between formal and everyday languages” (n.p.). The practical
implication of this argument is that one should eshew the flashy abstractions of modern
graphical operating systems in favor of more technical interfaces such as the command line—
Kittler preferred Microsoft DOS—that grant one a more direct view of what is really happening
inside the machine. This line of thinking has recurred recently in discussions of the ways
computers are changing the practices of reading and writing. In her book Reading Writing
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Interfaces (2014), Lori Emerson argues that the fixation on intuitive, “user-friendly” computer
interfaces is becoming an “ideology” that “is used quite deliberately to distort reality” (xi); the
flashy graphics and smooth fonts of Apple Computer interfaces, she argues, give users a less
authentic engagement with the machine than more technical interfaces like DOS and the UNIX
shell. Like Kittler, Emerson advocates making the inner structures of computer systems visible
to the user, laying bare, as much as possible, the algorithms beneath. This imperative means, in
practice, approaching digital texts more like an engineer than like a literary critic in the
traditional sense.
At the other end of the spectrum are social constructionists Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and
David Golumbia, for whom the division between technical and cultural matters is a mere effect
of power. Chun and Golumbia have both connected the position of the computer user who is
given only a partial view of the system to the interpellated subject (Chun, Programmed Visions;
Golumbia, Cultural Logic). For Chun, software grants the user a false sense of agency while
actually constraining his or her actions; the sense that algorithms operate autonomously from
culture is, from Chun’s perspective, an illusion created by ideology. Golumbia similarly
questions whether algorithms can be legitimately separated from the political contexts that
created them. This constructionist position is unassailable on its own terms, but it does little to
remedy the disconnect between humanistic and technical fields. Golumbia’s approach treats
the cultural side of the technical–cultural divide as all in all, leaving no common ground on
which a dialogue with engineers could take place. The intellectual history of the algorithm that
I have undertaken in this dissertation can provide, I offer, an alternative framework for
understanding the cultural implications of technology that does not privilege either the cultural
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or the technical perspective nor seek to break down the boundary between them, but rather
seeks to articulate the function of that boundary more clearly and to open, perhaps, the
potential for reconfiguring the relation between algorithm and meaning.
A useful starting point is to consider some of the phenomenological differences
between technical and humanistic practices. Programming is manifestly a very different
experience from, for instance, doing a close-reading of a poem. As far back as the bronze age
of computer culture in the 1980s, programmers have reported an experience of intense focus
that is sometimes referred to as “hack mode.” As Eric S. Raymond puts it—using an earlier
sense of the word hacking that refers to any type of problem-solving, not just illicit ones—hack
mode is “a Zen-like state of total focus on The Problem that may be achieved when one is
hacking (this is why every good hacker is part mystic)” (“hack mode” n.p.). In The Art of Unix
Usability, Raymond and Rob W. Landley equate hack mode with the psychological idea of flow,
which was originally proposed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (“Interfaces and Flow”). As
Csikszentmihalyi defines it, flow is a pleasurable state in which one loses awareness of space
and time and devotes one’s full attention to a single activity (Flow: The Psychology of Optimal
Experience). Raymond and Landley offer advice on how to design software so as to encourage
the experience of flow, suggesting, for instance, avoiding pop-up alerts that might jolt users out
of a flow state (“The Rules of Usability”). There is perhaps an analogy between “hack mode”
and the experience of being absorbed in a novel; in both cases, one’s physical circumstances
seem to drop out of view. But what comes into focus during the programmer’s flow state is
very different from what a novel reader would typically be thinking about. Culture disappears,
as does the machine itself; one dives into a world of abstract problems that seem detached
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from materiality, language, and other people, except to the extent that other people are
directly involved with the code on which one is working.
This experience of culture dropping from view results, I wish to argue, from a set of
attitudes toward the relation of algorithm and ordinary language that we have inherited, most
importantly via George Boole, from the semiotic theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. By way of example, consider the situation of the “Save” item in a “File” menu. While
the term’s resonance with salvation has provided fodder for jokes (“Why does Jesus never lose
his work? Because Jesus saves!”), such punning has no disciplinary relevance to the logic of the
software, and users must push it aside when it is time to get work done. Computers are
constructed in such a way that they respond most usefully to instrumental thinking, and their
interfaces are designed so as to encourage even the non-technical user to use and interpret
words related to the machine in ways that correspond to the program logic. Thus, whatever
authoritarian connotations one might detect in the presence of a “Submit” button on a web
form, the best way to ensure that one correctly understands the system is to suppress these
meanings. User-interface designers certainly do consider existing semantic practices when they
select names, but when a misalignment occurs between the way a signifier functions in the
software and the meanings assigned to it by a culture at large, the technical realm has primacy;
if one wishes to avoid frustration, one must interpret the word in a way that corresponds to the
workings of the computer system, regardless of how well or how badly this reading coincides
with the linguistic practices of one’s community.138
This distinction between technical and common significations falls out along just the
lines of the dispute between voluntarism and involuntarism that took place in the eighteenth

351

century. The structure of computer languages—at least if we understand them the way
programmers are trained to—enacts a voluntarist view of the sign much like that of Condillac.
To give an example, one can name a pair of variables first_name and last_name or
first_name and mxxxphh5y, and the program will work in exactly the same way.139 The

names are, as programmers say, arbitrary; considered as signifiers they are voluntary in that
they can (in theory) be altered at will. But modern linguistics has followed Condillac’s
opponent, Herder, in maintaining that signifiers in natural languages are not arbitrary in this
sense of being intentionally modifiable. New words, linguistics rightly recognizes, are seldom
created from whole cloth; they are almost always made from previously existing linguistic
material, such as roots, affixes, foreign words, and proper names. If I coined the term largejawed bonefish to refer to a newly discovered species of shrub, people would undoubtedly be
confused. In that sense, signifiers in natural languages are not entirely arbitrary; even if the
language as a whole is based on arbitrary symbols, newly coined words rarely lack some trace
of pre-existing practices. Saussure calls this sort of partial non-arbitrariness “relative
motivation” (A Course in General Linguistics 131; see also Humboldt, On Language 77). These
historical considerations can affect computer code, too—there are certainly practical reasons to
use last_name rather than mxxxphh5y, especially if one is working together with other
programmers—but not at the level of computer logic. Computer languages are typically
designed to exclude, as much as possible, the choice of signifiers from having an effect on the
behavior of a program.
As hard as it may be to imagine an alternative, this manner of thinking about the
relation of algorithm and culture has not always been in place. For a seventeenth-century
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mathematician like William Oughtred or Leibniz, the value of algorithmic methods was that
they could represent the world in a way that had nothing to do with the ordinary language of
human beings. The appeal of real characters in this view was that their meanings were (it was
believed) not arbitrary in the way that the meanings of words were. Perhaps the individual
𝑎

characters that make up the formula 𝑦 = 2 (𝑒

𝑥⁄
𝑎

+𝑒

−𝑥⁄
𝑎)

were arbitrarily chosen, but the fact

that this particular arrangement of characters represents the shape of a chain hanging between
two fixed points (as Leibniz discovered in 1691) is, in the view of the real character tradition,
non-arbitrary.140 From this perspective, the choice between last_name and mxxxphh5y is of
no significance; the meaning of the system does not stem from what is happening in human
beings’ heads, but rather from the fact that algorithms exist in harmony with the natures of
things. In this view, no barrier separates the mechanical processes by which mathematicians
move characters around from the world of human life; algorithms do not exist in a realm of
abstraction separate from our world, but rather, as Leibniz put it, provide a way into the
interior of things. All one need do to guarantee meaningful results in any domain, from
mathematics to poetry, is to follow the rules.
If the real-character tradition aimed to use algorithms to create a non-arbitrary mode of
signification, Enlightenment theories of the sign went in the opposite extreme, pushing the
arbitrariness of the signifier much further than modern linguistics does. At the same time, this
tradition denied that algorithms themselves could be arbitrary, only accepting algorithmic
methods that were believed to be grounded in clear and certain principles. Someone like
Clairaut, d’Alembert or, especially, Condorcet would have viewed the presence of naturallanguage words in computer code with skepticism, since they could potentially introduce
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unclear concepts into one’s understanding of the system.141 The premise that natural
languages are insufficiently clear led to an obsession with eliminating all traces of the
vernacular from mathematical practice, creating, instead, a totally new system of signs that is
built from the ground up through explicit definitions. Condorcet may, in fact, have preferred
mxxxphh5y to last_name—or better yet, he would have preferred to use a numerical code

representing a position within a universal taxonomy of things. If culture would have dropped
out of view in the use of Condorcet’s universal algebra, it was because the ultimate goal of the
project was to replace culture altogether with something more rational.
It was only around the time of Babbage and Boole that something recognizably like the
autonomy of algorithm and meaning emerged. In the nineteenth century, mathematics came
to be viewed as a world of pure form, detached from mundane reality. For Boole, this world
was the (pseudo-)Kantian realm of pure reason, in which a level of certainty seemed possible
that could not be obtained in fields of knowledge tainted by the empirical. In this view,
signifiers like last_name serve to mediate between the formal structure of the algorithm,
which exists in this rarefied realm, and people’s existing modes of thought, providing a way for
the intuitions people receive from their cultures to guide their mathematical practice. In this
post-Kantian view, culture’s role in the design and use of algorithms is subjective and thus
cannot absolutely constrain the decisions that one makes; culture only takes on an objective
role when the time comes to relate the algorithmic system to the world of people and things.
This epistemological divide between, in Boole’s terminology, process and interpretation enables
the algorithmic aspects of a system to be chosen arbitrarily, irrespective of the already
established conventions that govern the semantic ones.
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For all its practical advantages, this sectoring off of algorithm and culture into
autonomous spheres has the side-effect of alienating the modes of thought involved in
technical disciplines from those involved in interpretation. The problem is that the choices one
makes in the algorithmic realm can feed back into one’s way of thinking about the signifiers one
uses. If one does choose mxxxphh5y rather than last_name, the former string will soon take
on a meaning in one’s mind—it will come to denote the element of the system to which it is
attached. This feedback may take place even if the names one choose are more in line with
ordinary language: the meanings the labels bear within the code will almost inevitably drift
away from the words’ ordinary significations in the language from which they are taken. In this
way, computers enable one to enter a private linguistic bubble in which one is alienated from
the practices of the broader community of language speakers.142
A clear instance of this disconnect has recently surfaced in digital humanities. In his
article on the meaning problem, Liu discusses a text-analysis technique known as topic
modeling, which provides a way of identifying clusters of words called topics that tend to
appear together within a collection of text (Liu, “Meaning” 414). These statistical patterns
sometimes, although not always, correlate roughly with what a human being would recognize
as the topic of a piece of writing—that is, what a text is about. The creators of a popular variant
of topic modeling known as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) make it clear, in the paper in which
they introduce the method, that one should not read too much into the word topic: “We refer
to the latent multinomial variables in the LDA model as topics, so as to exploit text-oriented
intuitions, but we make no epistemological claims regarding these latent variables beyond their
utility in representing probability distributions on sets of words” (Blei et al 996n). If one wishes
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to be precise, then one must interpret the “topics” as what they are—variables within a
statistical model—rather than equating them too readily with what one would ordinarily
understand to constitute topics. Among humanists who have adopted this method, the need to
avoid such overreach sometimes leads to self-conscious writing styles that encapsulate every
instance of the word topic in scare-quotes. But without the assumption that the “topics” in the
model correspond in some way to concepts accessible within the discourse of interpretation,
the results of topic modeling would seem to be incommensurable with knowledge produced
through more traditionally humanistic methods.
In spite of its seeming inevitability, this epistemological gap is not inherent in the nature
of computation; it results from a complex of assumptions about algorithm and culture that
crystalized in the nineteenth century. The systems of Leibniz and Condorcet would not
manifest the meaning problem, although they both would lead to other, perhaps equally
troubling problems. Like Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Condorcet’s belief in human
perfectibility, the present arrangement has political stakes. Leibniz’s system presumes a
hierarchical society that elevates the “excellent men” who define the rules of systems over the
mechanics who merely follow those rules. Condorcet’s language scheme was part of a
revolutionary program that would respond to the difficulty of interpreting topic models by
completely replacing the existing notion of topic with a new one based on the mathematical
model—at least if (and this is a big if) it were plausible to claim that this model rests on the
undeniable truths of universal reason. Modernity eschews this revolutionary program in favor
of disciplinary compartmentalization. From a technical perspective, culture provides a reservoir
of intuitions that can be used to find solutions to problems and develop new ideas; from a

356

cultural perspective, technical fields produce new forms that people must either give meaning
to somehow or else, when they have a choice, reject. The two perspectives are alienated from
each other by being founded on incompatible views of which aspects of language are capable of
arbitrary alteration.
The epistemologies of Leibniz and Condorcet are not coming back, but it would be shortsighted to suppose that the present arrangement will last forever. It is possible that this change
will happen sooner rather than later. As of 2018, a disillusionment with Silicon Valley has
grown in some regions of the popular discourse, a development that may result in a
reconfiguration of the systems of trust that govern technical knowledge. On the engineering
side, the invention of new and somewhat unpredictable forms of artificial intelligence have
made it more difficult for developers to exert total control over their creations. These new
developments create the potential for an epistemological readjustment that could, perhaps,
enable a more productive interchange between the interpretive and algorithmic perspectives
than exists at present. There may not currently be much reason to hope for such an outcome,
but to decline the attempt to imagine a path to a better world is to concede defeat.

The Incomprehensible Prophecy

In a 2016 interview, the English electronic music duo Autechre discuss the possibility of artificial
intelligence playing a role in the composition of music. Autechre is known for being one of the
first major musical groups to generate elements of their music algorithmically, a practice they
first adopted with their 2001 album Confield. As they discuss in the interview, they have also
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developed an elaborate system of computer automation that they use in their live
performances to compose music on the fly. The interviewer asks the members of the duo, Sean
Booth and Rob Brown, if they perceive this software as “another entity in the band” besides
themselves (Booth and Brown n.p.). They both say yes, but they deny that it is an intelligent
entity. “[I]t's not another mind at work in our stuff,” Booth says; “It's just our habits,
transcribed” (n.p.). Booth elaborates that the negative reaction some people have to
automating music production—thinking that the resulting music is “not human”—rests on a
misunderstanding (n.p.). “With this kind of algorithmic music, because the algorithms are made
by people, it is people music”—since the logic of the software is based on human decisions, it
contains, as the interviewer puts it, “ghosts and psychic residue” from the human beings who
designed it (n.p.).
But some new forms of artificial intelligence are going beyond the mere transcription of
human habits. In the present day, excitement is growing about deep learning, which is one of
the most sophisticated variants of a broader approach to AI known as machine learning. Deep
learning presents a general set of pattern-recognition methods that can be applied to virtually
any type of data.143 One of the most common forms of deep learning involves a computational
model called a neural network, which essentially consists of multiple copies of the same
mathematical function composed in interlocking patterns into a single, large function; these
networks are “trained” by adjusting the parameters of those functions so as to approximate a
desired behavior, such as recognizing whether a given image represents a horse. The
excitement over deep learning stems from the fact that it can apparently handle tasks that had
formerly been outside the scope of what algorithms could do. A human being would have a
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hard time devising an explicit set of criteria for determining whether an image depicts a horse,
but having a neural network “learn” the criteria for itself based on a large number of example
images works remarkably well (although it certainly does not work perfectly). As of this writing,
deep-learning techniques have already been adopted in numerous applications, including not
just image recognition, but also machine translation, voice recognition, and the filtering of
social media content.
The rise of deep learning raises a new set of philosophical questions that do not arise
with regard to algorithms that merely formalize existing human practices. Some writers have
explained the power of neural networks with the idea of emergence, which describes the
process by which complex behaviors can result from systems based on simple elements; an
important reference point for the idea of emergence is Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher,
Bach (1979), although Hofstadter himself has expressed skepticism about whether deeplearning systems are truly intelligent (“The Shallowness of Google Translate”). This
conversation could be seen as a continuation of the questioning of the nature of intelligence
that has been a part of the discourse surrounding computing machines going back to Alan
Turing. But considered in relation to culture, the rise of machine learning raises a different set
of issues that belong more to ethics than to the philosophy of mind. The problem lies in the
fact that these new techniques enable one to achieve practical goals, such as classifying large
numbers of images, without the need for a theory that can fully explain how the algorithms are
functioning. This gap between practice and theory can lead to the development of software
that produces unexpected and sometimes troubling results.
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Examples of such troubling behaviors have been proliferating in recent years. In 2017,
for instance, a group of researchers found a way of creating a 3D-printed object that looks like a
turtle to human beings, but that one of Google’s image-recognition systems consistently
recognizes as a rifle (Athalye et al). This example shows that, while the categories employed by
the software correspond approximately to human concepts such as turtle, they do not align
exactly, and the gaps between algorithm and concept can be exploited. Even more
concerningly, there have been several widely reported cases of AI systems “learning” to
discriminate racially, such as a facial-recognition program that failed to recognize African
American faces (Chen; Garvie and Frankle; B. A. Williams et al). In his 2018 book Algorithms of
Oppression, Safiya Umoja Noble argues that the algorithms used by technology companies like
Google enact what he calls “technological redlining,” a new form of racial profiling masked by
the putative objectivity of computation (1). The recurrence of such problems highlights the
need for systems of accountability capable of mitigating the discriminatory or otherwise
harmful effects of artificial-intelligence systems. More pragmatically, it gives technologists an
imperative to develop, if possible, ways of better controlling their use of AI so as to avoid
producing such effects unintentionally.
Such efforts are complicated, however, by the fact that there is, as yet, no generally
reliable method for predicting how AI systems will behave. Many neural networks contain
elements that are, like Boole’s logical quotients, uninterpretable, and researchers have debated
the extent to which deep learning systems are “black boxes” whose inner workings are
incomprehensible to humans.144 The need to better understand how AI systems function has
led researchers to study them experimentally, as one would study the behavior of an animal.
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One method, for instance, uses a second neural network to generate natural-language
explanations of what is happening in the network used to perform a classification task (Barratt);
AI practitioners also commonly use visual methods to examine the intermediate steps that
neural networks take in processing data. Yet these empirical methods do not provide a
comprehensive explanation of how deep-learning systems operate, and some aspects of the
software’s behavior remain (as of this writing) poorly understood. The AI researcher Naftali
Tishby discusses this problem in a 2017 conference talk, in which he proposes a theory of
machine learning that he calls the “Information Bottleneck Framework” (Tishby). A neural
network, Tishby hypothesizes, begins by “memorizing” patterns from the data, then selectively
“forgets” information that proves irrelevant (Wolchover n.p.). Whether or not this theory
ultimately proves successful is beside the point. The fact that its success is still up in the air—
that researchers will go on to test it, revise it, and consider alternative explanations—is a sign
that, just as Babbage feared, technê has gotten fully ahead of epistemê. To the extent that a
fully developed theory of their behavior is still forthcoming, neural networks contain an
element of what programmers sometimes call “black magic”—techniques that work for reasons
no one understands (Raymond, “black magic” n.p.). Using such techniques is generally
regarded as a bad practice, but it is becoming the law of the land as undertheorized artificialintelligence techniques become essential parts of the programmer’s toolkit.
Even if deep learning is one day fully tamed by theory, the broader issue about the
changing relation of epistemê and technê remains. The widespread acceptance of the “black
magic” of machine learning signals a shift away from the “SCIENCE FINDS—INDUSTRY APPLIES”
model of technological progress toward making industry the prime mover. This shift is also
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manifest in the rise of new management practices that value quantified results over theoretical
principles. In 2001, for instance, a group of programmers published a manifesto for an
approach to making software that they call agile development. Agile development values, as
the manifesto puts it, “Responding to Change over following a plan” (“Manifesto for Agile
Software Development” n.p.; emphasis in original); the idea is to adapt as rapidly as possible to
the changing desires of consumers rather than deciding ahead of time what one’s product will
look like. A major problem raised by such practice-before-theory approaches to engineering is
that they provide no clear means of taking responsibility for the effects of one’s choices. I do
not mean to single out agile development in particular as a cause of this problem; it is the result
of broader systemic factors in the present global economy. The effect of the profit-maximizing
methods of the technology sector is to create feedback loops in which technological platforms
like Facebook influence people’s opinions, which in turn prompts a readjustment in the
technology, ad infinitum, rapidly altering culture in ways that no one can predict with certainty.
Concerns about these effects broke into the mainstream media in 2016, when the
unexpected outcome of the US presidential election, among other factors, led to the fear that
social-media platforms were encouraging political polarization, the spread of misinformation,
and the radicalization of racism and misogyny. Chamath Palihapitiya, a former Facebook vice
president, made one such argument in a seminar at Stanford in 2017, stating that technology
companies “have created tools that are ripping apart the social fabric of how society works”
(quoted by Vincent n.p.). The media discourse on this issue has revolved around the figure of
the algorithm, which serves, in this context, as a metonymy for the inscrutable forces that seem
to be driving cultural change in disturbing directions. If Autechre’s use of automation
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introduced another entity into their musical practice, something analogous has, if we take
these arguments seriously, happened to our political discourse: an alien voice—the voice of the
algorithm—has entered the public sphere. But whereas the members of Autechre maintain
that their music-making algorithms are grounded in their own sensibilities, the workings of
social-media filtering algorithms are not so clearly traceable back to the decisions of individuals.
Recommendation engines are based on data provided by millions or billions of users, some of it
created for innocuous reasons, some of it concocted with malicious intent. Making sense of
this situation is not simply a matter of understanding the technical aspects of the software
running the platforms, but rather requires the elusive dual perspective from which culture and
algorithm are both visible. Whether and how we can understand the effects of these
technologies on our world will be one of the central problems of the twenty-first century.
An early foreshadowing of this crisis may be found in the work of Babbage. In the
darkness just before the dawn of general-purpose computing, Babbage recognized the
possibility of building a machine whose behavior one cannot predict. What held him back from
embracing this possibility was a narrative of progress that insisted on placing humanity and, in
particular, science at the helm of the machines we create. In the final chapter of The Economy
of Machinery, which presents a more worldly but no less visionary account of humankind’s
future than The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, Babbage imagines a coming time in which “the
dominion of mind over the material world advances with an ever-accelerating force” (318).
That this dominion is coming, he tells us, is confirmed by the fact that many miracles once
imagined by poets, such as the taming of wind and fire, have become real on account of
technological advances like the sail and the oil lamp. As we gain ever more control over nature,
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Babbage writes, legend gives way to science, and “the unruly masters of the poet and the seer
become the obedient slaves of civilized man” (318). This aspect of the narrative of progress
persists to this day in, for instance, the discourse of television commercials. But it is reaching its
limits. Far from being our slaves, the machines with which we coexist are slipping out of our
individual control and, to the extent that algorithms have gained a role in determining how
people interact and consume information, becoming our masters.
In light of the apparent triumph of practice over theory, one might suppose that those
poets and seers Babbage mentioned will be coming back—that the biggest technological
changes of the future will not be driven by rational forethought, but rather by intuition and
imagination. The thought leaders of Silicon Valley would certainly be glad to take over the role
of seers, having enthusiastically positioned themselves, since at least the 1980s, as visionaries.
But ceding this role to technologists would hardly be satisfactory. As Coleridge would remind
us, the role of the seer is a fundamentally moral one; to prognosticate requires a vision of how
the world ought to be. The problem is not exactly that the prophets of Silicon Valley are the
wrong people for the job, but rather that, if we are to maintain some hope of a democratic
future, no one group of people can be trusted with stewardship over the cultural effects of
technology. I would like to end, then, by suggesting an alternative way of addressing the ethical
dimensions of technological change: everyone, not just engineers and technology-industry
executives, must take some degree of responsibility for what happens at the interface of
algorithm and culture. The creators of technology certainly must be held accountable for what
they do, not least for intentionally designing technologies in ways that encourage addictive
behaviors. But granting all the responsibility to them is insufficient in a situation that renders it
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impossible for anyone, even the most powerful, to gain a full view of the effects that
technological decisions will have. In order for society to maintain some degree of
egalitarianism, ordinary people must also play a role in determining the direction that
technology takes us, not necessarily by making market decisions—as if one could realistically
opt out of Google—but rather by reflecting more critically on the ways technology is influencing
their modes of thought and resisting this influence when they judge it to be pernicious. 145 If
culture exists outside of the voluntary control of any individual, moral agency must be
distributed.
The praxis I am suggesting raises an epistemological question: how does one take
responsibility for one’s engagement with algorithms when one cannot always understand
them? One readily available answer is that technical knowledge should be spread far and wide.
The past two decades have seen a profusion of popular books that aim to demystify computers,
such as Charles Petzold’s Code: The Hidden Language of Computer Hardware (1999) and Pedro
Domingos’s The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will
Remake Our World (2015). A premise of these books is that learning about technology can be
empowering because it enables one to make more informed decisions. Domingos argues, for
instance, that we can take control of how our use of social media affects the advertisements we
see, what the government knows about us, and (perhaps) our credit ratings (267-76). Such
efforts at demystification aim to make computers a bit more like Stanhope’s Demonstrator—a
bit more transparent. Spreading knowledge about how computers work is certainly a positive
step, but supposing that this sort of technical literacy is sufficient to democratize technology
carries the danger of deferring the possibility of genuine democracy to an ever-receding future
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state in which everyone is enlightened. A similar problem faces the open source movement,
which seeks to make the code of software available to the public so that people may examine it
and create their own modified versions of a program. Like technical literacy, open source is by
and large a good thing, but it is not sufficient to head off the oligarchical implications of
technology. If the ability to make good decisions were entirely dependent on technical
knowledge, then those who do not have the ability, time, and resources both to gain this
knowledge and to put it into use will simply be left behind.
Rather than waiting in vain for universal enlightenment, a truly egalitarian epistemology
must be able to function in a world that will always have its dark corners—a world in which we
can never expect to gain total knowledge of what is going on inside the black boxes of
computation. One such approach, I would like to conclude by suggesting, can be derived from
the resonance that computation has long had with the poetic avant garde. By poetic, for this
purpose, I mean any semiotic practice that has license to break the rules of ordinary language
and explore meaning-making possibilities on the margins of established conventions. Software
has this license, at least to the extent that it employs algorithmic logic rather than grammar to
contextualize the signs that appear in the interface: the words on a computer screen can easily
gain entirely different meanings from the ones they ordinarily bear. Thinking about the
semiotics of computation as poetic, I propose, can serve as the basis for a way of critically
engaging with computer systems that does not require complete knowledge of those elements
that are hidden from the user.146 Algorithms only have their present power over culture
because the belief in the narrative of technological progress, combined with the set of practices
that we have inherited from Boole—the use of signifiers to bridge the gap between
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autonomous algorithmic and cultural realms—enables user interfaces to shepherd people into
particular ways of thinking. This situation could be changed with a stronger awareness of the
ways computation is bending the rules of our languages.
A poetic view of computation could lead us in multiple directions, not all of them
particularly democratic. It was a commonplace in the involuntarist tradition of the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that poets have a special ability to do what ordinary
persons could not, to alter a language. Such views had strong footholds in Germany (Herder,
Humboldt) and the United States (Emerson, Whitman), and Coleridge sometimes came close to
this position as well. For Emerson, “the poet is the Namer or Language-maker” (Essential
Writings 296); in Herder’s view, poetry is the best means of swaying the mysterious agents that
drive cultural change. If one replaces the poet with the technologist and overlooks the moral
component of these arguments, then the result is precisely the modern narrative of
technological progress: the technologists lead and culture follows. But this view of poetry is not
the only one applicable. One approach that I find promising is to design interfaces that allow
the signifiers on the screen to drift away from their ordinary meanings, as they inevitably will,
but to present these signifiers in a way that emphasizes the uncanniness of this drifting—of the
fact that things are going on with the words on the screen that differ from the way language
ordinarily works. Take as an example the 2013 interactive-fiction piece Ultra Business Tycoon III
by the art-games designer Porpentine. This highly disturbing game parodies the logic of
capitalism by casting the player into a “business world” in which everything is defined by
economic relations. In one series of events, the player character vomits, and the game dutifully
reports that “[t]he vomit cannot be monetized.” As these jarring effects accumulate, one gets
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the sense that the words on the screen refer to entities that bear only a partial resemblance to
their real-world counterparts, alien entities that exist in a world operating according to
different rules from the ones that govern consensus reality.
The uncanny elements of this game serve, above all, to remind the player of the
existence of forces beyond what he or she can comprehend or control. Employing some such
reminder is, I maintain, critical to breaking out of the technocratic formation that alienates
computational from interpretive perspectives. A poetic approach to computation, meaning one
in which the user maintains conscious awareness of the effects that algorithms have on the
production of meaning, must rest on the recognition that what happens at the interface of
computation and culture can never be entirely under the voluntary control of any individual,
whether user or developer. Culture cannot, or at least should not, be subject to the sort of
absolute governance that engineers have sought, since the time of Babbage, to maintain over
their creations. If I am right, then it is a desire to maintain total mastery over the situation that
causes the involuntary aspects of language, which are captured under the category of culture,
to fall from the programmer’s view. Reckoning with the cultural effects of algorithms means
giving up on this dream of mastery.
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Notes

1

Peter’s book appeared in a second edition in 1678 and in two further editions in 1679. The
first edition only includes tables for generating hexameter; the subsequent editions include a
different set of hexameter tables along with a similar set of tables for pentameter. These
revised tables were later reproduced in a 1739 book entitled The Curiosity: or, the Gentleman
and Lady's Library (193-201); similar tables probably inspired by Peter’s were published in a
variety of other eighteenth-century texts. All of my quotations are from a 1679 edition that
includes a somewhat more extensive preface than the first edition. For a contextual account of
Peter’s pamphlet, see Ruff.
2 Chapter 2 includes a brief discussion of chemistry, but my focus is on the way eighteenthcentury chemists reformed their nomenclature, which falls, for my purposes, under the banner
of semiotics. I also include a number of discussions of logic, which is distinct from the three
disciplinary histories by which I have set my scope. However, the forms of logic in which I am
most interested overlap heavily with the other disciplines: semiotics in the case of eighteenthcentury empiricist logic, which is often indistinguishable from the linguistic thought of the time,
and mathematics in the case of nineteenth-century symbolic logic. In spite of these overlaps, it
is worth stressing that mathematics and logic constituted two entirely separate disciplines until
Boole and De Morgan brought them together in the 1840s, and that the convergence of
mathematical computation and formal logic in computing machines did not happen until the
twentieth century. On account of this disciplinary separation, Michael S. Mahoney has warned
against conflating the histories of calculating machines and logic machines (“The History of
Computing in the History of Technology”). Recently, Matthew L. Jones has argued that
Mahoney’s division depends on too idealistic a view of computing; instead, Jones notes,
starting in the seventeenth century, “[t]he histories of calculating machines and logic
intersected time and again—not of necessity, but contingently” (11). I am interested in
uncovering broader attitudes toward mechanical processes and their relation to meaning, so I
cover both logic machines and mechanical calculators; however, it is important to keep in mind
that thinkers in prior centuries would not necessarily have drawn a disciplinary connection
between the two.
3 The exact number and identity of the value spheres differed in Weber’s various articulations
of this idea. In, for instance, “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,” he
discusses five spheres, the economic, political, esthetic, erotic, and intellectual (331-57). In
“Modernity: An Unfinished Project,” Habermas modifies Weber’s scheme to consist of the
three value spheres of science, aesthetics, and moral philosophy, which correspond roughly,
although not exactly, to Kant’s division of pure reason, aesthetics, and practical reason (45).
See also Oakes.
4 On the context and reception of Snow’s idea of the “two cultures,” see Porter, “The Two
Cultures Revisited,” Mosco, “Entanglements: Between Two Cultures and Beyond Science Wars,”
and Rheinberger, “Culture and Nature in the Prism of Knowledge.” For some alternative
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perspectives on the relation of culture and science, see Levine and Rauch, eds., One Culture:
Essays in Science and Literature.
5 Habermas, “Modernity: An Unfinished Project” 38; see Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse
of Modernity and d’Entrèves and Benhabib, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity:
Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. It is also worth mentioning another
debate about the legitimacy of modernity that took place between the twentieth-century
German philosophers Karl Löwith and Hans Blumenberg. Löwith argued that the modern
notion of history emerged from Christian eschatology, on which grounds he critiqued the
West’s claims of secularization; Blumenberg defended the legitimacy of secularizing religious
concepts and thus of modernity itself. This debate refers to a long-view notion of modernity
that begins around the Renaissance, and of which Montaigne and Descartes are potential
founding figures. The modernity that I discuss here is a narrower one that is characterized by
the fragmentation of knowledge disciplines and the division of science from culture; this form
of modernity emerged, at the earliest, around the Romantic period, and arguably was not
complete until around 1880 or 90. See Löwith, Meaning in History; Blumenberg, Legitimacy of
the Modern Age.
6 My account of eighteenth-century empiricist attitudes toward language is inspired in part by
Foucault’s discussion of the “regime of representation,” and my section on nineteenth-century
linguistics draws upon Foucault’s book as well. However, my account of the seventeenth
century differs drastically from Foucault’s, which is now generally recognized as problematic
(see Clauss; Lewis 3-4). Foucault pays little attention to Leibniz, and although he begins his
book with a reading of Jorge Luis Borges’s essay about John Wilkins, he makes little attempt to
understand Wilkins on his own terms. I also differ from Foucault in considering eighteenthcentury historicism and hermenutics as part of the linguistic thought of the time; Foucault
mostly ignores these traditions, perhaps because of his preference for French over German
authors. Most importantly, Foucault only briefly touches on the changing conceptions of
“mathesis” in the early-modern period, whereas I intend to show how mathematical practice
changed in tandem with the broader epistemological changes of the seventeenth to the
nineteenth century. My focus on the changing relation of algorithm to meaning ultimately
leads me in a very different direction from that of Foucault’s archaeology of the “human
sciences.” It should be noted that Foucault has also been criticized for failing to account
adequately for developments after 1850; see Palti, “The ‘Return of the Subject’ as a HistoricoIntellectual Problem” and Kittler, Discourse Networks 278.
7 My choice of the word empiricist embroils me in a longstanding scholarly debate, so it is
worthy of explanation. In the received history of eighteenth-century philosophy, which derives
ultimately from the work of Thomas Reid, the philosophy of the period was divided into
rationalists such as Leibniz, who believed that reason could deduce truth from undeniable
principles, and empiricists such as Locke, who believed that all knowledge was derived from the
senses. Immanuel Kant’s great intervention was, in this view, to attempt to fuse these two
strains of philosophy. Modern scholars have critiqued the idea that there was an absolute
division between rationalism and empiricism before Kant (see Norton, “The Myth of ‘British
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Empiricism’”). As Hans Aarsleff has argued, the assumption that Locke is an empiricist in Reid’s
strict sense leads to a distorted view of his philosophy, which clearly distinguished rational
thought from the mechanical following of associations (From Locke to Saussure 130). While I
agree with Aarsleff that Locke was not an associationist in the manner of later thinkers like
David Hartley and La Mettrie, I still find Reid’s distinction between empiricism and rationalism a
useful rubric for understanding the major currents of eighteenth-century thought. Empiricism
means, for my purposes, any philosophy that emphasizes the grounding of knowledge in
sensory data, whether or not some rational component is additionally required. Thinkers with
empiricist leanings in this sense include Locke, Newton, Condillac, and, in my reading, Herder;
Leibniz and Berkeley do not fit into my definition of empiricism.
8 Knuth writes, “I tend to think of algorithms as encompassing the whole range of concepts
dealing with well-defined processes, including the structure of data that is being acted upon as
well as the structure of the sequence of operations being performed” (“Algorithmic Thinking”
170). He represents his inclusion of data structures as a departure from the consensus.
9 It should be noted that the term algorithm also has a more specific, technical definition in
Alan Turing’s theory of computation. For Turing, algorithm refers specifically to a procedure for
computing a mathematical function; this definition restricts the term to procedures whose
input is fixed at the beginning, rather than provided through continuous interaction with an
environment. Turing’s definition is not directly relevant to the historical period I am covering
here, but it is worth emphasizing that results from modern theoretical computer science do not
necessarily apply to everything that could be called an algorithm in the non-technical definition
I am using. For a warning about the danger of extending Turing’s theory to where it does not
properly apply, see Goldin and Wegner, “The Origins of the Turing Thesis Myth.”
10 See The Algebra of Mohammed ben Musa, trans. Rosen.
11 An important exception would be the algorithms implemented in the microprogramming of
computing machines—that is, the design of the physical processes that take place when the
machine performs operations such as single-digit addition, carrying digits, and so on. These
algorithms involve pieces of metal or electronic components rather than characters. However,
written notations do often play a role in the design of these non-symbolic algorithms. Charles
Babbage went to great lengths to develop a notation system for describing complex mechanical
systems, thus bringing writing into the practice of microprogramming; similar notations exist
for electronics. The procedures for using an abacus are also examples of algorithms that do not
involve written or printed characters, although one might argue that an abacus involves a
mechanical representation of characters.
12 There have been many attempts to frame Leibniz’s work as a predecessor to the computer,
some more justified than others. My account emphasizes one thread that links Leibniz to the
modern field of computer science—he was interested in turning reasoning into a more
“mechanical” process as a way of circumventing the uncertainty of language. However, I am for
the most part more concerned with uncovering the alienness of the ways in which Leibniz and
other thinkers from before 1900 thought about the relationship of the mechanical to meaning;
my interest in Leibniz, in Michel Foucault’s terms, is archaeological, not genealogical.
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It may be assumed that the subjective corresponds to culture and the objective to science,
but this would, as I discuss in Chapter 4, be a misunderstanding of how these terms functioned
in the early nineteenth century; for Romantic thinkers, science, literature, and culture all had
both subjective and objective aspects.
14 On the relation of meter to technological standardization efforts in the Victorian period, see
Hall, Nineteenth-Century Verse and Technology: Machines of Meter.
15 On account of the revival of Leibniz’s intellectual reputation, it is appropriate that, in 1845, an
English inventor named John Clark created a machine called The Eureka that could create Latin
verses on the basis of similar principles to John Peter’s versifying system. The idea was not
entirely forgotten between the time of Peter and Clark, though; some eighteenth-century
authors produced other versifying tables on similar principles to Peter’s, although these authors
seemed to have a more clearly satirical purpose that Peter himself. See Jason David Hall,
Nineteenth-Century Verse and Technology: Machines of Meter.
16 Lev Manovich has also connected computation to the notion of the avant garde, arguing that
“new media is indeed the new cultural avant-garde” (1); however, his emphasis is more on the
similarities between graphical user interfaces and Modernist design techniques such as
photomontage than on notions of historical agency. See Manovich, “Avant-garde as Software.”
17 Some promotional materials use the slightly softer phrasing “MAN ADAPTS.”
18 James Knowlson and M. M. Slaughter use the term universal language to describe Wilkins’s
scheme; Umberto Eco applies the term philosophical language to both Wilkins and Leibniz in
The Search for the Perfect Language. Rhodri Lewis includes Wilkins’s work under the broader
umbrella of the artificial language. As Jaap Maat points out in his book Philosophical
Languages in the Seventeenth Century, these classifications are misleading because the term
language, in the seventeenth century, referred specifically to forms of communication that
were primarily spoken, while projects that involved symbols were almost always called
characters (22-23). Maat, however, treats this as no more than a terminological confusion,
assuming that words and symbols are interchangeable for the purposes of seventeenth-century
semiotics (22). My argument emphasizes the differences in attitudes towards spoken and
visual communication at the time. Accordingly, I have avoided referring to the schemes of
Wilkins and Leibniz as languages.
19 Jaap Maat and Andreas Blank have both discussed Wilkins and Leibniz together. Maat finds
that Leibniz was heavily engaged with Wilkins’s work while planning the calculus ratiocinatur
and argues that it should be included in the tradition of universal language schemes as well as
in the history of logic, in which context it has been studied the most (382). Blank similarly
argues that Wilkins was more of an influence on Leibniz than has been acknowledged, focusing
particularly on how Leibniz dealt with the relation of ordinary concepts to metaphysical ones
(51).
20 For instance, Charles Hayes, in the preface to an English-language account of Newton’s
theory of physics published in 1704, wrote that authors should not seek “empty applause by
writing in a language not easily attain’d, as if the Knowledge of things and words had a
necessary dependence on each other” (quoted in Guicciardini, Development of Newtonian
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Calculus 15-16). Knowlson argues that this desire to study things rather than words led
seventeenth-century scholars to resist learning multiple vernaculars, thus reinforcing the desire
for a universal language (29).
21 George Dalgarno is one such exception, as Maat points out; in Ars Signorum, he states that
“the art of audible signs and visible signs is one and the same” (quoted by Maat 44). While Maat
suggests that Dalgarno realized the equivalence of the two types of signs while undertaking his
real character project, John Wallis takes credit for convincing Dalgarno of this point in his 1678
pamphlet Defence of the Royal Society. In a discussion of an early version of Dalgarno’s project,
Wallis told Dalgarno, according to the pamphlet, that “this Universal Character, must be in the
nature of a New Language,” in response to which Dalgarno modified his scheme so as “to make
his Character Effable” (that is, audible) (16). Wallis’s account may not be credible; Rhordri Lewis
argues that it is not (86-87). In any case, the fact that, as Maat notes, Dalgarno felt the need to
devote an entire chapter of his book to defending the position that spoken and written signs
are equivalent (Maat 44) suggests that it ran contrary to the common belief of the time.
22 In addition to Dalgarno (see the previous note), John Wallis was critical of the idea that a real
character could overcome the limitations of vocal language. In Defence of the Royal Society, he
suggests that the scheme is inherently impractical: “For all Persons, to Learn his Character, and
to have all Books, Written in it; is the same thing as to Translate all Books into One Language,
and to have this Language learned by All”—something that Wallis takes as self-evidently absurd
(16).
23 The Hindu-Arabic numeral system was seen as a major advance over other options because,
unlike the verbal numeration of English, which requires the creation of additional words as
numbers get larger (million, billion, trillion), it could express any integer with a fixed set of
symbols—nine digits (1–9) and one cypher (0), as it was commonly explained in the
seventeenth century. See the arithmetic texts of Jonas Moore (1650) and William Leybourn
(1657) for examples.
24 See, for example, Rayner, White, Johnson, and Liversedge, “Raeding wrods with jubmled
lettres;” Jaeger, “Redundancy and reduction;” and Piantadosi, Tily, and Gibson, “Word lengths
are optimized for efficient communication.”
25 Some twenty-first century philosophers call this sort of operation extended cognition—the
incorporation of external objects, such as the pen and paper of the mathematician, into one’s
mental processes. See Clark (xxviii).
26 C.f. Thomas Baker, who defends prolixity in the preface of his book The Geometrical Key
(1684), arguing that Descartes, “had he not been so designedly concise and curt (as himself says
he was) tho he hath still many Admirers, yet might he have had more Readers, and fewer
Commentators” (n.p.).
27 As Maat points out (330), Leibniz appears to have begun with a plan for a universal character,
but decided to add a spoken component as well after hearing about Wilkins’s work in the early
1670s. Maat argues that Leibniz saw the spoken and written versions as interchangeable;
however, it is apparent from the comments Maat cites that the use of visual symbols does play
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a special role in his scheme, because, like algebraic notation, they facilitate certain types of
algorithmic reasoning that cannot easily be done with spoken words.
28 The idea of a division of labor between intellectual disciplines runs contrary to the Baconian
program, in which different areas of study were thought to correspond to different mental
faculties that coexisted in every human mind. Valenza argues that, in Britain, this Baconian
view of the disciplines did not give way to the division-of-labor model until the latter half of the
eighteenth century with the work of Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart (11-13).
29 Golumbia argues that Leibniz’s cult-hero status among computer scientists is due in part to
his political support of administrative centralization (8).
30 Loemker explains Leibniz’s confidence that calculation could extend beyond mathematics
with another appeal to ambiguity, arguing that, in attempting to apply the method of logical
analysis to substances, Leibniz equivocated between an Aristotelian–Stoic view of substances
and a Platonic theory of forms (16).
31 Poststructuralists have long noted Locke’s hypocrisy in criticizing the use of metaphor in spite
of the fact that he uses metaphors frequently himself. At one point in the Essay, to pick an
especially egregious instance, he argues that using words without attaching fixed ideas to them
serves to “break or stop the pipes” by which knowledge is transmitted (454). However, it
should be noted that Locke walks back on his criticism of metaphor somewhat in his later book
The Conduct of the Understanding, which was initially intended to be part of a revised version
of the Essay; here, he claims that metaphor is acceptable as means of explaining ideas and as
an “ornament of speech” (73), objecting only to the use of metaphors in the process of
reasoning. Nonetheless, Locke has little appreciation for the possibility that figurative language
could play a role in cognition, as, for instance, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson famously
argued in Metaphors We Live By.
32 I say partially algorithmic because the procedure for analytic integration often involves
substitution methods, which leave some room for judgment. A typical process of symbolic
integration consists, in my terminology, of applying a series of procedures that are individually
algorithmic, but choosing which algorithms to apply generally involves intuition. The procedure
for differentiation, at least in simple cases, is readily reducible to a fully deterministic algorithm.
33 The Analyst 9-14. Berkeley’s pamphlet is primarily directed against the Newtonian version of
the calculus, not the Leibnizian one, but this passage includes a discussion of “foreign
Mathematicians” who follow Leibniz’s approach (9), and Berkeley gives examples of both the
Newtonian and Leibnizian notations (13).
34 Suppose for instance, that 𝑦 = 2𝑥. Then, by following the procedure for derivative, one gets
1 𝑑𝑦
1
𝑑𝑦
=
2.
By
substitution,
then,
𝑑𝑥
=
2𝑑𝑥. If one cancels out the two instances of 𝑑𝑥 on
∫
∫
0 𝑑𝑥
0
𝑑𝑥
1

1

the left—this is where the proof goes wrong—one ends up with ∫0 𝑑𝑦 = ∫0 2𝑑𝑥 , which,
performing the integrals, gives 1 = 2.
35 Although the Cauchy–Weierstrass foundation for the calculus is now the standard one, an
alternative approach called non-standard analysis emerged in the twentieth century that does
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allow the existence of infinitesimals; this work proved that Leibniz’s original approach was
viable after all, albeit with some modification. See Robinson, Non-Standard Analysis.
36 The exact origins of the epsilon–delta formula are somewhat muddled, and Cauchy
potentially deserves credit for using the formula before Bolzano even though he did not
explicitly state it. See Grabiner.
37 Strictly speaking, Lagrange’s theory had a fatal flaw that would have discredited it by
eighteenth-century standards had it come to light. Lagrange tried to base the calculus on the
idea of a Taylor series, which provides a way of approximating mathematical functions by
means of polynomials. It can be proven that Taylor expansions do not exist for all functions, on
account of which they are insufficient as a foundation for the calculus. But this was not
discovered until the nineteenth century. See Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage” 36-37.
38 See Hine 42. One of the most prominent critiques along these lines was made by George
Berkeley, who argued in The Analyst that the Newtonian calculus rested on absurd assumptions
about the existence of infinitesimals; see Guicciardini, Development of Newtonian Calculus 39.
39 Newton appears to make a similar distinction in an undated journal passage titled
“Restoration of the Ancients’ Solid Loci.” Against Descartes’s claim to have been the first to
solve Pappus’s problem, Newton argues that “the Ancients” had already worked out the
solution to the problem, but had chosen not to reveal it because it could not be clearly
explained in words (277). Newton’s reasoning seems to be that symbolic notations existed as
private means of ratiocination in antiquity, but were not viewed as appropriate for
communicative purposes and thus were not preserved. This belief, while not generally
supported by modern historical research, was widespread in the seventeenth century.
40 Condorcet is generally perceived as a highly optimistic thinker; from his speeches of the early
1780s to the Esquisse, he expressed a belief in the inevitability of scientific and moral progress.
However, as Keith Michael Baker has argued (93-95), Condorcet’s notion of progress was
rooted in the epistemological modesty of the Newtonian and Lockean traditions, which both
denied the possibility that human beings could ever attain knowledge of first causes.
Accordingly, Condorcet’s optimism was tempered by the concern that metaphysical “systems”
and sectarian “prejudices” might blind people to the empirical truth. My argument is that he
came to see language as more strongly implicated in such threats in his late writings.
41 There were at least a dozen people besides Stanhope who worked on calculating machines in
the eighteenth century. Of particular note is the work of the German parson Philipp Matthäus
Hahn, who designed and built several calculating machines in the 1770s on a plan inspired by
Leibniz; Hahn’s work was continued by his son and his apprentices. However, Stanhope was, to
my knowledge, the only person in the period who attempted to mechanize logic.
42 My principle source for this account is Robert Harley’s 1879 article. The first detailed study of
Stanhope’s demonstrator after Harley appears in Martin Gardner’s 1958 book Logic Machines
and Diagrams, which offers an interesting analysis of Stanhope’s ideas but contains little
information that is not in Harley’s article. Aspray (106-08) and Nilsson (12-13) include very brief
discussions of Stanhope’s work in their histories of computation; both largely follow Gardner.
Shilov and Silantiev have, more recently, expanded on Gardner’s account, describing some early
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versions of the Demonstrator of which Gardner was unaware (5). Matthew L. Jones includes an
insightful study of Stanhope’s work on calculating machines in his 2016 book Reckoning with
Matter: Calculating Machines, Innovation, and Thinking About Thinking from Pascal to
Babbage, but only briefly mentions the Demonstrator (197-99). The most valuable modern
account of Stanhope’s theory of logic appears in a 1997 article by Jane Wess, which gives a
detailed account of Stanhope’s philosophical influences.
43 This skepticism toward formal logic was not new in the eighteenth century; in Elements of
Philosophy (1656), Thomas Hobbes argues that “they that study the Demonstrations of
Mathematicians, will sooner learn true Logick, then they that spend time in reading the Rules of
Syllogizing which Logicians have made; no otherwise then little Children learn to goe, not by
Precepts, but by exercising their feet” (40). The analogy between learning to reason and
athleticism was a commonplace from the mid-seventeenth century until well into the
nineteenth (see, for example, Whewell, The Mechanical Euclid 144 and Boole, Laws of Thought
12).
44 Patrick Baert argues that Habermas’s theory of communication depends on a similar
assumption: that “there is a neutral algorithm that will enable individuals to decide between
competing perspectives” (91).
45 Ideally, at least. In her 1855 autobiography, Harriet Martineau claims that, while her family
exclaimed about the comet in the sky, “as big as a saucer,” she could not see it at all (46).
“Philosophers,” she writes, “may make of it what they may” (46).
46 Stanhope was not the only one to produce such a feedback system; around 1783, Johann
Helfrich Müller designed a calculating machine that notified users of certain error conditions
with a bell, which he regarded as a major improvement over past designs. See Jones 150-51
and Lindgren 66.
47 Perhaps not incidentially, the abandonment of Enlightenment empiricism happened around
the same time as the transition from gold coins to paper money. Stanhope himself dealt with
the anxieties caused by this transition both as a scientist and as a parliamentarian. In 1775, he
published a pamphlet discussing means of detecting forgery in coinage (Stanhope,
Considerations; see Walker 172); around 1811, he invented an “ingenious device for preventing
forgeries” of bank-notes, as Lord Holland described it (quoted by G. Stanhope and Gooch, 211;
see also 209). This project was part of a broader political program in which Stanhope
advocated in favor of paper currency. In 1811, Stanhope wrote a bill making it illegal to charge
more in bank notes than in gold coins of the same face value, which turned out to be one of his
rare successes in Parliament. The immediate exigency of the bill was a case brought to
Stanhope’s attention by a commoner named John Leach. Leach’s landlord, Peter King, 7th
Baron King (who would later be known as a biographer of Locke and father-in-law to Ada
Lovelace) had decided to charge his tenants a higher rate of rent if they paid him in bank notes
rather than in gold, a practice that the new bill made illegal. While Stanhope did not support
making paper money into legal tender, his measure was an important move toward the
acceptance of bank notes as an equal to specie.
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See Anon., “A History.” Leibniz’s original plan was for the Academy to conduct its
transactions in the German language, which he meant as a way of keeping the language of
science close to that of the common people and grounding it in the concrete. The organization
ultimately deviated from this plan, selecting French as the primary language for its publications.
Pombo takes Leibniz’s insistence that the Academy use German as evidence of linguistic
nationalism (136-7). Whether his advocacy of German as a scholarly language contradicts the
views that Leibniz expressed in his writings about the characteristica universalis (not to mention
the fact that he wrote the bulk of his own philosophical work in French and Latin) is a matter for
debate; in Pombo’s view, the divergent strands of Leibniz’s linguistic work are ultimately
motivated by a unified concern with the revelatory power of language (193).
49 The date of this pamphlet is incorrectly listed as 1740 in some library databases, including
that of the Bibliothèque nationale de France. This incorrect date would make it the first entry
in the origin-of-language debate. However, it was published after Condilac’s Essay and was
clearly influenced by it. See Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 178.
50 The English version was a pirated book produced without Michaëlis’s knowledge (see Lifschitz
40). It contains a number of translation errors and other anomalies, including misnumbered
pages. The translations here are based on the 1769 English version, but I have corrected them
with reference to the French text, which was approved by Michaëlis himself. The section from
which I quote is not included in the German version.
51 For instance, Kurt Müller-Vollmer argues that, in moving from the sign to signification as a
practice, Herder “marks a clear break with the representational episteme and its leading
discourse” (12); on the other hand, Robert Edward Norton argues that Herder’s project has
“significant affinities to the endeavors of the writers who collectively embody the European
Enlightenment” (6).
52 Herder states in the Treatise that he had been unable to obtain a copy of Maupertuis’s
Reflexions, but he was familiar with Johann Peter Süßmilch’s summary of it (77). I am not
making a claim of direct influence.
53 Herder later developed the idea of Sprachkritik into an alternative to Kantian
transcendentalism that critiques ordinary language rather than developing a special
transcendental vocabulary (see Benes 49). The term Sprachkritik has since been used in a
number of different ways; see Perspektiven linguistischer Sprachkritik by Bücker, Diedrichsen,
and Speiß, eds.
54 The extent of Herder’s influence on later developments in linguistics is the subject of a
longstanding debate among intellectual historians. German scholars have traditionally viewed
Herder as the inaugurator of the form of modern linguistics that reached its full development in
the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Aarsleff, on the other hand, has firmly denied that Herder
has any significance for the history of linguistics, arguing that his thought is largely derivative of
Condillac’s and questioning whether Humboldt was familiar with Herder’s work (From Locke to
Saussure, 194-99). Kurt Müller-Vollmer and Michael N. Forster, among others, have attempted
to refute Aarsleff’s arguments (Mueller-Vollmer 10; Forster 79). For the purpose of this
chapter, I do not take a position on the extent of Herder’s influence; I merely use his work as an
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example of an early expression of the view of language that ultimately won out. I do, however,
disagree with Aarsleff that Herder’s work is largely derivative of Condillac’s, for reasons that I
believe I have made clear.
55 Siskin and Valenza, for instance, have located the origin of the modern intellectual disciplines
in the eighteenth century, arguing for a continuity between Enlightenment and Romantic
models of disciplinarity. Both Siskin and Valenza characterize Wordsworth’s poetic project as
an attempt to create a space for poets within this disciplinary system. This position stands in
contrast to a longstanding scholarly tradition that views Romanticism as a break from
Enlightenment thought; see, for instance, Marshall Brown’s “Romanticism and Enlightenment.”
My account emphasizes a particular point of discontinuity between eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century forms of disciplinarity: a separation of technical from “human” factors that
altered all disciplines in the Romantic period. See Siskin, “Mediated Enlightenment: The System
of the World” and Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in
Britain, 1680–1820.
56 Wilhelm von Humboldt is perhaps best known for developing the idea of the research
university, which he put into effect as the founder of the University of Berlin. The importance
of Humboldt’s ideas for modern higher education is difficult to overstate, but his influence on
universities was not widespread internationally until around the end of the nineteenth century;
thus, his importance for early-nineteenth-century notions of disciplinarity is more tenuous. My
focus here is more on his work in linguistics than on his theory of education. See Anderson,
European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914.
57 There are some aspects of literature that can be standardized, most notably poetic meter.
Jason David Hall argues that Victorian attitudes toward meter were influenced by the
standardization imposed by railroads and other new technologies (Machines of Meter 23). This
standardization is admissible because meter is, in my terms, a technical matter within the
discipline of poetry. The idea of standardizing poetic language at the level of meaning—
requiring poets to use a controlled vocabulary of the sort used in the hard sciences—would be,
I maintain, anathema to modern notions of artistic creativity.
58 The closest thing to such a consortium might be the tongue-in-cheek Pacific Order of
Onomatopoeia Professionals, which in 2017 voted on the best ways to represent certain sounds
in comics (see tonycliff.tumblr.com/post/160249418912). This endeavor, apart from being
largely a joke, deals primarily with orthography, where standardization is more readily accepted
than in the use of metaphor.
59 On the history of the idea of literature in a British context, see Eagleton 15-46. On the
specific role of British Romanticism in the construction of modern notions of art, see Bourke;
Pfau; Gamer.
60 One should be careful to distinguish the discipline of literature itself (that is, of writing poems
or fiction) from that of literary scholarship or criticism. The term literature came mostly to
exclude scientific writing by the late nineteenth century, but the academic study of literature
has been conceived of as a science in various contexts since that time. Late-nineteenth-century
philologists prided themselves on being more scientifically rigorous than the cultural critics of
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the time, and the Russian Formalists similarly viewed their work as scientific in nature. In
German universities, literary studies commonly fall under the heading Literaturwissenschaft
(literary science). Finally, some twenty-first-century approaches to literary scholarship, such as
cognitive cultural studies and some strains of digital humanities, aim to introduce
methodologies borrowed from scientific disciplines to the study of literature. My concern here
is not with the division between the sciences and the humanities within the academy, but
rather with the division between scientific and literary genres of writing.
61 On rhetoric manuals, see Howell. Ann M. Blair discusses florilegia in her book Too Much to
Know. It should be noted that drawing one’s quotations from a florilegium was generally
looked down upon, although the compilers of the books themselves were held in high esteem.
However, the objection was less to the unoriginality of the quotes compiled in the books than
to the fact that they enabled people to give the impression that they were more well-read than
they really were.
62 All citations of The Prelude are to The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 1850: Authoritative Texts, Context
and Reception, Recent Critical Essays, eds. Wordsworth, Abrams, and Gill. I have indicated
which version I am citing in the paranthetical citations except when it is clear from context.
63 Bewell and Ferguson have both connected this argument to eighteenth-century accounts of
the origin of language (Bewell 51-105; Ferguson 17). While the similarity of terms is apparent,
Wordsworth’s purpose is, in my reading, rather different from that of Condillac and other
voluntarists, for whom the purpose of such accounts was to show how language could be
remade anew.
64 There has been extensive scholarly discussion of how Wordsworth conceived of poetic
language and, going back to Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, debates over how accurately his
remarks in the preface correspond to the Lyrical Ballads poems themselves. In one account,
Wordsworth was attempting to correct the deficiencies he observes in language by developing
a poetic vocabulary that could adequately express human experience (G. K. Blank 19); in
another, his poetry ultimately tends toward a reconciliation with the inadequacy of any form of
language to represent the objects of the affections (Ferguson 95).
65 Orality also figures in Wordsworth’s poetic project in his use of the ballad form, which
positions Lyrical Ballads in relation to the eighteenth-century practice of ballad collecting. See
McLane.
66 It should be noted that algebra and geometry were distinguished to a greater extent in
Wordsworth’s time than they are today. Wordsworth’s remarks on mathematics in The Prelude
are specifically about geometry, so it should not be assumed that he took similar views about
algebra.
67 Since my use of the term linguistics is open to the charge of anachronism, it is worthy of
explanation. Wilhelm von Humboldt drew a distinction between linguistics (Linguistik), which is
the scientific analysis of languages themselves, and philology (Philologie), which involves “the
editing of literary monuments” (English 155; German 202). These terms were not universally
accepted in the early nineteenth century, although William Whewell was an early adopter of
Humboldt’s definitions (see Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences cxiv). The English term
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linguistics and its French cognate linguistique were not broadly used until after 1850; in
German, the word Sprachwissenschaft (language science) was more common than Linguistik
until the late twentieth century. Nonetheless, I have chosen to adopt Humboldt’s terms as a
convenient way of distinguishing the study of language itself from the practice of textual
scholarship. It should be noted that Humboldt saw himself as practicing both linguistics and
philology; the two were, for him, complementary.
68 Ludwig Wittgenstein notes this difference in Philosophical Investigations: “Think of the
uneasiness we feel when the spelling of a word is changed. (And of the still deeper feelings that
questions about the spelling of words have aroused.) Of course, not every kind of sign has
made a deep impression on us. A sign in the algebra of logic, for instance, can be replaced by
any other one without exciting deep feelings in us. —” (74).
69 As Brian Rotman points out in Ad Infinitum, modern mathematics “bifurcates its discourse
into a privileged formal mode and an informal one considered as supplementary and
epiphenomenal” (7). The informal mode, in which one explains a mathematical idea by means
of metaphors, examples, and intuitive concepts rather than developing it through rigorously
prescribed symbolic procedures, corresponds to the subjective in Humboldt’s theory of
language.
70 Humboldt was, as one might expect, critical of the idea of creating a new language from
scratch; he suggested that this was a mistake on the part of “the great Leibniz,” although he
also praised Leibniz for considering the inner perspective in the study of language. See Trabant
135-37.
71 Aarsleff made this point convincingly decades ago, although the lesson does not seem to
have stuck. That Locke viewed the mechanical association of ideas as irrational is apparent
from his chapter on “The Association of Ideas” in the Essay, in which he calls association a “sort
of madness” (354). See Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure 29, 130, 173; see also D. F. Norton,
“The Myth of ‘British Empiricism.’”
72 In terms of history, Wordsworth is the outlier in this trio. In his seminal study Wordsworth:
The Sense of History, Alan Liu argues that Wordsworth’s use of his tour of Europe in his
narrative of poetic development in The Prelude constitutes an attempt to remove the self from
history (4-5). But if Wordsworth wants to deny history, he does not enact this denial in the
same manner as Enlightenment narratives like Condorcet’s Sketch, in which the state of
enlightenment stands at a culminating point at which past practices cease to be binding on
future ones. Wordsworth’s attempt to root poetic diction in nature precludes the possibility of
making an absolute break from the organically developing practices of a people. See also
Manning.
73 Boole and Babbage did not meet in person until 1862, which was late in both of their careers
(Hyman 249). Although Babbage disagreed with Boole on some points (see Grattan-Guinness
xliv), he wrote on his copy of Boole’s Mathematical Analysis of Logic, “this is the work of a real
thinker” (quoted by Hyman 244). Boole cites Babbage in passing in his 1860 textbook Treatise
on the Calculus of Finite Differences, noting that “[i]n the state to which it has been brought,
more especially by the labors of Mr Babbage,” the calculus of functions “is much too extensive
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a branch of analysis to permit of our attempting here to give more than a general view of its
objects and methods” (208; see 224). While George Boole did not show much interest in
Babbage’s calculating machines, his wife, Mary Everest Boole, was an admirer of Babbage’s
work and wrote about it in several of her books.
74 The current standard biography of Boole is Desmond MacHale’s The Life and Work of George
Boole: a Prelude to the Digital Age; a classic analysis of his thought from the perspective of
contemporary logic is Hailperin’s book Boole’s Logic and Probability. Almost all of the scholarly
literature on Boole focuses narrowly on explicating his views and evaluating the technical
aspects of his mathematical and logical theories. One of the very few exceptions is Daniel J.
Cohen’s insightful study of Boole in Equations from God: Pure Mathematics and Victorian Faith
(77-105), to which I am indebted for my understanding of Boole’s religious background.
Cohen’s overall argument is that Boole’s interest in symbolic logic stemmed from a desire to
find common ground among competing religious sects; Cohen does not engage in detail with
Boole’s philosophy, which I have set out to do here. There has also been some scholarship on
Boole’s influence on late-nineteenth-century economic thought, motivated primarily by the fact
that one of Boole’s early champions, William Stanley Jevons, was also an important economist
(see Maas; Cook).
75 On Boole’s attempts to navigate the sectarian conflicts at Queens College, Cork, see Cohen
79-97.
76 To be clear, this word appears in a discussion of a different problem in which the imaginary
numbers do not cancel out. T. Richard Witmer translates sophistica as “sophisticated” in his
English edition of the Artis Magnæ, while Pycior translates it as “sophistic” (20). I have chosen
Pycior’s translation because, from context, it is clear that Cardano is referring not the difficulty
of the case, but rather to the fact that the expression cannot be interpreted either numerically
or geometrically. The value √−15, he writes, “is far from the nature of a number and from that
of a line, though somewhat closer to the latter. This truly is sophistic (sophistica), since with it
one cannot carry out the operations one can in the case of a pure negative and other” numbers
(220). Cardano goes on to conclude that the imaginary solution “is as refined as it is useless”
(220).
77 In Elements of Algebra, Euler states that “negative numbers are less than nothing” (5).
Euler’s book was published after d’Alembert’s entry for “Négatif.”
78 On the history of the Analytical Society, see Wilkes, “Herschel, Peacock, Babbage and the
Development of the Cambridge Curriculum”; Becher, “Radicals, Whigs and Conservatives: The
Middle and Lower Classes in the Analytical Revolution at Cambridge in the Age of Aristocracy”;
and Grier, “The Inconsistent Youth of Charles Babbage.” The consensus is that, in its short
existence as an active organization, the society failed in its goal of reforming the Cambridge
curriculum; however, some of the members later gained positions of influence at Cambridge,
and symbolic methods were eventually accepted there.
79 For an account of the context surrounding the composition of Peacock’s book, see Fisch, “The
Making of Peacock’s Treatise.” Fisch argues that, in the first edition of the book, published in
1830, Peacock held back from embracing a totally formalist position, instead trying to split the
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difference between the symbolic methods of Babbage and the Pauline epistemology of
Maseres and Frend (168); Peacock did not, in Fisch’s account, embrace fully symbolic methods
until around 1840.
80 Boole misquotes the passage slightly, substituting “obstacle” for “obstacles” and “mere” for
“merely.” Boole also modifies the punctuation in a way that does not significantly affect the
meaning. The other early editions of Mill’s book, as far as I have been able to gather, do not
contain any variations in this sentence, so the changes are likely Boole’s.
81 On the possible connection between Boole’s work on differential equations and his logic, see
Laita, “The Influence of Boole’s Search for a Universal Method in Analysis on the Creation of his
Logic.”
82 Other important influences include William Rowan Hamilton and Arthur Cayley, who were
developing algebraic systems that worked with arrays of numbers rather than individual
numbers, and that obeyed different laws than ordinary algebra; see MacHale 65-66.
83 Even if Boole did not read Peacock’s writings, Peacock certainly exerted an indirect influence
upon Boole by means of Gregory’s essay, which is framed as an attempt to clarify and further
develop Peacock’s ideas. On Gregory’s influence on Boole, see Laita, “The Influence” 52.
84 For an overview of the difference between Boole’s system and modern Boolean logic, see
Hailperin, “Boole’s Algebra Isn’t Boolean Algebra.”
85 The requirement that categories be mutually exclusive is a major difference between Boole’s
system and most later versions of Boolean logic. This requirement is a necessary consequence
of the analogy Boole maintains between symbolic logic and algebra. One can prove this as
follows. Suppose that x and y are logical variables and 𝑥 + 𝑦 is a logically meaningful
expression. Then, by Boole’s definition of logically meaningful, it must obey the law of duality,
so that (𝑥 + 𝑦)(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑥 + 𝑦. Expanding this and applying the law of duality again, one gets
𝑥 + 2𝑥𝑦 + 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 ⟹ 2𝑥𝑦 = 0 ⟹ 𝑥𝑦 = 0. The latter equation means, logically
interpreted, that x and y are not both true, Q.E.D. Boole’s exclusive interpretation of
disjunction is inconvenient in practice, and most later systems of algebraic logic, including the
Russell–Whitehead notation that has become the standard, deviate from Boole on this point;
however, in doing so they create a greater divergence between symbolic logic and ordinary
algebra than Boole intended. Boole addresses this issue directly in an 1856 manuscript titled
On the Foundations of the Mathematical Theory of Logic and on the Philosophical Interpretation
of its Methods and Processes (Selected Manuscripts 91-92). See also Jevons, Pure Logic 72 and
Hailperin, Boole's Logic and Probability 87-96.
86 It is often claimed that Boole used 1 to represent true and 0 to represent false (see, e.g.,
MacPhail xvii), but this is not strictly accurate. In the truth-value interpretation, 1 and 0 are
only used for logically necessary truths or falsehoods, and variables representing contingent
propositions like “It is raining” or “Now is night” have values other than 1 or 0. The
interpretation of 1 and 0 is one of the few points on which Boole changed his mind between
Mathematical Analysis and The Laws of Thought. In the 1847 version of his theory, 1 means
true in all circumstances and 0 means false in all circumstances. In the 1854 version, he
interprets 1 as true at all times and 0 as false at all times. He does not explain the reason for
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this change very clearly, but it appears to be because introducing the idea of time into the
interpretation enables him to connect 1 to the idea of eternity, thus making the religious
implications of his theory more apparent. See Mathematical Analysis 48-50 and Laws of
Thought 162-67.
87 Boole’s inference algorithm is primarily intended to determine what properties a thing must
have based on a given statement; as such, it works somewhat like solving an equation.
Corcoran and Wood argue that this aspect of Boole’s system rests on the logical fallacy of
conflating solutions of equations with logical consequences (111-14); however, Brown has
disputed this point (307).
88 This is how one might work out the problem in detail. We have 𝑝(1 − 𝑔) = 0. One can
express g as a function of p in the general form 𝑔 = 𝑣𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝), where v and v’ are
unknown values. Expressing the equation in this form is possible regardless of how g and p are
defined because of the law of duality, as Boole demonstrates. We substitute this into the
original equation, getting 𝑝(1 − (𝑣𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝))) = 0 ⟹ 𝑝(1 − 𝑣𝑝 − 𝑣 ′ (1 − 𝑝)) = 0 ⟹ 𝑝 −
𝑣𝑝2 − 𝑣 ′ 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) = 0. By the law of duality, the third term vanishes and the exponent
disappears from the second, so we have 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑝 = 0 ⟹ 𝑣𝑝 = 𝑝. Substituting this into the
general form of g gives us 𝑔 = 𝑝 + 𝑣′(1 − 𝑝). I removed the prime mark from v’ in recording
the result for clarity. Boole’s use of v to represent indeterminate quantities is widely regarded
as problematic, since it appears to be a variable even though it does not behave as one; see
Hailperin, Boole's Logic and Probability 97-98.
89 In modern algebra, this is only true if 𝑧 + 𝑤 ≠ 0. However, Boole was working in an
0
1
algebraic tradition that allowed division by zero in solving equations; indeed, the values and
0
0
play important roles in Boole’s algorithm. See Laws of Thought 156.
90 In a manuscript written some time after The Laws of Thought, Boole discusses an “inverse”
mental operation “by which from the conception of a given class of things we ascend to the
conception of some larger class from which the given class would be formed from the mental
selection of those individuals which possess a given property” (Selected Manuscripts 58). This
“inverse operation” would seem to correspond to division in the logical calculus. Boole writes
that this operation “has no verbal symbol or equivalent construction in language” and is “only
conceivable by means of that operation of which it is the inverse”—that is to say, the
composition of attributes (58). Thus it would seem that, at least at the point when he wrote
this manuscript, he believed that division corresponded to an operation that can occur in the
human mind, but that cannot be expressed in ordinary language. This argument is problematic,
however, because there is no guarantee that the “larger class” he discusses is unique; indeed,
there could be infinitely many classes that satisfy this definition of 𝑝 / 𝑞. Boole does not treat
division as corresponding to a mental operation in The Laws of Thought. Hailperin developed
an alternative interpretation of Boolean quotients using Venn diagrams and the mathematical
idea of a multiset (Boole's Logic and Probability 109-12); Frank Markham Brown has criticized
this interpretation for adding a layer of complexity that is not present in Boole’s own work
(304).
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See, for instance, his 1851 address The Claims of Science, in which he argues that the senses
alone can only produce “a mere collection of facts,” but the mind “feels the pressures of
impulses, it is conscious of the existence of powers and faculties which urge it to reduce the
scattered details of its knowledge into form and order” (quoted in MacHale 111; 112). This
impulse to organize knowledge, he indicates later in the talk, must not be pursued at random,
but rather must serve “the true welfare of our species,” which “essentially contains a moral
element” (114). Whether or not there was any direct influence, the resemblance to Coleridge’s
“Essays on the Principles of Method” is apparent.
92 The religious aspects of Boole’s thought are not incidental to his philosophy of logic; without
the faith that the laws of thought are imposed by divine will, his system lacks a foundation.
One can tell that the laws of thought are correct, he argues in the manuscript quoted above,
because they generate a correct method for reasoning. But how can one tell that the method is
correct without already knowing the laws of logical validity? Since Boole has no notion of a
metalogic or metamathematics in which to judge the correctness of method, he falls into
circular reasoning at this point without the deus ex machina of religious faith. See GrattanGuiness xli.
93 Boole attempts to back up the claim that his laws of thought are universal in the last chapter
of The Laws of Thought, in which he detects traces of his laws of unity and duality in ancient
thinkers like Heraclitus and Pythagoras (411-13). This passage is one of the moments in Boole’s
writings in which the connection between his logical theory and his Unitarian religious views is
most apparent.
94 Although Mary’s writings should treated with some caution in drawing conclusions about
George Boole, scholars have often turned to them for evidence as to his views on religion,
education, and other matters that he did not address much in writing. Luis M. Laita argues,
based on a comparison of her writings and his, that her representations of his views are
basically accurate (“Boolean Algebra and its Extra-Logical Sources: the Testimony of Mary
Everest Boole”).
95 The separation of form from meaning distinguishes Boole from other seventeenth-century
real character schemes as well. Daniel J. Cohen compares the work of Boole and De Morgan to
that of Wilkins, arguing that “[t]he Victorians who founded modern mathematical logic may
have judged John Wilkins’s system defective, but they clearly emulated his basic idea and
strongly agreed with the motivation behind it” (27). This is true to the extent that both Boole
and Wilkins saw written notations as means of resolving sectarian strife, but Boole’s work
contains no hint of the sort of hierarchical catalogue of things that forms the heart of Wilkins’s
scheme.
96 The Kantian resonances are most apparent in his later writings on probability theory, in which
he refers to a series of theorems about the properties of statistical data as “conditions of
possible experience” (Studies in Logic and Probability 319). Boole certainly differs from Kant in
his conception of the transcendental realm, given his focus on algebraic relations rather than
on spatial and temporal intuitions, but he did seem to conceive of the relation between logical
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and conceptual truth in terms of the Kantian division between pure reason and understanding,
legitimately or not.
97 The comparison with Mill should not be taken to indicate that Mill’s views on the definition
of logic were the same as Boole’s; specifically, Mill made a sharp distinction between logic and
psychology, whereas Boole did not. Cook argues (340) that Mill’s definition of logic influenced
Boole’s reception at Cambridge, leading John Venn and the economist Alfred Marshall to
overlook the possibility that Boole’s laws of thought could serve as a model of the human mind.
Jevons’s interpretation of Boole does not follow Mill on this point, nor did Boole himself.
However, Boole did clearly distinguish between logical truths, which are normative, and the
truths of natural philosophy, which are merely factual; thus, even if he did not separate logic
from what he understood to constitute “psychology,” he did (like Mill) distinguish logical
concerns from the empirical facts of human behavior. See also Maas 614-16.
98 In the first pages of The Laws of Thought, Boole suggests a rationale for expecting the
understanding of logic to come in a sudden burst of insight. Boole’s example is Aristotle’s
dictum de omni et nullo—the principle that if something is true of a category, then it is also true
of any subcategory of that category. The logical truth of this principle, he argues, “is made
manifest in all its generality by reflection upon a single instance of its application”; the fact that
one need not offer multiple examples to convince people of its truth is evidence that it “is
founded upon some general law or laws of mind” (4). Bornet argues convincingly that this
passage is directed at Mill’s argument in System of Logic that logical truths are founded on
induction (Bornet l). Whereas Mill would argue that adding more examples strengthens the
induction and thus provides further evidence of the truth of the principle, Boole holds that one
can perceive the truth of the principle with certainty all at once.
99 In this regard, Boole’s logic system is, like Stanhope’s calculating machine, an example of
prescriptive technology. In the lecture series published as The Real World of Technology, Ursula
M. Franklin makes a case that technology has become increasingly prescriptive since the
Industrial Revolution, being designed not just to help workers complete tasks, but also to exert
control over their actions (18). Prescriptive technology, she argues, encourages a “culture of
compliance” in which workers are given a single correct way to do something rather than
having room to make their own decisions (19).
100 Boole does suggest, in the introduction to Mathematical Analysis, that one may only use
symbolic methods if one has “an ability to expand the abbreviated forms of reasoning which
they induce, into their full syllogistic development” (10). Yet the use of uninterpretable
expressions seems to render the “full syllogistic development” of the reasoning his system
enables impossible. In its actual design, Boole’s logic system is more concerned with producing
answers in a methodical way than with making the reasoning behind them comprehensible to
people.
101 Harriet Martineau also tells a variant of this story in her discussion of Babbage in her
autobiography, attributing the remark not to a Member of Parliament, but rather to “a lady”
(268).
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From this passage alone, it is not apparent whether Babbage means that the calculation will
be made truthfully with regard to the new numbers just entered, or whether the machine will
return to the original computation without regard to the interference. In a manuscript that
Babbage prepared for Wilmot Buxton’s unfinished biography, Babbage makes it clear that the
latter is the case (Buxton 249). See also Exposition 188.
103 On Babbage’s ideas about the division of labor, see Shaffer, “Babbage’s Intelligence”; Sun,
“Machinery and the Factory System”; and Ozgur, “Babbage’s Legacy”.
104 Apart from the discussion of Babbage in “Maelzel’s Chess Player,” Poe alludes to the
Difference Engine without mentioning Babbage’s name in “The Thousand-and-Second Tale of
Scheherazade (1845). Poe’s “The Power of Words” (1845) is based on a theme taken from
Babbage’s Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, as I discuss below. Part I of Poe’s Marginalia series (first
published in 1844) contains a discussion of “[a]ll the Bridgewater treatises” that Jerome J.
McGann convincingly argues is a reference to Babbage’s unofficial entry in the series (see
McGann 44).
105 Ivor Grattan-Guinness argues that a key aspect of Babbage’s work is his “algorithmism”
(“Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 34). Babbage’s algorithmic thought, according to
Grattan-Guinness, combines three elements: thinking about repetitions and combinations of
processes, employment of algebraic methods, and belief in the importance of signs for
reasoning (34). Two other aspects of algorithmic thinking that Grattan-Guinness does not
include in his definition, but that bring Babbage closer to the modern discipline of computer
science than his precursors, are treating computations as physical systems possessing changing
states and considering the efficiency of computational processes. Babbage viewed his
computing engines and treating numbers like physical things, moving them around like grain in
a mill (Hyman 166), and using language strongly reminiscent of modern computer science, he
wrote about operations that “cost” certain amounts of time (Buxton 264).
106 Most citations of Poe’s writings are to The Collected Works of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Mabbott,
The Collected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe, ed. Pollin, and The Works of the Late Edgar Allan Poe,
ed. Griswold. In parenthetical citations, I refer to these three editions by their editors’ names.
107 In Ortiz’s account, the influence of Condillac was limited to the earliest phase of Babbage’s
career, ending around 1821, when Babbage cites de Gérando’s book (“Babbage and French
Idéologie” 14). Ortiz leaves open the question of whether French idéologie had an influence on
Babbage’s later work on computing machines, although he does suggest, in a later essay, that
Babbage’s continued references to the idea of “language” in his later work may derive from this
early French influence (“On the Impact” 74).
108 This book was officially a collective production of the Analytical Society, but Babbage and
Herschel were the only members who contributed to it. Hyman argues that the preface, from
which I take the quotation, was written primarily by Babbage (25-26n). See also Grier 8-9.
109 Richards argues that the notion of generalization employed by British mathematicians of the
early nineteenth century differs from the notion of abstraction, which served a somewhat
analogous role for French mathematicians in the period, in that generalization rooted the
validity of the resulting method in the specific example from which it is developed (311).
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Babbage’s anxiety about the potentially unruly results of generalization, which I discuss below,
might be seen as a symptom of his tradition’s aversion to methods that lack conceptual clarity.
110 Sometimes Babbage is credited with inventing the form; as of August 24, 2017, the
Wikipedia article for “Form (document)” states that “[i]t is believed that the form was
conceived by mathematician and inventor Charles Babbage,” with a direct citation of Babbage’s
Economy of Machinery and Manufactures as its only source. It is not true that Babbage was the
first to use blank forms; Blair and Stallybrass, for instance, discuss several instances of forms
used for administrative purposes in the early 1600s (144). However, Babbage did offer
influential arguments for the use of forms as an economic expedient. For instance, CampbellKelly argues that Babbage’s discussion of the “division of mental labor” in Economy influenced
the development of British census forms starting in 1841 (27-29). For general discussions of the
history of paperwork, see Kafka, The Demon of Writing and Gitelman, Paper Knowledge; for a
broader account of the way management techniques like Babbage’s contributed to the
standardization of human subjects for statistical purposes in the Victorian period, see Poovey,
Making a Social Body.
111 Babbage claims at multiple points in his work that the design of machines and algorithms
cannot be mechanized, but rather requires human intelligence (Decline of Science 126;
Economy 292; Passages 472). Against this reading, Ashworth suggests in his article “Memory,
Efficiency, and Symbolic Analysis: Charles Babbage, John Herschel, and the Industrial Mind” that
Babbage saw the human mind as operating much like the Analytical Engine (649); Maas makes
a similar claim, albeit more guardedly (593). Ashworth’s support for this claim mainly comes
from Wilmot Buxton’s unfinished 1872-80 “memoir” of Babbage. In the passage Ashworth
cites, Buxton claims that, with the construction of the Difference Engine, “[t]he marvellous pulp
and fibre of a brain had been substituted by brass and iron” (48). Elsewhere, Buxton includes a
lengthy quotation from Hobbes’s Leviathon claiming that all reasoning consists at base of
addition and subtraction (155); he suggests that, if Hobbes is right, then we may represent all
that may be represented in ordinary language in algebraic notation and accordingly subject it to
the processes of the Analytical Engine (156). However, as Buxton acknowledges, this
Hobbesian (or rather pseudo-Hobbesian, seeing as Hobbes himself was viciously opposed to
symbolic algebra) musing is mere speculation, and it is not based on the recorded views of
Babbage himself (156). Babbage’s own writings do not bear out the claim that he viewed the
human mind as working like a computing machine, as Green (43) and Purbrick (21) have
demonstrated.
112 One type of misbehavior that Babbage and his associates had to fend off was the possibility
that the wheels would land inbetween digits, thus producing ambiguous or invalid results—
what Matthew L. Jones calls the “keeping-it-digital problem” (29). Jones discusses the
approaches that Babbage and others took to this problem in his monograph Reckoning with
Matter: Calculating Machines, Innovation, and Thinking about Thinking from Pascal to Babbage.
113 For an overview of the technical aspects of Babbage’s work on computing machines, see
Bromley, “The Evolution of Babbage's Calculating Engines”; for an account of position of the
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difference engines within the broader history of mathematical table-making, see Swade,
“Unerring Certainty.”
114 The interested reader can find an accessible explanation of the details in Babbage’s Passages
(49-57). The basic method of differences can only be used for polynomial functions, but it can
be extended to other types of function using approximation methods. Babbage thought that
Taylor’s theorem could be used to extend the method of differences universally, but this
approach does not work in all cases, as was proven in Babbage’s time by Augustin-Louis Cauchy
and William Rowan Hamilton. Babbage seemed to have been unaware of these developments,
at least as of 1827. See Grattan-Guinness, “Babbage as an Algorithmic Thinker” 36-37.
115 In spite of its name, the Difference Engine No. 1 was not Babbage’s first attempt at
constructing a difference engine; he completed a smaller, working prototype in 1822, which has
since been lost (Passages 47; Lindgren 43; Roegel). Note that the description of the Difference
Engine No. 1 in Lardner’s 1834 essay is inaccurate and will lead to confusion if one attempts to
reconcile it with the engraving.
116 A team working at the London Science Museum began building a version of the Difference
Engine No. 2 in 1985 and completed it in 2002. See Swade, “The Construction of Charles
Babbage's Difference Engine No. 2.”
117 Babbage was interested in the supernatural from a young age. In his autobiography, he
describes a youthful attempt to raise the devil by drawing a circle on the floor with his own
blood, stepping into it, and reciting the Lord’s Prayer backwards (Passages 10-13); at
Cambridge, he and some of his friends formed a Ghost Club, which sought to collect evidence
regarding the existence of ghosts (Passages 34). Among the many artifacts he collected were a
set of “wooden fortune cards, of the time of Queen Elizabeth,” which he permitted the
Cambridge Antiquarian Society to print in an 1843 collection of early English literature (Wright
and Halliwell 249). While Hyman represents Babbage’s experiments with magic as scientifically
hard-minded efforts to test supernatural claims (14), Babbage’s fascination with the occult
clearly went beyond any rationalist desire to debunk superstition. His argument in The Ninth
Bridgewater Treatise does not so much lord science over a belief in the supernatural as suggest
that the two are compatible.
118 Based on this similarity, Lindgren argues that the paragraph about the machine going
“beyond the reach of the present power of mathematics” in Lardner’s 1834 essay was in fact
written by Babbage himself (Lindgren 109).
119 C.f. Tresch, who links the readers that Poe manipulated in the Balloon Hoax to the idea of a
mass audience that was emerging with the production of large-scale newspapers like the Sun
(“Potent Magic” 283-84).
120 This passage perhaps derived from the same thinking as one of Babbage’s best-known
economic arguments, that the difficulty of verifying the genuineness of goods can affect their
price. See Economy 101-11.
121 Poe’s shift away from conventional notions of reason over the course of his career has long
been recognized. As David Ketterer puts it in The Rationale of Deception in Poe, Poe evolved
from an opposition between reason and imagination “to a position where a species of reason
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allied with imagination is valued in an ambiguous concept of intuition” (xiii). I follow Ketterer in
distinguishing early from late Poe.
122 This move is clearly influenced by Brewster, who lists various automata before declaring that
“they sink into insignificance when compared with the automaton chess-player” (321).
123 Heyward Ehrlich notes that, in this passage, “Poe held up his idea of Babbage’s ‘pure
machine’ as an infallible standard” (113). However, it should be clarified that Babbage’s
Difference Engine is not itself the standard of intelligence for Poe, since Poe explicitly states
that Babbage’s engine is “altogether beneath” any being that can play chess (319). This is a
point on which Poe differed from his source, David Brewster, who placed Babbage’s machine at
the top of the hierarchy of intelligence; see Tresch, “Potent Magic” 286.
124 Scholars have long noted that the methods Dupin describes in “The Purloined Letter” and
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” are inadequate to explain his seemingly superhuman ability
to determine other people’s thoughts. Irwin argues that Dupin represents a childish desire “for
mental dominance, the wish for the world to conform absolutely to our dreams, for thinking to
make it so” (xvi). Jonathan Elmer contends that Dupin’s solution of the mystery “offers the
Minister—and indeed, all those who later inhabit the third witnessing position—the fantasized
witnessing of his own conception,” a sort of self-witnessing that is precluded by the structure of
democratic subjectivity (196). I am not setting out to defend the coherence of Dupin’s
methodological statements, but I do take them as a genuine attempt on Poe’s part to convince
his readership of the superiority of a poetic mode of thought to Enlightenment empiricism.
125 Poe was a regular reader of the Edinburgh Review, which he obtained in a pirated edition
produced by the New York publisher Theodore Foster (see Hayes 94). He wrote a précis of the
July, 1835 issue for the Southern Literary Messenger (December, 1835, 82-89); he quoted from
articles in later issues of the Review in several places in the 1830s and 40s.
126 The view that Whewell defends—that mathematical study can serve as a means of
developing reasoning skills that can then be transferred to other areas—had been established
for centuries. Joan L. Richards argues that this view of mathematics as an “exemplary” science
had existed in both Britain and France in the eighteenth century, but went out of style in France
in the early decades of the nineteenth (“Rigor and Clarity” 301). A century before the
Whewell–Hamilton dispute, George Berkeley had questioned the exemplarity of mathematics
in his pamphlet The Analyst (1734), arguing that one might be skilled in mathematics and yet
“unqualified to decide upon Logic, or Metaphysics, or Ethics, or Religion” (53-54).
127 In the early story “Some Passages from the Life of a Lion,” also known as “Lionizing,” the
narrator encounters an assortment of “lions and recherchés” at a dinner party. Among them is
“a human-perfectibility man,” who “quoted Turgot, Price, Priestly, Condorcet, De Stäel, and the
‘Ambitious Student in Ill Health’” (Mabbott II.176).
128 Technically, it is possible. One could write a program that goes through every possible
mathematical text and checks whether it is a correct proof of a given theorem. If a proof exists,
this program would eventually find it, even though it might take billions of years. However,
such a program would be unable to determine that a theorem is unprovable; if so, its search
would simply go on forever. In 1936, Alan Turing and Alonzo Church independently
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demonstrated that there is no general way around the latter problem; no algorithm can be
found for determining the proveability of a statement. While the work of Church and Turing
put a damper on the project of creating a universal theorem-proving machine, effective proofgenerating algorithms are possible within certain restricted domains. On the history of such
efforts, see Stephanie Dick’s dissertation After Math: (Re)configuring minds, proof, and
computing in the postwar United States. There is also a class of program called proof assistants
which are only partly automated, requiring occasional hints from a human operator; the idea
(of which Babbage would certainly approve) is to have the machine take care of all the tedious
parts of the proof while the human operator supplies the intuition needed to overcome the
most difficult hurdles. See Bertot and Castéran.
129 Babbage and Poe were not the only ones to discuss this idea. Buxton argues that Babbage’s
may have taken this idea from the Indian philosophy of Mimansa Darsana (Buxton 343); there is
also a similar idea in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Hall of Fame, although Babbage appeared to be
unaware of this at the time when he wrote The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise (Hyman 141). The
idea of spoken words echoing for all eternity seems to have struck a chord with people in the
nineteenth century, because it was adopted by a number of other popular writers. Apart from
Poe, Charles Dickens discussed it in an 1869 speech (Hyman 140n); Nathaniel Willis and Edward
Hitchcock adapted it into speculations about light waves, which he applied to understanding
photography (Becher 40-41); and the Ohioan proto-science-fiction writer Florence
McLandburgh used it as the basis for her 1876 short story “The Automaton Ear” (7-43). Steven
Connor argues, with particular reference to McLandburgh, that Walter Benjamin’s image of the
Angel of History can also be linked back to this nineteenth-century trope (121).
130 Babbage cites Laplace’s 1812 book Theorie Analytique des Probabilités in support of the
claim that the vibrations of individual atoms are governed by mathematical laws just as planets
are (Bridgewater 110n). Poe was familiar with the Theorie Analytique des Probabilités (see
Holman 33), so he may have taken some of the inspiration for “The Power of Words” directly
from Laplace. However, Laplace only uses the image of vibrating air particles to illustrate the
fact that we must use probablistic methods in cases where we are ignorant of the precise truth,
and he does not speculate much about the implications of the idea for the remembrance of the
past (iv). From the similarities that I discuss below, I conclude that Poe likely borrowed from
Babbage’s book.
131 It should be noted that Babbage’s notion of progress was not quite the same as the
Enlightenment one. Buxton claims that Babbage rejected the idea of human perfectibility,
preferring philosophies that bore practical fruit (351). As Tamara Ketabgian has noted,
Babbage’s notion of progress had to do more with supplementing the human body with
machines than with improving people (The Lives of Machines 29). Babbage’s work as a whole is
directed toward practical inventions that compensate for the weaknesses of human minds and
bodies. For instance, in 1831, he had logarithm tables printed in ten different colors of ink so
that he could find out which color was least fatiguing on the eye (Buxton 308; see Lindgren 61);
the preface his 1841 book of tables explains his extensive efforts to find a table layout and
printing technique that was easy to read (Table of the Logarithms vii-xi).

390

132

An often-cited text related to Didérot’s project is his entry for “Art” in the Encyclopédie,
which proposes a “general treatise on the mechanical arts” that would put them on a level with
the liberal (1.714; my translation). Babbage’s program of applied science differed from
Didérot’s project in that Babbage elevated the roles of industrialists and scientists over that of
the factory worker based on the division of labor. See Schatzberg, “From Art to Applied
Science.”
133 There were also smaller exhibitions in London in the eighteenth century, which Babbage
attended as a child (Passages 17; see Maddaluno). France held industrial expositions in the
earlier nineteenth century as well, most notably in 1844; see Hahn 34-36.
134 For instance, an unflattering 1906 account of his life calls him a “rather ugly, egotistical, and
crotchety old mathematician” and declares that the scientific manner in which he catalogues
street nuisances “has a slightly comical appearance” (Fyvie 192; 201). In the 1960s, Babbage’s
campaign against street noise led one of his biographers, Maboth Moseley, to dub him an
“irascible genius” (Moseley 21). Hyman later pushed back against Moseley’s characterization
and cast the street-noise campaign in more a positive light (Hyman 246); yet Moseley’s epithet
seems to have stuck. Babbage’s great-great grandson, Dr. Neville F. Babbage, examined the
mathematician’s autopsy report and found that he had kidney problems and arterial disease,
which may have accounted for his sensitivity to noise and irritability late in life (M. R. Williams,
“Last Word” 12).
135 The 1939 fair’s vision of the future had as much to do with American democracy as it did
with technology; apart from the General Motors exhibit, the fair included a diorama of a future
city called the “Democracity” and a 65-foot statue of George Washington. The nationalistic
implications of this vision were overt; the Fair included an artificial version of Niagara Falls that
represents, the narrator of a promotional newsreel tells us, the “the forward march of America,
resistless as a torrent’s flow.” See 1939 NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR NEWSREEL "WORLD OF
TOMORROW" 72342.
136 Futurama II took the form of a ride that led spectators through a series of dioramas. The
visuals of the ride are preserved in a promotional film that has been uploaded to YouTube
under the title '64-65 NY World's Fair FUTURAMA Ride Video; this film features the same
recorded narration that was played during the ride. An audio recording of the actual ride made
by a visitor is available at “Welcome to Futurama II.”
137 For instance, see Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
(1979) and Frederic Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991).
On the continuing ubiquity of the conviction that progress is inevitable, see Gray, “An Illusion
With a Future.” Two important studies of the idea of progress broadly considered are J. B.
Bury’s The Idea of Progress (1920) and Robert Nisbet’s History of the Idea of Progress (1980).
138 This doubling is well understood in computer science, especially in the subfield of HumanComputer Interaction (HCI). A classic account of the role of the semantic plane in computer
systems is Peter Bøgh Andersen’s 1990 book A Theory of Computer Semiotics. Drawing on the
semiotic theories of Louis Hjelmslev, Roland Barthes, and Umberto Eco, Andersen’s book aims
to elucidate the way computers fit into evolving work environments by “putting problems of
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meaning, interpretation, and aesthetics on the agenda of computer science” (4). From the
perspective of Hjelmslev’s variant of structuralism, Andersen argues that “we must normally
view natural language [computer] interfaces as clever and useful illusions, as semiotic systems
that masquerade as another system”; this “disguise technique” makes a computer interface
“parasitic upon English,” since interface symbols like “New” and “Save” resemble English words
even though they actually work within a different language system (13). As a way of facilitating
reasoning about how computer interfaces relate to natural-language practices, Andersen
recommends “a methodology that separates technical implementation from communicative
purposes” (13). This separation, I am arguing, was rendered possible by the
compartmentalizartion installed by Boole; Andersen’s HCI theory is thus dependent on
epistemological presuppositions that we have inherited from the nineteenth century. Terry
Winograd and Fernando Flores discuss this issue from a different perspective in their
Heideggerian study of HCI, Understanding Computers and Cognition (1987); programmers and
users, they argue, think about computers in terms of a hierarchy of increasingly abstract “levels
of representation” that become more similar to ordinary language at the same time that they
become increasingly detached from the physical workings of the machine (86).
139 In certain types of programming language, the variable names are stored in memory, and
thus the change would, in fact, have a minor effect on the physical state of the computer while
the program runs. There are also ways of accessing variable names within a running program in
some languages, although this would not usually be considered a good practice. In general,
modern programming languages are designed so as to render the choice of names as
inconsequential as possible to the logic of the system.
140 This curve is called the catenary. I chose to present it in modern notation for the sake of
simplicity; Leibniz presents the equation in a more complex form that includes both symbolic
notation and Latin. Christiaan Huygens and Johann Bernoulli derived the equation
independently around the same time Leibniz did; all three of their solutions were published in a
single issue of Acta Eruditorum. See Leibniz, “De linea […].”
141 This particular way of thinking was best-established in France, although it gained some
English adherents, including Stanhope, after 1789. Another strain of English thought,
exemplified by Francis Maseres and William Frend, similarly valued conceptual clarity, but drew
more on a Pauline epistemology that did not necessarily support the idea of making a radical
break with the past. If I am judging correctly, Maseres and Frend would be resistant to any uses
of algorithms that caused words to drift away from their ordinary significations.
142 Is computer code thus the private language that Wittgenstein argued was impossible? Not
exactly. Wittgenstein’s argument was against the possibility of a language that was in principle
incomprehensible to anyone but its creator because it represents sensations that cannot be
communicated. Since the private meanings created in programming stem not from
incommunicable sensations, but rather from the logic of the system, which is there for anyone
to understand (however difficult understanding it may be in practice), computer code is only
contingently private; thus Wittgenstein’s argument does not apply. See Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations 95-101.
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The current standard text on this method is Deep Learning (2016) by Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua
Bengio, and Aaron Courville.
144 On this issue, AI researchers may be divided rougly into three schools of thought. One
school maintains that, because machine-learning methods do not rest on humanly
comprehensible concepts, they cannot produce genuine knowledge. A prominent advocate of
this position is Noam Chomsky, who argues that machine learning can only identify statistical
patterns in data but cannot provide a way for researchers to understand what those patterns
mean (Cass). At the opposite extreme is a group of applied machine-learning practitioners,
many of them working in industry, who embrace the employment of algorithmic models as
“black boxes,” judging them only by the accuracy of the predictions they make. The statistician
Leo Breiman, for instance, argues that academic statisticians’ insistence on interpretability
leads to the development of “irrelevant theory” and prevents them from working on exciting
problems that can only be dealt with using machine learning (Breiman 199; 200). A third school
takes a middle-ground position, maintaining that neural networks need not be black boxes, but
rather can be made interpretable with the aid of visualization techniques.
145 Another possible response would be to call for the nationalization of social media platforms,
search engines, and other elements of technological infrastructure so that they may be held
accountable to the electorate. I am not opposed to nationalization in general, but given the
tendency of these technologies to create cultural feedback loops by influencing people’s
opinions, I do not believe that allowing people to vote on technological decisions would
improve the situation I am discussing, although it may be desirable for other reasons.
146 It is worth a note about how the practice I am suggesting relates to the academic subfield of
critical code studies. In particular, Rita Raley’s essay “Code.surface || Code.depth” critiques the
idea that one can “trace a computing operation down to a foundation, bottom, or core” (n.p.).
Critical code studies typically involves applying the techniques of hermeneutics to computer
code, a practice that sometimes blurs the lines between code and poetry. My purpose is to
suggest ways in which people can think more critically about their own use of technology
without having to dig into the technical details of how computers work, so I am not suggesting
that people read computer code; my approach focuses more on how people interact with user
interfaces and how those interfaces are designed. The poetic reading practices I am suggesting
could, however, be applied to code considered as a part of an interface for programmers,
although this could only be done responsibly by a practitioner with technical expertise.
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